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Abstract 
In a review of research on the relationship between shame and psychopathology it is 
suggested that too little attention has been paid to the actual context in which shame is 
experienced by people with psychological difficulties. An attempt is then made to link 
existing models of pathological shame with recent literature on emotion and it is 
suggested that shame associated with psychological disorder is of an enduring script- 
like nature, termed 'marker shame'. Literature on the relationship between shame and 
disclosure is introduced. It is argued that in addition to presenting an opportunity to 
investigate the operation of shame in a social context research on the dynamics of 
shame and disclosure is important given the central role that emotional disclosure 
plays in psychotherapy. 
The empirical part of the thesis consists mainly of a diary and interview study 
designed to explore the nature of shame in the context of psychotherapy patients' 
daily lives and the role of shame in the context of disclosure or non-disclosure of 
unpleasant emotional experiences. Quantitative data on the nature, context and 
disclosure of shame and the other unpleasant emotional experiences is reported. A 
major finding is that the majority of unpleasant emotions experienced by the 
participants were not disclosed and that 'marker shame' appeared to play a role in this 
non-disclosure. An empirical approach to qualitative data analysis is then introduced 
and used to explore the apparent 'emotional isolation' of participants. The findings 
again appear to illustrate the operation of 'marker shame'. A qualitative analysis of 
participants' accounts of emotions that they did disclose is reported and a shame- 
related account of disclosure dynamics is shown to compare favourably with a 
number of alternative theoretical accounts of the benefits of disclosure. Qualitative 
analysis from a second interview study focusing on significant emotional memories is 
presented which appears to replicate most of the earlier findings in a second sample of 
psychotherapy patients. 
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Chapter One 
Shame and Psychological Disorder 
In this chapter literature that has linked shame and various forms of 
psychopathology will be reviewed. An attempt will be made to examine both the 
theoretical and research basis of the association and a number of the assumptions 
that lie behind the work will be examined. The chapter will conclude with an 
examination of what is missing. 
The literature on shame and psychopathology 
Three theories linking shame to psychopathology 
A few researchers have argued that shame is important in the aetiology of a 
broad range of psychopathologies. However surprisingly little attention has been 
paid to the precise mechanisms by which shame is supposed to be associated 
with psychopathology. In this section an attempt has been made to identify how 
three of the most influential theorists understand this relationship. 
H. Lewis (19 87a) described shame as 'the "sleepee' in psychopathology. ' In her 
view symptoms could be traced back to 'sequences' in which a patient 
experiences 'unacknowledged' shame as a result of perceived rejection from 
another. She argues that while the unacknowledged shame leads inevitably to 
'hwniliatea fury' at the other person (because of their rejection) this angy 
response is trapped by feelings of guilt because the shamed individual believes 
that their fury is illegitimate since it is directed towards a valued attachment 
figure. According to H. Lewis this 'feeling trap' can result in the formation of 
symptoms such as hysteria or depression as the individual is unable to 
acknowledge either their humiliated fury or their shame in relation to the valued 
other. The theory does not appear to specify exactly why unacknowledged 
feelings of shame and humiliated fury should lead to particular symptoms. 
A somewhat different perspective is that of Kaufman (1989), who draws on the 
work of Tomkins (1963) to describe how a variety of pathological 'syndromes' 
can develop from internalised 'scenes' in which the individual has experienced 
shame. The shame-based syndromes that Kaufinan describes encompass most 
forms of psychological disorder and include compulsive syndromes, phobic 
syndromes, depressive syndromes and dissociative syndromes. At the heart of 
Kaufinan's understanding of these syndromes is Tomkins' (1979) idea of 
cognitive-affective 'scripts' which control and regulate the experience of affect. 
In the case of a painful affect such as shame these scripts are likely to be 
defensive and the function of the syndromes is to help people to control their 
exposure to and experience of shame (and also other emotions which may be 
associated with it). Thus for Kaufinan (1989) many psychopathologies can be 
understood as ways of warding off the experience of shame. The development of 
shame-related scripts is thought to be triggered by early experiences in which the 
individual has been shamed by important others. They are assumed to operate 
largely out of awareness. 
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For M. Lewis (1992), as for H. Lewis, psychopathology is associated with 
unacknowledged shame. He distinguishes between dissociating the self from 
acknowledged shame by forgetfulness, denial, laughter and confession, and 
dissociating the self from unacknowledged shame by 'emotional substitution'. 
Emotional substitution of unacknowledged shame in M. Lewis' view generally 
takes the form of mis-identifying shame as sadness or anger (which is made 
easier by the fact that these emotions may well be experienced at the same time 
as shame). He suggests that substituting the unconscious experience of shame , 
with the conscious label of sadness and anger is quite nonnal if it does not 
happen too often. However it can become pathological, turning to depression or 
rage when the individual has a prolonged history of experiencing shame 'either 
because [they] are shame-prone or because they are trapped in interpersonal 
environments in which they are consistently shamed' (p. 14 1). According to M. 
Lewis emotional substitution occurs when shame has already been triggered. He 
distinguishes a variety of other pathological conditions where the avoidance of 
shame is anticipatory. Of these, narcissism in his view relates to a tendency to 
experience shame coupled with ideations and actions designed to avoid or mask 
the experience of shame, and multiple personality disorder is regarded as a 
defensive response to prolonged and severe experiences of shame. 
In summary H. Lewis (1987a) describes sequences in which unacknowledged 
shame leads to humiliated fury then to guilt and then symptoms. Kaufman (19 89) 
suggests that there are a plethora of possible 'scripts' and syndromes in which 
experiences of shame can be controlled and defended against. M. Lewis (1992) 
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proposes two pathways from shame to pathology. On the one hand a 
'simultaneous' pathway in which experiences of shame are mis-identified and 
consciously experienced as depression and rage. On the other hand a kind of 
'anticipatory' strategy in which the individual structures their mental and social 
lives in problematic ways which nevertheless enable them to control and 
minimise dreaded experiences of shame. 
While each of these theorists draws on a different literature a common theme 
appears to be that psychopathology relates to a variety of manoeuvres in which a 
person avoids the conscious acknowledgement of shame. Furthermore an 
assumption of all these theories appears to be that shame can exist as a 'state' of 
the individual irrespective of that individual's conscious awareness of that state. 
Shame ancipsychopathology in general 
A number of studies have been carried out to establish whether shame is related 
to an increased experience of psychopathology. Two studies by Tangney, 
Wagner & Grarnzow (1992) using the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution 
Inventory (SCAAI) and the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) found 
shame-proneness to be positively correlated with all twelve indices of 
psychopathology included in the studies (all subscales of the SCL-90, the Beck 
Depression Inventory, and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory). Guilt-proneness on 
the other hand was only moderately associated with psychopathology and part- 
correlational analyses indicated that the associations between guilt and 
psychopathology resulted from shared variance between shame and guilt. Using 
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his Intemalised Shame Scale (the ISS) -a trait measure of shame - Cook (1994) 
also found significant correlations between trait shame and all subscales of the 
SCL-90. Harder et al. (1992) found positive correlations between the Adapted 
Shame and Guilt Scale (ASGS) - in which participants are asked to assess how 
well adjectives indicative of shame describe them - and all subscales of the SCL- 
90 except the hostility-anger subscale. However in Harder et al's study when 
shame was partialled for guilt the somaticisation, anxiety and paranoid ideation 
subscales were no longer significantly associated with shame. Two studies by 
Johnson and colleagues (Johnson et al, 1987; Johnson et al, 1989) using a 
situational measure of shame and guilt, the Dimensions of Conscience 
Questionnaire (DCQ) indicated that shame, but not guilt, was associated with 
neuroticism assessed by the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. 
More detailed attention has been paid to relationships between shame and a 
number of specific psychopathologies. The next sections review the theoretical 
and research work that has focused on shame and several discrete forms of 
psychopathology. 
Depression 
Depression has been linked to shame more than shame has been linked to any 
other disorder. To begin with theorists have noted similarities between the 
experience of shame and that of depression. Firstly, as H. Lewis (1987b) points 
out, the attributional style of internal, stable and global attributions for bad events 
associated with depression is similar to the attributional pattern that one would 
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expect in shame. Secondly Gilbert (1992) among others has noted that the 
downcast expression of the depressed person is similar to that of the shamed. 
These similarities between shame and depression suggest that being ashamed 
might often be one part of the experience of depression. In keeping with this 
Gilbert (1992) sees both shame and depression as part of an innate system for 
dealing with intra-species defeat (the 'yielding subroutine of agonistic 
behaviour'). If this is so shame might be seen as a symptom of depression. 
However in keeping with the notion of psychopathology as defence against 
shame -a theme noted in the theoretical accounts of shame and psychopathology 
described above - some theorists have seen depression as a response to and a 
shelter from shame. In this case shame may therefore be seen as one cause of 
depression. Mollon & Parry (19 84) for instance, noting that 'a sympathetic 
inquiry into the secret preoccupations of depressed patients will often reveal 
repetitive ruminations over what are felt to be shameful or humiliating 
experiences' (p. 137), see depression as a form of 'turning away' from a 
disappointing world where one can see no possibility of being valued or loved. 
Similarly M. Lewis (1992), as noted above, sees depression as an 'emotional 
substitution' for prolonged and unbearable shame. 
Evidence in favour of an association between shame and depression is quite 
strong, and there is also a little evidence concerning the nature or causal status of 
the association. Correlations between shame measures and the SCL-90 subscale 
for depression have been found in the studies by Tangney, Wagner & Gramzow 
(1992), Cook (1994) and Harder et al (1992) reviewed above. Tangney, Wagner 
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& Grarnzow (1992) found in two studies that shame-proneness was strongly 
associated with depression as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). 
They also found that, although shame was associated with an attributional style 
characterised by internal, stable, and global attributions for negative events, 
hierarchical regression analyses demonstrated that shame-proneness accounted 
for substantial variance in depression above and beyond attributional style. 
Harder et al (1992) report highly significant correlations between the BDI and 
three shame scales - the AS GS, the Personal Feelings Questionnaire (PFQ), and 
TOSCA. Hoblitzelle (1987) found a significant correlation between the Adapted 
Shame and Guilt Scale (ASGS) and Zung's Self-Rating Depression Scale. Only 
one study, by Gilbert et al (1994), appears to have failed to find the predicted 
correlation between shame and depression (assessed by the BDI). In this case the 
authors suggest that the measure of shame they used (the DCQ) may be less 
sensitive to measures of psychopathology than the scales used in other studies. 
A number of interview-based studies on the relationship between shame and 
psychopathology have also been conducted. Andrews (1995) has developed an 
interview-based measure of bodily shame in which research participants are 
asked whether they 'have ever felt ashamed of [their] body or any part of it? ' 
Their responses to this and a series of follow-up questions are used to develop 
ratings of both past and current bodily shame. Andrews (1995) found that bodily 
shame was related to childhood physical and sexual abuse and both chronic and 
recurrent depression in a community sample of women. Bodily shame was found 
to have an effect independently of self-esteem and dissatisfaction with the body. 
In a regression analysis Andrews found that bodily shame appeared to mediate 
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the relationship between early abuse and the later development of depression. 
The suggestion of a causal role for shame in the development of depression was 
further supported by her participants' retrospective accounts of the onset of 
bodily shame. Their accounts indicated that bodily shame first occurred after 
experiences of childhood abuse and before the onset of any depressive episode A 
study of depressed patients of both genders by Andrews & Hunter (1997) 
broadened the interview measure of shame to include 'characterological' and 
'behavioural' shame in addition to bodily shame. Bodily shame remained the 
most powerful correlate of childhood abuse, however all three types of shame 
were related to chronic depression. Eales (1989) used an interview-based rating 
of shame about unemployment in a study of unemployed men. He found that 
men who experienced shame about their unemployment were significantly more 
likely to suffer affective disorder (depression or anxiety). Finally a study by 
Brown et al (1995) involved rating severely threatening life events (of the kind 
that might trigger depression) for the likelihood that the individual would feel 
humiliated and trapped. These authors found that their ratings of humiliation and 
entrapment predicted depression in both a patient and non-patient population. 
While humiliation can be distinguished from shame (Gilbert, 1997), rating the 
extent to which a person's life events are 'humiliating' probably provides some 
indication of the degree to which they are shaming as well. 
The studies by Andrews, Eales and Brown et al are an important step on from the 
questionnaire-based work cited previously. In particular they suggest that the 
shame involved in psychopathology is understandable in the individual's past or 
present context. For example bodily shame in Andrews' work is related to 
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physical and sexual abuse - the experience of which implies an interpersonal 
basis for feelings of bodily shame - the individual's body has actually been the 
focus of abusive experiences by important others. In Eales' (1989) study the 
shame associated with affective disorder was specifically about being 
unemployed - again this may make some sense in a culture where masculine 
identities and status are closely bound up with being a worker (see Oatley & 
Bolton, 1985). In Brown et al's (1995) study the researchers judged the degree to 
which provoking events were humiliating using criteria that were independent of 
the participants' own assessments of how humiliating their experiences were. 
This implies that pathogenic shame can be related to events that would be 
experienced as shameful by many or even most people in the same culture. This 
is a point to which we will return later in the chapter. 
Research does not enable us to untangle the question of whether shame plays a 
causal or concomitant role in depression, though Andrews (1995) work suggests 
that in her sample of women bodily shame might have played a causal role in the 
development of depression. 
Narcissism 
A number of psychoanalytic theorists have suggested that shame is a 'veiled 
companion of narcissism' (Wurmser, 1987). H. Lewis (1987c) argues that behind 
the overt narcissistic behaviours of arrogance and conceit a subtler subtext can be 
discerned which consists of the narcissistic patient's proneness to humiliation 
and their sensitivity to put down from others. From this perspective she argues 
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that narcissistic 'entitlement' can be seen as a form of 'humiliated fury' in which 
the narcissistic individual attempts to 'turn the tables' on the other. Mollon 
(19 84) has suggested that in many psychotherapy patients proneness to shame 
arises from a 'fragile self caused originally by empathic failures of the 
individual's caregivers in childhood. Similar psychoanalytic perspectives on 
narcissism and shame are to be found in the work of Broucek (1982) and 
O'Leary & Wright (1986). M. Lewis (1992) suggests that both the apparent 
arrogance of the narcissistic individual and their proneness to shame derive from 
a tendency to make global self-attributions when they succeed or fail at, 
something (i. e. they tend to evaluate their experience in terms of how it reflects 
on their personality or character rather than on more circumscribed traits or 
actions). Since this means that failure results in shame (rather than say guilt) 
these individuals are, in M. Lewis' opinion, likely to 'exert large amounts of 
interpersonal control in an attempt to ensure that failure does not occur' (p. 166). 
Control is sought both by blaming others for failure and manipulating others' 
evaluations of them. 
There are two features that appear to be common in accounts of the relationship 
between shame and narcissism. Firstly it is suggested that narcissistic individuals 
are vulnerable to experiences of shame. Secondly their 'pathological' behaviour 
is understood as an attempt to ward off the experience of shame. 
A few studies have attempted to correlate measures of shame with measures of 
narcissism. Harder & Lewis (1986) found that shame measured by the PFQ was 
significantly negatively correlated with the Narcissistic Personality Inventory 
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(NPI). Wright et al (1989) also found a negative relationship between shame 
assessed by the ASGS and the NPI. Gramzow & Tangney (1992) once again 
found a negative relationship between shame - this time assessed by the SCAM 
and TOSCA - and the NPI. While on the one hand these findings appear to be 
consistent with the notion that narcissism involves strategies designed to avoid or 
minimise the experience of shame, Gramzow and Tangney argue that the NPI 
may fail to tap pathological aspects of narcissism. They demonstrate that when a 
number of apparently adaptive factors in the NPI are partialled out shame- 
proneness is significantly correlated with an 'exploititativeness' factor in the 
NPI. Gramzow & Tangney also found that shame-proneness was significantly 
correlated with Gerson's Splitting Scale, indicating that shame is positively 
correlated with one important pathological narcissistic defence. 
A central theme in the literature is that narcissistic patterns of thought and 
behaviour are a means of warding off the experience of shame, which is 
consistent with the strong negative correlations between measures of shame and 
the NPI. In the research to date the significant negative findings between 
narcissism and shame and Gramzow & Tangney's (1992) positive findings of an 
association between shame-proneness and exploitativeness and splitting can both 
be interpreted as evidence in favour of an association between shame and 
narcissism. However since these two strands of evidence rely on different 
interpretations of the validity of the NPI they are not completely compatible. 
Nevertheless the findings so far seem to indicate that there is probably some kind 
of relationship between these two kinds of experience, even if we do not yet 
know exactly how it operates. 
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Eating Disorders 
Silberstein et al. (1987) argue that shame plays a major role in the aetiology and 
maintenance of bulimia. They highlight the prevailing cultural norms and 
practices which make thinness an important ideal for women in our society as 
well as citing evidence which suggests that for most women such ideals are 
unattainable due to the heritability of body mass and the paradoxical effects of 
dieting. These factors make bodily shame a common experience for many if not 
most women and a predisposing element in bulimia. Silberstein et al suggest that 
the dieting component of bulimia represents an attempt by women to control and 
minimise their bodily shame at the expense of their own appetites and desires. 
Bingeing is seen as 'a defiance and a rebellion against feeling constrained' (p. 
101), however it soon becomes a source of ftnther shame. As a consequence of 
these two sources of shame: 
An unfortunate spiral is ... set in motion. Ashamed first of her weight and 
then of her repugnant eating behaviours, the bulimic woman 
progressively withdraws into a private world. She now experiences 
herself as a personal failure and feels unwantable, provoking yet more 
shame. 
(Silberstein et al, 1987, p. 102). 
As in the case of narcissism there are now a few studies that have examined the 
extent to which eating disorders are associated with shame. Sanftner et al (1995) 
found the TOSCA measure of shame-proneness to be associated with a range of 
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eating disorder symptoms assessed via the Eating Disorder Inventory -2 (EDI-2) 
in a population of female undergraduates. Specifically these authors found 
shame-proneness to be associated with the drive for thinness, bulimia, body 
dissatisfaction, feelings of ineffectiveness, lack of interoceptive awareness, 
asceticism and social insecurity subscales of the EDI-2. Murray et al (1997) 
found that internalised shame (assessed using the ISS) was associated with 
pathological attitudes towards eating in a population of young women. They also 
found that internalised shame appeared to mediate the link between self-reported 
family dysfunction and eating attitudes. In an interview study of the daughters 
(ranging in age from 15 to 25) of Andrews' (1995) sample, Andrews (1997) 
found a significant association between bodily shame and bulimia assessed 
according to DSM-III criteria. She also found a significant association between 
bodily shame and childhood physical or sexual abuse, although she was not able 
to demonstrate a mediating role for bodily shame in the relationship between 
early abuse and the development of bulimia. Andrews was unable to establish 
from her participants' retrospective accounts whether their experience of bodily 
shame had predated the onset of their bulimia. 
To summarise, research does appear to demonstrate an association between 
shame and eating disorders. Furthermore the Murray et al (1997) study and 
Andrews' (1997) study suggest that the shame involved may stem from 
problematic and abusive childhood experiences. However the extent to which, 
shame is a cause or result of bulimia has not been examined systematically, 
although the analysis by Silberstein et al suggests that shame is important in both 
of these ways. It also appears that, as in the case of narcissism, at least one aspect 
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of the psychopathology - fasting - could be understood as a means of defending 
against shame (as Silberstein et al suggest). 
Borderline personality disorder 
Lansky (1992) has argued that dynamics of shame are central in borderline 
personality disorder. In his view: 
Borderline patients endure continuing disturbances in all interpersonal 
relationships, disturbances that can only be understood with the dynamics 
of shame in mind. Most of the defensive operations of borderline patients 
are reactions to their shameful self-consciousness among others. 
(Lansky, 1992, p. 37). 
According to Lansky the purpose of the defensive operations is to evacuate a 
4sense of personal inadequacy' by 'disowning shameful parts of oneself' (p. 47) 
using modes such as blaming, impulsive action, preoccupation and overt shaming 
of others. A similar perspective has been put forward by Nathanson (1994). Like 
Lansky he regards the symptoms of borderline personality disorder as defensive 
manoeuvres designed to control and minimise the experience of shame. Linehan 
(1993) also notes that shame is very pervasive in borderline individuals. She sees 
Borderline Personality Disorder as 'primarily a dysfunction of the emotion 
regulation system' (p. 42). In Linehan's view borderline patients experience 
shame as a 'secondary emotion' to negative emotions such as sadness or anger 
that have been punished in childhood. Their shame about these feelings leaves 
such individuals in a trap where on the one hand they seek to have their feelings 
acknowledged and validated and on the other hand they condemn themselves for 
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experiencing them. For Linehan Borderline Personality Disorder is therefore 'a 
natural result of a social environment that 'shames' those who express emotional 
vulnerability' (p. 42). 
So far there appears to be no research specifically addressing the relationship 
between borderline pathology and shame. However Gramzow & Tangney's 
(1992) finding of an association between shame-proneness and splitting (cited 
earlier in the section on shame and narcissism) is evidence of an association 
between shame-proneness and at least one form of borderline defence. Once 
again the literature implies that the pathological effects of shame are to be found 
in the means employed to defend against shame. 
Psychosis 
It has been known for some time that a high level of criticism and over- 
involvement (referred to as high Expressed Emotion, or EE) by the families of 
recovering psychotic patients is associated with relapse (e. g. Vaughn & Leff, 
1976). This implies that shame and shaming by other people might play a 
contributory role in the genesis and maintenance of psychotic illnesses. In 
keeping with this interpretation Morrison (1987) presents a series of case studies 
suggesting that themes associated with shame play a major role in the 
psychotherapy of recovering psychotic patients. 
More recently Trower & Chadwick (1994) have drawn attention to psychotic 
patients' difficulties in constructing a positive interpersonally constructed self 
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They suggest that in some forms of paranoid psychosis the individual is unable to 
construct a viable sense of self due either to the disregard of significant others or 
to the fact that significant others intrude an alien 'bad' self when they attempt to 
present themselves in a positive way. These two kinds of problems in 
constructing the self are linked to different emotional and pathological 
consequences. The latter form of threat to the self, the imposition by important 
others of an alien 'bad' self, Trower & Chadwick link to intense feelings of 
shame and the desire to hide. These feelings manifest themselves in paranoid 
delusions in which others are seen as punishing, and all the individual can do is 
attempt to hide. This kind of paranoia, which Trower & Chadwick call 'bad me' 
paranoia, is distinguished from what they call 'poor me' paranoia. In 'poor me' 
paranoia the individual's attempts at constructing a positive sense of themselves 
in interactions with others are assumed to have been met with indifference rather 
than the imposition of a 'bad self. ' In poor me paranoia the self is insecure, rather 
than alienated, and psychotic delusions concern other people's failures of 
recognition and respect. Delusions are therefore persecutory rather than 
punishing. In this latter form shame appears to be a threat which the individual 
seeks at all costs to ward off, rather than an ongoing state, of the kind suffered by 
the 'bad me' paranoid. In summary Trower & Chadwick's work suggests two 
ways in which shame might be implicated in psychotic delusions. In one of these 
the individual is in a chronic state of shame which is maintained by delusions in 
which the self is constructed as bad. In the other the individual appears to be in a 
chronic defensive stance against the ever-present threat of shame, a stance 
maintained by delusions in which the self is under attack. 
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So far there has been little systematic research on the relationship between 
psychotic experience and shame. However studies which have compared 
measures of shame with the SCL-90 have found significant correlations between 
shame and the SCL-90 subscale for psychoticism (Tangney, Wagner & 
Gramzow, 1992, Cook, 1994, Harder et al, 1992). Trower & Harrop (1997) have 
developed a means of identifying potential threats to the self in psychotic 
patients' descriptions of problematic interactions. This early work appears to 
support the notion that interactional sequences that thwart psychotic patients' 
attempts at self-construction may lie at the heart of their paranoia . 
Socialphobia 
Despite a growing literature on social phobia (e. g. Heimberg et al, 1995) little 
attention has been paid to the role of shame in this disorder. This is perhaps 
surprising given that 'social phobics appear to be characterised by an excess of 
negative thoughts, particularly related to their own perceived inadequacy and 
others' evaluations' (Rapee, 1995, p. 53) and the DSM-IV definition of social 
phobia states that social phobia is characterised by a marked fear of humiliation 
(APA, 1994). So far there does not appear to be any research explicitly on the 
relationship between shame and social phobia and social phobia generally seems 
to be considered a form of anxiety (cf. Crozier, 1990 who argues that the 
omission of shame and embarrassment in accounts of 'social anxiety' is a serious 
omission). Social phobia could perhaps be seen as proneness to shame or fear of 
shame (and embarrassment) where control of shame is maintained by avoidance 
of social situations rather than by dissociating, manipulating one's view of 
17 
oneself and controlling others evaluations as in narcissism and borderline 
personality disorder. 
Violence 
A number of theorists have linked shame to a maladaptive kind of anger that H. 
Lewis (197 1) has termed 'humiliated fury' and 'shame-rage'. H. Lewis (1990) 
describes humiliated fury as an 'inevitable' accompaniment of shame that is 
evoked almost 'simultaneously'. However she suggests that expression of this 
hostility is generally blocked by feelings of guilt. What takes place is 'a 
lightning-speed sequence from an evoked state of shame almost simultaneously 
into humiliated ffiry and thence into guilt for what is processed by the person as 
forbidden anger - unjust, wrong, or inappropriate anger' (p. 233). Since Lewis 
(1971) first wrote about the relationship between shame and humiliated fury a 
number of other theorists have suggested that the expression of overt hostility 
following shame is not always blocked by guilt and among certain people may 
result in acts of violence. Gilbert (1994) has noted that clinical work with violent 
men often reveals that these individuals are 'extensively prone to shame and 
sensitive to their image and its acceptance' (p. 38 1). Retzinger (199 1) has 
examined how shame-rage contributes to marital dissatisfaction and conflict. 
Scheff (1994) argues that 'shame is the basic cause of the escalation of conflict' 
(p. 4) and analyses these dynamics at national level in the events leading up to 
the two World Wars. For both Retzinger and Scheff it is unacknowledged shame 
that results in rageful and aggressive behaviour. Lansky (1992) has suggested 
that marital violence occurs when partners whose personalities are vulnerable to 
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disorganisation attempt to control intimates so that they will not be flooded with 
shame. Explicit in Lansky's work, though implicit in Retzinger and Scheff s idea 
that it is unacknowledged shame that lies behind aggression, is the notion that 
violence is a way of avoiding feelings of shame which might otherwise be 
experienced if other people's perspectives were attended to or given credence. 
While there appears to have been little systematic research on the relationship 
between shame and violence there is evidence that measures of shame are 
associated with maladaptive forms of anger. Wicker et al (1983) found that 
shame was associated with a desire to 'punish' others. Tangney et al (1992) in a 
study of undergraduates found that the shame subscales of the SCAM and 
TOSCA were significantly correlated with subscales that measure the 
externalisation of blame. They found that shame-proneness was associated with 
the trait anger and anger reactivity subscales of Spielberger's Trait Anger Scale 
and the anger-hostility and paranoid ideation subscales of the SCL-90. In a 
second study these authors found shame-proneness was correlated with all 
subscales of the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory except two - the assault scale 
and the verbal aggression scale. While this latter finding suggests that shame- 
linked hostility is not likely to be expressed in violence, this may simply reflect 
the fact that the study was conducted with a non-pathological undergraduate 
sample. A study by Tangney et al (1996) involved 302 children, 76 college 
students and 194 adult travellers at an airport. Shame-proneness assessed by the 
TOSCA was positively correlated with maladaptive responses to anger (assessed 
by the Anger Response Inventory) in all age groups. These maladaptive 
responses included malevolent intentions, direct, indirect and displaced 
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aggression, self-directed hostility, and 'negative long-term consequences' 
following anger. The finding that shame-proneness is associated with aggression 
and hostility is consistent with conclusions drawn by Baumeister et al (1996) 
from an extensive review of the research on violence and self-esteem. 
Baumeister et al found that low self-esteem did not predict violence. They 
suggest instead that the literature is consistent with violent individuals having 
high but unstable self-esteem. This lack of stability means that such individuals 
are sensitive to 'unflattering feedback' which may catapult them into negative 
emotional states such as shame. According to Baumeister et al, the aggressive and 
violent behaviour can therefore be understood as an attempt to forestall the 
interpersonal definition of situations that would lead to unwanted emotions. As 
they put it: 
To avoid certain negative emotional states, such as shame, dejection, 
sadness, and disappointment with oneself, the person refuses to 
contemplate information that reflects unfavourably about the self. When 
others attempt to provide such unfavourable feedback, the person 
becomes agitated and directs unpleasant emotions at them. By focusing 
on his or her hostility toward the evaluators, the person avoids the dismal 
cycle of accepting the feedback, revising his or her self-concept, and 
experiencing the dejected feelings about the self. 
(Baumeister et al, 1996, p. 11). 
Finally, in a qualitative analysis of suicide notes, Mokros (1995) concludes that 
suicide is associated with a 'deeply humiliated state of being' (p. 1097). 
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The studies cited in this section seem to support the theoretical link between 
shame and aggression. The theoretical contribution of Lansky (1992) and the 
review by Baumeister et al (1996) both imply that aggressive and violent 
behaviour may frequently derive from attempts to avoid the experience of shame. 
Summary 
A number of theorists have made links between shame and the experience of 
psychopathology in general as well as a number of specific psychological 
disorders. These claims appear to be substantiated by a growing body of research 
in which, for the most part, measures of trait shame or shame-proneness have 
been found to correlate with measures of psychopathology. A small number of 
studies using different interview-based measures of shame have also found links 
between shame and psychopathology. 
Less work appears to have been done on the development of theories to account 
for mechanisms of the relationship between shame and psychopathology. 
Individuals suffering from narcissism, borderline personality, eating disorders 
and maladaptive aggression were characterised as being prone to experiences of 
shame and their symptoms were understood as attempts to avoid the experience 
of shame. However other types of relationship are also plausible. Some theorists 
have noted 'structural' similarities between the experience of shame and 
depression, which suggest that shame may be part of the experience of 
depression. Trower & Chadwick (1994) note that 'bad me' paranoia in psychosis 
has much in common with classic accounts of the experience of shame. Another 
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possibility, which Silberstein et al. (1987) spelled out in the context of eating 
disorders, is that the experience of psychopathology can itself lead to shame. 
Critique of the literature on shame and psychopathology 
In the fmal part of this chapter attention will be paid 1) to ways in which shame 
has been operationalised in research and some implications of this 2) to a more 
socially grounded conceptualisation of the relationship between shame and 
psychopathology and 3) to the need for a more detailed specification of how 
proneness to shame relates to symptornatology. An attempt will be made to 
identify omissions and weaknesses in the existing literature and suggest some 
promising new directions for theory and research. 
The operationalisation ofshame in research 
Almost all of the research on shame and psychopathology that has been 
published to date has utilised a cross-sectional questionnaire-based design. In this 
section and the next some conceptual and empirical problems with this approach 
are identified, which highlight the need for new methods in this field. 
Firstly there are some fundamental disagreements in the literature about the 
nature of shame. For some theorists (e. g. Kaufman, 1989) shame, humiliation 
and embarrassment are all tokens of the same underlying affect. For others, and 
indeed for participants in a number of self-report studies (e. g. Miller & Tangney, 
1994; Tangney et al, 1996) there are important distinctions to be made between 
these emotions and their effects. Given the complexity of the issues involved in 
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shame it is perhaps no surprise that, as Andrews (in press) has put it, 'shame 
appears to be an elusive concept that ... does not lend 
itself easily to being 
operationalised' (p. 8). 
An underlying assumption in most if not all of the scales appears to be that 
individuals are either incapable of, or unwilling to, directly identify their 
experiences as shame using the word 'shame. Indeed the present writer has been 
unable to find a single use of the word shame in any of the scales referred to in 
this chapter. One possible reason why shame has been operationalised in shame 
scales without ever using the term is that shame is associated with hiding 
(Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Wicker et al, 1983) so it is assumed that people will be 
motivated to conceal this state from researchers. However a review of the 
evidence on shame and disclosure in Chapter 71bree suggests that people are 
often willing and able to report shame experiences, especially in the context of 
anonymous research (see also Macdonald, in press). A second reason is that 
many writers on shame and psychopathology appear to understand shame as a 
state which may have no counterpart in conscious experience. M. Lewis (1992) 
for instance distinguishes between a biologically hard-wired 'emotional state' of 
shame and the emotional 'experience' of shame and argues that the two do not 
always coincide (hence the possibility of 'emotional substitution' referred to 
earlier in the chapter). H. Lewis (197 1) says that shame appears to have some 
intrinsic connection with denial' (p. 196) and is often registered as no more than 
a 'peripheral, nonspecific disturbance in awareness' (p. 197). However shame is 
a common language word used by people to describe certain kinds of presumably 
conscious experiences - experiences which they appear, according to a number 
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of studies, to be able to differentiate from other experiences such as 
embarrassment or guilt (Wicker et al, 1983; Tangney et al, 1996). To appropriate 
such a word and use it to describe events that occur at a biological level, a level 
that people do not consciously experience, could be regarded as looking for the 
4emotion' in the wrong place, as constructionist theorists such as Averill (e. g. 
Averill, 1994b) have argued. Clore (1994) has argued on definitional grounds 
that emotions can never be unconscious, since 'feeling' is a necessary (though 
insufficient) condition for the experience of emotion (although most theorists of 
emotion would agree that components of emotional processing can occur in the 
absence of conscious awareness - see Davidson and Ekman, 1994). 
The assumption that shame cannot be tapped directly leads, in the opinion of the 
present writer, to a major problem in the construction of shame scales. The 
problem is that in attempting to find analogues for the supposed underlying state 
of shame the researcher chooses items which overlap with other related but non- 
emotional constructs such as self-esteem or attributional, style. Conceptual 
blurring may even extend to the psychopathologies with which shame is 
correlated, as Andrews (in press) has argued in a recent review of 
methodological issues in shame research. Andrews concludes that: 'Because of 
the high reliance on negative and global self-referent items in current 
questionnaire shame scales, correlations between measures of shame and 
particular disorders may be solely a consequence of a diffuse negative affectivity 
reflected in both measures' (Andrews, in press, p. 30). While this argument could 
be levelled at all the questionnaire measures, a number of scales (e. g. the PFQ 
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and the ASGS) also confuse emotional states, usually shame, embarrassment and 
humiliation which in many ways appear to quite different. 
It is possible that researchers could safely develop more direct means of 
assessing shame, which would also be more valid. It was noted that people are 
able to make meaningful distinctions between emotions as similar as shame, guilt 
and embarrassment (Wicker et al, 1983; Tanpey et al, 1996). Furthermore the 
feasibility of such an approach in studies of shame and psychopathology has 
been demonstrated in the research by Andrews (1995; 1997; Andrews and 
Hunter, 1997) who asked participants directly about bodily, behavioural and 
characterological shame. 
The fact that an association between shame and psychopathology can be found 
when people are asked direct questions about shame raises questions about the 
utility of the concept of unacknowledged shame and the need to identify it in 
research. However Andrews studied relationships between shame and depression 
and bulimia and it may be that these particular pathologies are associated with 
more overt shame than occurs in other pathologies such as narcissism, borderline 
personality disorder and pathological aggression. Currently it is not known what 
the limitations of this direct means of assessing shame are, and whether 
individuals suffering from disorders such as narcissism and borderline 
personality would acknowledge shame in this way remains to be seen. 
The context ofshame andpsychopathology 
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A second problem with questionnaire-based research on shame is that it deflects 
attention from the relationship between an individual's shame and the social 
context within which that shame takes place. Shame-proneness or trait shame is 
operationalised at an individual level and as a result the research creates an 
impression of people experiencing shame which is unwarranted by their external 
circumstances. This bias can be seen in even the most carefully constructed of 
shame scales, Tangney's scenario-based TOSCA (Tangney et al, 1989). The 
scenarios used in this scale are of common situations to which a number of 
emotional responses are possible (e. g. standing up a friend one has arranged to 
meet or making a mistake at work). While many of these situations might 
plausibly elicit shame most of them pale into insignificance beside the possible 
sources of shame for people who suffer from psychopathology. For this latter 
population circumstances such as being sexually or physically abused as well as 
currently being in powerless or debilitating circumstances are all too common, 
and a wealth of research now testifies to this fact (reviewed for example in 
Pilgrim, 1997). Only in the interview-based research of Andrews (1995; 1997; 
Andrews & Hunter, 1997), Eales (1989) and Brown et al (1995) are these factors 
beginning to be recognised in research on shame. The fact that most of the 
questionnaire-based research uses undergraduate samples reinforces the 
conclusion that such research mis-represents the true context of shame and 
psychopathology. 
This line of criticism of the literature on shame and psychopathology is 
consistent with comments made by a number of authors who oppose the 
individualistic bias of most work on psychopathology. Coyne (1982) for example 
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has argued that cognitive models of depression are inadequate because they fail 
to take account of the depressed person's ecological niche. In his view a wider 
focus might reveal that 'Much of the persistence of depression may be the result 
of persons being in depressing situations' (p. 10). More recently Hagan & Smail 
(1997a, 1997b) have criticised individualistic assumptions in clinical psychology 
arguing that psychological distress is usually associated with 'the operation on 
the individual of damaging social forces and ... the individual's lack of the 
appropriate powers and resources to affect his/her predicament' (Hagan & Smail, 
1997a, p. 258). 
The needfor a more detailed specification of the way in which shame is related 
to psychopathology 
A repeated theme in the review part of the chapter was that the relationship 
between shame and psychopathology often involves an individual being 
vulnerable to shame on the one hand, and attempting to avoid the experience of 
shame in problematic ways on the other. The close association of on the one 
hand the experience and on the other a tendency to avoid the experience suggests 
that these kinds of shame experience may differ in nature from, say, prototypical 
experiences of sadness or anger which may occur in a clearer and more 
differentiated manner. The difference is reminiscent of Lansky's (1995) 
distinction between shame as a 'painful emotion' and 'the signal that shame is an 
imminent danger if distressing awareness is not removed from consciousness' (p. 
1076). In the next chapter an attempt will be made develop a model of the kind 
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of anticipatory shame that appears to be involved and relate it to a number of 
concepts which are beginning to emerge in the literature on emotion. 
Conclusion 
Theory and research linking shame to a number of psychopathologies was 
reviewed. A number of problems and weaknesses in the research were identified. 
Firstly it was acknowledged that attempts to operationalise shame as an emotion 
which is likely to be unconscious or unacknowledged led to measures which may 
confuse shame with a variety of constructs, including the measures of 
psychopathology it has been correlated with (cf. Andrews, in press). Secondly it 
was argued that the predominance of questionnaire studies has deflected attention 
away from the context in which shame is experienced, and in particular from the 
fact that the shame experienced by psychologically disordered individuals may 
reflect actual rejection and stigma. Finally it was suggested that the kind of 
shame referred to by clinically oriented theorists of shame appeared to differ 
from prototypical emotional experiences. In the next chapter an attempt will be 
made to clarify the nature of pathological shame. In Chapter Four a diary method 
is introduced that capitalises on the evidence that individuals are sufficiently 
aware of and willing to report experiences of shame, and which aims to elicit 
information about the actual context in which shame is experienced by 
psychologically distressed adults. 
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Chapter Two 
Marker Shame 
Most researchers whose work was reviewed in Chapter One suggested that 
psychopathology was associated with enduring experiences of shame, or with a 
proneness to experience shame. It was also noted that for many theorists the 
pathological consequences of shame were associated not with the experience of 
shame per se, but with the means such shame-prone individuals use to avoid 
experiencing shame. In the current chapter an attempt is made to develop a 
clearer understanding of the nature of maladaptive shame by placing it in the 
context of a number of recent attempts to explain memory based emotional 
phenomena. 
Review of literature on memory based and chronic aspects of emotion 
Various strands of research and theory on emotion suggest that emotional 
experiences can be closely tied in with memory processes which lead individuals 
to respond to present predicaments on the basis of past emotional 'lessons'. 
Emotions of this kind will be termed 'marker emotions'. This marker function of 
emotions seems to have been neglected in mainstream approaches to emotion 
which appear to have concentrated primarily on identifying the antecedent 
cognitive appraisals, the action tendencies, the displays and the 
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phenomenological concomitants of individual emotions' (cf. Lazarus, 1991; 
Frijda, 1986; Oatley, 1991). In this section an attempt is made to fill in this gap 
by reviewing research and theory from neuropsychology, the analysis of self- 
reported emotions, and the theoretical perspective of Tomkins and researchers 
who have been influenced by his ideas. 
Neuropsychology 
Research on the neuropsychological basis of emotional experiences has 
highlighted the memory based functioning of certain emotional responses and the 
importance of what LeDoux (1993) calls the 'assignment of affective 
significance to sensory events' (p. 110). Recent research has demonstrated some 
of the neural pathways that seem to be implicated in this process, many of which 
appear to centre on the amygdala, a particular focus of LeDoux's own work 
(LeDoux, 1993). Focusing on the amygdala and related brain circuits Rolls 
(1990) has presented a model of emotion in which emotion serves as a reward or 
punishment that becomes linked with environmental information relevant to the 
organism's adaptive interests. As he puts it 'emotions can usefully be defined as 
states produced by instrumental reinforcing stimuli' (p. 162). The emotional 
system provides motivating feedback about the reward/non-reward contingencies 
of particular environments or scenarios. A similar perspective on the function of 
emotional experiences has recently been put forward by Demasio (1994). He has 
studied patterns of frontal lobe damage in humans, which leave intellectual 
functioning unimpaired, but which nevertheless appear to prevent the individual 
1A critical review of research and theory on shame which has taken place in the 
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from retaining the emotional colour of their experiences. 'Mis deficit invariably 
leads to these individuals making disastrous decisions in experimental tasks, 
suggesting, Demasio argues, that emotions play a vital part in our rational 
decision-making process. They do this, according to him, by providing an 
individual with a motivational commentary that consists of 'somatic markers' - 
bodily reactions that become associated with particular events. 
These neurological contributions suggest that emotional memories play a vital 
part in guiding action, dissuading an individual from making the same mistakes 
again, and leading them on when past experiences suggest that prospects are 
good. The emotional experiences in question would appear to be 'gut feelings' 
motivational markers which are linked with particular kinds of environmental 
information. It seems likely that such gut feelings are not always clearly 
differentiated and labelled as 'emotions'. Indeed they may usually belong to what 
Bucci (1995; 1997) refers to as the 'subsymbolic' level of emotional processing. 
Such feelings may also be regarded as 'transferential', in cases where the 
environmental information triggers the feeling in situations that are not 
associated with the original punishing or rewarding circumstances. 
Self-reported emotions without a 'definite time ofoccurrence' 
Implicit in the cognitive-appraisal approach to emotion (Lazarus, 199 1; Frij da, 
1986; Oatley, 1991) is the assumption that emotions occur in discrete episodes. 
In these episodes appraisals lead to action tendencies and action tendencies lead 
context of these approaches to emotion is available from the author. 
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to ways of changing the triggering events in the enviromnent. Until recently there 
has been little attention to the temporal dimensions of such episodes, however 
Frijda et al (1991) have found reason to extend this episodic understanding of 
emotional experiences. In an analysis of self-reported emotions they note that 
many include 'elements both with and without a definite time of occuffence' 
18 8). For example a person may say in an emotional report that they 'felt 
disgusted' by someone at a particular time, and also that 'they have been angry 
with him ever since. ' Frijda et al refer to these latter affective phenomena as 
'sentiments', distinguishing them from 'emotions' and 'emotional episodes' 
which are temporally discrete. A sentiment is defined as: 
a disposition to respond emotionally to a certain object. The construct 
serves to explain the lasting effect of emotional events or episodes; it 
serves more generally to explain the emergence of emotions that are not 
waffanted by an eliciting event per se. A sentiment is a disposition that 
turns innocuous encounters into emotionally laden ones. 
(Frijda et al., 1991, p. 207). 
Frijda et al refer to a number of properties that sentiments possess. Firstly, the 
object of the sentiment is appraised in emotional terms regardless of the 
situation. In this sense the sentiment represents an abstracted emotional attitude 
towards a particular object, person or situation in the individual's environment. 
Secondly, the sentiment arouses affect (the object is liked or disliked, accepted or 
rejected) sometimes when the object of the sentiment is only thought about. 
Thirdly, as Frijda et al put it 'sentiments are dispositions that motivate actions to 
decrease or promote the occurrence of relevant emotional events' (p. 208). 
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Fourthly, sentiments are associated with rumination about their object (Frijda et 
al quote their participants' use of phrases such as 'It remains there to bother you' 
and 'it keeps pursuing you more or less', p. 209). Finally, sentiments are 
associated with particular beliefs about their object. These are often beliefs 
associated with the particular emotion which then become rigidified (e. g. blame 
which has featured in the experience of anger becomes ossified so that the person 
who was the target of the anger is seen, now a sentiment has formed, as 
blameworthy in all situations). 
Frijda et al's work on sentiments illustrates how emotional dispositions can 
endure and influence both attitudes and decisions at the same time as being 
relatively low-level emotional experiences which don't appear to be adequately 
captured in episodic accounts of emotion. Furthermore sentiments are seen as 
emotional experiences that link past emotional learning to current predicaments. 
They are also seen as dispositions which have the power to turn 'innocuous 
encounters into emotionally laden ones', and which 'motivate actions to decrease 
or promote the occurrence of relevant emotional events. ' 
Emotion 'scripts' 
A more comprehensive theoretical approach to enduring and personality based 
emotional phenomena can be found in the work of Tomkins (1963; 1995) who 
became increasingly interested in the emotional dynamics associated with 
personality. His work and the work of a number of researchers who have recently 
rediscovered his ideas offer perhaps the most developed account of emotions as 
markers. 
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Tomkins' described how various cognitive-affective constructions could develop 
in personality as means of controlling the individual's experience of positive or 
negative emotion, and emotional situations. For negative emotions these intra- 
psychic organisations are understood as 'affect acting at a distance' enabling 
individuals to avoid shame, fear or other negative emotions 'before [they] are 
seared by the experience of such negative affect' (Tomkins, 1963, p. 320-1). 
Tomkins (1963) described how an individual could construct what he called 
'theories' to guide and control the experience of the affect in question, so that, in 
the case of theories built around negative affects the theory functions to 'guide 
action so that negative affect is not experienced' (p. 320). He paid particular 
attention to the processes that cause a theory to develop. Tomkins suggested that 
theories build to the extent that they are unsuccessful in controlling the 
experience of intolerable negative affect, each failure necessitating increasingly 
generalised avoidance strategies to control the unwanted emotion. Using shame 
as an example, and the metaphor of crossing a busy road, Tomkins (1963) 
explains the difference between a 'strong' and a 'weak' theory as follows: if the 
theory is weak and the individual is confident of their ability to successfully 
negotiate the 'traffic of shame', such a person 'stands at the curb of shame, 
confident that he knows when to commit himself to the risks of passage. ' 
However: 
if the individual cannot find the rules whereby he can cross the street 
without feeling anxious, then his avoidance strategies will necessarily 
become more and more diffuse. Under these conditions the individual 
might be forced, first, to avoid all busy streets and then to go out only late 
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at night when traffic was light; finally, he would remain inside, and if his 
house were to be hit by a car, he would have to seek refuge in a deeper 
shelter. 
(Tomkins, 1963, p. 324). 
As a theory builds the past experience of an emotion comes to mark certain 
situations, prompting action designed to avoid the emotion triggering 
circumstances. 
In the latter part of his career Tomkins developed a more complex version of this 
model which he called 'script theory. ' The basic unit of analysis in script theory 
is 'the scene' which is conceived of at its simplest as an experience that includes 
at least one affect and one object of that affect. 'Scripts' like the earlier 
'theories', represent attempts to control the intrinsically rewarding or 
unrewarding experience of each affect, they are 'sets of ordering rules for the 
interpretation, evaluation, prediction, production, or control of scenes' (Tomkins, 
1995, p. 334, italics in the original). Tomkins paid attention to what he termed 
the process of 'magnification' of scenes into scripts. This magnification takes 
place largely as a result of rumination about scenes, as the person remembers and 
thinks about the scene, and as they envisage how things might happen in the 
future. It is assumed that this process links one affect-laden scene with others, 
which are slightly different, melding them into a somewhat more generalised or 
abstracted script. The fact that each scene that is connected in the script is 
different is important, and Tomkins sees the individual as operating in a manner 
analogous to a scientist who aims to 'explain as much variance as they can with 
the fewest possible assumptions' (Tomkins, 1995, p. 328). In the case of negative 
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emotions the individual is supposed to magnify the scene by discovering 
analogues - similarities in otherwise different scenes. This means that once a 
script has been formed it can act as a filter that excludes contradictory 
information, so that emotional experiences that are particularly feared are also 
especially likely to be triggered, at least in their marker form. In this way 
emotional experiences are seen firstly as causing emotional scripts, but later 
being caused by them. As Tomkins puts it: 'In the early stages of magnification, 
it is the set of scenes which determines the script; but as magnification increases, 
it is the script which increasingly determines the scenes. ' (Tomkins, 1995, p. 
333). 
Singer & Singer (1992; 1994) and Singer & Salovey (1993) have done much to 
connect Tomkins' ideas with the mainstream of research and theory in memory 
and emotion. They argue that script theory provides the most complete account 
of the development of transference patterns, in which people assimilate 
analogous situations to representations of previous emotional experiences. These 
writers ground their understanding of Tomkins' idea of magnification in Reiser's 
'context-plus-index' model of autobiographical memory. This experimental 
approach has established that remembered experiences 'are accessed by first 
retrieving the [knowledge] structures themselves, then using generic information 
within them to direct search through associated structures and events' (Reiser, 
1983, quoted in Singer & Salovey, 1993, p. 88). According to Singer & Salovey 
this generic memory structure is analogous to the script in Tomkins' theory so 
that magnification 'extracts the common properties of distinct events in time and 
forms a generic category in memory that serves as an abstract representation of 
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these properties' (Singer & Salovey, 1993, p. 88). In this way psychological 
magnification can be viewed as 'a specific instance of how individual 
experiences are indexed in generic structures of autobiographical memory' 
(Singer & Salovey, 1993, p. 90). 
Singer & Singer (1992) and Singer & Salovey (1993) distinguish a number of 
different levels at which memory based emotional phenomena might become 
manifest. As the emotional memory becomes more generic and abstract at the 
script level it is assumed to become more and more automatic. This has been 
operationalised in the notion of 'summary' memories in research by Singer & 
Moffitt (1991-1992). However Singer & Singer (1992) and Singer & Salovey 
(1993) are also interested in emotional memories which are more accessible to 
introspection. Drawing on theoretical work by Tomkins and Adler they have 
begun research on what they call 'self-defining memories. ' These are defined as 
memories which are: vivid; affectively intense at the time of recall; frequently 
revisited whether in thought or conversation; linked to other memories; and 
finally focused on the individual's enduring concerns or unresolved issues 
(Singer & Salovey, 1993). It is assumed that these emotions are important in 
people's self-definition, however it is also assumed that they serve to reinforce 
and underline the more abstracted and generic scripts. Self-defining memories, as 
well as scripts, are a form of 'affect acting at a distance', as 'What we feel when 
we recall the memory tells us what it would be like to have that experience of 
success or failure again' (Singer & Salovey, 1993, p. 65). In both scripts and self- 
defming memories the focus is on 'affective responses that link the past and the 
future to the here and now' (Singer & Salovey, 1993, p. 160). Research by 
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Moffitt & Singer (1994) has demonstrated that self-defining memories are related 
to people's current goals, and that participants who identified more avoidance 
goals 'also recalled memories with greater relevance to the nonattainnient of 
their strivings' (Moffitt & Singer, 1994, p. 33). In these latter cases the memories 
could be seen as acting as 'cautionary tales' about the pursuit of particular goals. 
Summary 
A number of neuropsychological approaches to emotion (LeDoux, 1993; Rolls, 
1990; Demasio, 1994), an analysis of the temporal aspects of self-reported 
emotions (Frij da et al, 199 1), Tomkins' analysis of the development of emotional 
patterns in personality (Tomkins, 1963; 1995) and Singer and his colleagues' 
development of this work (Singer & Singer, 1992; Singer & Salovey, 1993) all 
point to a rich and comparatively neglected area of study in mainstream emotion 
research, that of enduring memory based emotional phenomena. The function of 
these 'marker' emotions appears to be that of guiding individuals away from 
negative experiences that they have previously encountered. 
Marker Shame 
In this section an attempt will be made to show how the notion of shame as a 
marker emotion fits in with theories of shame as a maladaptive emotion. 
Following this it will be suggested that marker shame acts as a commentary on 
the goal of being valued. 
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Marker shame and existing theories 
The notion of marker shame fits in well with a number of phenomena which 
theorists have linked to maladaptive shame. Firstly theorists have described 
maladaptive describe shame as extremely hard to identify. This is typified in H. 
Lewis' (19 87a) observations that therapists generally fail to identify their client's 
shame in therapy sessions. Since it is a part of the therapist's job to pay close 
attention to their client's emotional states this implies that such shame is highly 
elusive. Scheff (1988) has described shame as 'invisible' and Scheff (1988) and 
Retzinger (1991) emphasise the fact that unidentified shame is interpersonally 
destructive. 
A second area that the notion of marker shame helps to illuminate is the nature of 
the association between shame and psychopathology. At first sight it appears 
somewhat paradoxical that an emotion which appears to be associated with 
appeasement and submission on the one hand (Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990; 
Keltner & Harker, in press) should also be associated with such interpersonally 
destructive charactýristics as rage, violence, and narcissism (see Chapter One). It 
is also puzzling how shame could come to be associated with such a variety of 
different pathologies. However the notion of marker shame as 'affect acting at a 
distance' (Tomkins, 1963, p. 320) helps to clarify the relationship between 
emotion and psychopathology since there are many ways in which one can avoid 
a situation in which an emotion might be experienced. For example one might 
manipulate one's beliefs in order to avoid the appraisal patterns that lead to 
shame by blaming others as Baumeister et al (1996) maintain (see Chapter One), 
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or one might engage in any number of behaviours which reduce exposure to 
potentially shaming experiences. The various pathological patterns of behaviour 
can be seen as shame avoiding scripts (Kaufman, 1989). Which script is chosen 
may depend on the degree of social support and secondary gain associated with 
the available options. 
Thirdly the notion of marker shame helps to make sense of the description of 
shame as a 'transference' emotion. The transference aspects of shame have been 
especially emphasised by H. Lewis (197 1). Her understanding of shame involves 
a6 split' in the functioning of the self in which a projected 'other' person was 
assumed to be scornfully viewing the self. H. Lewis made it clear that although 
in shame the shamed person experiences this 'other' as the source of shame, 
nevertheless shame is a species of 'self-derogation. ' Consequently she described 
the imagery associated with shame as 'paranoid. ' H. Lewis' ideas about shame as 
a transference emotion can be related to the emphasis in marker models of 
emotion on the role of interpersonal expectations. Tomkins (19 63) has described 
how emotional 'theories' develop as a result of 'rewarding' or 'punishing' 
responses of the parents to the display of an emotion. The emotion is more likely 
to be controlled and developed as a marker emotion if interpersonal feedback and 
subsequent interpersonal expectations are negative. Inherent also in the idea of 
transference shame is the idea that shame is structured somehow in an 
individual's personality - this is also alluded to in H. Lewis' (197 1) description 
of shame as a 'superego' emotion. It is also in keeping with the emphasis on 
shame-proneness, trait shame or intemalised shame in the review of shame and 
psychopathology in Chapter One. Tomkins' (1995) script model of marker 
40 
shame provides a detailed theoretical analysis of how such personality based 
shame of this kind develops and operates in the context of an individual's 
emotional engagement with their environment. 
Marker shame and the goal of being valued 
In addition to clarifying certain aspects of existing theories of maladaptive shame 
the marker shame concept can help place shame in a context which clarifies the 
part it plays in human distress. In H. Lewis' later work (H. Lewis, 1987a) she 
emphasised the relationship between shame and the human need for attachment. 
According to her shame could be understood as an emotion that arises when an 
individual experiences some threat to an 'affectional tie' with someone else. 
With the help of Singer & Salovey's (1993) idea that scripts and self-defining 
memories act as motivational commentaries on people's important goals it is 
suggested that marker shame acts as 'cautionary tale' concerning the individual's 
goal of being included and valued by other people. This is consistent with ideas 
on the appraisal of shame which suggest that shame is triggered when an 
individual's goal of esteem is thwarted (Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990; see also 
Frijda, 1993; Crozier, 1995). In the case of marker shame it would appear to be 
the threat of this goal being thwarted which will activate both the marker shame 
and the various avoidant scripts associated with pathology. 
If this is so it makes shame extremely relevant to a social understanding of 
psychological disorder, because if marker shame acts as a cautionary tale on the 
goal of seeking value in relationships with others it would appear to define the 
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. limits of an individual's ability to engage as a respected partner with others. If 
the individual acts against their marker shame or shame script then they will 
expect other people to behave in a rejecting or humiliating fashion. This suggests 
that people who have pervasive marker shame may feel very isolated from others 
since they may not have an agenda for seeking positive interpersonal outcomes in 
relationships, being preoccupied instead with the avoidance of negative 
outcomes. 
An illustration can be found in a case study by Singer & Singer (1992). In this 
study what appears to be marker shame blocks the subject, Tom's, pursuit of 
important social goals and helps to maintain his state of emotional isolation. Tom 
recalls a self-defining memory of his childhood early in therapy. He remembers 
breaking a pencil in class, being held up in front of his classmates by his teacher, 
and being prevented from looking away, while the teacher informs the class that 
"'B" is for "Browif 'and for "Baby. "' He then remembers being shut into a 
cupboard at the back of the classroom where he feels somewhat safer. Singer & 
Singer describe how this memory highlights key features of a script that is 
repeated again and again in Tom's relationships. They summarise it as follows: 
Experiencing himself as unworthy and in danger from a hostile world, he 
sought a haven at the margin of each encounter. From this edge, he 
looked rueftilly outward, exiled from true satisfaction, but momentarily 
protected from open humiliation. 
(Singer & Singer, 1992, p. 519). 
This same pattern would be enacted in therapy whenever Tom attempted to enter 
into a closer relationship with the therapist. As Singer & Singer describe: 
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Tom would attempt to move closer to the therapist, only to detect with a 
sudden chilling effect that the therapist appeared to be looking at his 
watch, stifling a yawn, or laughing at him instead of with him ... Tom's 
painful observations, spurred on by the automaticity of his nuclear2 script, 
would result in a subsequent withdrawal from the relationship with the 
therapist and a renewed complaint that he could not trust any caregiver. 
(Singer & Singer, 1992, p. 529). 
Although Tom's childhood memory is one in which shame and humiliation are 
clearly salient his script appears to have compressed the experience to a degree 
where what is registered is an undifferentiated 'sudden chilling effect. ' However 
this 'marker' has an important effect in his life, causing him to back off from 
relationships in which he hopes to be valued. In keeping with theoretical 
observations of the link between shame and rage Tom subsequently appears to 
attack the therapist for being an untrustworthy caregiver. 
Marker shame and otherforms ofshame 
It seems likely that marker shame is only one of a number of possible forms of 
shame. It would seem in particular that marker shame can be contrasted with 
forms of shame which communicate deference or appeasement and which may 
support and enhance social relationships. This latter view of shame has been 
emphasised by Castelfranchi & Poggi (1990) and by Keltner & Harker (in press). 
These authors present research which appears to indicate that displays of shame 
2A term used by Tomkins for scripts which have formed around important 
unresolved goals. 
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may lead to more favourable judgements from other people. A more detailed 
treatment of such 'performative' shame can be found in Appendix 1. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter it is suggested that pathological shame fits in with some recent 
ideas about memory based affective phenomena. These ideas stress the 
importance of quite subtle kinds of emotion, based on past experience, which 
play a crucial role in planning. In this context it is argued that the specific 
relevance of marker shame is that it leads to self-isolation and blocks the pursuit 
of the social goal of being valued by other people. In the next chapter literature 
on the relationship between shame and one domain of social activity - disclosure 
- will be reviewed. Subsequently research will be presented which specifically 
examines the role of anticipatory shame in the non-disclosure of negative 
emotional experiences in samples of psychotherapy patients. In Chapter Eight an 
attempt to operationalise Singer & Salovey's (1993) notion of self-defining 
memories in context of shame will be reported. 
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Chapter Three 
Shame and Disclosure 
Theoretical perspectives 
Shame and hiding 
"All I can think of is I just wanted to hide myself away. " 
"I hid it because I didn't tell nobody [inaudible] kept it all to myself. " 
"I tried my best to hide my whole body. All the time. Wearing huge 
jumpers and huge skirts constantly. " 
These remarks were made by people who had just described incidents involving 
strong feelings of shame and who were then asked by the interviewer 'If you 
could have done, was there anything about yourself you wanted to hide? " The 
word 'shame' is in fact thought to derive from an Indo-European word meaning 
'hide', and the idea that shame motivates hiding and concealment is a central 
defming component of shame for most theorists. Fischer & Tangney (1995) in 
the introduction to their recent edited volume on the 'self-conscious emotions' 
suggest that in shame 'The person tries to hide or escape from observation or 
judgement' and may 'turn ... away from other people' (p. 10). In the same 
volume Barrett (1995) suggests that the 'action tendency' of shame is 
1 These comments are taken from a pilot interview study conducted by the writer 
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'Withdrawal; avoidance of others; hiding of the self' (p. 43). In a similar vein 
Lazarus (199 1) says 'I propose that the action tendency in shame is to hide, to 
avoid having one's personal failure observed by anyone, especially someone who 
is personally important' (p. 244). These theoretical perspectives on shame and 
hiding are congruent with the layperson's understanding of shame. Lindsay- 
Hartz (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Lindsay-Hartz et al, 1995) used a method known as 
4 conceptual encounter' in which the interviewer compares their a prior! 
conceptualisation with that of research participants. One of the goals of the study 
was to 'develop abstract descriptions of guilt and shame that would describe each 
and every example of shame'. On the basis of this approach and the interviewees' 
own accounts of their shame, Lindsay-Hartz et al (1995) arrived at a 'summary' 
statement of what they called the 'instruction' of shame: 'we wish to hide in 
order to get out of the interpersonal realm and escape our painful exposure before 
the other. '(p. 278). 
It would appear, then, that there is a reasonable consensus among theorists, 
researchers and lay people that the experience of shame involves an impulse to 
get away from other people, an action tendency of interpersonal avoidance. This 
link between shame and hiding suggests that, at least at the time of experiencing 
shame, people are unlikely to disclose or talk about how they are feeling. 
Unacknowledged shame 
There is, however, another layer to the issue of concealment and shame. Ibis is 
that shame may be concealed from conscious acknowledgement. As mentioned 
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in Chapters One and Two a number of writers have focused on fleeting 
experiences of shame which may never be labelled or even consciously 
experienced as such (H. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Retzinger, in press; 
Scheff, in press). H. Lewis (197 1) coined the term 'unacknowledged shame' to 
refer to this phenomenon after analysing transcripts of a number of 
psychotherapy sessions, using Gottschalk's coding scheme for detecting 'shame- 
anxiety' and 'guilt anxiety'. Lewis was struck by the amount of shame she 
discovered which remained unacknowledged by both client and therapist. As she 
puts it 'Difficulties in identifying one's own experience as shame have so often 
been observed that they suggest some intrinsic connection between shame and 
the mechanism of denial' (197 1, p. 196). According to Lewis denial operates in 
two ways. In the first of these ways: 
Shame affect is overt or available to consciousness but the person 
experiencing it either will not or cannot identify it. At the moment that 
the person himself says: 'I am ashamed', shame affect is likely to be 
diminishing. An observer may identify that the other person is having a 
shame reaction, or the person himself may identify it as it is receding, but 
while shame is occurring the person himself is unable to communicate. 
He often says only that he feels 'lousy', or 'tense', or 'blank' 
(H. Lewis, 1971, p. 197). 
This kind of shame is referred to as 'overt, unidentified shame'. The second kind 
of denial tempered shame is referred to as 'bypassed shame', and, according to 
Lewis, it involves much cognitive activity focused on 'doubt about the self's 
image from the other's viewpoint' (p. 197), although there appears to be little of 
the feeling component characteristic of the overt, unidentified shame, only a 
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'wince', 'blow' or 'jolt' which constitutes a 'peripheral, nonspecific disturbance 
in awareness' (p. 197). 
Lewis raises the issue of how the level of awareness at which shame is 
experienced influences the degree to which it is communicated, or even 
communicable. Thus in addition to being unwilling to talk about their experience 
people may also lack the verbal schemas needed to articulate that they feel 
ashamed. Various other descriptors might be used to label internal experiences, 
such as awkward or hurt, but not shame (Retzinger, 199 1). 
According to Lewis another reason that these fleeting experiences of shame 
remain unacknowledged - both to others and to the self - is that people are 
ashamed of their own shame reactions. Scheff (1988; 1990; 1995), drawing on 
Lewis' notion of 'unacknowledged shame' and Cooley's notion that we 
constantly 'live in the minds of others without knowing it', suggested that shame 
'is the most frequent and possibly the most important of emotions [because of its 
role in maintaining conformity] even though it is usually invisible' (Scheff, 1988, 
p. 387). He argues that we are all constantly in a state either of pride or shame, 
but these experiences are profoundly taboo, accounting for the fact that shame is 
rarely referred to. 
Lewis and her followers describe how such unacknowledged shame leads to 
other problematic emotions, typically, in Lewis'(1 97 1) words, a 'lightening- 
speed sequence from an evoked state of shame almost simultaneously into a 
humiliated fury and thence into guilt for what is processed by the person as 
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forbidden anger - unjust, wrong, or inappropriate anger' (p. 233). This kind of 
humiliated fury creates a 'feeling trap' in which the person can oscillate between 
shame and anger - each state rekindling the other. Scheff (1987; 1988; 1995) and 
Retzinger in her (199 1) study of marital conflicts, have amplified Lewis' 
observations by applying them to interpersonal as well as intrapersonal 
dynamics. Thus each party's 'humiliated fury' conveys disrespect to the other 
evoking a similar experience of shame-rage, which in turn provokes more shame 
in the first, and so on. The result of this is that: 'Denial of shame is both cause 
and effect of a continuing cycle of deception and self-deception about thoughts 
and feelings'(Scheff, 1995). 
Shame is therefore likely to be obscured by its proximity to other emotions such 
as guilt or 'humiliated fury', making it harder for people to identify. The fact that 
even researchers and theorists of shame are not in agreement about whether 
shame is distinct from closely associated emotions such as guilt, embarrassment 
and humiliation (Miller & Tangney, 1994; Wicker et al, 1983; Gilbert, 1997), 
adds weight to the notion that it may be difficult for people to identify their own 
shame. 
Interim summary 
The theory reviewed so far suggests, then, that the experience of shame and the 
source of shame are unlikely to be disclosed for a number of reasons. First, 
because hiding and concealment are intrinsic parts of the emotion - it's 'action 
tendency' (Barrett, 1995; Lazarus, 199 1) or 'instruction' (Lindsay-Hartz et al, 
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1995). Second, as Lewis (1971) notes, because there can be domains of 
'unacknowledged', 'undifferentiated' and 'bypassed' shame where people are 
minimally aware of their own experience of shame at the time that they 
experience it. Third, as Lewis and Scheff suggest, because talking about shame 
(which will usually involve revealing feelings of inadequacy, inferiority and 
possible badness) may be taboo. Shame can remain unacknowledged because 
people feel ashamed of their own shame. Finally, because shame may be hard for 
people to distinguish from other emotions it is closely associated with, 
especially, for example, embarrassment, humiliation, shyness, social anxiety or 
guilt. 
Shame and the management of identity 
Lewis' ideas were derived from psychotherapy transcripts. A broader 
sociological perspective on the disclosure of shame is provided by Goffman's 
dramaturgical account of human interaction (Goffman, 1959). Goffman proposed 
that a fundamental human motive is the maintenance of a person's identity 
claims in particular interactions. In large part, Goffman's work involves subtle 
analyses of how this motive manifests itself in multifarious ways in a wide 
variety of social situations. Although not quite centre stage in Goffman's writing, 
this fundamental process is seen as driven by the emotions of embarrassment and 
shame. These are both thought to occur when a person fails to uphold their 
identity claims in a particular situation. In Goffman's words: 
Given the fact that the individual effectively projects a definition of the 
situation when he enters the presence of others, we can assume that 
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events may occur within the interaction which contradict, discredit, or 
otherwise throw doubt on this projection. When these disruptive events 
occur, the interaction itself may come to a confused and embarrassed halt. 
Some of the assumptions upon which the responses of the participants 
had been predicated become untenable, and the participants find 
themselves lodged in an interaction for which the situation has been 
wrongly defined and is now no longer defined. At such moments the 
individual whose presentation has been discredited may feel ashamed 
while the others present may feel hostile, and all the participants may 
come to feel ill at ease, nonplussed, out of countenance, embaffassed, 
experiencing the kind of anomaly that is generated when the minute 
social system of face-to-face interaction breaks down. 
(Goffman, 1959, p. 23). 
Although Goffinan did not formally separate shame and embarrassment as we 
might today (e. g. Miller, 1996) he did write extensively and insightfully on the 
manifold means employed by people to hide what he calls 'destructive 
information' - information which would cause embarrassment or shame in an 
encounter were it known by the other interactants. Goffman talks of two core sets 
of practices which people use to maintain identity in interactions. The first of 
these is 'corrective' and occurs when people act in such a way as to minimise or 
cover up identity slips of other people: an example would be simply to carry on 
as if nothing embarrassing has occurred if someone demonstrates that they have a 
stutter. The second set of practices are 'preventive' - they consist of our attempts 
to maintain our own identity claims. In this case a person might nod sagely and 
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remain silent in order to conceal the fact that they have a stutter. It is into this 
latter category that the importance of controlling 'destructive information' about 
oneself belongs. Thus as Goffman (1959) put it: 'A basic problem for many 
performances, then, is that of information control; the audience must not acquire 
destructive information about the situation that is being defined for them. ' 
26). 
In Goffinan's (1963) book, Stigma: notes on the management ofa spoiled 
identity, he makes a distinction between those who have to manage the 
discomfort of having their shameful qualities exposed for all to see, and those 
who harbour qualities which if known would cause them to suffer the shame of 
exposure: 
The term stigma and its synonyms conceal a double perspective: does the 
stigmatised individual assume his differentness is known about already or 
is it evident on the spot, or does he assume it is neither known about by 
those present nor immediately perceivable by them? In the first case one 
deals with the plight of the discredited, in the second of the discreditable. 
(p. 14). 
This important distinction suggests that shame may operate in different ways 
depending on whether it is an outcome which has currently been realised, so that 
the identity a person is projecting has actually been discredited, or whether such 
an outcome is simply feared. It is those who fear being discredited who are likely 
to be motivated to avoid disclosure of their shameful characteristics and 'pass' as 
normals. Thus much of Goffinan's analysis concerns what could be termed 
'techniques of non-disclosure'. Goffman's work gave rise to the study of 
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'facework', defined as the 'artful process of diffusing and managing self-focused 
emotions and other-focused emotions', key among which are shame and pride 
(Ting-Toomey, 1994, p. 4). To date the affective underpinnings of facework have 
been largely neglected by researchers (Ting-Toomey & Cocroft, 1994). 
Since Goffman's landmark work, self-presentation and image management have 
attracted much attention, with a large literature supporting the power of self- 
presentation (e. g., Leary, 1995). The evidence is now overwhelmingly in favour 
of humans as 'image managers', sensitive to the interests of their audience, and 
striving to manage their self-presentations in order to maximise positive approval 
and minimise disapproval. Strangely, the research on self-presentation has 
become increasingly separated from the shame literature. There is much, 
however, that each could gain from the other. 
Marker shame 
For Goffinan it is the anticipation of shaming interactions which leads to various 
forms of hiding and non-disclosure. Goffman's approach contrasts with the focus 
of the more emotion-based work on hiding and non-disclosure, where this arises 
as a consequence of experiencing shame. However it is consistent with the 
marker shame which was described in the previous chapter, based on the work of 
Tomkins (1963) and Singer & Salovey (1993). Together with Goffman these 
authors suggest that shame can have pre-emptive functions and, in this capacity, 
prompt a considerable range of behaviours designed to conceal and protect the 
self. Such a function may be compatible with the low visibility 'unacknowledged 
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shame' alluded to by H. Lewis (1971) and Scheff (1988). Pre-emptive marker 
shame of this kind may play a major role in people's decision making. Later in 
the paper it will be suggested that shame of this kind plays a part in the non- 
disclosure of emotions more generally. 
Empirical studies of disclosure and shame 
In the previous sections a robust link was found between shame and concealment 
at a theoretical level. It remains to be seen to what extent this position is 
supported empirically. 
The aversive effects of embarrassment and shame 
A number of social psychology experiments, which were not intended 
specifically to look at the inhibitory effects of shame on disclosure, nevertheless 
imply that the threat or experience of shame diminishes affiliation. In an early 
experiment by Sarnoff & Zimbardo (1961) participants were led to believe that 
they would have to take part in an experiment where they would have 'to suck on 
a number of objects commonly associated with infantile oral behaviour' (p. 360) 
a manipulation which was expected to lead to high anxiety because of the threat 
of being 'ridiculed and censured'. Subjects in this 'high anxiety' condition 
showed a marked decrease in affiliation, as indexed by their desire to wait alone 
for the supposed investigation rather than in the company of others. In a study of 
coping Folkman. et al (19 8 6) found that: 
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When threat to self-esteem was high, subjects used more confrontive 
coping, self-control coping, accepted more responsibility, and used more 
escape-avoidance compared to when threat to self-esteem was low; they 
also sought less social support. 
(Folkman et al, 1986, p. 997). 
Brewin et al. (1989) studied the relationship between cognitive appraisals and 
individuals' self-reported attempts to seek social support. Social withdrawal 
following a stressful experience was associated with appraisals of low consensus 
of the negative outcome (i. e. the person felt that other people would not have had 
such a negative outcome), global self-attributions and blame on personal 
inadequacy. As the authors point out these appraisal dimensions have been linked 
to the experience of shame, suggesting that social withdrawal was associated 
with the degree to which the participants felt shame. In a review of self-defeating 
behaviour patterns Baumeister & Sher (1989) cite a number of studies which 
demonstrate that people are prepared to sacrifice 'tangible rewards' in order to 
evade situations where they might lose face. In one such study subjects were 
confronted with a trade-off between money and the expectation that they would 
be exposed to an emotional state in which 'core features of the self would 
become salient. As in other studies subjects preferred to avoid exposure rather 
than maximise monetary profit (Baumeister & Cooper, 1981). Baumeister & 
Sher conclude that: Me importance of high self-focus and negative affect in 
causing self-deitructive behaviour was ... confirmed, although some further 
evidence is desirable. ' (p. 12). 
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Shame-like or embarrassing predicaments are therefore strong motivators of 
socially avoidant behaviour. In all but the Brewin et al (19 89) study the 
avoidance was associated with the threat of shame or embarrassment. Tbus these 
studies go some way towards supporting Goffman's view that people will be 
powerfully motivated to avoid situations in which they might experience shame. 
This focus in all but Brewin et al's (1989) study on the anticipation of shame or 
embarrassment might be why the word shame is not used by these authors 
(although Baumeister & Sher (1989) mention embarrassment). As suggested 
above such anticipatory shame may be particularly 'invisible', occurring only 
momentarily in consciousness. Given this, and the fact that shame and 
embarrassment are distinct affective states (Edelmann, 1995; Miller & Tangney, 
1994), it is obviously desirable to have more direct evidence on the role of shame 
in socially avoidant behaviour. 
Studies ofshame 
Lindsay-Hartz (1984; Lindsay-Hartz et al 1995) interviewed 19 people about 
their experiences of shame and guilt. She found that all of the interviewees who 
described an experience of shame 'emphasised that they felt a desire to hide and 
figet out' of the interpersonal situation in which they found themselves' (1984, p. 
692). This desire to escape she relates to the fact that the negative self-image of 
the person who is ashamed 'is experienced as a social reality' (1984, p. 698). As 
she puts it 'If others cannot see us, and if we can even hide from ourselves, then 
we have no social reality' (p. 698). Lindsay-Hartz' findings are consistent with a 
study by Frijda et al (1989) in which the authors attempted to predict the names 
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of 16 different emotions recalled by 60 subjects from questions about the action 
tendencies of those emotions. Positive responses to a question about wishing to 
disappear from view distinguished shame from the other emotions. A pilot 
interview study of ten psychotherapy patients (Macdonald & Tantam, 1994) 
found some evidence of social avoidance in the wake of shame-like experiences 
(such as being in a social situation where one wanted to hide or disappear, and 
feeling humiliated by other people). It was found that in 88% of cases 
participants expressed that they were concerned about the negative 
characteristics they revealed in the situations they described - suggesting that, at 
least according to the criteria adopted by H. Lewis (197 1) they were 
experiencing shame. Seventy per cent of the responses to a question about how 
they behaved afterwards mentioned some form of social avoidance, and in 72% 
of the responses to the question 'was there anything you wanted to hide or 
concealT the subject mentioned something they wanted to conceal. Given the 
fact that this collection of narratives included a number of experiences which did 
not appear to be experiences of shame the data does suggest a high association 
between shame, or shame-like, experiences and socially avoidant and hiding 
behaviour. 
'Social sharing' ofshame. The research considered so far has focused on the 
participants' experience of wanting to hide or conceal at the time that they felt 
the shame. Both the theory and the research suggests that shame is unlikely to be 
disclosed voluntarily to others at the time that it is happening. However an 
important secondary question concerns whether people are prepared to talk about 
their shame afterwards. Goffman's theory suggests that people would on the 
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whole be motivated to avoid the disclosure of potentially 'discrediting' 
experiences. This is apparently confirmed in a study by Shimanoff (1984) in 
which references to emotion words in conversations by college students and 
married couples were analysed and it was found that shame was among the least 
frequently mentioned emotions (along with grief, loneliness, pride and 
resentment). While fitting in with the theoretical perspectives reviewed earlier, 
for instance Scheff's proposal that shame is profoundly taboo, this finding may 
of course simply reflect the fact that people do not talk about shame in an 
everyday conversational context, or when they are being tape recorded. However 
non-disclosure carries with it the risk that one will be found out, and in the 
process lose control of how negative information about the self is presented. 
Additionally if one acknowledges one's shame one is signalling a susceptibility 
to social control which may be appeasing (Keltner, in press), and lead to 
increased acceptance. 
Research by Rime and his colleagues (Rime et al, 199 1; Rim6 et al, 1996) has 
established that generally everyday emotional experiences are associated with 
'social sharing' after the event - people generally tell someone else about the 
emotional experiences they have had. Summarising the results of a number of 
retrospective studies of social sharing, which included 913 participants whose 
age ranged between 12 and 60 years, covering 1384 emotional episodes, the 
'observed proportion of cases in which subjects reported having talked with 
people about the emotional episode varied from 90 to 96.3% of the sample, 
according to the study' (Rime, 1996, p. 4). Shame was included in a number of 
these studies. Rime et al (199 1) asked 87 participants to describe shame, anger, 
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sadness, fear or happiness experiences, after which they were asked to fill in a 
social sharing questionnaire. Contrary to the authors' expectations shame did not 
differ from the other emotions in either the proportion of social sharing, or the 
manner in which they were shared. It was found that for shame, as for the other 
emotions, the subjects reported in more than 50% of cases that their first sharing 
of the experience involved 'giving the other person a full account of what 
happened', 'telling the other persons what the event had meant', and 'telling the 
other person how the subject had felt'. However the study did reveal some 
differences between shame and the other emotions. Firstly, shame was discussed 
less than other emotions with acquaintances, colleagues and parents, so that the 
recipient of social sharing was more likely to be a partner, friend or sibling. 
Secondly, the social sharing was less likely to take place with 'the first person 
encountered right after the event' (p. 448). Evidence from this study appears to 
suggest that while people are prepared to share their experiences of shame, they 
are also more cautious and selective about who they do this with - generally 
choosing equal status intimates. Shame was also included in the basic emotions 
investigated by Rime et al (1996) in two prospective diary investigations of 
social sharing. In the first of these studies no differences in social sharing were 
found between shame and other emotions in a sample of 41 female students. 
However in the second study, a replication and extension of the first there was a 
non-significant trend for shame to be less socially shared on the day the emotion 
happened (25% compared with the overall average of 58%). There were only 8 
instances of shame among the 459 emotions recalled overall, and unfortunately 
no data was presented about social sharing after the day that the emotion took 
place. It may well be that in line with Rime et al's (199 1) finding, shame was 
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simply shared later and more selectively. Overall the evidence from Rim6 and his 
colleagues suggests that, surprisingly in the context of the association between 
shame and hiding, people do talk about their experiences of shame, but they take 
care about who they tell. 
Rim6 and his colleagues studied social sharing in non-distressed populations, and 
their research paradigm was designed to elicit typical rather than extreme 
emotional experiences. However there is some evidence that shame may be 
disclosed even when it is extremely distressing. An unpublished interview and 
questionnaire study by Terwijn (1993) in which 46 respondents were asked to 
describe the 'worst shame' in their lives, included a number of questions about 
the disclosure of the experience to others. Terwijn found that 60% of her 
respondents had talked about their experience with one or more others, and of 
these 18% had talked to a therapist, although, in line with Lewis' (197 1) work 
they had not all, apparently, used the word 'shame'. Ile experience was 
generally not disclosed to the individuals who were most involved in the 
participants' shame, a factor which Terwijn linked with lack of resolution of the 
shame experience. 
Disclosure ofshame in research interviews. Parallel evidence of disclosure of 
shame after the event is provided by the extent to which participants in research 
interviews are willing to reveal their shame. Lindsay-Hartz (19 84) found that in 
contrast to describing experiences of guilt, her respondents had greater difficulty 
and more resistance to describing experiences of shame. Apparently responses 
such as 'I know I've felt ashamed, but I can't think of any specific examples' and 
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'Well, I can think of an example, but I don't think I want to tell you about it' 
were characteristic of this reticence. However, Lindsay-Hartz was able to obtain 
accounts of shame from her respondents. She concludes: 'If one does not ask, 
one does not find out about such experiences'. Terwijn (1993) employed an 
ingenious procedure both for recruiting participants, and for enabling them to 
talk about their shame. Terwijn initially asked people in an Amsterdam library if 
they would fill in an 'Emotion Memories Questionnaire' which asked 
respondents if they had ever felt a range of emotions, and if they were prepared 
to talk in more detail about one emotional episode. One third of the people who 
filled in the questionnaire agreed to do this. Participants were then asked to come 
to the laboratory where the true focus of the study was explained. Then, using a 
method developed by Pennebaker (1987), they were left alone in a dimly lit room 
equipped with a tape recorder and asked to describe in detail their experience of 
shame. Following this they filled in a questionnaire asking them specific 
questions about their experience. Terwijn reports that most participants found 
that this was a good experience (and indeed some of them apparently found that 
the experience helped them to come to terms with their shame). Andrews and her 
colleagues (Andrews 1995; Andrews & Hunter, 1997) asked both community 
and psychiatric samples whether they had ever felt ashamed of their bodies, 
character or behaviour, both at the time of the interview and at other times in 
their lives. If they responded positively to any of these questions they were asked 
to describe their feelings in detail. These researchers found that people were 
apparently quite willing to answer questions of this nature. Finally in two 
interview studies conducted with a total of 32 psychotherapy patients most 
participants were willing to talk about experiences of shame, although in two 
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cases the patients refused to talk about particular incidents that had come to mind 
(Macdonald & Tantam, 1994). Three themes emerged from comments made by 
interviewees in this latter study, which may have been associated with patients' 
willingness to disclose. First the disclosure was taking place in an enviromnent 
which was effectively sealed off from their normal day to day lives. It was 
stressed that the interviews were confidential, and that if any portions were 
quoted in a final report of research care would be taken to remove any details 
which might identify the subjects. Second a number of participants said that they 
were keen to assist in research which might benefit other people suffering 
distress similar to their own. As one participant said 'I'm stuck the way I am, ah, 
so maybe anything I say might help a little bit in research, might be able to help 
somebody else'. Third some of the participants indicated that talking about their 
experiences of shame made them feel somewhat better. Indeed one participant 
said that it didn't matter what he was asked, he had come to the interview 
intending to talk about a situation in his life which it turned out had caused him a 
considerable amount of shame. Another factor which none of the participants 
referred to, but which may well have been important in the participants' decision 
to disclose, was that it was made very clear that no pressure would be put on 
participants to reveal anything they chose not to. It seems likely that this element 
of control was useful in reducing their anxieties about being exposed. 
Recent research on shame has therefore tended to demonstrate that people are 
willing to talk about shame, at least in a research setting, when they are asked 
directly. It may be that the interviewer has to provide the word 'shame' before 
the individual volunteers their experience as such. Indeed, although many of the 
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participants in Terwijn's study had spoken about the experiences where they had 
felt the worst shame in their lives, they generally had not actually used the word 
shame. Perhaps in addition to offering the word shame the researchers are 
conveying the message that the individual can be understood and accepted in 
spite of their shame. 
Anticipatory shame and emotional disclosure 
The benefits of emotional disclosure 
There is a growing body of research which has demonstrated that people benefit 
from disclosing disturbing emotional experiences to others (see Pennebaker, 
1995). In particular Pennebaker and his colleagues have demonstrated health and 
psychological benefits following experimental manipulations in which 
participants were required to write about traumatic experiences from their past 
(reviewed in Pennebaker, 1993). For example in one of the first of these studies 
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1986) 46 students were asked to write essays for 15 
minutes on four consecutive nights. There were four different essay writing 
conditions. In the first participants were asked to write about a trivial subject, 
such as the shoes they were wearing. In the remaining three conditions 
participants were asked to write about a 'personally upsetting experience'. In one 
of these conditions they were asked to write a facts only account of these events. 
In another they were asked to write an account of their feelings only, with no 
mention of what actually happened. And in the final condition they were asked to 
write about both the facts and the feelings associated with the event. The most 
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important finding was that writing about facts and emotions together resulted in 
fewer visits to the student health centre in the six months following the 
experiment. However both the combined fact and feeling, and the feeling only 
group appeared to have gained in health according to a self-report measure of 
health problems completed approximately four months after the experimental 
manipulation. In addition to these long-term benefits there also appeared to be a 
short-term cost for the participants in the fact and feeling and fact conditions. 
Both of these groups experienced higher blood pressure and more negative 
moods, relative to the other two groups on each day after writing their essays. As 
the authors state: 'Clearly, writing about the emotional side of a traumatic event 
was upsetting and physiologically arousing' (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986, p. 280). 
In contrast to the participants whose essays included their feelings, participants 
who only wrote about the facts were found to be similar to the trivial topic 
control condition participants on all the dimensions of interest (self-report, 
health, and physiology). Similar patterns of results have been found in a number 
of follow up studies (e. g. Pennebaker et al, 1990). 
Explanations of this phenomenon have concentrated on two intrapsychic factors. 
Firstly it is assumed that undisclosed emotions require inhibition which is 
effortfal and therefore costly to the individual. The costs of inhibition can be 
seen at both a physiological and a cognitive level. Traue (1995) reviews a body 
of research which indicates that there is an association between inhibition of 
disclosure and muscular tension in the back and neck. Wegner & Lane (1995) 
document how attempts to suppress thoughts (an activity presumed to 
accompany secrecy) actually fuel a process which leads to intrusive experiences 
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of the self-same thoughts. This is thought in turn to renew efforts to suppress the 
unwanted thoughts. 
Secondly the benefits are thought to reflect the extent to which disclosure 
facilitates the 'assimilation' of the disturbing emotion to the individual's 
knowledge structures prior to the disturbing experience. Pennebaker & Beall 
(1986) argue that this is more plausible than a cathartic explanation, as a simple 
model of cathartic release would have difficulty in accounting for the fact that 
participants initially felt worse after writing. Consistent with such a cognitive 
integration model is the finding in one study that participants whose essays 
became more organised over the four days of writing (as evaluated by 
independent judges) showed correspondingly greater improvement in immune 
functioning (Harber & Pennebaker, 1992). A similar process of cognitive 
assimilation has also been invoked to explain the mechanism of emotional 
change in psychotherapy (Stiles et al, 1990). Stiles et al describe how in 
psychotherapy 'warded off experiences which are initially too painful to be 
labelled or talked about directly are 'assimilated' into knowledge structures 
which enable the individual to make sense of them. 
Social dynamics associated with the benefits ofdisclosure 
Although Pennebaker (reviewed in Pennebaker, 1993) has uncovered evidence 
suggesting that other people are not always willing to listen to disclosures of 
traumatic experiences as Kelly & McKillop (1996) have pointed out none of 
these theoretical treatments pay attention to social dynamics which might 
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mediate the benefits of emotional disclosure. This is perhaps because much of 
the research to date has involved written disclosure which takes place when the 
participant is alone (e. g. Pennebaker & Beall, 1986). Kelly & McKillop make the 
point that disclosure does not normally occur in a vacuum and that qualities of 
the recipient of the disclosure are unavoidably central in evaluating the benefits 
of disclosure. Indeed even written disclosure in psychological studies takes place 
within a context in which there is an implicit permissiveness, in addition to 
trustworthiness conveyed in the emphasis on confidentiality. In their paper Kelly 
& McKillop survey a range of studies which suggest that in a great many 
instances recipients of disclosures may respond in ways which are damaging to 
the confidant, for instance they cite research suggesting that people who have 
experienced traumas are likely to receive unsatisfactory responses when they 
relate their experience to others, and they point out that since people construct 
their identities through interactions with others, in such cases disclosure could 
lead to the construction of a negative identity. This more social perspective on 
disclosure implies that social emotions such as shame and guilt may influence the 
decision to disclose or withhold confidences. 
Shame and emotional disclosure 
Work by Finkenauer and her colleagues (Finkenauer & Rim6,1996; Finkenauer 
et al, 1996) suggests that the social emotions of shame and guilt do indeed play 
an important role in the inhibition of emotional experiences that are not socially 
shared. Finkenauer & Rim6 (1996) aimed to examine factors which might 
underlie the non-disclosure of the 10% or less of emotions which according to 
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the research on social sharing (Rime et al. 1991; Rime et al, 1996) are not 
disclosed to others. They asked participants to recall an important emotional 
episode that they had never told anyone, and one which they had shared with 
another person. They found that while emotional secrecy was not associated with 
the intensity or traumatic nature of the emotional experience, it was associated 
with the degree to which secret episodes elicited shame, guilt, and perceptions of 
responsibility. On the basis of these results the authors proposed a 'social model 
of secrecy' in which non-disclosure of emotional experiences was hypothesised 
to result largely from the projected personal and interpersonal consequences of 
disclosure. Finkenauer et al (1996) explored this idea in a study in which 
participants were interviewed following an induction in which they were either 
asked to imagine an important negative event which they would have kept secret, 
or one which they would have shared. Results indicated that compared with the 
shared emotional experience the secret one was associated with the perception of 
social threat. Furthermore the anticipation of revealing the secret elicited 
significantly more shame, guilt, embarrassment and unease than subjects in the 
sharing condition anticipated that they would feel the first time they shared their 
emotional event. 
These studies illustrate that shame associated with the projected interpersonal 
consequences of an action is also associated with inhibition of that action (in this 
case the disclosure of emotional experiences). This is highly congruent with both 
Goffman's (1959; 1963) analysis of dealing with destructive personal 
information, and Tomkins' (1963) model (reviewed in Chapter Two) of shame 
acting 'at a distance' in order to pre-empt higher intensity experiences of shame. 
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These studies also supplement the existing literature on the dynamics of 
disclosing negative emotional experiences by emphasising the role of the 
projected interpersonal consequences of disclosure, including shame, in the 
decision to disclose. Indeed it is possible that the increased cognitive 
organisation and narrative coherence that has been associated with beneficial 
disclosure (Pennebaker & Francis, 1996; Pennebaker, 1990) is itself related to 
the degree to which the participant becomes able to account for their experience 
in a way which does justice both to the events which transpired and the survival 
of an identity which is not strangulated by shame or guilt, as Lewis (19 87) has 
suggested. 
In summary it appears that the literature on the benefits of emotional disclosure 
is currently limited by a bias towards intrapsychic theoretical explanations. The 
work of Finkenauer and colleagues suggests that the primary reason for 
withholding emotional experiences from others may be associated with 
anticipated social responses to disclosure. Such anticipated responses in many 
cases appear to lead to private experiences of shame which in turn are associated 
with concealing the emotional experience. By extension the benefits of 
disclosure may depend on the positive social feedback the individual receives as 
Kelly & McKillop (1996) have argued. 
An understanding of the shame dynamics associated with non-disclosure has 
potential relevance to our understanding of psychotherapy since, as Stiles (1995) 
has pointed out, personal disclosure is the predominant activity of clients in 
psychotherapy, regardless of the theoretical orientation of the therapist. Stiles 
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notes that the benefits of disclosure may lie in the qualitative aspects of the 
therapeutic relationship since it has been found that sheer quantity of disclosure 
does not correlate with the outcome of therapy. As he points out if the therapist 
fails to respond in a validating way to the client's disclosure the client may go on 
disclosing. He argues that disclosure operates more like a 'fever' than a 'drug' in 
therapeutic treatment. Like a fever the disclosure may not only be a sign of 
distress, but also a part of the restorative process. His analysis suggests that it 
would be fruitful to pay closer attention to the nature and context of disclosure 
experiences in psychotherapy. 
Finally, the nature of the shame involved in the withholding of emotional 
disclosures appears to be anticipatory - it is associated with an action that is 
anticipated rather than executed. It is also intertwined with negative interpersonal 
expectations. These were characteristics of marker shame noted in the previous 
chapter. Consequently the shame involved in disclosing shame would appear to 
be marker shame. 
Conclusion 
There is evidence to suggest that the action tendency of shame is one of hiding 
and concealment (Frijda et al, 1989; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Macdonald & Tantam, 
1994). Further evidence suggests that the threat of being embarrassed or ashamed 
leads to socially avoidant behaviour (Samoff & Zimbardo, 1961; Folkman et al, 
1986; Baumeister & Sher, 1989). However it does not appear to be the case that 
people will automatically avoid talking about their experiences following a 
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shaming event. Rim6 and his colleagues (Rim6 et al, 1991; Rime et al 1996) have 
shown that shame is regularly shared, though more selectively than other 
emotions. Even very severe experiences of shame were found to have been 
disclosed in Terwijn's (1993) study. Participants in studies of shame have 
generally been willing to reveal their experiences of shame in a research setting 
(e. g. Andrews, 1995, Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Macdonald & Tantam, 1994). A 
small number of studies provide preliminary evidence that marker shame 
(associated with anticipated social responses) may play an important part in the 
decision to disclose negative emotional experiences generally (Finkenauer & 
Rime, 1996). So far no studies have explored the dynamics of shame and 
disclosure in the lives of psychotherapy patients despite the central importance of 
disclosure in therapy (Stiles, 1995), and exploration of the possible benefits or 
harms associated with the disclosure of shameful information awaits future 
research. 
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Chapter Four 
A Diary Investigation of the Experience and Disclosure 
of Shame, Guilt, Hatred and Disgust by Psychotherapy 
Patients 
Introduction 
It was noted in Chapter One that there has been little if any detailed analysis of 
shame experiences in cuff ent research on shame and psychopathology. It was 
suggested that correlations between shame measures and indexes of pathology 
tell us little about the nature of this relationship and that the measures themselves 
can be criticised for either failing to tap into important dimensions of clinically 
relevant shame, or confounding the operationalisation of shame with the 
pathologies it is being correlated with (Andrews, in press). It was also noted that 
for an emotion which is regarded as social (Fischer & Tangney, 1995) there is a 
dearth of information about the social context in which shame is experienced by 
those suffering psychopathology. The aim of the investigation reported in this 
chapter is to address this gap in the literature by obtaining actual accounts of 
shame occurring in the daily lives of psychiatric outpatients, and comparing them 
with accounts of three other unpleasant emotions, guilt, hatred and disgust. 
It was suggested in Chapter Three that an important aspect of the social context 
of shame is whether it is disclosed to other people or not. This chapter 
highlighted a number of complexities in the literature about whether shame tends 
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to be disclosed to others. It was also suggested that our understanding of 
therapeutic disclosure processes in general might be increased by taking into 
account the role of shame in the disclosure and non-disclosure of other 
unpleasant emotions. So far there has been very little work on this and no 
relevant studies have been carried out in a clinical population. 
In order to address detailed questions about the experience of shame a method is 
needed which provides information about naturally occurring experiences of 
shame with minimum distortion due to memory bias. The structured diary 
method of Oatley & Duncan (1992) was chosen a) because it is a means of 
obtaining accounts of emotions that are more typical than accounts obtained 
when people are asked to describe incidents that occuff ed some time in the past, 
and b) because by priming participants to attend to specific components of the 
emotion the diary method minimises retrospective bias, which is greater for 
incidental as opposed to intentional remembering (Nickerson & Adams, 1979, 
cited in Oatley & Duncan, 1992). Oatley & Duncan (1992) have used this 
technique to gather information about the incidence of emotion types in 
particular populations and to test predictions from Oatley & Johnson-Laird's 
(1987) cognitive theory of emotion. More recently Rim6 et al (in press) have 
used structured diaries in a number of studies examining the extent to which 
emotional experiences are 'socially shared' with other people (see Chapter 
Three). A review of the issues involved in the use of self-report data in the study 
of emotions is included in Appendix 2. 
While the diary method was regarded as the optimal method for gaining basic 
information about the emotions it was thought that written self-reports would be 
insufficiently sensitive to obtain detailed insights about the context and outcome 
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of the disclosure of the emotional experiences which were reported. For this 
reason semi-structured follow-up interviews were conducted in which 
participants were asked about the circumstances, reasons and interpersonal 
effects associated with disclosure or non-disclosure of the emotional experiences 
that they reported. Data from these interviews will be reported in Chapters Six 
and Seven. 
The specific hypotheses of the study and the theoretical literature on which they 
are based are outlined in the remaining part of the introduction. They are grouped 
under six topics of theoretical interest, namely the nature of shame experienced 
by psychiatric outpatients, what triggers the shame, the immediate context of 
shame, the disclosure of shame, the disclosure of unpleasant emotional 
experiences in general and marker shame. 
The nature of shame 
i) In keeping with work on the action tendency of shame (see Chapter Three) it is 
predicted that shame is more likely to be associated with the action tendency of 
wanting to hide than guilt, hatred and disgust. 
ii) It is predicted that shame will be associated with the bodily sensation of 
blushing to a greater degree than guilt, hatred or disgust in line with the 
theoretical perspective of Castelfranchi & Poggi (1990) and the findings of 
Wicker et al (1983). 
iii) It is predicted that shame will be more intense than the other emotions, as 
shame has been described as an especially intense and disruptive experience 
(Tomkins, 1963; M. Lewis, 1992). 
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iv) It is predicted that shame will last for longer than the other emotions in line 
with literature suggesting that shame is an especially long-lasting emotion 
(Tomkins, 1963; M. Lewis, 1992). 
v) It is predicted that women are more likely to report an experience of shame 
than men, as women have been described by a number of writers as being 
particularly susceptible to the experience of shame (H. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 
1992; Seu, 1995). 
The triggersfor shame 
In Chapter One is was noted that the question of whether shame experienced by 
psychologically disordered people reflects genuine stigma has been neglected in 
much of the research on shame and psychopathology. Indeed the methods, 
measures and theories that have been adopted tend to carry the implication that 
the individual who scores high on shame is experiencing more shame than 
circumstances warrant. However it was noted that genuinely stigmatising 
experiences such as Childhood Sexual Abuse (CSA) and being unemployed are 
frequently associated with shame (Coffey et al. 1996; Eales, 1989) which 
suggests that the shame experienced by psychologically disordered people may 
in many cases reflect actual stigma. It is therefore predicted that instances of 
shame will reflect circumstances which can commonly be understood as 
stigmatising. 
The context and disclosure ofshame 
i) Literature on the nature of shame associated with psychopathology (Chapter 
Two) has emphasised that shame may be a long-lasting even chronic condition 
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for psychologically disordered people making it likely that such experiences will 
commonly be experienced when a person is alone. Tangney et al (1996) have 
found that even in an undergraduate sample 18% of reported instances of shame 
were experienced privately. It is therefore predicted that shame is more likely to 
be experienced when the participant is alone than the other emotions. 
ii) A question was included that asked whether the participant believed other 
people were aware that they were experiencing the feeling that they reported (a 
slightly different question to whether they actively disclosed the emotion to 
anybody). Since shame has been linked to hiding (see Chapter Three) and - 
especially in clinical samples - is believed by many to lack a clear display (see 
Chapter Two, though see also Keltner, 1995) it is predicted that participants will 
estimate that others are not aware of the way they are feeling when they 
experience shame. 
iii) In spite of Rime et al's (1991; Rim6 et al, 1994) findings on the social sharing 
of shame the clinical view of shame outlined in Chapter Two suggests that 
experiences of shame in a psychologically disordered population will be 
disclosed less than other unpleasant emotions. It is therefore predicted that 
experiences of shame will be disclosed less than the emotions of guilt, hatred and 
disgust. 
iv) Rime et al's (1991) findings suggested that shame was disclosed more 
selectively (see Chapter Three). This implies that shame might be harder to 
disclose than guilt, hatred and disgust. It is therefore predicted that shame will be 
harder to disclose than guilt, hatred and disgust. 
Disclosure of unpleasant emotional experiences in general 
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i) Work by Joseph et al (1994) and Joseph et al (1997) has suggested that 
psychopathology may be associated with people's negative attitudes towards the 
expression of their own emotional experiences. One implication is that in general 
emotional experiences in clinical populations may be kept private and not 
socially shared in contrast to the social sharing of emotional experiences in the 
non-clinical populations studied by Rim6 et al (in press). It is therefore predicted 
that the majority of emotions will be undisclosed. 
ii) Work on the benefits of emotional disclosure by Pennebaker and others 
(reviewed in Chapter 'Ibree) suggests that disclosing emotional experiences may 
be beneficial for the discloser. It is therefore predicted that in general disclosure 
of the emotional experiences will lead to the participant feeling better. 
iii) Many writers on emotion have noted that disclosing emotional experiences 
can reactivate emotions that were felt at the time of the original incident (e. g. 
Singer & Salovey, 1993; Pennebaker, 1990) as well as engendering emotions 
associated with the response they expect from the listener. 'Ibis leads to the 
prediction that when emotions are disclosed other emotions will be felt as they 
contemplate disclosure. 
iv) As noted in Chapter T11ree Finkenauer et al's (1996) model of social secrecy 
implies that experiences will be kept secret when individuals anticipate that other 
people will respond to disclosure in a negative manner. It is therefore predicted 
that undisclosed emotions will be associated with participants anticipating they 
will make a negative impression on others if they disclose. 
Marker shame 
One major limitation of any self-report study of emotion is that it is likely to 
exclude instances of emotion that are fleeting or unarticulated. While the priming 
76 
effect of the diary method is likely to reduce forgetting to some extent, Oatley 
and Duncan (1992) acknowledge that the diary method only captures a part of the 
emotional spectrum and that there remain emotional experiences that are not 
amenable to valid self-report. In Chapter Two it was suggested that this may be a 
particular problem in the context of clinically relevant shame. A self-report study 
can never completely resolve difficulties of this nature, however in the current 
investigation an attempt has been made to approach the study of marker shame 
by including questions on experiences of shame associated with the 
contemplation of social behaviour. Questions were also included which were 
designed to tap into subtle experiences of shame associated with the other 
unpleasant emotions in the study. 
i) Marker shame as outlined in Chapter Two appeared to be largely triggered by 
fantasised rather than actual social outcomes. The study aims to examine whether 
such marker shame is associated with the non-disclosure of unpleasant emotional 
experiences as suggested by Finkenauer et al (1996). It is therefore predicted that 
non-disclosure of shame, guilt, hatred and disgust will be associated with feeling 
shame at the thought of disclosure. 
ii) It has generally been found that self-reported emotional episodes involve 
complexes of different emotions experienced either in close proximity or even at 
the same time as one another (Frijda et al, 1991; Oatley and Duncan, 1992; 
Lazarus, 1991). A rough indication of the presence of less obvious forms of 
shame could therefore be obtained by finding out whether more focal emotions 
were associated with shame as a subsidiary emotion. In line with the notion that 
marker shame is likely to be prevalent in the lives of psychologically disordered 
patients it is hypothesised that experiences of guilt, hatred and disgust will 
frequently be associated with shame. 
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Method 
Materials 
A modified form of Oatley and Duncan's (1992) emotion diary was used to 
obtain accounts of shame, guilt, hatred and disgust. The diary was structured and 
asked participants to record specific details about each emotion as soon as 
possible after the emotion had been experienced. Participants were asked to fill in 
the diary questions for the first instance of any of the four emotions of shame, 
guilt, hatred and disgust that they experienced in the week after they had been 
given the diary. The diary is included in Appendix 3. 
Procedure 
Participants were seen initially for approximately 15 minutes when the diary was 
explained and an appointment made one week later for the return of the diary and 
a follow-up interview. For all but three of the participants this first appointment 
took place before their assessment appointment for psychotherapy in an NHS 
psychotherapy department. When participants returned to the clinic for the 
follow-up interview the interviewer went through their responses to the diary 
clarifying anything which was unclear and where possible obtaining responses to 
questions which had been left blank (this was not possible in two cases when 
participants returned the diary without coming in for the interview). 
Participants 
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Participants were referrals to a psychotherapy outpatient clinic. 38% (48/126) of 
the people invited to take part completed the study. Of the 62% (78/126) who did 
not complete the study 54% (42/78) said they did not wish to take part. 36% 
(28/78) of those who did not complete failed to turn up to one or other of the 
appointments (most frequently the second). The remaining 10% (8n8) of non- 
completers had other reasons for not attending one of the appointments - for 
example their assessment therapist cancelled their appointment and the 
researcher was unable to make the time of the next appointment. Of those who 
did complete the study 20.8% (10/48) reported that they had not experienced any 
of the target emotions. The current analysis is therefore of the 38 people who 
filled in the diary. This was 3 0.2% (3 8/126) of those invited to take part. 
Of the 38 people who recorded emotions 76.3% (29/38) were women. 
Furthermore 55.3% (21/38) of the participants had, according to their medical 
notes, suffered childhood sexual abuse (CSA). This high proportion possibly 
reflected the fact that the service was locally recognised as having expertise in 
treating adult survivors of CSA, although studies have found that between 26 and 
40% of psychiatric in and out-patients have suffered CSA (Drauker, 1992). 
58.6% (17/29) of the women had suffered CSA, and 44.4% of the men (4/9). The 
average age of the participants was 36.9 (SD 9.6). 
Results 
The 38 participants recorded a total of 76 emotions'. Of these 17 were shame 
(22.4%), 25 were guilt (32.9%), 20 were hatred (26.3%) and 14 were disgust 
1 Included here are emotions recorded as requested in the diary instructions which asked 
participants to fill in a section of the diary for only the first instance of each of the four types of 
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(18.4%). The mean number of reported emotions was 2 per participant. Results 
will be reported in the same order as the hypotheses listed in the introduction. 
The nature ofshame experienced by psychiatric outpatients 
i) The action tendency of each emotion reported was assessed by the question 
'Did you act or feel like acting emotionally in any wayT If the participant 
indicated that they had they were asked to say what they did or felt like doing. 
The hypothesis that shame should be associated with a greater tendency to hide 
or conceal than guilt, hatred and disgust was not confirmed, because in only one 
instance of shame was there a reference to the impulse to avoid people. The most 
common action associated with shame was crying or wanting to cry which was 
referred to in 65.3% (9/16) instances. However in this respect it hardly differed 
from guilt where crying was also the most common emotional action occurring in 
68% of instances (17/25) and disgust where crying was again the most common 
emotional action referred to in 57.1% (8/14) instances. Indeed only hatred 
appeared to have an action tendency that distinguished it from the other emotions 
with 55% (11/20) of the hatred instances being associated with a hosti e action or 
impulse. However 30% (6/20) of the hatred instances too were associated with 
crying or wanting to cry. 
emotion. A number of participants recorded more than one instance of one particular kind of 
emotion and in these cases only the first instance has been included, although interview data 
relating to these emotions will be included in the thematic qualitative analysis. Five participants 
recorded two instances of guilt, one recorded two instances of disgust, one recorded two and 
another three instances of hatred. No-one recorded more than one instance of shame. In an 
attempt to retain as much data as possible in the analysis it was decided that in cases where a 
subject had ticked more than one emotion at the top of the page the data would be included in the 
study as an instance of a) whichever emotion the subject had not previously written about and b) 
if a choice still remained possible one of the two self-conscious emotions. This procedure led to 
the inclusion of one instance of disgust (equally mixed with shame), and one instance of guilt 
(mixed with shame, hatred and disgust). 
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A possible problem with this data is that participants may have believed that 
temotional actions' meant emotional expressions so that they failed to report on 
action tendencies that may have been present. If this is so it might account for the 
fact that only one instance of guilt was associated with a desire to apologise, a 
surprising finding given that research elsewhere suggests there is a link between 
guilt and reparation (Tangney, 1995). An implied action tendency of hiding may 
be present in the fact that 18.8% (3/16) of the shame instances involved the 
participants saying that they had suicidal impulses or a desire to die, perhaps 
indicating an extreme wish to hide themselves. However it is equally possible 
that normal action tendencies for these emotions were somehow inhibited and 
perhaps swamped by depressed affect and an accompanying tendency to cry. 
This latter interpretation suggests that the emotions in this population may 
possibly have been 'abnormal'. 
ii) Participants were asked if they had any bodily sensations accompanying the 
emotion, and were asked to tick boxes if they felt tension (of body, jaw, fists), 
trembling, heart beating noticeably, irregular breathing, blushing, stomach 
(churning or butterflies), sweating, feeling hot, feeling cold and other (they were 
asked to say what it was). The hypothesis that shame would be associated with 
blushing to a greater extent than the other three emotions does not appear to have 
been confirmed. Only three instances of shame were associated with blushing 
(18.7%, 3/16). Although this is a somewhat higher proportion than was found for 
guilt (8.7%, 2/23), hatred (0), and disgust (7.1% 1/14), blushing does not appear 
to be a salient phenomenon in the experiences of shame reported in the study. 
The pattern of bodily sensations was similar to that for emotional actions with 
greater similarity than difference between the emotions of shame, guilt and 
disgust and some evidence of a distinctive profile for hatred. For shame, guilt 
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and disgust the dominant bodily sensations were chuming/butterflies in the 
stomach and tension. 43.7% (7/16) of the shame instances, 39.1% (9/23) of the 
guilt instances, and 35.7% (5/14) of the disgust instances were associated with 
chuming/butterflies in the stomach. 25% (4/16) of the shame instances, 43.8% 
(8/23) of the guilt instances and 50% (7/14) of the disgust instances were 
associated with tension. Hatred was distinct in that a mere 20% (4/20) of the 
hatred instances were associated with churning/butterflies in the stomach, while 
60% (12/20) were associated with tension and 45% (9/20) with 'heart beating 
noticeably'. 
iii) Participants were asked to rate how strong the 'actual feeling' of the emotion 
was on a scale of 0- 10 where 0= 'no noticeable feeling' and 10 = 'as strong as 
I can imagine. The means were 7.9 (SD 2) for shame, 7.1 (SD 1.9) for guilt, 7.4 
(SD 2.3) for hatred and 6.7 (SD 6.7) for disgust. Since few participants recorded 
the maximum of 4 emotions in their diaries, statistical comparison of the data for 
each emotion needed to take into account a large amount of missing data. 
Because of this some comparisons were possible only within subjects and some 
only between subjects, and it is not possible to do both analyses simultaneously. 
Accordingly separate within subjects and between subjects analyses have been 
conducted and the data combined according to the procedure recommended by 
Winer (1986). Ibis procedure produces a value of X2 with 2 degrees of freedom. 
As can be seen in Table 4.1 there were no significant differences between the 
four emotions, and therefore the hypothesis that shame tends to be a more intense 
emotion than guilt, hatred and disgust can be rejected. Nevertheless it does 
appear that the emotions were generally intense. 
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Table 4.1. X2 values and significance of comparisons between emotions on 
intensitv 
Shame and Guilt 3.96 ns 
Shame and Hatred 1.28 ns 
Guilt and Hatred 0.49 ns 
Shame and Disgust 6.72 ns 
Guilt and Disgust 1.18 ns 
iv) Participants were asked how long the emotion lasted. Shame lasted on 
average 13.4 hours, the longest of the four emotions, although there was very 
considerable variation in shame scores (SD = 14.1 hrs). Guilt was the next 
longest, lasting on average 8 hours, although here there was even more variation 
(SD 18.3). Hatred and disgust appeared to be considerably less lengthy emotions, 
although still on average lasting over 2 hours. The mean for hatred was 2.2 hours 
(SD 4) and for disgust 2.6 hours (SD 7.1). The statistical procedure described 
above yielded significant differences between shame and hatred (X2 = 11.96, p< 
0.05) and shame and disgust (X 2= 10.96, p<0.05). X2 values for all the 
comparisons are shown in Table 4.2. The hypothesis that shame tends to be 
longer lasting than other emotions has therefore been supported in the cases of 
hatred and disgust, but not in the case of guilt, which like shame also appeared to 
be a very enduring emotion. 
Table 4.2. X2 values and significance of comparisons between emotions on 
duration 
xz 
Shame and Guilt 6.42 ns 
Shame and Hatred 12.54 < 0.05 
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Guilt and Hatred 3.24 ns 
Shame and Disgust 11.6 < 0.05 
Guilt and Disgust 4.78 ns 
v) 55.6% (5/9) of the males reported an instance of shame, a slightly higher 
proportion than the 41.4% (12/29) of female participants who reported an 
experience of shame, however there was no significant effect of gender on 
likelihood of reporting an instance of shame (X2 (df 1) = 0.56, p =. 45)2,3. 
Therefore the hypothesis that women were more likely to report an instance of 
shame is not supported. 
The triggersfor shame 
Participants were asked what they thought triggered off the emotions and they 
were provided with several lines in which to write open-ended responses. They 
were also provided with space to write down any thoughts which came into their 
minds and were hard to stop during the emotion. In many cases the information 
written down by participants was supplemented by their tape recorded comments 
when the researcher went through their responses on return of the diary. A 
summary of the triggers for shame is reproduced in Table 4.3 (data and analysis 
of the triggers for the other three emotions is included in Appendix 5). The 
analysis that follows is qualitative and constitutes a preliminary and tentative 
2A table of the observed values in included in Appendix 4. 
3 In one cell of the Chi-Square the expected value was marginally less than 5 (4.03). In a review 
of the use and misuse of Chi-Square Delucchi (1983) has argued that the need for expected values 
of 5 or above may be overly conservative: 'it seems that, as a general rule, the chi-square statistic 
may be properly used in cases where the expected values are much lower than previously 
considered permissible ... For most applications, Cochran's rule, which states that all expected 
values be greater than one and not more than 20% be less than five, offers a fair balance between 
practicality and precision. ' (Delucchi, 1983, p168). 
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approach to the hypothesis that shame experienced by psychotherapy patients 
reflects genuinely stigmatising circumstances. 
Table 4.3: Trfizeers for experiences of shame 
P TRIGGERS 
I Talking to assessment psychiatrist about a flashback to sexual abuse. She felt 'cheap' and as if 
the good part of herself had been 'almost rubbed out. ' Thoughts of harming herself and suicide 
- 2 Thinking about being sexually abused and how she had broken up with her previous partner 
I because she thought he would be unable to understand her feelings 
3 Thinking after her assessment interview with psychiatrist that the police would be informed 
about her abuser, the abuse would be made public, and people would not understand and would 
think of her in the same way as they thought about the abuser 
5 Wanted to have sex with someone inappropriate, and worried that that person would notice how 
he was looking at him 
6 Flashing back to memories of sexual abuse and thinking that all these memories must be shared 
with his therapy group 
7 Having had a tantrum (involving rage at people who sexually abuse children and anger at his 
wife because he thought she could not understand) the next day he thought it was not normal and 
he felt that it was something he could not explain to his children who had witnessed it [G] 
8 Seeing bums on her body reminded her of how she had done things without caring how she 
appeared to others or herself, which she now felt very ashamed of 
10 Did not know what triggered off the feeling, but wrote that his thoughts were about not being 
able to control his feelings (later in the diary he reports an experience of self disgust mixed with 
shame triggered by not being able to control his feelings) 
11 Being told the clinic would offer her a limited number of sessions, which confirmed her feeling 
that no one will believe her and that her experience of sexual abuse is 'ingrained', she can't be 
helped, and 'it can never be corrected' 
14 Felt she was a bad person when she was bored and irritated with 'very nice' people who 
considered her a friend 
16 Recalling her abuse in her assessment interview, and the fear that it might mean they would 
make her take legal action which she was not ready to do [GI 
17 Not thinking in an orderly fashion at work, which reminded him of how stupid he is and was as a 
child. He felt he was a terrible person and everybody was ganging up on him 
19 Things coming out in court about her mistreatment of her daughter, 'knowing that I could do 
such a thing to one of my kids, somebody that means the world to me' 
21 Not being able to live up to her husband's sexual expectations. Thinking she 'was not a good 
enough person', that she 'should do something to make the feelings stop', that her 'husband 
deserved someone better than her' 
23 Thinking 'about psychotherapy and being 'mad', whether it was worth it'. She had to stop 
driving and pull off the motorway 
26 Visiting her children in care. The shame occurred 'because I think why should everybody else 
have their kids, and I ain't got my kids' 
32 [No details of trigger on diary, no follow up interview] 
[G] indicates that the emotion was described as being mixed with guilt 
Looking at the triggers for shame presented in Table 4.3 it seems that all of them 
involve situations in which the individuals themselves believe they possess 
characteristics which could devalue or stigmatise them in relation to others. In 
some cases this was made very explicit, for instance P1 talked about how 
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speaking to her psychiatrist in detail about the sexual abuse she had suffered 
made her feel 'cheap' and as if the good part of her had been 'almost rubbed out. ' 
In other cases it was hinted at, for example P10 wrote only that he had thoughts 
about not being able to control his feelings, although his diary and interview 
taken as a whole suggested that he regarded his emotions as a sip of weakness 
(as, he implied in a follow-up interview, did his wife). The question remains 
whether this 'sense of stigma' reflects actual stigma in the culture that the 
participants' belong too. Various features of the responses suggest that this is a 
strong possibility for many if not all of these shame experiences. Firstly a 
sizeable minority of the shame experiences reported in the study were associated 
with participants either thinking or talking about their experiences of childhood 
sexual abuse (37.5%, 6/16). Despite increasing awareness of CSA in recent years 
writers on the treatment of CSA survivors still point to the taboos surrounding 
this trauma (e. g. Drauker, 1992). Secondly two of the women in the study (who 
had in fact suffered CSA themselves) said that their shame had been triggered by 
what appeared to be the public perception that they had or could harm their own 
children. P 19 said her shame was triggered by a court case in which her daughter 
had described how her mother had physically abused her and in the other P26 
said her shame was triggered by the fact that her children had been taken into 
care presumably because she was unfit to look after them herself. For a woman 
to have been judged harmful to her own children is surely to have broken one of 
our culture's most deeply established precepts, and to have seriously 
compromised her chances of being regarded as 'normal' by others. In two of the 
remaining cases it seems that the participant had done something which would 
render them abnormal in many people's eyes. P8's shame was associated with 
bums she had inflicted on herself without at the time caring how she appeared to 
others, and P7 described how he had had a tantrum in which he jumped up and 
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down shouting and swearing in front of his family. Two of the remaining 
instances involved sexual impulses which might be judged by many as abnormal. 
P4 wanted to have homosexual sex with someone in his group for male survivors 
of CSA. P21 was unable to have sexual feelings towards her husband and unable 
to identify any understandable reason for her lack of desire (in a follow-up 
interview she talked about how she felt she was surrounded by images and talk 
about sexuality and felt very ashamed because she couldn't feel the feelings she 
was supposed to). Of the remaining instances a number seemed to involve failure 
to experience appropriate feelings and behaviour in other contexts. P14 was 
ashamed because she was unable to feel positive feelings with the 'very nice' 
people who regarded her as a friend and went out of their way in their attempts to 
be supportive of her. P17's shame was related to an inability to 'think in an 
orderly fashion' in his work as a computer technician and P1 O's shame seemed to 
be related to a general inability to control his feelings some years after the death 
of his son. It seems very possible that in each of these latter three cases the 
participant had indeed strayed from the norms governing behaviour in his or her 
own social niche (for example 'thinking in an orderly fashion' is presumably of 
great importance when working with computers). The only remaining instance of 
shame that of P23 was related to her thinking about doing psychotherapy and the 
implication that she was 'mad'. Her perception seems to echo the long-standing 
stigma attached to being mentally ill (cf. Goffman, 1963). 
While this review of the different triggers for the shame reported in the study 
does not provide direct information about the social norms relevant to each 
participant in their social context it does hopefully suggest that the shame each 
person felt 'makes some sense'. Each instance can be seen as reflecting some 
genuine dislocation of the person from their community and the values enshrined 
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in it. This is perhaps enough to call into question the notion that shame 
experienced by people who suffer psychological disorder results from an 
irrational attributional bias (M. Lewis, 1992). The hypothesis that instances of 
shame reported by psychiatric outpatients would reflect circumstances which can 
be understood as genuinely stigmatising thus appears to be supported by this 
exploratory qualitative analysis of the triggers for shame. 
The context ofshame 
i) Participants were asked to tick a box indicating which of several categories of 
people they were with at the time of the emotions they recorded. The options 
were alone, with friends, with spouse/partner, with people at work, with 
acquaintances, with strangers, with a psychotherapy group, with a professional 
such as a doctor, priest or counsellor and 'other'. The data for all four emotions 
is presented in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4. Table showing who the participant was with when experiencing 
thp d-mnfinn fnr onch nf the different emotion tvDes 
SHAME GUILT HATRED DISGUST 
Alone 31.2%(5/16) 40%(10/25) 31.5%(6/19) 57.1%(8/14) 
Friend 12.5%(2/16) 12%(3/25) 21.1% (4/19) 7.1%(1/14) 
Family 0%(0/16) 16%(4/25) 15.8% (3/19) 14.3% (2/14) 
Spouse/partner 31.2% (5/16) 12%(3/25) 21.1% (4/19) 7.14% (1/14) 
People at work 0%(0/16) 0%(0/25) 10.5% (2/19) 0%(0/14) 
Therapy context 18.75% (3/16) 16.4% (4/25) 0%(0/19) 14.3% (2/14) 
Acquaintances 0%(0/16) 0%(0/25) 0%(0/19) 0%(0/14) 
Strangers 0%(0/16) 0%(0/25) 0%(0/19) 0%(0/14) 
Other 6.25% (1/16) 4%(1/25) 0%(0/19) 0%(0/14) 
31.2% (5/16) of the shame instances took place when the participant was alone. 
However 40% (10/25) of the guilt instances also took place when the participant 
was alone along with 57% of the disgust instances (8/14) and 31% (6/19) of the 
hatred instances. Using the method of combining the between and within subjects 
analysis referred to above (Winer, 1986) no statistically significant difference 
was found between the extent to which shame and guilt were experienced when 
alone (X 2=8.689 df 4, p= ns). Insufficient numbers meant that it was impossible 
to conduct statistical comparisons between shame and the other two emotions. 
Although shame did not appear to be experienced more privately than any of the 
other emotions it did on the whole seem to have been experienced in quite 
intimate contexts since in addition to the 31.2% which were experienced alone a 
further 31.2% (5/16) were experienced when the participant was with their 
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spouse or partner and none were experienced with strangers, acquaintances or 
people at work. However this tendency seems to hold for the other emotions as 
well - in fact none of the emotions in the study seems to have taken place when a 
participant was with an acquaintance or stranger. 
ii) Participants were asked whether, if other people had been present, they 
thought these people were aware of what they were feeling. Overall in 50% of 
cases of shame (8/16) the participant thought that another person was aware of 
how they felt. (Interestingly this included two cases in which the participant had 
said they were alone when feeling the emotion. Closer inspection revealed that in 
both of these cases the emotion had lasted for a day or more, so presumably at 
times during this period the participant had been with other people). If shame 
experienced alone (with the exception of these two cases) is excluded then other 
people were aware of the participant's shame in 61.5% (8/13) of cases. In only 
half of these 8 cases had the participant actually disclosed to another person. 
Thus whether others were aware of the shame did not depend entirely on the 
participant talking about how they felt. This may of course have been because the 
other person was aware of their shame as a result of their posture or their tears. In 
any case the hypothesis that other people would not be aware of the way 
participants were feeling was not confirmed, at least according to participants' 
own accounts. 
When percentages are compared with the other three emotions shame appears if 
anything to be the emotion that other people were most aware of. Compared with 
the 50% other awareness of shame, 30% (6/20) were rated as aware of 
participants' hatred, 28.6% (4/14) of participants' disgust and only 12% (3/25) of 
participants' guilt. However it was not possible to confirm this statistically as 
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expected frequencies in some cells of the Chi-Square test for the unrelated data 
were too low to perform the necessary between subjects and within subjects 
analysis. 
The disclosure ofshame 
i) Participants were asked whether they had told anyone about each experience 
that they reported. Shame remained undisclosed in 70.6% (12/17) of cases, a 
finding which is compatible with the notion that shame generally is not 
disclosed. However non-disclosure appeared to be a feature of all the emotions 
sampled with guilt remaining undisclosed 70.8% (17/24) of the time, disgust 
78.6% (11/14) of the time and hatred 55% (11/20) of the time. Unfortunately it 
was not possible to establish whether there were any statistically reliable 
differences due to low expected frequencies in some cells of the Chi-Square on 
the unrelated data. 
ii) For the twenty four emotions which were disclosed participants were asked to 
rate how difficult it was to share the experience on a scale of 0- 10 where 0 is 
'not difficult at all' and 10 is 'almost impossible'. Shame appeared to be more 
difficult to disclose than the other emotions. The mean rating for shame was 6.4 
(SD 2.9) compared with 4.14 (SD 2.8) for guilt, 2.9 (SD 3.8) for hatred, and 1 
(SD 3.4) for disgust. Low numbers made it impossible to carry out the full meta- 
analytic statistical procedure recommended by Winer (1986) and used in the 
analysis of the intensity and duration data because there were too few repeated 
cases to enable the repeated measures part of the analysis to be carried out. 
However an unrelated ANOVA on the unrelated instances of disclosed shame 
and guilt was highly significant (F (1,6) = 28.15, p<0.005). An unrelated 
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ANOVA on the unrelated instances of disclosed shame and hatred was also 
significant (F (1,11) = 9.75, p<0.05). No comparisons were possible between 
shame and disgust because only three instances of disgust were disclosed (one 
repeated measures, and two unrelated). Although with such small numbers 
conclusions must be uncertain, the data appears to confirm the hypothesis that 
shame may be harder to disclose than guilt, hatred and possibly Oudging by the 
means isgust. 
The disclosure of unpleasant emotions in general 
i) As noted above participants were asked if they had told anyone about the 
emotional experiences they reported. 32% (24/76) of all the emotions reported in 
the study were disclosed, so that 68% (51/75) were not disclosed. Ibis finding 
contrasts starkly with Rime et al (199 1) and Rime et al (1 994)'s discovery that 
between 4% and 10% of emotions recorded by a variety of non-clinical 
populations were not disclosed to others (Rime and his colleagues studied all the 
emotions in the current diary with the exception of hatred, which was the 
emotion which was most disclosed in the current study). The hypothesis that the 
unpleasant emotions experienced in this clinical population would tend not to be 
disclosed appears therefore to have been supported. 
ii) If participants had disclosed they were asked whether they felt better as a 
result of telling somebody how they felt. Overall 62.5% (15/24) said they did feel 
better. Although numbers were too small for reliable statistical analysis fewer 
participants said that they felt better after disclosing experiences of shame than 
they did after disclosing the other emotions. In 20% (115) of the incidents of 
shame the participant judged that disclosure had made them feel better, compared 
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with 71.4% (5/7) of the disclosed guilt instances, 100% (3/3) of the disclosed 
disgust instances and 66.6% (6/9) of the disclosed hatred instances. If shame is 
excluded 73.7% (14/19) of the disclosed emotions led to the participant feeling 
better. Thus the hypothesis that participants would feel better as a result of 
disclosing their emotions appears to be generally supported for all the emotions 
with the exception of shame. 
Participants were also asked whether they felt worse as a result of telling 
somebody how they felt. Although only 19 of the 24 accounts of disclosed 
emotions included ratings for this item (presumably because some participants 
regarded it as a redundant question having already said that they felt better) 75% 
(3/4) of the instances where participants agreed that they felt worse were 
instances of shame. However it should be noted that in spite of this indication 
that disclosing shame was a negative experience follow up interviews revealed 
that two of the three participants who had said that disclosing their shame made 
them feel worse said later that the disclosure was helpful for them. This raises the 
possibility that feeling worse initially might actually be part of the process of 
being helped with one's shame. Indeed such a process would be in keeping with 
exposure treatments for other kinds of distressing emotional experience. 
iii) If participants disclosed they were asked to indicate which emotions out of a 
list of eleven they felt as they were deciding to talk about the emotion. The 
candidate emotions were anger, anxiety, disgust, embarrassment, fear, guilt, 
happiness, hatred, sadness, shame and depression. Overall participants who 
disclosed reported an average of 3.4 emotions as they were deciding to talk about 
each emotion (SD = 2.3). This appears to confirm the prediction that disclosure 
of emotional experiences will itself be associated with a number of emotions. 
93 
In 54.2% (13/24) of the disclosed emotions participants indicated that they had 
felt depression of this kind. In addition 41.7% (10/24) were associated with 
embarrassment, 37.5% (9/24) were associated with shame, 33.3% (8/24) with 
anxiety and 29.2% (7/24) with guilt. The disclosure of shame was associated 
with embarrassment (80%, 4/5), anxiety (60%, 3/5), disgust (60%, 3/5), guilt 
(60%, 3/5), shame (60%, 3/5) and depression (60%, 3/5). The disclosure of guilt 
was associated with depression (57.1%, 4/7), anxiety (57.1%, 4/7), 
embaffassment (42.9%, 3n), sadness (42.9%, 3/7) and shame (42.9%, 3/7). 
66.7% (6/9) of the disclosed instances of hatred were associated with depression. 
iv) When participants had not disclosed an emotion they were asked 'were you 
afraid about how others might see you if you told themT Overall 63.2% (24/38) 
of the undisclosed emotions were associated with positive responses to this 
question. Numbers were too low to carry out a statistical comparison of the four 
emotions for this question, however guilt seemed to attract fewer endorsements 
of this item, only 50% (8/16) agreement, while both hatred (72.7%, 8/11) and 
disgust (72.7%, 8/11) paralleled shame (72.7% 8/11). It may be that people do 
not expect the same degree of censure or negative regard for guilt were it to be 
disclosed as they do for the other three emotions. Overall the results provide 
some support for the hypothesis that undisclosed emotions will be associated 
with the participant being afraid of how others would see them if they disclosed. 
Marker shame 
i) When participants did not disclose an emotion they were asked 'did the 
thought of telling anybody make you feel any sharneT 90.9% (10/11) of non- 
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disclosed instances of shame were given a 'yes' rating for this question. 
However the proportion was quite high for the other three emotions as well - in 
all 65% (26/40) of the other non-disclosed emotions were associated with shame 
at the thought of telling anyone: 66.7% (12/18) for guilt, 72.7% (8/11) for hatred 
and 54.5% (6/11) for disgust. The hypothesis that non-disclosure of shame, guilt, 
hatred and disgust will be associated with feeling shame at the thought of 
disclosure appears to have received some support. 
ii) Participants were asked 'was the feeling mixed, so that there was more than 
one emotion at exactl the same timeT 43.8% (14/32) of the mixed instances of 
guilt, hatred and disgust involved mixes with shame. That means that including 
the emotions that were not mixed or where the participant was not sure if they 
were mixed 23.7% (14/59) of the emotions of guilt, hatred and disgust reported 
in the study were mixed with shame. This breaks down into 20% (5/25) of the 
guilt instances, 25% (5/20) of the hatred instances and 28.6% (4/14) of the 
disgust instances. Approximately one quarter of these emotions were therefore 
mixed with shame, a somewhat higher proportion than the 15.7% (8/5 1) non- 
guilt emotions that were mixed with guilt. Participants were also asked to 
indicate the next feeling that they had. In 32% (8/25) of the guilt instances the 
next emotion was or, when participants had ticked more than one emotion, 
included, shame. The next feeling was only occasionally shame in the case of the 
other two emotions (11.1% (2/18) for hatred and 15.4% (2/13) for disgust). 
In order to get a rough indication of the proportion of emotions with some link to 
shame a category was created in which instances of guilt, hatred and disgust were 
examined for any link with shame. A link with shame was noted if a) the emotion 
was mixed with shame, or b) the emotion was followed by shame, or c) the 
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emotion was accompanied by shame at the thought of disclosure, or d) the 
emotion was accompanied by shame when the participant was deciding to 
disclose. Using these inclusive criteria for a link with shame it appeared that 61% 
(36/59) of these emotions were linked to shame. This broke down into 70% 
(14/20) of cases of hatred, 64.3% (9/14) of cases of disgust and 52% (13/25) of 
the cases of guilt. Unfortunately low expected frequencies in some cells of a Chi- 
Square on the unrelated data meant that it was not possible to establish whether 
these differences were statistically significant. Nevertheless the hypothesis that 
guilt, hatred and disgust will frequently be associated with shame therefore 
appears to have been supported. 
Summary ofresults 
In many respects shame proved to be more similar than different to the other 
unpleasant emotional experiences included in the study. There appeared to be no 
distinctive action tendency for shame but a general tendency to cry or want to cry 
in all the emotions. Nor was shame characterised by sensations of blushing, but 
rather churning or butterflies in the stomach and tension, two sensations which 
also seemed characteristic of guilt and disgust. Although shame was found to be 
intense it was not found to be more so than guilt, hatred or disgust, and although 
a substantial minority of the shame instances were experienced when the 
participant was alone once again there did not appear to be major differences 
between shame and the other emotions in this regard, although it was not 
possible to confirm this statistically. Similarly although in as many as 50% of the 
cases of shame the participant believed other people were aware of how they felt 
shame did not seem much different from the other emotions although once again 
it was not possible to confirm this statistically. Finally, counter to suggestions 
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that shame is predominantly experienced by women there was no greater 
likelihood of women reporting an instance of shame than men. 
The one statistically confirmed difference between the emotions was for 
duration. Both shame and guilt appeared to be very long-lasting emotions (with 
durations averaging 14.1 and 8 hours respectively), and in the case of shame this 
was found to have been significantly longer than the durations of hatred and 
disgust. There was some suggestion that the shame reported by psychiatric 
outpatients in this study might have reflected genuine stigma, rather than a 
characterological predisposition towards experiencing shame. 
In line with the picture of few differences between shame and the other emotions 
it appeared that shame was not disclosed to any greater degree than the other 
emotions. However there was a trend for shame to be rated as somewhat harder 
to disclose. The study did appear to confirm the hypothesis that psychiatric 
outpatients would in general tend not to disclose their emotional experiences. 
When they did however they tended to feel better, even though disclosure itself 
was an emotional experience. Non-disclosure was often associated with the fear 
of how others would see the participant if they disclosed. There was also an 
indication that marker shame might be associated with non-disclosure as non- 
disclosure was often associated with agreement that the thought of telling 
anybody made the participant feel shame. There was some support for the notion 
that shame would be associated in subtle ways with the other emotional 
experiences reported in the study. 
Discussion 
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The fact that 62% of the people who were invited to take part in the study did not 
complete it suggests that the diary task may have been a demanding one, both in 
terms of the time and commitment necessary to complete and return the diary 
and the fact that participants were asked to concentrate on emotional experiences 
that may have been very distressing (one of the findings reported above was that 
the disclosure of emotions was itself an emotional experience). In light of the 
difficulty obtaining participants it is regrettable that no details were obtained of 
the emotional lives of the ten participants who completed the study but did not 
experience any of the four target emotions. Since it seemed that these individuals 
had experienced other emotions during the week (for example sadness or anger) 
the inclusion of these emotions might well have strengthened the findings about 
disclosure per se. In spite of these problems, which may be expected when a 
research method is used for the first time in a particular setting, the study did 
demonstrate that it was possible to obtain rich detail about the nature and context 
of a number of unpleasant emotions, including shame, in the daily lives of 
psychiatric outpatients. 
The most distinctive feature of the shame reports in the study was how long they 
lasted (an average of 13 hours). Since marker shame (as outlined in Chapter 
Two) was distinguished largely by its chronic and enduring nature it appears at 
first glance that these experiences might be experiences of marker shame. 
However the fit between the long-lasting experiences of shame reported in the 
diary and the theories of marker shame reviewed in Chapter Two is far from 
perfect. The very high intensity of the experiences of shame reported in the diary 
deviates from the picture of marker shame outlined in Chapter Two where it was 
assumed that marker shame would be low in intensity and indeed function as a 
warning to the individual to avoid situations which might engender more intense 
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feelings of shame. One possible explanation for the high intensity of the reported 
shame experiences is that the participants appear in many cases to have been 
involved in re-examining the emotional presuppositions associated with marker 
shame, and so were deliberately choosing to act against the promptings of their 
marker shame. It is plausible that such deliberate disregard of the more subtle 
signals of shame might cause such signals to become more acute as one 
perceives the danger to be closer. This interpretation is consistent with the fact 
that all the participants were beginning therapy at the time of the study, a 
process which involves deliberately exposing parts of oneself one normally keeps 
hidden. If this interpretation is correct it leads to the conjecture that shame might 
initially become more intense before diminishing in therapy as the decision to 
expose shame-related information approaches, as Weiss (1995) and Ward (1972) 
have argued. 
The diary was able to uncover traces of lesser intensity shame that fits in better 
with the profile of 'subtle' and minimally articulate shame outlined in Chapter 
Two. The finding that shame was experienced 'at exactly the same time' as 
approximately one quarter of the emotions of guilt, hatred and disgust, and that 
61% of all the non-shame emotions in the study were linked in some way to 
shame suggests that shame may frequently accompany other unpleasant 
emotional experiences in psychiatric populations. Such subtle and secondary 
experiences of shame may form a part of the 'negative attitudes towards 
emotion' which Joseph et al (1994) and Joseph et al (1997) have found are linked 
to the development of psychopathology. The finding that 65% of non-disclosed 
guilt, hatred and disgust was associated with feeling shame at the thought of 
disclosing the emotional experience suggests one pathway through which marker 
shame may have a significant effect on behaviour, in this case reinforcing the 
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individual's emotional isolation. The diary seems, then, to have revealed both the 
presence of subtle forms of shame in a number of unpleasant emotional 
experiences and the action of marker shame in the decisions of patients not to 
confide their emotional experiences to others. 
Although clinical approaches to shame have tended to emphasise the 
pathological nature of an individual's shame, and implied that the shame is 
unwarranted in the sufferer's social context, a qualitative review of the 
circumstances associated with each of the reported experiences of shame 
suggested that the participants' shame may well have been warranted in the 
individual's own social niche. Although the work reported here is a very 
preliminary attempt to capture this aspect of shame in a clinical sample it points 
towards an important new direction in the study of shame, one that could unite 
shame research with other socially informed approaches to mental health and 
treatment (e. g. Pilgrim, 1997; Orford, 1992). In particular it shifts the focus of 
treating shame away from the individual to the relationship between the 
individual and their social context. To say that people's shame 'makes sense' in 
their social context is not to contradict the fact that the nature of the shame may 
be marker shame. Marker shame is assumed to reflect actual social experiences. 
The fact that the majority of experiences of shame were not disclosed contrasts 
with Rim6 et al (199 1) and Rim6 et al (1 994)'s finding that shame tends to be 
shared in non-clinical populations. However the finding that shame was 
disclosed no less than the other emotions in the study is parallel to Rime et al 
(199 1) and Rim6 et al (19 94)'s discovery that there was no statistical difference 
in the extent to which shame was shared compared with the other emotions 
(including as mentioned before guilt and disgust). This suggests that the 
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disclosure or non-disclosure of shame may reflect the psychiatric status of the 
participants rather than being essential to the emotion itself. If this is so it 
highlights the importance of carrying out studies of shame which pay attention to 
the personal and interpersonal context in which it is experienced. 
The most striking generic characteristic of the emotions reported in the study was 
that so many of them (68%) remained undisclosed in contrast to many studies 
with non-clinical populations (summarised in Rimd et al, in press) in which 
between 90 and 96% of emotions were disclosed to others. As well as confirming 
the hypothesis based on the work of Joseph et al (1994) and Joseph et al (1997) 
that psychiatric outpatients would not express their feelings to others, this implies 
that emotional isolation is a significant and distinctive feature of psychiatric 
outpatients' daily lives. That much of this emotional isolation appeared to be 
related to shame (65% of the non-shame emotions which were not disclosed were 
associated with feeling shame at the thought of disclosure) and the fear of how 
other people would see them if they disclosed (63.2% agreement for the 
undisclosed emotions) supports Finkenauer et al's (1996) social model of secrecy 
in which emotional experiences are believed to be kept secret when anticipated 
disclosure leads to unpleasant social emotions such as shame and guilt and 
expectations of a negative response from others. 
The finding that when emotions were disclosed this tended to make the 
participant feel better (in 62.5% of cases) suggests that disclosure may frequently 
be helpful as is implied in the literature on the benefits of emotional disclosure 
(e. g. Pennebaker, 1993). However the diary results do not provide information 
nu about the context of the disclosure and in particular the response of the recipient 
of the disclosure which may mediate whether it is helpful or not (Kelly & 
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McKillop, 1996). One possibility consistent with the finding that shame was 
often associated with non-disclosure is that disclosure is helpful when it reduces 
feelings of difference and shame, however this conjecture requires ftuther 
exploration. In chapters six and seven data is presented from the follow-up 
interviews which were designed to explore in detail the context of the disclosures 
and non-disclosures reported in the diary, and the effects of withholding and 
disclosing on the individual's relationships with others. 
The participants' lack of disclosure, their sense that disclosure would lead to 
shame and the creation of a negative impression on others, and the suggestion 
that their experiences of shame may have 'made sense' in their social contexts 
raises the possibility that psychiatric distress may derive in part from the 
emotional isolation that occurs when people feel that others cannot understand or 
respond positively to their experiences. While this proposition requires further 
research it resonates with recent attempts to develop models of psychotherapy 
that are more sensitive to social contexts (e. g. Riikonen & Smith, 1997) as well 
as with research in which mental health service users rated being able to talk to 
someone as their primary need when distressed (Mental Health Foundation, 
1997). Further work on psychiatric patients' experiences of emotional isolation 
and ways in which it is alleviated may also contribute to our understanding of the 
generic relationship factors which appear to account for much of the 
effectiveness of psychotherapy (Lambert & Bergin, 1994; Bums & Auerbach, 
1996). 
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Chapter Five 
Introduction to a Qualitative Follow up Interview Study 
of the Disclosure and Non-disclosure of Emotional 
Experiences by Psychotherapy Patients 
Background 
At the end of the previous chapter it was suggested that dynamics associated with 
disclosure might play an important part in the so-called non-specific effects of 
psychotherapy. This is consistent with a number of findings in the mental health 
literature. First, that personal disclosure by psychotherapy patients characterises 
the behaviour of psychotherapy patients in different forms of psychotherapy 
(Stiles, 1995). Second, that personal disclosure by the patient is correlated with 
measures of good psychotherapy process (Stiles, 1995). Third, the evidence from 
consumer surveys of mental health service users indicating that what users want 
when in distress is someone to talk to (Mental Health Foundation, 1997). Fourth, 
the evidence of the protective effects of having a good confidant in conununity 
studies of the onset of depression (e. g. Brown and Harris, 1978). In addition to 
these findings a growing body of laboratory work has demonstrated the 
beneficial effects of emotional disclosure in non-clinical populations (see 
Pennebaker, 1993 and Chapter Three). 
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However, despite the fact that disclosure is generally interpersonal, involving the 
response of a recipient of the disclosure, explanations of the benefits of 
emotional disclosure are predominantly intrapsychic. It was suggested in Chapter 
Three that this derived in part from a lack of naturalism in the experimental 
settings used in the relevant social psychological studies and in part from an 
over-reliance on cognitive and mechanistic explanatory theories. Stiles et al's 
(1990) assimilation model of change events in psychotherapy, alluded to in 
Chapter Three, was an important example of one such theory. According to these 
authors disclosure is beneficial because it promotes the 'assimilation' of 'warded 
off experiences into knowledge structures which permit the individual to make 
sense of the problematic experience. An alternative, although not necessarily 
incompatible, perspective, outlined in Chapter Three, draws inspiration from the 
dramaturgical perspective of Goffman, and in particular his view that people are 
motivated to conceal 'destructive information', information that would cause 
shame or embarrassment if revealed. If Goffman is right the negotiation of the 
identity implications of potentially destructive information should play a central 
role in the harms or benefits of emotional disclosure. This view harmonises with 
Kelly and McKillop's (1996) critical review of the disclosure literature in which 
they argue that the harms or benefits of disclosure are mediated by the social 
response of the recipient Some preliminary evidence in favour of such a 'social' 
model of disclosure decisions has been presented by Finkenauer et al (1996) 
based on a non-clinical sample (see Chapter Three). 
A 'Goffmanesque' perspective on disclosure implies that the anticipation of 
experiences of shame or embarrassment and the desire to avoid them will 
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mediate both the decision to disclose and the outcome of any such disclosure. If 
the disclosure decisions and outcomes of psychotherapy patients operate in this 
manner then shame may be embedded in social processes that relate crucially to 
the individual's experience of solidarity with others (cf. Hagan and Smail, 1997). 
Such an analysis would point the way to a conceptualisation. of pathological 
shame that may go some way to establishing a socially grounded model of the 
relationship between shame and psychopathology. 
In Goffinan's theory shame and embarrassment drive the many kinds of 
'facework' at the same time as remaining subtle and in the background, lurking 
as threats rather than being embodied and displayed. In Chapter Two it was 
argued that clinically relevant shame (termed 'marker shame' in that chapter) 
also relates to social threat rather than actual negative outcomes. It is pre- 
emptive, it serves to protect the self from potential negative evaluations of other 
people and it marks the limits of an individual's sense of legitimate social 
participation. Tbe role of anticipatory shame in psychotherapy patients' 
inhibition of their emotional experiences would therefore appear to be a test of 
the utility of the concept of marker shame. From this perspective therapeutic 
experiences of disclosure may often be those that 'deconstruct' the interpersonal 
expectations associated with marker. 
Quantitative data from the diary study reported in the previous chapter provide 
some preliminary evidence in favour of a dramaturgical model of disclosure 
dynamics in the lives of psychotherapy patients. It was found that 68% of the 
unpleasant emotional experiences reported by participants had not been disclosed 
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to anyone else, suggesting that a social process which has been found to be 
practically universal in non-clinical populations (Rim6 et al, 199 1; 1992; in 
press) was being inhibited. That this might be due to participants' assessments of 
the threat to their identities posed by disclosure of their experiences was 
suggested by the fact that in well over half of the instances of non-disclosure the 
participant agreed that the thought of telling anybody made them feel shame and 
they were afraid of how others would see them if they were to disclose. 
The aim of this follow-up interview study is to explore in greater detail the 
context of the diary participants' experiences of disclosure and non-disclosure 
paying particular attention to the social representations and experience of shame 
associated with both disclosing and withholding the emotions reported in the 
diary. The study also attempts to examine the interpersonal effects of disclosing 
and withholding these emotions. Since in the diary study it was found that when 
emotional experiences were disclosed participants generally said that they felt 
better an attempt will be made to identify factors associated with the helpfulness 
or unhelpfulness of disclosure experiences. 
Given the tendency in both the disclosure literature and the literature on shame 
and psychopathology to disregard the everyday context of these experiences the 
current study attempts to explore disclosure as it takes place in the day to day 
context of the psychotherapy patients' lives. The intention is to explore factors in 
patients' first person accounts of particular disclosure and non-disclosure 
experiences that relate to the plausibility of a dramaturgical theory of disclosure 
dynamics. 
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Method 
Introduction to the qualitative method 
Almost every study reviewed in the introductory chapters used a quantitative 
method. While research of this kind is important and may be necessary to tease 
apart competing accounts of psychological phenomena, in some cases an over- 
reliance on quantitative research methods may lead to a premature narrowing of 
focus and a corresponding neglect of the broader context of the phenomena of 
interest. In Chapter One it was argued that research on shame and 
psychopathology has tended to neglect the social context in which shame is 
experienced and in Chapter Three a similar argument was put forward regarding 
research on the benefits of disclosure . This neglect may have arisen as a result of 
the objectivist assumption that shame and disclosure are 'things' with properties 
which can be understood in isolation from the context within which it takes place 
(see Woolgar, 1996 for a critique of this approach). 
While it would be possible to investigate neglected facets of the context of shame 
using quantitative methods, and the preceding chapter has attempted to do just 
that, the use of qualitative methods offers a number of advantages over a purely 
quantitative strategy. Firstly qualitative methods are a useful means of examining 
naturally occurring phenomena in their ordinary settings. Secondly they offer a 
means of understanding phenomena in a comparatively holistic way which 
includes variables which have not been pre-selected by the interviewer. As such 
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qualitative methods are well suited to inductive stages of theory development. 
Finally as Miles and Huberman (1994) note qualitative data 'with their emphasis 
on people's "lived experience", are fundamentally well suited for locating the 
meanings people place on the events, processes and structures of their lives 
and for connecting these meanings to the social world around them' (p. 10, 
italics in original). 
There has been an upsurge of interest in the use of qualitative methods in 
psychology in recent years (e. g. Hayes, 1997; Richardson, 1996; Robson, 1993; 
Stiles, 1993). This appears partly to have come about as a result of a more critical 
view of the development of scientific knowledge (Woolgar, 1996; Henwood, 
1996) and partly as a result of the interest of psychologists in developing 
psychological knowledge in applied settings (Hayes, 1997). However there is 
considerable variety in the epistemological positions underlying the use of 
qualitative methods (see Henwood, 1996, Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The 
orientation adopted in this study is the 'transcendental realist' position of Miles 
and Huberman (1994). These authors accept that our knowledge of reality is 
inevitably coloured by how we describe it, however they propose a broadly 
empirical approach in which some understandings of the social world can be 
demonstrated to be more accurate representations of social 'reality' than others. 
As they put it 'social phenomena exist not only in the mind but also in the 
objective world - and ... there are some lawful and reasonably stable 
relationships to be found among them' (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 4). 
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There are 'few fixed formulas or cookbook recipes' (Yin, 1989, p. 105) to guide 
the qualitative researcher and as Miles and Huberman point out 'no study 
conforms exactly to a standard methodology; each one calls for the researcher to 
bend the methodology to the peculiarities of the setting' (Miles and Huberman, 
1994, p. 5). The current analysis incorporates features associated with a number 
of qualitative approaches, including grounded analysis (Pidgeon and Henwood, 
1996), multiple case analysis (Yin, 1989) and the data display approach of Miles 
and Huberman (1994). However in keeping with the epistemological position of 
'transcendental realism' a key concern has been to establish the reliability and 
validity of conclusions drawn from qualitative data. In order to do this an 
emphasis has been placed on the analysis of negative cases (Yin, 1989), 
alternative explanations (Yin, 1989) and the presentation of data in display 
matrices (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Participants 
Participants were those who took part in the diary study reported in the previous 
chapter (for more details see Chapter Four, p8 1). However four of the 38 diary 
participants are not included in the interview study because they did not provide 
an audiotaped interview. One participant did not want her interview audiotaped, 
two participants sent their diaries back to the clinic but were unable to attend the 
appointment for the interview, and in one case the tape recorder did not work. 
The final sample therefore consisted of 34 psychotherapy referrals. 
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Materials 
Participants took part in a semi-structured interview in which they were asked 
about the reasons for the non-disclosure or disclosure of the emotions they 
recorded in the diary, shame and related feelings attendant on disclosure or 
anticipated disclosure of the emotion, and the effects of disclosure or non- 
disclosure on their relationships with other people. 'Me interview protocol is 
included in Appendix 6. 
Procedure 
Interviews were carried out when participants returned to the clinic having kept 
their emotion diaries for one week. The interviewer went through the responses 
written in the diary with the participant, which functioned partly as a means of 
clarifying the written responses and partly as a means of bringing the recorded 
emotion back into the participants' awareness. The interviewer then went 
through the interview questions for each emotion that was recorded in the diary. 
Following the interview participants were debriefed, given an account of the 
purpose of the investigation and invited to ask the interviewer any questions they 
had about the research. 
Analytic strategy 
The interviews were of varying lengths due largely to the varying numbers of 
emotions recorded in the diaries by different individuals. Interview material 
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relating to emotional experiences recorded in the diaries but excluded from the 
diary analysis because they were repetitions of one type of emotion (e. g. two 
instances of shame, or three instances of hatred) was retained for the interview 
analysis. This decision was made because 1) the focus of this analysis is factors 
relating to disclosure per se rather than to the emotion types that are disclosed or 
withheld and 2) the diary analysis of Chapter Four revealed few differences 
between the different emotion types regarding disclosure. 
Interview material from all the interviews was pooled and material relevant to 
four main themes of interest was extracted to create four texts relating 
respectively to 1) reasons for non-disclosure, 2) effects of non-disclosure, 3) all 
material relevant to helpful disclosure and 4) all material relevant to unhelpful 
disclosure (Code-A-Text computer software was used to facilitate this procedure, 
Cartwright, 1996) 
The analysis will be reported in two chapters. In Chapter Six the data on non- 
disclosure will be considered and in Chapter Seven attention will be given to the 
data on experiences which were actually disclosed. Because of the differing 
amounts of material in the various pooled texts (i. e. relating to reasons for non- 
disclosure, effects of non-disclosure, helpful disclosure and unhelpful disclosure) 
somewhat different analytic procedures were used for the analysis of each. 
Methods used in each of the two following chapters of qualitative data analysis 
are outlined below. 
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Chapter Six on the non-disclosure of unpleasant emotional experiences. There 
was considerably more material on the reasons for non-disclosure and the effects 
of non-disclosure because of the high proportion of emotional incidents which 
were not disclosed. Because of the wealth of material here it was felt possible to 
use an inductive form of coding, developing codes in a 'grounded' manner from 
the descriptions provided by participants. While the a priori theories and 
assumptions of the researcher inevitably play a role in this inductive form of 
enquiry (see Pidgeon, 1994) this procedure has the advantage of developing 
theoretical ideas which are based closely on participants' own accounts and 
should allow factors that are important in the participants' social world to emerge 
in the developing theory. It seems particularly appropriate to use such a method 
for this data because there appear to be few alternative explanations offered for 
why participants fail to reveal emotional experiences. The work reported in this 
chapter also involves negative case analysis (Yin, 1989). Data display matrices 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994) have been included in appendices. 
Chapter Seven on the disclosure of unpleasant emotional experiences. The data 
set was considerably smaller for helpful and unhelpful disclosure. However there 
are alternative accounts in the literature concerning the benefits of disclosure 
(see Chapter Three). For the section of Chapter Seven on helpful disclosure the 
material has therefore been organised around the alternative theoretical 
explanations for the benefits of disclosure in the manner advocated by Yin 
(1989). Interview material on instances of unhelpful disclosure was so scarce 
(only four participants described unhelpful disclosures) that the most appropriate 
means of analysis appeared to be looking at each instance individually in an 
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attempt to discover what factors were associated with the unhelpfulness of the 
disclosure. In Chapter Seven, as for Chapter Six considerable attention has also 
been given to negative cases. 
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Chapter Six 
The Non-disclosure of Emotional Experiences by 
Psychotherapy Patients 
Introduction 
In this chapter the interview material relating to non-disclosure will be examined. 
The main parts of the analysis will concern firstly the reasons for non-disclosure 
and secondly the effects of non-disclosure on the participants' relationships. 
This part of the analysis uses material from the twenty seven interviews in which 
participants spoke about at least one instance in which they did not disclose an 
emotion to anyone else. (79.4% (27/34) of the participants in the study talked 
about an emotion which they had not disclosed). Categories developed in a 
'grounded' manner from the interviews will be presented along with summary 
tables, percentages and consideration of negative cases. 
Why don't participants disclose? 
The interviews provided a great deal of information about the reasons 
participants had not disclosed emotional experiences and this is the largest , 
section of the chapter. Because of the comparatively large number of categories 
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which emerged in the analysis a list of the categories relating to reasons for non- 
disclosure is included in table one. Summary tables listing sub-categories 
endorsed by each non-disclosing participant are included later in the chapter for 
'anticipated responses to disclosure' and 'shame and other factors associated 
with the self. 
Table One: Categories relating to reasons for non-disclosure 
Main category Sub-category 
Habitual non-disclosure 
Anticipated responses to disclosure 
Negative recipient responses (e. g. 
labelling, judging and blaming) 
Fear of upsetting or burdening others 
Unhelpful positive responses of others 
Others not understanding 
Others not trustworthy 
Disclosure pointless 
Isolation 
Shame and other factors associated 
with the self 
Shame and self-conscious emotions 
Out of character 
Inability to justify feelings and 
experiences 
Own responsibility 
Rejection of own feelings 
Reluctance to experience unpleasant 
emotions or memories 
Habitual non-disclosure 
Responses to the interview question 'if you can can you explain why you chose 
not to tell anyoneT included many comments that suggested that non-disclosure 
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was habitual. This was often described by participants as a general tendency 
presumably relating to a wide range of emotional experiences: 
'I normally keep urn things to myself (P51). 
'I'm not one for telling people how I'm feeling' (P33). 
'I somehow keep it all bottled up' (P 18). 
just tend to bottle things up myself and uh just try and put it to the back 
of my mind' (P28). 
cas I say I tend to bottle it up more than anything, instead of telling 
anyone' (P3 8). 
In some cases non-disclosure was described as a property of the kind of person 
they were: 
'I'm a very private person' (H). 
'I'm quite a closed person' (P23). 
'I'm a very private type of person' (P24). 
1 Refers to 6participant 5' in the study. 
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However in other cases it seemed to be more specific to a particular experience 
or emotion, as in the following extracts: 
'I don't want anybody to know that's what happened to me. ' (P 16). 
'You know to me it's something private and I just don't want to share it 
with anybody. ' (P22). 
II don't find it easy to share, that particular feeling. ' (P 15). 
Overall 81.5% (22/27) of the participants who discussed an undisclosed 
emotional experience indicated that non-disclosure was a recurrent or habitual 
pattern (see Appendix 7). This is a powerful corroboration of the pattern of non- 
disclosure found in the quantitative diary study. It suggests again that non- 
disclosure is characteristic of this population (or at least many people in this 
population) and it underscores the contrast alluded to in the previous chapter 
between the study participants and the non-clinical populations studied by Rim6 
and his team. Rime and his colleagues found that disclosure is a normal 
characteristic of the aftermath of emotional experience (see Chapter Tluee). This 
again points towards the possibility that 'emotional isolation' might be a 
significant component in these participants' distress. It also highlights the 
importance of an understanding of why the participants choose not to disclose. 
Anticipated responses to disclosure 
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Participants' reasons for not disclosing frequently involved expectations of how 
other people would respond if they disclosed. 
Negative recipient responses (including labelling, judging and blaming). The 
most frequent anticipated responses seemed to involve labelling, judging or 
blaming. 
Sometimes participants thought that others would think they were 'stupid' 
(Participants 5,8, and 28): 
'anybody else I may or try to talk to that I know may end up telling me to 
stop being so stupid. Which is one word I can't stand' (P5). 
'I suppose they probably think I was you know stupid thinking on those 
lines, you know' (P28). 
Sometimes they thought people would think they were 'round the bend' (P3 8), 
'barmy' and 'crackers' (P 14), or that they had 'a screw loose' (P7): 
'I think they would think I was barmy, I think they'd just think I was 
crackers' (P 14). 
'to a normal person in the street, you know, I mean, the basic thing is 
when you turned your back they say "He's round the bend", you know. 
So, uh, you tend not to, you bottle it all up, you know. Uh, basically for 
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your own self-respect I suppose. You know, to give you what little 
respect you've got left' (P38). 
P35 thought that most people would think she was 'completely odd': 
'somebody who's in a cosy little life, moving along ... wouldn't have the 
first clue of what you were on about, and think it completely odd, not to 
be looking on the bright side of life' (P35). 
P 17 feared that others might think him a 'freak'. Many participants also worried 
about what the other person might think (P3 0), feared that people would 'judge' 
them (P 19,27,16), or thought that if they told somebody they would be seen in 
an 'entirely different perspective' (P26): 
'Nine times out of ten I don't bother to say anything, because I just think, 
you know, he's judging me on certain things, by saying that I am a lousy 
parent to the extent that he says I've got no control over my children' 
(pig). 
'I couldn't see myself telling anybody at all. Because, you see, because p- 
, people don't know the things, they can't judge me by them. So I 
wouldn't tell them' (P 16). 
A few said or implied that they thought their disclosure would lead to arguments. 
P38 said that if he spoke about his experience to his wife she might not agree 
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with him in which case he is 'likely to go up the wall again' and this will 
'double' his problem. Some said that other people were likely to tell them that 
their feelings were wrong, for instance P 10 who thought his wife would say 'I 
suppose this is another bloody depression' and P8 who thought her friends would 
tell her what she was feeling was wrong. 
Overall, 70.4% (19/27) participants invoked the possibility of negative recipient 
responses of this kind to explain why they chose not to disclose. The common 
denominator in all these anticipated responses seems to be that the recipient of 
the disclosure will respond in a clearly invalidating manner - generally 
evaluating the participant less favourably. 
Confidentiality. Probably related to the fear of being exposed to negative 
evaluations two participants said that they were concerned that others would 
spread the information to others (P5 and 16). 
Not wanting to upset or burden others. About half (55.5%, 15/27) of the 
participants made a reference to not wanting to upset or burden others by telling 
them about the experience: 
'I don't really feel I ought to burden people with my depression, or my 
problems' (P 14). 
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11 just feel like I'm just putting on people and I'm not, you know, they've 
got better things to do, than listen to me, wallowing in self-pity, you 
know'(P15). 
'I just, I just feel as though I don't want to, even for one percent, 
encroach on their time, and pull them away from whatever else they 
might want to do' (P 18). 
'my friends that know about it get really upset [clears throat] when I 
when I've told them and I don't want to upset them' (P8). 
'If the family knew what happened it would split the family in half. I 
mean it's a very fragile family at the moment, and that's why I've chosen 
just to keep it so myself (P2). 
Unhelpful positive responses. In addition to burdening or damaging others, a 
number (33.3%, 9/27) of non-disclosing participants talked about how other 
people might respond in an apparently positive way which was nevertheless 
perceived as unhelpful. For example P21 feared that her husband would tell her 
not to worry and that everything was fine, but she would consider this to be 
telling lies and him not taking the situation seriously: 
'I think possibly he would tell me not to worry and everything was fine, 
and I know it's not, so 1,1 know that he would be telling me lies. Um, that 
maybe he wouldn't take this situation as seriously as I take it, or, he 
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would but he would try to, um, convince me that it was no problem, urn 
and I don't want to hear that, um. I want him to take it seriously if I told 
him'(P21). 
Similarly P23 talked about her parents' response to her in the past: 
'I think that a little while ago, a few years ago, when I first saw [name of 
psychiatrist] and then sort of told my mum about it, my parents said 
"Don't be ridiculous, pull yourself together. You've got everything going 
for yoif " (P23). 
P3 8, P 14 and P 10 said that they would probably receive advice, which they 
would not want to take. 
Lack of interest or attention. About one quarter (25.9%, 7/27) of the non- 
disclosing participants mentioned that they thought other people would not listen 
or be interested in their disclosure: 
'they might not just be bothered or want to sit there and listen to it' (P26). 
'I get the feeling people ask for entertainment value. Not, to laugh at, but 
just "That's interesting" you know. But after a while these things are less 
interesting if you keep going on about them, they get boring. I tend to try 
not to. So I try to avoid talking about [most of the? ] time' (N). 
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Not believed. 18.5% (5/27) of the non-disclosing participants indicated that they 
thought they would not be believed. In three of these cases participants thought 
people would not believe that they had been sexually abused. 
Lack of understanding. A cluster of expectations related to more abstract 
qualities about potential recipients of disclosures. About a third of the non- 
disclosers (33.3% 9/27) referred to the possibility that other people would not 
understand them: 
'Folks can say that they understand, but they don't really' (P24). 
'I just feel that people don't understand, and I think that they'll know 
abnormal about me if I try to explain how I feel about my family' (P 14). 
Lack oftrust. Some participants (14.8%, 4/27) also referred to their lack of trust 
in other people. For instance P27 felt she could not trust her most available 
potential recipient enough to talk to her. P5 says he does not trust his therapy 
group: 
'I mean the people that are there [in his therapy group] at the moment I 
don't really know. Um. So I just couldn't really blab out to anybody. It's 
trust at the moment. There's not really much, there's no trust there at the 
moment, there's no um, there's no bond, if that's the word we're looking 
for, I don't know. So, I mean even though they've all experienced the 
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same thing as I have, there's that, eff, element of doubt, that I'm probably 
a one-off, they're a one-off, you know' (P5). 
No point in disclosing. About a quarter of the participants (25.9%, 7/27) 
mentioned that they thought disclosure would be pointless: 
'I don't really think it's urn, if we're talking about colleagues or, or, or 
close friends I don't think it is, uh, I don't think it's of any value' (P36). 
'I, I just don't see the point in telling them. I just don't see the point' 
18). 
Table Two lists the categories of anticipated responses referred to by each non- 
disclosing participant. The mean number of anticipated negative responses was 
2.8. A matrix displaying material from the interviews corresponding to each 
category for each participant is included in Appendix 8. The emphasis 
participants placed on how other people might respond negatively and 
unhelpfully raises the question of the degree to which such expectations are 
accurate. Kelly and McKillop's (1996) review suggests that in general people do 
have low tolerance for other people's disclosures of emotional distress. This 
implies that the participants' assessments of the likely negative or unhelpful 
responses to disclosure may be quite accurate. In any case the pervasive concern 
with other people's responses is strongly in line with Kelly and McKillop's 
argument that the benefits or harms associated with disclosure relate to the way 
in which the recipient responds. More specifically it appears that to a 
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considerable degree participants are concerned about how others will evaluate 
them. This is in line with the Goffinanesque approach to disclosure outlined in 
Chapters Three and Five. 
Table 6.2: categories of anticipated responses of others for non-disclosing 
participants 
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(22.2%) 
1 
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Isolation 
In addition to the potential responses and qualities of available recipients of 
disclosure over a quarter (29.6% 8/27) of participants said that one of the reasons 
they did not disclose was because there was no one available that they felt they 
could talk to: 
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'There was, there was nobody to tell' (N). 
'basically I'm just on my own really' (P 10). 
'There was no one around to tell. Apart from my husband, which I'd 
rather not discuss it with' (P24). 
These comments seem to underline the sense of isolation and lack of solidarity 
with other people experienced by these people. 
Shame and otherfactors associated with the setf 
Non-disclosing participants were asked 'Do you think that if you told somebody 
you would feel stupid, or silly, or ashamed of yourself? ' In this section responses 
will be considered which involve shame and other factors that seem to relate 
more to qualities associated with the self than to how other people might 
respond. A table with material from the interviews corresponding to each 
category is included in Appendix 9. 
Shame and other seýf-conscious emotions. 74.1% (20/27) of the participants 
agreed that they would feel shame if they told somebody else about an 
undisclosed emotion recorded in their diaries: 
'That's the shame part of it, to tell anyone. Um, because I mean I was 
always like somebody that they looked at to sort anything out you know. 
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Urn, the same now [inaudible] so. But you can't make them understand it' 
(P38). 
'Um, I wouldn't, I would feel I think more shame than stupid. Um, I 
would feel that um, it's something that I should, a problem that I should 
keep to myself, that I shouldn't tell anybody about, um, cos it is 
shameful, it is a shameful thing' (P2 1). 
'Probably ashamed. [And what, what do you think that would be about, 
the shame would be about? ] Just sort of how like I've been and how I've 
treated people and ... you know, it would just be about that really. ' (P23). 
'Um. It's not, uh. It's this thing about men not talking about their 
emotions. Uh. It's, it's a, a girly thing to do. [Laughs slightly]. So I'd feel 
a bit stupid. I'd feel a bit ashamed as well. I'd feel a bit ashamed if I told 
a man. I'd feel defmitely. Not so much if I told a woman' (P4). 
'Yeah, just stupid and ashamed, yes, yeah. I don't think I'd necessarily 
feel silly. [Yeah. And can you say a bit about why that might be? ] [Sighs] 
I think that everybody else has got their relationship with their parents 
seems to be fine and OK and mine certainly isn't and never has been. 
And I just feel that people don't understand, and I think that they'll know 
abnormal about me if I try to explain how I feel about my family. I just 
don't talk about it. I (P 14). 
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Of those who did not agee Participants 15,19 and 35 used descriptions that 
many shame theorists (e. g. H. Lewis, 197 1, Retzinger, 199 1) would regard as 
indirect expressions of shame e. g. 'silly' (P 19) or 'uncomfortable' (P3 5). 
'I think I'd feel stupid. [Yeah. Can you say a bit more about that? ] Um. I 
just feel like I'mjust putting upon people and I'm not, you know, they've 
got better things to do than listen to me, wallowing in self-pity, you 
know'(P15). 
'I think if you want that category [? ], I think then I'd have felt silly telling 
him over it, and that to the extent that it would have took me back to 
being a small person again. [Yeah. So that would have been difficult. 
Yeah. Would you, do you think you would have felt ashamed as well? Or 
not? ] No, I don't think I would have felt ashamed over it because 
[husband] knows a lot about my past, things like that. Um, I think it's 
because he knows so much about my past, and that, cos it's the only 
person it's ever been shared with, he's the one that sort of got me this far. 
But it seems to be more understanding to things that has actually gone on 
and on, you know all things like that. So I don't think anything I'd have 
said would have actually made him actually ashamed. ' (P 19). 
'I would feel uncomfortable. [Not those ... ?]I would feel it's not the right 
thing to do. [Yeah. So you wouldn't use those words? ] No, sorry. [That's 
OK]. Um, you know, like when you feel uncomfortable you get like a pit, 
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feeling in your stomach, and you think "Oh, shouldn't have done that". I 
get that sort of uncomfortable. ' (P35). 
P22 denied feeling shame. As she put it: 'I won't feel ashamed. I doret think I've 
got anything to be ashamed of. However she does express fear about how other 
people would judge her if she disclosed. It is perhaps surprising that more 
participants did not deny shame in this way since many theorists of shame have 
commented on people's shame of their own shame (e. g. Scheff, 1988). P26 
seems to have interpreted the interviewer's question as meaning would she feel 
ashamed about having disclosed if she were to disclose, and so she responded 
negatively, although in her diary she said that the thought of disclosing made her 
feel some shame. She also says that she did not disclose because 'people might 
look at me in an entirely different perspective'. In the context of their responses 
in the interview as a whole Participants 25 and 37 who also said they did not 
experience shame at the thought of disclosing were exceptions and will be 
considered at the end of this section. 
The agreement by most participants that they would either feel ashamed or 
'stupid' or 'silly' if they disclosed is supportive of the dramaturgical perspective 
on disclosure, which is understood to be driven by the threat of shame and 
embarrassment. It is also consistent with Finkenauer's Social Model of Secrecy 
in which emotional secrecy is thought of as driven by threat to the self, which 
causes social emotions, which in turn are regulated through secrecy. Finally the 
participants' comments support the notion explored in Chapter Two of the 
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relevance of marker shame in psychological disorder and they illustrate how it 
might operate in the specific context of disclosure. 
18.5% (5/27) participants saw guilt as a factor in the non-disclosure of an 
emotional incident: 
'If I wasn't feeling guilty because of that I would have explained and told 
someone' (P33). 
'I feel guilty when I'm encroaching on their time so much' (P 18). 
'I'd feel guilty, and um, feel that I'd let people down' (P23). 
These comments suggest that guilt may be an important factor alongside shame 
in the non-disclosure of emotional experiences by psychotherapy patients. 
Out of character. 40.7% (11/27) of non-disclosing participants related non- 
disclosure to the fact that disclosure would somehow contradict or undermine a 
valued outward identity. Some participants spoke about how the emotional 
experience they recorded in the diary contradicted their sense of themselves as 
$strong': 
'I've always been really strong and in control. And to tr-, to to then be 
reduced to relying on other people to help me, and, um. Other people 
usually tell me their problems, and to tell them, it's too difficult for me 
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I've kept it together up to now, but, I think it's just so difficult, um, to put 
myself in a position where I'm not in control of the situation' (P8). 
'Uh, the reason that being is I've always been a very, very strong 
character. And my, I've had a lot of family problems, and I've always 
been the one who's been, who when I've been you know ... I was always 
the one who was sort of called upon to sort any problems out' (P 10). 
Other participants referred to other valued facets of their identities that were 
belied by their emotional experiences: 
'the family see me as a laugh, and a sense of humour and all that stuff, 
and, um, I don't know how they'd see me if I said anything' (P2). 
'Just mind. I think because I'm seen to have this really good relationship 
with my children and probably too, because I am, constantly trying to 
work it out, and work it out with her [daughter], you know, and I, I think 
it's a sense of failure really, about it. But I don't compound it by having 
people know' (P 12). 
'I suppose that, sort of people who know me um, that they see me as sort 
of fairly successful, confident person, and that's not really where it's at. 
So it would be kind of like shattering that image' (P23). 
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The comments in this category suggest that these participants are trapped in 
forms of relating to others which while they may be validated by others are false 
to the participants own emotional experiences. 
Inability tojustifyfeelings and experiences. 37% (10/27) participants made 
reference to how they felt unable to justify or account for their feelings or 
experience: 
'Well I feel ashamed and put the damper on what should have been a 
perfectly nice enjoyable evening. Urn, I didn't want to do that. Couldn't 
justify why everybody was irritating me so much. Couldn't understand 
myself why I felt like that. Um, I don't know why I have these feelings, 
but it's quite common' (P 14). 
'women of my age are um, normally perfectly capable of having, um, a 
sexual relationship with their husband. They are expected to have a 
sexual relationship. Ibere's no reason why they shouldn't. For whatever 
reason I, I don't or can't, um, and that is an extremely shameful thing. 
Urn, I should be able to. Urn, it's, he's an extremely caring man, so 
there's no reason why I shouldn't be able to' (P2 1). 
can't. I just can't tell anybody really how I feel. I can't, just can't 
explain it. She, she wants to know why I go into these rages, and I can't 
explain it' (N). 
132 
'[With your family and friends you would feel silly or stupid or ashamed 
of yourself? ] All [inaudible ? three]. I don't know about stupid, but it, I 
just find it hard to clarify it really, you know, just explain or just, yeah, 
just to talk' (P 12). 
Here again the participants seem unable to articulate aspects of their experience 
because there appears to be no social mandate to do so. Their emotional 
experiences appear to fall outside the framework of available stories that can be 
used to 'mitigate or at least make comprehensible a deviation from a canonical 
cultural pattern' (Bruner, 1990, p. 49). 
Responsibility. 33.3% (9/17) of non-disclosing participants mentioned that they 
considered themselves responsible for their difficulties. Sometimes this was in 
the context of sexual abuse: 
'when it happened I should have told someone. And that, it went on for 
years, and I never told anybody. And it could have been stopped' (N). 
'[And what is it that would make you feel silly or stupid? ] Having to 
actual-. Certain things that's happened I somehow feel I could have 
stopped. I am a bit confused as to why I let it well, go on for so long' 
(P24). 
'Shamed that it had happened and I didn't put a stop to it' (P33). 
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The sense that the participant was somehow responsible for their own feelings 
appeared in other contexts as well: 
Mat's why I said I was stupid, because if I just thought a little better, 
you know, if I get my mind to think a little better I wouldn't have, I feel I 
wouldn't have the problem in the first place' (P 17). 
Mostly participants mentioned that their emotional difficulties could only be 
resolved by themselves: 
'I think the whole thing with my son, is something I feel I should deal 
with myself (P27). 
'I feel it's all mental pressure, and I've just got to learn to be stronger. 
And s-, still stems from me' (P 18). 
'You're on your own. You know your own problems. You've got to sort 
them out yourself. It's easier said than done. It took a lot for me to come 
here' (P 10). 
These expressions of individual responsibility are perhaps symptoms and causes 
of the fact that the participant cannot find a socially sanctionable understanding 
of their experiences that could form a basis for reaching out to others. 
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Rejection ofone "s ownfeelings. 18.5% (5/27) participants made explicit 
comments about how they regarded their feelings as invalid: 
'see if I've cried I feel vulnerable then. I feel dis-, that's a disadvantage, 
you know, because I'm showing my weakness' (P 10). 
'I'm not supposed to have these feelings, I'm supposed to be self- 
disciplined, you know' (P 17). 
'I was feeling silly about what I was feeling' (P 15). 
Reluctance to experience unpleasant emotions or memories. Over a fifth (22.2%, 
6/27) of the non-disclosing participants made comments to the effect that they 
didn't wish to disclose because it would have intensified or reinforced the pain of 
their feelings: 
'I think if I told people how I was feeling, then it would have made the 
feelings that I'd had more tense. Cos at the same time it would, I know 
for a fact it would have took me deeper back into my past, than I wanted 
to go back. To the fact that, with [husband] I talk about things. But then 
once I've actually opened it up I find myself talking more and more about 
it, gomg that far back that, you know, I go back to old memories, and I 
didn't want that' (P 19). 
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'If I don't tell anybody people can't remind me about it. And then 
eventually, when the memory gets distant, you can blank it, forget it 
happened, you know, pretend that it didn't happen, or it didn't happen to 
me'(P16). 
'I think that if I actually tried to explain how I was feeling and why it 
would make it sort of, um, not real, because the whole thing was real to 
me anyway, but sort of, urn, it would cement it ... to actually tell him that 
would compound I think all the other um, or would compound the 
knowledge that he had' (P2 1). 
This category is the only one to emerge that may be distinct from the overall 
theme of how the individual fits in with others. This is because reluctance to 
experience a memory or emotion could be simply because it is painful per se, and 
not because of the social implications of experiencing it. However in some cases 
this category can also be seen to relate to social and identity related concerns as 
appears to be the case for P21 who did not want the emotional experience to be 
compounded by other people's judgements in addition to her own. 
Table 6.3 shows the categories of self-related factors associated with non- 
disclosure for each participant. The mean number of categories per participant is 
2.2. 
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Table 6.3: cateeories of self-related factors for non-disclosing participants 
Shame etc Out of 
character 
Inability to 
justify own 
feelings 
Problems 
are own 
respons- 
ibillty 
Rejection of 
own fee 
lings 
Reluctance 
to 
experience 
unpleasant 
emotions/ 
memories 
Other 
2 
4 
7 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
17 
18 
19 (7) 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
30 
33 
35 
36 
37 
38 
TOTAL Excluding 
(? ) = 20/27 
(74.1%) 
11/27 
(40.7%) 
1 10/27(37%) 9/27 (33.3%) 1 5/27 (18.5%) 6/27 1/27(4%) 1 
The emergingpicture ofreasonsfor non-disclosure 
So far two major elements seem to have emerged in participants' reasons for 
non-disclosure - on the one hand the anticipated responses of others and on the 
other participants' own attitudes and feelings relating to disclosure, including 
shame. The fact that most participants mentioned themes in both of these two 
broad categories suggests that the negative self-judgements concerning the 
individuals' experiences often miffored the participants' representations of how 
other people would judge them. 
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The analysis so far appears broadly to support a Goffmanesque understanding of 
the reasons for non-disclosure. The most common anticipated negative responses 
of others seemed to be ones that were labelling, blaming and j udgmental. This is 
consistent with the idea that non-disclosure is related to how the individual 
would be evaluated by other people were they to disclose. This in turn is 
congruent with the prevalence of anticipated shame were the participant to 
disclose. 
The other categories that emerged are compatible with this interpretation. The 
'out of character', 'inability to justify', 'responsibility' and 'rejection of own 
feelings' categories all imply that the individual feels that they cannot present 
others with an account of their experience in which they would emerge as worthy 
of respect. The various categories of anticipated response imply that participants 
considered other people lacking in what Riikonen and Smith (1997) term the 
4moral imagination' to understand their experiences. Either others would prove 
unable to heed their account, or they would prove untrustworthy, or they simply 
would not understand. 
While the weight of evidence seems to favour the Goffinanesque view of 
disclosure there is some suggestion that other considerations were involved too. 
Firstly the category 'reluctance to experience unpleasant emotions/memories' 
suggests that participants may have inhibited emotional experiences for the 
simple reason that they are painful and not because of the identity implications of 
disclosure. However while this may have been true in some cases it is also 
possible that reluctance to experience the emotion was in part due to the 
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implications experiencing the emotion has on how they are seen by others. This 
certainly seemed to be the case for P21 whose attempt to 'blank' the emotion was 
related to the desire not to 'compound the knowledge' that her husband had 
about her. 
A second factor which invites a different interpretation is the finding that many 
participants were concerned about bothering or harming other people. This is 
probably also related to the spontaneous comments by a number of participants 
that non-disclosure was related to feelings of guilt. 71be notion that damage to 
others is an important factor in the decision not to disclose contrasts with the 
notion that non-disclosure is based primarily on fear of damage to the self. It 
seems plausible that many participants felt both guilt and shame related to non- 
disclosure - after all as H. Lewis (197 1) and others have pointed out one may 
often be ashamed of things about which one also feels guilty. While guilt is in all 
probability a consideration in the decision not to disclose it does however appear 
to be less pervasive than the identity-relevant concerns that characterise the 
Goffinanesque interpretation, although this could in part reflect the fact that 
shame, but not guilt, was explicitly mentioned in the structured interview 
questions. 
Overall, the findings concerning participants' reasons for non-disclosure suggest 
that the quite pervasive trend of emotional secrecy in this population is in large 
part related to the participants' inability to frame their emotional experiences in 
an account which would confer respect and understanding of their experience by 
other people. 
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The effects of non-disclosure 
Non-disclosing participants were asked 'do you think that not talking to anyone 
about the way you felt had any effect on your relationships with other peopleT 
Their responses seemed to fall into four categories. Having presented these this 
section will end with a consideration of how non-disclosure may have been part 
of an escalating cycle of difficulty in relationships. 
No effect 
More than half of the non-disclosing participants (51.9%, 14/27) said for at least 
one undisclosed emotion that not disclosing had no effect on their relationships 
with other people. Some participants simply said that they did not think non- 
disclosure would have an effect. In some cases they said that non-disclosure had 
no effect because nobody knew: 
'No. Cos what they don't know can't hurt yer' (PS). 
'I don't talk about it ... So nobody knows. It doesn't effect the 
relationship, cos, nobody knows' (P 15). 
This underlines the sense that what may be salient in their minds is the potential 
negative effect of disclosing. Two other participants said that non-disclosure 
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simply confirmed the status quo - one in which they appeared to be emotionally 
isolated from other people: 
'The only effect it had it sort of confirmed what they said, you know, we 
were a happy family. It didn't change how I felt or anything. Just made 
me feel I'm living a very deceptive life. A lie. Which I wish it wasn't but 
itiust is' (P24). 
'No [No. Basically you just left things as they were? ] As they were. And 
then you just build up a, put another brick on the top' (P36). 
Given the fact that non-disclosure was so habitual for most of the participants, 
asking them what effect it had on their relationships was perhaps a difficult 
question as non-disclosure is the rule rather than the exception. As one 
participant put it it was a 'hard question' because: 
cyou're asking me to say did somebody have a reaction because you 
didn't do something' (P 16). 
Nevertheless a number of participants indicated that there were significant effects 
of non-disclosure on their ways of relating and on their relationships. 
Isolation 
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A proportion (37% 10/27) of non-disclosing participants said that for at least one 
undisclosed emotion non-disclosure led to them isolating themselves to a greater 
degree. Only one participant referred specifically to isolating himself in the 
actual context of the emotion that was reported in the diary: 
'I excluded him. For the next few days. [You sort ofjust didn't 
acknowledge him? ] Well, I talked to him, but on a superficial level. Not, 
uh, encouraging conversation' (N). 
The rest of the participants who said that they isolated themselves indicated that 
this was a general tendency in circumstances of the kind that they had described: 
'And why, [coughs] it's it does have a bearing on the relationship, 
because you're too embarrassed to tell em. You're too ashamed to tell ern 
why it happened all them years ago. It stops from, it stops you from 
forming very close relationship with someone because you, it's 
something you go to sleep at night and think about' (P7). 
'I talk, I very seldom talk about how I feel. Yes, it does, it cuts me off 
from people. I'm very superficial with people, I'm very hard to get to 
know, and I've, I don't say I've done that deliberately but certainly I 
know, I'm aware of it, that I'm very hard to get to know. I think people 
find me unapproachable' (P 14). 
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'I'm sort of standing back from them, putting myself off from them, I'm 
not open, I'm not an open person. Urn, not how I'd like to be, in that 
sense' (P21). 
'Yeah, because I tend to go a bit introverted and spend a lot of time on 
my own and stuff. [And how does that affect relationships? ] Um. I just 
don't really communicate. Just kind of shut away for a while' (P23). 
Isolating oneself and keeping a distance from other people fits in with the need to 
prevent others from becoming aware of 'destructive information'. Indeed non- 
disclosure can itself be seen as a fonn of self-isolation given the general 
tendency to share emotional experiences (Rim6 et al, 1991; in press). The 
comments above suggest that for these participants non-disclosure may have 
made them feel increasingly lonely. This kind of self-isolation is reminiscent of 
H. Lewis' understanding of the 'self-ostracism' that takes place when people are 
ashamed. Comments of this kind underline the growing impression of a group of 
people who are experiencing considerable dislocation of themselves and their 
experiences from others. 
Hostility and irritation 
A similar proportion (29.6% 9/27) of non-disclosing participants said that not 
disclosing an emotional experience made them feel angry, irritated or hostile 
towards other people: 
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'Yeah. Cos 1,1 become really, um, sullen ... I, I can become quite abrupt' 
(P18). 
'because of not talking about it, all my anger and all my hurt is inside, 
and, how it comes out is me being snappy towards my family and 
argumentative' (P2). 
'Um ... I probably took 
it out on my mother. She's the person I have 
most contact with. And, uh, I saw other people in a different light. Uh. 
Uh, as enemies. Wanting to do the same thing' (N). 
'I suppose so. Yeah, I suppose it does. Urn, because when I feel that I 
can't talk to my parents, then sort of after I feel angry that I can't talk to 
them, so I feel sort of quite a lot of anger towards them, and I suppose it 
comes out in my general behaviour. And sort of how I interact with them. 
[And can you can you just say what kind of behaviour that would be? ] 
Um. Just sort of, just snapping and, you know, sort of not really engaging 
in conversation' (P23). 
The kind of anger the participants describe appears generally to be a sullen and 
irritable kind of anger, an anger which is perhaps consistent with the individual 
isolating themselves more. Five participants (18.5 %) indicated that they isolated 
themselves and became angry, irritable or aggressive. 
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It is not clear in most cases exactly what the hostility is associated with, although 
a possibility is that the individual reacts angrily because they anticipate negative 
responses from others if they disclose and they then respond to those around 
them on the basis of these expectations. This is consistent with P23's remark 
(above) that she feels angry because she can't talk to her parents - her anger is 
presumably associated with the kind of behaviour she thinks her parents will 
exhibit if she tries to talk to them. P24 also seems to indicate that her anger is 
associated with how other people might think of her if they were to know about 
the emotional experiences she conceals: 
'They're trying to question me to find is there a problem? And I'm angry 
for them for even daring to question me' (P24). 
If this is true of the other accounts it would seem once again that the issue for the 
participants is the difficulty of getting a positive view of oneself accepted by 
other people. The anger may be understood as protest against other people's 
perceived inability to acknowledge the validity of the individual or his or her 
experiences. As such it has much in common with the kind of 'shame-rage' 
discussed by H. Lewis (197 1) and others (see Chapter One). 
Difficulties in relationships 
40.7% (11/27) of non-disclosing participants indicated that non-disclosure was 
associated with some difficulty in their relationships with others. Some of these 
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participants talked about how anger associated with non-disclosure had caused 
problems in their relationships: 
'Yes. My partner is, um, in the, the, pulling the short straw all the time, 
you know, he's been the brunt of it all, and on this occasion as well, yeah. 
I was quite snappy with him because of it' (P 18). 
'No, the only person it effects unfortunately is um my husband and the 
kids. He gets very tense and wants to know, because if I think about 
things like that, I do become very aggressive. When I say aggressive I 
mean um, I get very angry, and I raise my voice, I'm impatient as well' 
(P24). 
'I think, I think it had on [husband] more than anybody, to the extent that 
[husband] in the end actually got up, and he went out on his own, after, 
you know, sort of arguments, and things like that. Which is a thing 
[husband] has never ever done' (P 19). 
Some emphasised the difficulty that withdrawing and withholding information 
about themselves and their feelings caused in relationships: 
'But as he says, at the moment he knows I can't open up to him, and it's 
hurting him more than it, s hurting me. And it's a horrible feeling, because 
you know, someone's so close to you, and you can't tell him how, what 
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you feel, and how you are feeling. It's a horrible feeling altogether' 
(P26). 
'I don't know how it's affected him. Not talking to him is definitely 
affecting it an awful lot. Cos he wants to sort of get into my inner mind. I 
am not giving the opportunity. And he gets annoyed, because he feels 
we're not sharing. I'm not being co-operative, or I don't want to involve 
him in, you know. He feels if I'm upset, maybe if I told him the reason 
why I was upset he'd be able to help me, but he can't help me. And so I 
refuse to say anything to him. It's just one vicious circle' (P24). 
'You know, sexually, we haven't got a sex life. I, I feel as if I don't want 
to get close to anybody. And, you know, that causes major problems' 
(Plo). 
A common theme is the considerable distress the participants' withdrawn or 
angry behaviour seems to cause their partners. Indeed, one of the participants 
indicated that the reason he had sought help in the clinic was because his 
marriage was under threat. In the following passage he talks about how his 
refusal to speak about his moods and his tantrums has made his wife question 
whether she wants to continue the relationship: 
'And [clears throat] this is what affects our relation, that I will not talk to 
her about this. And she can't understand why when I do these kind of 
things I will not talk, I will not tell her how I feel. Urn. Cos I can't. I just 
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can't tell anybody really how I feel. I can't, just can't explain it ... Won't 
explain why I've done it, won't explain how I was feeling, what's 
brought it on, and just dismiss it then, just hoping it will go away, that 
nobody will pick up on it. My wife wants to know why I'm doing it, and 
because I can't explain, and will not explain to her she doesn't find it any 
use to carry on' (N). 
P2 indicated that she had split up with her partner because she felt he was not 
understanding enough, although she had not told him about her abuse and he had 
put her behaviour down to her being a 'miserable person': 
'I have been really miserable over the last few months, and um, he just 
put it down to me being miserable as a person. But I've not been able to 
tell him about me being abused or how I felt, and so, I just feel let down 
because I thought he'd be more understanding' (P2). 
P28 talked about how not speaking about her experiences worsened her marriage 
before it's eventual dissolution: 
'I think by, um, bottling things up in this case, I don't think it has helped, 
because obviously you build, um, a baffier up, urn, knowing what's 
happened with me and my husband I've noticed by not talking things just 
get worse and worse [MmI. But he's the type that you can't really talk to 
about feelings, uh, so it just gets worse. [So how does it get worse? What 
happens when it gets worse? ] Urn, you just, on both parts you just stop 
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speaking. You have nothing to say, you just, you know, you don't exist 
really. I try and um, carry on as if nothing's happening when it is. [Mm. ] 
And you don't seem to have any control over it, you just let it slip. And 
then itjust gets worse then' (P28). 
It seems likely that these interpersonal effects of non-disclosure may contribute 
to an escalation in the individual's feelings of isolation and alienation because 
the behaviour associated with non-disclosure may itself attract negative labels or 
even rejection from others. P24 describes how her husband's attempts to get into 
her 'inner mind' lead to a 'vicious circle' in which both her and her husband 
seem to feel increasingly aggressive towards one another. P2 talks (above) about 
how not speaking to her partner about her abuse (which still prompts many of her 
emotions) leads him to label her as a 'miserable person'. A similar process 
seemed to be taking place in the case of another sexually abused woman with the 
woman she sits next to at work: 
'Yeah. [Can you say what those effects were? ] Well people don't 
understand it, what you're going through. Say for instance the girl that 
sits next to me at work, sometimes I'm down, and she must think "what's 
wrong with her". It does affect you. [And so, how would it affect your 
relationship with her? ] Well it has. She's not as friendly any more. 
[Right]. But I don't feel that she's close enough and she's got any 
business to know, where I'm going and why. It does affect it' (P33). 
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It is possible that responses of this kind mean that people who have suffered 
experiences that are stigmatising may develop increasingly stigmatised identities 
as they attempt to protect themselves. 
Two participants spoke about how non-disclosure led to more intra-personal 
difficulties. P 15 talked about how non-disclosure led to the emotion 'eating her 
up' inside: 
'Um, cos you can't express it really, so you just keep it inside. ... [And 
when you suppress it what do you think happens then? ] It just eats you up 
inside' (P15). 
P27 talked about how the emotion would build up in her if she didn't disclose: 
'I don't think, no, I don't think it's had an effect on my relationships with 
them, but it's had an effect on my relationship with myself. [Right. So 
what's that? Can you say a bit more about that? ] Um, it's just the fact that 
it must be something to feel guilty about. You know, if I can't talk about 
it to somebody, there must be a legitimate reason. [Right, so it builds up]. 
Yeah. [That if you don't tell somebody then you can, that's a sign that... ] 
Yeah, that, that, there's a real reason for it to be happening' (P27). 
This comment implies that non-disclosure acts as a kind of seal on the 
expectations of negative and judgmental reactions from others - so that the non- 
disclosing person treats others as if they would respond in this way. Earlier it was 
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suggested that this might underlie the hostility that many non-disclosing 
participants appeared to experience towards other people. 
Table 6.4 shows which of the four main themes that emerged in the analysis of 
the effects of disclosure was endorsed by each non-disclosing participant. A 
display matrix showing the interview material corresponding to each category for 
each participant is contained in Appendix 10. 
In summary, participants sometimes said that non-disclosure had no effect on 
their relationships with other people, probably because non-disclosure simply 
maintained an ongoing state of emotional isolation. However many participants 
indicated that non-disclosure led to them being more aggressive, more withdrawn 
and led to serious difficulties in close relationships. These difficulties appeared to 
be due in part to the negative behaviours suffered by the partners but also 
because the partners appeared to have great difficulty accepting aggressive and 
withdrawn behaviour in the absence of any explanation. It was tentatively 
suggested that the participants' negative behaviours following non-disclosure 
might lead to negative judgements on the part of those close to them, thus 
perpetuating and potentially deepening their emotional isolation. For example an 
individual who feels unable to talk about being sexually abused because she feels 
that this is 'destructive information' may behave in a sullen and 'difficult' 
manner which, in the absence of explanation, may paradoxically be seen as 
evidence that there is something wrong with her, or unpleasant about her. It is 
possible that these secondary effects of non-disclosure may even lead to 
attributions of emotional disorder, attributions which, as some social 
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constructionist thinkers have argued may mask the social origins of the 
individual's suffering. 
Table 6.4: the four main themes emerging in the analysis of the effects of 
disclasure for each non-disclosinL' Darticinane 
P NO EFFECT ISOLATION HOSTILITY RELATIONSHIP 
2 
4 
5 
7 
8 
10 
12 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
30 
33 
35 
36 
37 
38 
TOT 
AL 
55.5%(15/27) 37%(10127) 29.6%(9/27) 40,7%(11/27) 
Analysis of atypical cases of non-disclosure 
In the methods section it was mentioned that a major technique in establishing 
the validity of conclusions drawn from qualitative data was that of paying 
attention to so-called 'negative' cases - cases which do not appear to conform to 
the general pattern of findings. Negative cases present a challenge to the 
emerging theoretical explanations and indicate the limits of the theory or where 
the theory needs to be modified. Two of the 27 participants who described at 
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least one emotional experience that they did not disclose clearly did not conform 
to the general trends discussed above. Since these two participants also differed 
markedly from one another they will be considered separately. 
P25 
The main difference between P25 and the other participants was that her non- 
disclosure seemed to be unrelated to any of the Goffmanesque concerns that 
typified the other participants' experiences of non-disclosure. Unlike most 
participants she denied that shame had anything to do with not disclosing the 
emotions: 
'Urn, well, why should I feel silly, or ... I can't see that I'd have any 
particular reason to feel silly, or ashamed of myself or anything else. ' 
Moreover there were no indications of shame as a theme in her life elsewhere in 
the interview, unlike for instance P22 who denied that she would feel shame if 
she disclosed but did reveal a preoccupation with how others might think of her 
if she did. Indeed there appear to be no indications that she had any interest in 
how other people might think of her. She did express concern in one part of the 
interview that other people might 'turn her away' when she wanted to talk to 
them. However this concern with rejection differed from that of other 
pa rticipants in that it was not apparently predicated on any characteristics of her 
2 Some participants have entries under both 'no effect' and the other columns. This is because 
more than one emotion was discussed in most of the interviews. 
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own that she felt might lead to rejection, and she did not appear to reject her own 
experiencing because of its implications for her social value. 
The reasons for non-disclosure that P25 did give in the interview reinforce the 
contrast between her case and the others. She comments on a number of 
occasions that the emotions that she reported in the diary are common 
experiences for her. For example she says of the guilt that she reported 'I just feel 
guilty all the time anyway. It's not anything abnormal'. This 'normality' is for 
her the reason that she does not tell anyone else, and she contrasts it with the 
kind of experiences that she would disclose: 
'Maybe because I sort of feel like that all the time anyway, so. [Laughs]. 
It wasn't anything that was sort of life or death or really sort of extreme. ' 
'I wouldn't tell anybody about that I felt guilty, well I might actually, 
come to think of it. I don't know. I might say in passing to someone "Oh I 
went round so and so's, I felt a bit guilty because I knew she was 
decorating. I might on that kind of level, but it wasn't like mega, it's not 
kind of in that league of, you know, sort of self-destruction or anything, 
you know, it's not big enough. ' 
At the end of the interview she clarifies the kind of experience that she would 
discuss: 
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'I mean I did feel really guilty. But the sort of things I tell people about is 
if you know I've cut my wrists recently, or, you know, I want to kill 
myself, or [Laughs] .' 
It appears then that the experiences that she would disclose are extreme and 
deviant behaviours, while more normal kinds of emotional experiences that she 
has she keeps to herself. In this respect her pattem of disclosure would appear to 
be opposite to the general pattern of reasons for non-disclosure where non- 
disclosure takes place as a result of the person believing that their experience is 
abnormal and difficult for others to understand. 
An explanation for the atypical reasons for disclosure given by this participant 
may lie in the fact that this participant appeared to be in a different kind of social 
context to the other participants. Unlike most participants, for whom the world of 
psychotherapy may have seemed quite unfamiliar, P25 seemed to live her life in 
a milieu which was imbued with the language and attitudes of psychotherapy. 
Unmarried and living alone she spent her days at a day centre and she had 
formerly been a patient in a therapeutic community. In this respect it might be 
said that this woman was immersed in what could be termed a 'mental health 
subculture'. While a full explanation may be impossible due to the limited scope 
of the research interview, a close reading of what she said in this interview 
suggests that aspects of this 'mental health subculture' may have contributed to 
her unusual attitude to disclosure. 
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A striking feature in P25's interview is how she explains her emotional 
experiences as if they are themes that illustrate the workings of her inner mind 
rather than as experiences which reflect her concerns in the real world. For 
instance she explains her guilt in the following way: 
'I don't know whether it was to do with again this thing about disturbing 
other people. It's ridiculous. Urn, or, uh, whether it was to do with I'm 
not entitled to enjoy myself. I'm not sure which one of those it was. ' 
In this quote it is as if her emotional experience has become simply a token of 
her (malfunctioning) personality dynamics. The objectifying quality of the phrase 
'this thing about disturbing other people' and the added comment 'it's ridiculous' 
imply that the social concerns associated with her guilt are invalid. Her guilt 
seems to be robbed of any external reference and the fact that she appears 
uncertain which of the two 'themes' is correct seems to underline its fuzziness. 
The 'therapeutic' way of understanding her emotional life illustrated above could 
be seen as invalidating her feelings, at least in so far as her feelings can be taken 
as an expression of her interpersonal reality. Indeed Gergen (1994) has recently 
argued that mental health terminology may lead to a kind of 'cultural 
enfeeblement' of the patient in which they are led to believe that the source of 
their difficulties lies within themselves and not in their relationships or the 
outside world. To the degree that she does not see her own feelings as valid she 
is similar to the other non-disclosing participants. However it does not appear to 
be a cause of shame in the same way as it is for the other participants. This is 
presumably because the 'therapeutic' discourse that seems to have enveloped her 
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self-understanding is broadly accepting even if it weakens her purchase on the 
extemal world. 
A possible effect of this self-referential form of self-understanding is that, even 
while she does not express much concern about being alienated from other 
people, she does frequently seem to be alienated from her own emotional 
experiences. In the absence of an external framework of meaning she seems to 
see herself as a kind of battleground in which conflicting emotions, thoughts and 
obsessions struggle to take over her mind. As she puts it at one point in the 
interview: 
'I can't find any space in my mind, in my own head which is just mine, 
and where there's nothing coming in on it, or taking it away'. 
However by attempting to disengage herself from the contents of her psyche she 
may become even more alienated from the outside world and any meaning in it. 
It is perhaps in this context of 'cultural enfeeblement' that her attitude towards 
disclosure begins to make sense. If most of time her experiences have no 
interpersonal meaning (or illocutionary force in the terms used by Haff6,1991) 
then it is possible that the disclosure of extreme acts such as threatening suicide 
and physically harming herself is a way of breaching this hall of mirrors of and 
compelling another person to respond to her directly. 
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If this tentative analysis is correct it suggests that the meaning of disclosure and 
non-disclosure may depend on how disclosure is construed within a particular 
community. This is consistent with some work which has demonstrated that 
practices of emotional disclosure vary considerably cross-culturally, and that 
emotional disclosure and non-disclosure has different implications in different 
cultures (Georges, 1995). It was suggested above that disclosure of deviant 
emotional experiences and acts might function differently in this participant's 
therapy-influenced subculture compared to how it might work in the wider 
community. In the mental health subculture disclosure of deviant experiences 
might well function (for the patient) as a ritual of re-engagement with other 
people, whereas people in the wider community might construe such disclosures 
as giving others the grounds to reject them or disparage them. It appears, then, 
that generalisations about mechanisms of disclosure may fail to account for local 
variations in the meaning of disclosure. 
P37 
Like P25, P37 did not refer to any of the typical reasons for non-disclosure 
alluded to by the other participants. There were no references to anticipated 
negative responses by other people and no references to shame or any of the 
other self-related reasons for non-disclosure. As a negative case P37 would 
appear to require less explanation than P25. She said that the reason she hadn't 
told anyone was simply because she hadn't yet seen her partner, but she would 
tell him when she saw him later in the day. She added that if it had been a really 
bad emotional experience she would have phoned him. This participant recorded 
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another emotion that she did disclose to her partner, and she said that 'I just 
always tell him everything'. Consequently the undisclosed emotion does not 
seem to be of the same order as the undisclosed experiences reported by most 
participants - in P37's case it is only undisclosed because she hasn't yet 
disclosed it. P37's disclosure dynamics would therefore appear to belong with 
those whose tendency is to disclose rather than with the non-disclosers 
considered in this chapter. 
Both P25 and P37 said that non-disclosure did not have any effects on their 
relationships with other people. 
Discussion 
The qualitative interview study reinforced the conclusion of Chapter Four that 
shame may play a significant role in psychotherapy patients' emotional isolation. 
Many participants readily agreed that they thought they would feel shame if they 
disclosed. Shame was also often implied in the other reasons that participants 
invoked for keeping things to themselves. These reasons included fear of being 
blamed or judged, fear of shattering a valued identity they have established in 
their relationships with others, a sense that it was wrong to have the feelings and 
experiences they had, and a fear of being misunderstood. 
The context-focused examination of shame and disclosure decisions conducted in 
this study suggests that psychotherapy patients were deeply concerned with 
whether they could be valued or understood by other people. This impression 
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was reinforced by comments that participants made in the interviews about not 
fitting in, remarks which occurred separately from their comments about why 
they did not disclose or what the effect of non-disclosure was: 
'I feel perhaps not part of it' (P14). 
'I do get that feeling a lot. I do get that feeling a I-, "Why am I here? " 
And if I'm pissing everybody else off, including my wife, uh, you know, 
why have me here, you know, what's the purpose of me being hereT 
(P17). 
'why can't I be normalT (P24). 
'because of my situation I feel that I am on my own, just put to one side' 
(P38). 
Participants often spontaneously mentioned how they thought of themselves as 
unworthy or inadequate people: 
'I think my problem is lack of self-esteem, uh. I'm not very proud of the 
uh, the way I conduct myself (N). 
'I feel as if I'm a failure basically. As if I've failed. This one, where it's 
really personal to me, where I can't deal with it' (P10). 
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'I just felt dreadful about myself. I mean I, I can't even begin to tell you. I 
hated myself as well, I suppose' (P30). 
'[what exactly did you feel guilty about? ] Everyffiffig, about the way that 
I am, about me' (P 15). 
These comments reinforce the findings of both the quantitative and qualitative 
elements of the study which indicate that psychotherapy referrals are very 
concerned with how they fit in with other people - or indeed how they appear to 
be unable to fit in. While this emphasis on the social elements of psychological 
distress chimes in with some recent thinking about the nature of psychopathology 
(e. g. Gergen, 1994; Riikonen and Smith, 1997; Parker et al, 1995; and see 
Chapter One) it cuts against the notion that these individuals suffer from 
disorders which can be understood outside the social context in which they 
operate. In this sense the findings also move the research on shame and 
psychological disorder on from the assumption that disorder results from an 
intrapsychic affective bias which predisposes the individual to experience more 
shame than normal regardless of the circumstances (see Chapter One). 
The findings of the qualitative interview study put some flesh on the bones of the 
diary study's finding of an association between shame and imagined disclosure 
(Chapter Four). In the quantitative part of the study it was found that a majority 
of undisclosed emotions were associated with shame at the thought of disclosure. 
In the qualitative part this was replicated but it was found to be part of a 
constellation of imagined negative social outcomes associated with non- 
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disclosure. The association between shame and imagined negative social 
responses is reminiscent of H. Lewis' (197 1) model of 'superego' shame (see 
Chapter Two) in which a major part is played by the shamed individual's 
imagination of negative and humiliating social responses. The current findings 
support this view of shame and underline the utility of the notion of a subtle form 
of 'marker' shame being implicated in psychological disorder. The current 
findings show vividly how this kind of shame impacts on the everyday practice 
of 'socially sharing' one's emotional experiences (see Chapter Three). 
It is not possible to know exactly how accurate participants may have been in 
their anticipations of a negative response to disclosure in the cases of non- 
disclosure. However the fact that very few participants reported disclosures 
which were met with a negative response, while over one third reported 
disclosures which met with a positive response (see Chapter Seven) suggests that 
participants may have been reasonably judicious in assessing how people would 
respond. This suggests that in future research greater attention could profitably 
be paid to the responsiveness of the social context of psychologically distressed 
patients and the 'normative' evaluations their experiences, if known, would 
receive. 
The qualitative findings also indicate that non-disclosure may contribute to a 
potentially escalating cascade of alienation. Many participants' tendency to 
become irritable, aggressive and withdrawn seemed to put significant stress on 
relationships, causing their partners considerable distress. It was possible to infer 
in some of the interviews that 'difficult' behaviour associated with non- 
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disclosure might in itself lead to negative judgements from other people - for 
instance P2, who said that other people thought she was just a really 'miserable' 
person. Consequently the attempt to avoid being judged or labelled by other 
people might actually lead to behaviour which is itself 'unaccountable', regarded 
as deviant, and labelled accordingly (ultimately perhaps with psychiatric 
diagnoses). 
Overall the current study marks an important first step in finding out how shame 
contributes to psychological disorder and distress. The findings point the way 
towards an increasingly social understanding of psychological difficulties and of 
the role of shame within them. 
So far the data also seem to be supportive of the Goffmanesque perspective on 
disclosure, and the related ideas of Kelly and McKillop (1996) and Finkenauer et 
al (in press). Participants' decisions to withhold information seemed to be 
significantly related to their desire to avoid shame or embarrassment and 
negative perceptions by others of themselves. However there was some evidence 
of factors associated with guilt and hanning others playing a role, which is 
consistent with the observations of H. Lewis (197 1) that shame and guilt 
frequently co-occur. There was also the possibility that some emotional 
experiences might be inhibited simply because they were painful in themselves, 
and not because of considerations relating to identity and how others would 
perceive the self if disclosed. 
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The negative case analysis suggested that the association between non-disclosure 
and threat to identity may be culture-bound. A participant who atypically seemed 
to live in what was termed a 'mental health sub-culture' did not appear to inhibit 
disclosure for the same reasons as other participants. It was suggested that this 
was because disclosure had different implications in her social context, i. e. it was 
not threatening to her identity, but at the same time may not have been regarded 
as a 'valid' response to her enviromnent. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Benerits of Disclosure: Helpful and Unhelpful 
Disclosure Experiences Reported by Psychotherapy 
Patients 
Introduction 
In this chapter data from the interviews concerning the actual experience of 
disclosure will be examined. The aim of the chapter is to explore in greater detail 
the context of the diary participants' experiences of disclosure and to pay 
particular attention to the social factors that may have mediated the outcome of 
these disclosures. 'Ibis chapter is also intended to examine whether the 
Goffinanesque themes that seemed so relevant to the non-disclosure of emotional 
experiences by psychotherapy patients also apply when the emotions are 
disclosed. In order to ground the analysis in the existing literature and to pay 
attention to alternative theoretical explanations of the data (as advocated by Yin, 
1989) an attempt will be made to identify material in the interviews which 
supports two alternative theoretical explanations of the benefits of emotional 
disclosure. These are the inhibition and the cognitive assimilation models which 
have been outlined in Chapter Three. Currently these models appear to be the 
dominant theories in the literature on the benefits of emotional disclosure. 
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Similarities between participants who disclosed and those who did not 
An initial question concerns the degree to which participants who disclosed had 
similar preoccupations to those who did not. If their preoccupations were entirely 
different to non-disclosing participants then that might suggest that quite separate 
theoretical constructs need to be developed to account for their disclosures. If 
this is not the case, and their concerns are similar, the Goffmanesque perspective 
that emerged in the previous chapter may be extended to account for the 
outcomes of disclosure as well as the reasons for non-disclosure. Some 
participants - about one quarter (26.5% 9/34) - reported instances of disclosure as 
well as instances of non-disclosure in their diaries. However 20.6% (7/34) 
participants reported only disclosed emotional instances and exactly 50% (17/34) 
reported only undisclosed emotions. In this section of the chapter an attempt will 
be made to see whether disclosing participants had similar concerns about 
disclosure to non-disclosing participants. Having done that comments by non- 
disclosing participants about when they would disclose will be considered. 
The ambivalence ofdisclosing participants 
Four participants - participants 3,6,11 and 31- were the most prolific of the 
disclosers who found talking helpful. All of them disclosed more than one 
emotion and described these disclosures as helpful to them and none of them 
recorded an emotion in their diaries that they did not disclose. Of these four, 
three indicated clearly in the course of their interviews that disclosure was 
difficult for them because of the kind of response that they anticipated: 
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'It's terribly tempting when you're so far down the road with abuse to 
think "Well aren't they a little bit sick of hearing about this and aren't Ia 
little bit sick of talking about it"' (M). 
"Ibere've been times when I've actually written the flashbacks down and 
I've hidden the paper, so she couldn't find it like, because I didn't know 
how she would react to what I'd put down' (P6). 
'I'd also sort of um, was aware that I tend to put on a front, so, uh, that 
I'm perfectly alright, and so I was frightened that I'd given her the 
impression that I was perfectly OK ... So therefore she wouldn't believe 
me. I'm never believed' (P 11). 
Another participant who disclosed (P20) expressed a fear of being judged and 
misunderstood if she discloses. Clearly for her disclosure is something she does 
quite selectively: 
'I mean most of my friends will phone up and say "How are you? " 
Because they know I've been uh, a bit uh, crazy. And uh, they'll come 
round and see me, but I won't tell them things ... I think some of them 
would be a bit judgmental ... And they wouldn't understand about, the 
sort of things that upset me' (P20). 
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Since there were only seven participants who only disclosed the emotions they 
recorded comments of this kind were made by over half of these individuals 
(57.1%). These comments tended to be made by the participants who elaborated 
more in their interviews so it is possible that the remaining three participants 
experienced fears of this kind but did not voice them in the interview. 
Participants who had failed to disclose at least one other emotion for the reasons 
discussed in the previous chapter were responsible for the remaining instances of 
disclosure. This suggests that a majority of participants who disclosed did so in 
spite of experiencing similar pressures to withhold as participants who remained 
silent. 
The ambivalence ofnon-disclosing participants 
Returning to the non-disclosing participants whose many reasons for not 
disclosing were discussed in the previous chapter it appears that, perhaps 
surprisingly, many of them were prepared and even willing to disclose given the 
right circumstances. A striking example of this occurred in the interview with 
P24 who had not disclosed any of the four emotions she recorded in her diary. 
Iluoughout the interview she seemed one of the strongest advocates of secrecy. 
However right at the end of her interview she revealed that the effort associated 
with this was beginning to tell on her: 
'I still feel, you know, who knows whose hands it falls into. By some 
coincidence it could be someone who knows the family and they put two 
and two together, and more or less can put a name to it. So I think "Oh 
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Jesus! " But what's the point? I've kept it together for so long, but lately I 
find it's sort of pulling me apart keeping all these things to myself. It's 
really, I feel my brain cells have been scrambled or something. And I feel 
as if, I just want to tell someone once and get it over with. You know get 
it off my brain' (P24). 
Given the negative aftermath of non-disclosure that emerged in the analysis of 
the effects of non-disclosure in the previous chapter it is perhaps not surprising 
that participants would be interested in finding a way out. However an important 
pre-condition - that for these participants had not yet been met - was finding the 
right person to talk to: 
'I think by sharing it now, looking at it now, I think by sharing it I think I 
would feel a lot better. By sharing it now, you know, with the right 
people' (P22). 
'Until I've got somebody I know I can trust, and say, you know, enough's 
enough, I want to spill the beans. But until I get that I just bottle it up 
inside' (P26). 
The precise characteristics of the right person seemed to vary between 
participants. P3 8 and P 12 indicated that they thought they could confide in a 
mental health professional: 
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Th well I suppose really to talk to anybody about it, you know, like 
somebody like yourself or a psychiatrist. I suppose in a way if you get it 
off your chest to somebody that can relate to this type of thing' (P3 8). 
'I find it harder to talk with family or friends. I mean I, they obviously 
know that I've had problems, but to break it down and talk to them about 
emotions, but, I'd really find it hard. Whereas a doctor or, um, my CPN1, 
I don't because well they know what they're talking about for a start I 
suppose, and also they, it's how they ask the question, you know, that, 
that makes it easier to give an answer out' (P 12). 
A slightly different emphasis, though one not incompatible with talking to a 
professional, was made by participants who stressed that they could only talk to 
someone if they were a stranger who was not involved in the rest of their lives: 
'I'd have to be in an enviromnent where I didn't know the person. Uh, or 
they didn't know me ... Where I don't, I haven't got to justify myself to 
people' (P 10). 
'[What would have to be different for you to tell somebody about this? ] 
Urn, they'd have to be people who aren't connected, who aren't 
Strangers' (P23). 
1 Community Psychiatric Nurse 
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'The only person I could tell is, maybe like a, like someone at the clinic. 
Because once I leave, I sort of cut myself off. It hasn't happened. I 
haven't said anything. It's not someone that I knew personally. I don't 
feel involved. That's the only way I could. Otherwise there's nothing that 
would make me, let anyone know my true emotions or feelings' (P24). 
A third qualification was having had similar experiences to the participant. A 
number of participants thought that if someone had experienced the same 
difficulties as them then they would be able to understand: 
'If I'd have told them [clears throat]. I'd tell select people. I would only 
tell people that cared about me. Urn. People I know. I'd probably tell my 
sisters. Not all my sisters. I'd tell a couple of my sisters, simply because, 
um, both, both them, two of my sisters are going through the same thing 
by the same person. They're going through the same thing. So, I could 
probably tell, talk to them about this and I wouldn't be ashamed. You 
know, outsiders I wouldn't tell at all' (P7). 
'I guess if someone's in the same position. If I felt with somebody close 
to them, it certainly would have to be somebody close to me, but if I felt 
somebody's background was similar to my own, I could probably say I 
could feel bad about [inaudible]. So, I feel as though they might 
understand because they have their same feelings perhaps' (P 14). 
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While there appears to be a contrast between those who could only tell outsiders 
versus those who could only tell someone who had been through the same 
experience, each of these desirable recipient characteristics would appear to 
reduce the possibly destructive impact of disclosure on the participants' 
identities. 
To summarise, non-disclosing participants seemed interested in disclosing if only 
they could find the right person. At the same time disclosing participants 
reported similar anxieties regarding disclosure as those who did not disclose. 
When put together these two elements raise the possibility that disclosing and 
non-disclosing participants may differ more in the availability of appropriate 
confidants than in the motives and concerns that drive their disclosure behaviour. 
The socially mediated benerits of disclosure 
In this section material in the interviews pertaining to social factors and social 
outcomes of the disclosure experiences reported by the participants will be 
considered. The analysis will deal firstly with the behaviour of the recipient, 
before moving on to the effects of this behaviour on the disclosing individual. 
The section will end with a consideration of the effect disclosure had on the 
relationship with the recipient. 
Understanding and supportive responses 
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Participants who reported an experience of helpful disclosure reported that the 
recipient of the disclosure responded in a highly positive and accepting manner. 
They sometimes spoke about how the recipient had been 'understanding': 
'When I told him, he understood everything about it. He understood 
completely. And he was very reassuring' (M). 
'Um, sympathetic. Understanding. Uh, he's prepared to listen' (P20). 
'And he just goes "Oh look at you" because he knows what I'm like. So 
he understands in a way' (P37). 
These comments are of course reminiscent of the fear expressed by non- 
disclosing participants that others would not understand. Other participants 
stressed how supportive their recipients had been: 
'I think the reality is that I thought she is supportive of me, and knows 
there are reasons for the way I feel' (P1 1). 
'Supportive ... Urn. Yeah, I just felt she was really supportive of me' 
(P15). 
'I think well actually one of my project workers ... she just said that she 
was very pleased that I was assertive enough to be able to speak about it, 
you know, whereas before maybe I wouldn't have been able to ... And 
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being able to talk about it makes you a stronger person. And she was 
praising me for it. And she said she did feel that you know maybe I was 
making that breakthrough to be able to talk ... She's very supportive our 
[name] [laughs] ... Yeah she was giving me encouragement that if in the 
future it happened again I could talk. Yeah, you know it wasn't anything 
to be ashamed of or anything' (P27). 
In some cases the recipient appeared to affirm the legitimacy of the participants' 
actions or points of view: 
'[Sighs]. Boy did I have mixed emotions on it. Like I said before uh, um, 
I still felt stupid, but uh, ah, I started listening to what she had to say, cos 
she said it, from what you tell me it's not all your fault' (P 17). 
'I could say that she feels soffy that this is all going on, but, and uh, she 
felt uh, sort of anger, for me ... you know, she thought I was right to feel 
angry. You know, so, you know, because she, I says to her "I'm so 
angry", and she says "You have every right to be"' (P3 1). 
Or in the case of P29 share the fact that they have been through the same 
experience: 
'Um, they can tell me, you know, sometimes it happened to them as well, 
you know ... it's not only myself (P29). 
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The supportive responses of the recipients when the disclosure was helpful 
contrast with those received by participants who reported unhelpful disclosures. 
Although there were only four participants who reported unhelpful disclosures, 
in three of these cases the recipient appeared to respond in an unsupportive 
manner (the one exception will be considered later in the section on negative 
cases). For instance P3 described how her husband responded to her in a 
'dismissive tone' and was 'pretty pissed off with her. P 13 said that she was 
unsure about how her mother felt towards her when she disclosed and stated that 
her mother, the recipient of her disclosures, 'just doesn't, she doesn't take not-, 
notice of me'. She also says that her mother tells her 'You should stand up for 
yourself for a change' implying rather unsympathetically that the participant's 
difficulties are her own responsibility. P26 says the recipient of her unhelpful 
disclosure tried to give her advice, which she did not want to take, and also 
seemed to think of her in a less favourable manner since she disclosed. 
Overall 71.4% (10/14) of the participants who reported a helpful disclosure 
described how the recipient responded positively and supportively to them. Ile 
four negative cases involve two (Ps 13 and P30) where the helpful aspects of the 
disclosure seemed only just to outweigh the unhelpfulness of the participants' 
response. PI 3's 'helpful' disclosure was remarkably similar to her unhelpful 
ones (see the previous paragraph) and P30 described how the recipient - in this 
case also her mother - seemed to accept her disclosure without really 
acknowledging or validating her: 
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'just like this "Oh, well you know, and ulf'. Like it was all, I don't know 
it is very difficult with my mother to know what's going on'. 
There were two other instances of helpful disclosure when the response of the 
participant did not seem important. Both of these involved expressions of anger 
and they will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. Of the unhelpful 
disclosures 75% (3/4) seemed to involve invalidating responses from the 
recipient. In summary it appears then that the helpfulness of disclosure in this 
population is strongly determined by the warmth and supportiveness of the 
recipient's response. 
Validation 
The fact that participants felt validated by the recipient when the disclosure was 
helpful is strongly implied in their comments about the understanding and 
supportive responses they received. Some participants commented that they 
valued the responses they received in ways that underlined this: 
'It's getting um, it's getting to feel that these emotions are reasonable. It's 
when somebody says "Yes, that's right, you're bound to feel like that", 
you think "Oh good, that alright, I'm in reality, that is a normal emotion! ', 
and uh, you feel more validated. The feelings are validated' (P3). 
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'Well I suppose it's a sort of, some sort of feeling of relief I suppose 
Just sort of better in myself that at least I told her, and at least she can see 
my point. You know, where he couldn't' (P3 1). 
it helps to know that there's other people there. That people can say 
"Yeah I feel that sometimes... (P6). 
P6 talked about how his wife's response to his disclosure of a specific incident 
associated with his abuse meant that he no longer felt he had to justify himself: 
'It just gave me the proof I needed that I can tell her things ... Um. It 
made me feel that I don't have to justify myself to not only my wife but 
to anybody. [Inaudible] what I've been through. It was bad. I'm having 
trouble coming to terms with it, but, the only one I've got to really justify 
it to is me. You know, it's ... There are times when I actually think well 
you know, OK yeah it happened but was it as bad, not as you make out, 
but as everybody else makes out. There are times when I've thought yeah 
like deep down [inaudible]. Then the society side of it comes in where it's 
it's you know the shame from [inaudible]. Well I was brought up a 
Catholic, so I've got all that Catholicism running around my head, even 
though like I'm very, very lapsed. I haven't got to justify myself to 
anyone you see' (P6). 
This quote suggests that what is important for this man is finding a shared sense 
of reality in which his experiences do not stigmatise him. In the previous chapter 
177 
the pervasive sense of failure and stigma of the non-disclosing participants was 
described, and earlier in this chapter evidence was presented suggesting that non- 
disclosing and disclosing participants had similar preoccupations with how 
others responded to them. It seems, then, as though feeling socially valid may be 
a central element in beneficial disclosure for this population. 
This conclusion is consistent with the material on unhelpful disclosures. 
Participants whose disclosures were not described by them as helpful did not 
appear to feel more socially valid as a result of their disclosures. P3 vividly 
illustrates how she felt increasingly alienated when her husband fails to respond 
supportively to her one unhelpful experience of disclosure: 
'I felt abandoned by him. Urn, which was which was the feeling that I 
was trying to avoid. That was what I was so frightened of was being 
abandoned by the whole of society, and having to take off to some far 
away place'. 
She also says that his response made her 'insecure' because: 
'if he wasn't there for me, then there was no one there for me really. And 
I felt insecure in the extreme anyway, and I desperately needed a line, 
sort of to hang on to, and he, and he just wanted to go to sleep'. 
P 13 continued to feel more and more angry about how her friends let her down, 
suggesting that she continues to feel socially invalid. P26 as noted above believes 
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the friend she spoke to now sees her in a completely different way and does not 
speak to her so much. A similar picture emerges in the two interviews which 
were somewhat but not very helpful, those of P3 0 and P 13. P3 0 emphasises how 
limited the helpfulness of the disclosure was by talking about how her mother 
(the recipient) was unable to recognise and respond to her needs. As she says in a 
somewhat bitter aside: 'if I think, you know, about the number of times this 
particular thing has happened, and me rushing to hospital because of something 
my mother did with my food'. PI 3's apparently helpful disclosure was similar to 
her unhelpful ones both in its form and its outcome and there is no evidence that 
she feels more socially valid as a result of it. So far, then, feeling socially 
validated as a result of the understanding and supportive responses of the 
recipient seems to be the pathway to beneficial disclosure for these participants. 
Disconfirming negative social expectations 
Some participants made it clear that their sense of enhanced social validity 
challenged their expectations about how other people would respond to them. In 
these cases it seemed very clear that the supportive feedback offered by the 
recipient helped to deconstruct, the negative social expectations which as we have 
seen characterised disclosing participants as well as those who did not disclose. 
This was very evident in the case of P6: 
'But when I tell I mean I write it down on the emotions, and I actually 
told her the flashback. And she says to me, "Is that all? " You know, it 
wasn't done in like "Oh well, you know, your abuse doesn't matter blah- 
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di-blalf'. It would have done like "Well, what did you expect me to do? " 
You know, "Pack up and leave? " sort of thing. She says "Is that all? " 
Which made me feel pretty good. That it wasn't that bad after all, even 
though it seemed like the biggest, darkest black secret, it wasn't 
[inaudible]' (P6). 
He contrasts this with how people have responded to him in the past: 
'... everybody in the past I've confided in has either used it against me or 
just left me cos they can't handle it. It's not the sort of secret you can just 
tell somebody and they're "Ah well, not to worry". You know, society's 
made it a taboo subject' (P6). 
His wife's response appears to offer him a social context in which his abuse does 
not have to be a 'black secret', where it has no impact on how he is seen. P 11 
described a similar dynamic: 
'How I feel is that she must think I'm stupid as I think I am, but I know 
that isn't the case. Urn. So I think the reality is that I thought she is 
supportive of me, and knows there are reasons for the way I feel' (P 11). 
P27 spoke about how she was surprised to find her recipients accepting of her 
feelings: 
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'Because it was just, basically over getting keys for my flat and that was, 
and the man said I couldn't have them on that day, I'd still have to wait 
and these two women know youjust have to wait, there's nothing you can 
do, it's no use sort of crying and talking about it. But they didn't actually 
feel that way. Cos once I did talk about it they were more than willing to 
help, but this is the idea sort of coming in my head, thinking they're 
going to think I'm really stupid, and there's no need going on about it, so 
1, it's just a case of I have to wait, I can't do anything about this' (P27). 
P3 talks about how disclosure helps to 'lift away' the embarrassment, alienation 
and isolation associated with her emotions which also implies that when she 
receives a positive response her expectations of stigma and rejection are 
deconstructed: 
'I think that all painful emotions are, and especially ones about sexual 
abuse, have a tinge of embarrassment about them. All your emotions are 
sort of slightly tinged with embaffassment. And urn when you talk about 
it, it lifts away the embaffassment, because the embaffassment is the 
secretive part and once you've talked about it, that takes that away. Do 
you know what I mean? [Yes, yeah]. And also a lot of the pain is 
alienation and isolation. That, that's where the pain comes in. And if you 
talk about it then obviously that's decreased' (M). 
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P3's positive experiences of disclosure also contrast with her negative 
experiences in the past. She says that when she first disclosed the fact that she 
was abused her mother had been 'completely unsupportive'. 
It is not clear whether all the participants who disclosed helpfully found their 
negative interpersonal expectations challenged in this way. Nevertheless it is 
plausible that these disconfirming experiences were particularly therapeutic since 
they represent a change in both the subjective and objective aspects of the 
individual's social context. At the subjective level the individual changes their 
expectations of other people in their social world (which may make it easier to 
access support). However there appears to have been change in the real world 
since other people are being supportive and understanding, in contrast to the 
unsupportive responses of others in the past mentioned by some participants. 
Strengthening relationships 
Helpful disclosure seems often to have strengthened the participants' relationship 
with the recipient. Many participants commented that it had led to increased trust 
in the relationship: 
'depending on how supportive they are is how much you feel about them 
at that moment in time. It's terribly connected to how much you love 
them. If you think that they're going to completely support you then you 
can really sort of um feel that everything is validated, your relationship 
wl em, your trust, everything' (M). 
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This sense of trust seemed to be related to being more confident that the recipient 
will value them and support them, a fact which often seems to be implicitly or 
explicitly contrasted with a prior reality in which they have not been valued. The 
following responses were made to the question 'What effect do you think talking 
about your feelings had on your relationship with the people/person you toldT: 
'Oh, they improved. They improved it. [In what particular way? ] In the 
way that it you know, it's security, it's knowing that whatever happened 
in the past with like whoever's harmed me in the past, he's always going 
to be there. And when we talk about the future that that increases my 
trust. So I don't feel Erightened, little girl any more, you know' (M). 
'It's made it a little bit stronger ... The more 1, she needs to trust me 
again, and the only way she can trust me is by me telling her things um, 
trusting her [inaudible]. It has helped. I don't think there's anything that 
I've said about the abuse that's come in our way' (P6). 
'I think it strengthened it. Every time I talk to her it strengthens the 
relationship. And it helps me to trust, and to realise that that trust isn't 
going to be abused' (P 11). 
'I think probably it brought us closer together. We're starting to become 
friends again' (P17). 
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41t9s just brought us closer, it does each time I talk. I mean I've done a lot 
of talking while I've been in the project, but not about my feelings, it sort 
ofjust brought us that little bit closer ... You know, we understood each 
other a bit better now' (P27). 
Some participants said that there had been no effect on their relationship with the 
recipient. This seemed to have been because the recipient was already a very 
close and valued friend. P37 who 'always tells [her boyfriend] everything' says 
that disclosure had no effect on her relationship with him because 'It's just a 
normal thing, you know'. Other conunents in this vein were made by Ps 20 and 
31: 
'Nothing, because he's just a friend. You know he's helpful to me. I don't 
know what I'd have done without him in the um, last six months' (P20). 
'I can say it makes us closer, but we're good friends, so [So you're close 
already? ] Yeah. [It keeps you close? ] Yes, yeah. Mm' (P3 1). 
Overall 50% (7/14) of the participants who recorded helpful disclosures said that 
the disclosure had strengthened their relationship with the recipient in this way. 
If the four participants whose helpful disclosures appeared to be atypical (either 
of a completely different nature as in the cases of Ps 5 and 36, or not in actual 
fact very helpful, as in the cases of Ps 13 and 3 0) then 70% (7/10) of the 
prototypical instances of helpful disclosure had positive effects of this kind. 
Those who did not report benefits in the relationship (with the exception of the 
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four atypical cases) implied that this was because the relationship was already 
very strong. 
In contrast to the helpful experiences of disclosure the unhelpful instances of 
disclosure did not seem to lead to any interpersonal benefits. Three of the four 
participants who reported unhelpful disclosures said that they did not know what 
effect disclosure had had on the relationship. However in one of these cases 
(P26) they said that they were 'not as close' as they used to be with the recipient. 
P3 said that the unhelpful instance of disclosure did not do 'much good' to her 
relationship with her husband. She describes how 'It made me hate him intensely 
at that moment' and made her insecure at a time when she 'felt insecure in the 
extreme anyway, and ... desperately need a line, sort of to hang on to'. It seems 
then that when disclosure was unhelpful any effects on the relationship were 
negative. 
The data above on the effects of emotional disclosure on relationships with the 
recipient suggest once again that social factors play a major part in the dynamics 
of disclosure and its helpfulness. Helpful disclosure seems to ground the 
individual in a social reality in which they consider themselves valued and valid. 
This is perhaps especially significant for participants such as the psychotherapy 
patients in this study who have had to struggle with experiences and emotions 
which appear to be hard for other people to understand. 
Summary 
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Overall a strong picture of the social elements involved in helpful disclosure 
seems to be emerging. Firstly participants emphasised the positive responses 
made to them by recipients. Secondly the benefits of disclosure seemed to 
include for some participants the disconfirmation. of negative social expectations, 
a feeling of increased validation, and a strengthening of trust in the relationship. 
These social aspects of helpful disclosure are consistent with disclosure 
functioning as a means of re-embedding the individual in a valuing and 
validating social reality. This conclusion is supported by the fact that these social 
factors did not seem in general to be present in the few cases of unhelpful 
disclosure reported in the study. However one exceptional case (P 19) will be 
considered later in the chapter. 
Shame and disclosure 
So far the experience of shame as a result of disclosure has not been considered. 
In the previous chapter participants were reported as saying that when they did 
not disclose the thought of telling anybody often made them feel stupid, silly or 
ashamed of themselves. ParticiPants who had disclosed an emotion were asked 
whether talking about it actually did make them feel stupid, silly or ashamed of 
themselves. What they said is presented and discussed in this section. 
Three of the four participants who described unhelpful experiences of disclosure 
said unequivocally that talking made them feel ashamed. P3 said that she felt 
stupid, silly and ashamed, and Ps 19 and 26 said they felt ashamed. The 
remaining participant who disclosed unhelpfully said (for one of the two 
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instances of unhelpful disclosure that she recorded) that she felt 'a bit stupid'. 
When the interviewer asked her if she had felt at all ashamed of herself as well 
she replied 'Ijust felt horrible. I just felt horrible about myself. This suggests 
that although she chooses not to use the word shame she does experience 
powerful negative feelings about herself, feelings that are perhaps quite similar to 
shame. These comments suggest that disclosing unhelpfully may have 
maintained these participants' sense of social disqualification. 
Helpful experiences of disclosure sometimes did not seem to involve feelings of 
shame, with some participants saying that they felt no shame when they 
disclosed helpfully: 
'[Right, OK. Um. And did talking about it make you feel stupid or silly or 
ashamed of yourself in this particular case? ] No, not at all' (M). 
'Um, I talked to someone I trust, you know, I don't feel any, you know, 
ashamed' (P29). 
'[And did talking about it make you feel stupid, or silly or ashamed of 
yourself? ] No. I felt OK about it all' (P3 1). 
In these cases the participant seemed to have been disclosing to someone who 
was already a tried and tested confidant. In other cases, though, participants did 
seem to feel ashamed or embarrassed: 
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'It made me feel silly that I've that I couldn't tell her anything. And it 
made me feel that I need to confide in her more, not be so stupid about 
hiding things from her' (P6). 
'... I felt stupid for feeling the way I did. Looking at it in the cold light of 
day, it just seemed like really childish and um, unreasonable' (P 11). 
'I felt a bit, a bit ashamed really, or embarrassed and that. Um, cos after 
talking about it it seemed so silly. Urn, you know it was like, it wasn't 
like I was going to be on my own for ever' (P 15). 
'[Did talking about it make you feel stupid or silly or ashamed of 
yourself? ] A bit ashamed that I've got myself in, in a mess' (P20). 
'[And did talking about it make you feel stupid or silly or ashamed of 
yourself? ] No. I felt a bit um, self-conscious, as if I was being stupid over 
the actual why I was getting angry over it ... But once I started talking 
I 
was fme' (P27). 
'I felt silly ... Because I think anyone would' (P37). 
The shame and embarrassment these participants felt often seemed to be related 
to the inaccuracies of their social expectations - the fact that while they had 
expected rejection or censure from others actually they have met with support 
and understanding. In this sense shame of this kind seems to be associated with 
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the pattern of disconfirming negative expectations which, as noted above, 
seemed to be an important aspect of some helpful disclosures. Shame in this 
context is reminiscent of Ward's view that 'Unless one feels shame to some 
extent, one cannot emerge from any well-wpm pathological behaviour pattern' 
(1972, p. 232). It is possible that shame of this kind has what Harre (1986) calls 
'illocutionary force' and actually enhances the participants' acceptance by the 
other person (see also Keltner, in press, Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990). 
It is notable that the shame described by participants talking about helpful 
disclosures seems to be less intense than that described by those talking about 
unhelpful disclosures. Most of the comments by participants who found their 
disclosure helpful refer either to mild shame or to something that may well be 
more embarrassment than shame (feeling 'silly' or 'stupid'). However in two 
cases of helpful disclosure the shame that the participant felt appeared to be 
somewhat more intense. In both of these cases the participant described how the 
disclosure could have led to a negative outcome since their shame seemed to 
perpetuate their sense of inadequacy and social disqualification. P1 1 describes 
how her realisation of the inaccuracy of her social expectations leads to shame 
about her apparent over-reaction: 
'I felt stupid and embarrassed because I look at it and I think, how on 
earth did I get from there to sort of you know feeling the way I do about 
here, something that seems like so trivial as somebody just saying you 
know these are the options that we can offer you. But I've come to 
getting from there to feeling so like ashamed with myself and, and you 
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know, feeling so hopeless and what's the point, uh, so I felt embarrassed 
and ashamed about that, which is you know just going in circles again' 
11). 
For P 19 there appears to be some doubt in his mind about whether his behaviour 
is justifiable in spite of what his wife says: 
'[So, um, did talking about it in this case make you feel stupid or silly or 
ashamed of yourself? ] Well yeah all of the above, you know. Yes. It 
Yeah, but if I didn't talk about it I would still have felt the same way, you 
know. Uh. I just had mixed feelings. Some, OK, I could see what my wife 
was saying. Others, you know, I was saying to myself, you know, well I 
should have known that anyway' (P 17). 
In these two cases stronger feelings of shame seem to be associated with 
lingering feelings of alienation and social disqualification. 
Overall 57% (8/14) of those who said that their disclosures were helpful said that 
they felt either silly, stupid or ashamed of themselves, while all of those who 
described unhelpful disclosures seemed to feel either shame or in the case of one 
of them 'horrible' about herself. While the finding that unhelpful disclosure is 
associated with shame is not unexpected the finding that positive disclosures are 
also associated with some shame (as well as embaffassment) is suggestive of an 
illocutionary or appeasing interpersonal message associated with shame (see 
Appendix 1). However the cases of P17 and P1 1 suggest that it is possible for the 
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supportive responses of others to lead to feelings of shame which underline the 
individual's sense of inadequacy rather than alleviating it. Failure of recipients to 
appreciate this might in some cases run the risk of subverting the benefits of 
otherwise supportive responses. 
Alternative theoretical explanations for the benefits of disclosure 
Having established that social factors consistent with the Goffmanesque 
approach to disclosure appear to play an important role in the disclosure 
experiences reported by participants an attempt will be made to examine the data 
in the light of two other theories. These are the two main theories that have been 
put forward in the literature to account for the benefits of emotional disclosure 
(see Chapters Three and Five). 
The benefits ofdisclosure: the inhibition model 
The inhibition model of the benefits of disclosure, first introduced in Chapter 
Tluee, is based on the idea that the inhibition of thoughts and feelings is harmful. 
Consequently disclosure is regarded as beneficial because it terminates the stress 
associated with inhibition. Two kinds of harmful inhibition were noted in 
Chapter Three. In the first of these, associated with the work of Wegner (e. g. 
Wegner and Lane, 1995) cognitive inhibition was thought to lead to intrusive re- 
experiencing of inhibited thoughts. A second kind of formulation of the 
inhibition model regarded inhibition as physiologically effortful and therefore 
harmful to the individual's health (see Pennebaker, 1993; Traue, 1995). In this 
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section participants' accounts of helpful disclosures will be examined for 
evidence that the benefits of disclosure arise from the 'release' of the tensions - 
whether cognitive or physical - of non-disclosure. 
Diminished intensity of thefeeling. Participants sometimes stated that one of the 
helpful aspects of disclosure was that it reduced the intensity of the feeling: 
'It alleviated the intensity of the feeling' (M). 
'Just sharing it with someone made it feel a lot better' (P 15). 
'It's like I'd suddenly told them all that was on my mind, so all that had 
cleared' (P27). 
'I could get it out and tell somebody. And I think that sort of like, to a 
certain extent lessens the frustration and anger' (P3 1). 
'Letting go. Some participants stated quite directly that the benefits of disclosing 
included a kind of 'release' of pent-up emotion: 
'There comes a sort of point where the emotion becomes unbearable and 
you have to release it in a verbal way ... So when I decide to talk about it 
there is a sort of build up of tension and then it breaks as you sort of 
release the emotion through telling about it' (M). 
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'I was just able to get it out rather than bottle it up inside' (P 15). 
'If you keep, keep holding stuff in sooner or later something's going to 
give, I think, and it could be to the point where somebody gets hurt, or 
even I get hurt, and uh, in ways I could hurt every, hurt the ones I love, 
especially my wife, you know. So, uh, no, it's good to get it out of my 
system' (P17). 
'I don't go into great depth of detail, but I can tell him enough to sort of 
unburden myself a little bit, and that, you know, usually is, usually helps' 
(P20). 
'I was talking to this man on the phone and while I was talking to him 
these feelings were building up at the time, and I just felt like just 
bursting into tears and I thought I've got to talk it out first, and then cry 
after or whatever ... it was very helpful to do that [tell friends] 
because 
once I sort of released the thoughts that were on my mind as well' (P27). 
These comments suggest that for many of the emotions that were helpfully 
disclosed participants experienced a release of tension. At the subjective level 
then, there appears to be some support for the inhibition model of the benefits of 
disclosure. 
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Interruption of destructive ruminations. A number of comments by participants 
suggest that helpful disclosure released them from a negative cycle of 
ruminations: 
'I suppose if I didn't write at all, or tell anybody it would have built up, 
and that's when the mental explosion happens, and depression comes 
setting in and everything' (P27). 
'It feels better for me to tell him, because then I'm not like thinking over 
it, or whatever' (P37). 
'It stops you suppressing it, it stopped me from suppressing what I was 
feeling ... [And when you suppress it what do you think happens? ] ... It 
just eats you up inside' (P 15). 
Comments by two participants indicated that these ruminations may have centred 
on the participants' sense of their own inadequacies and invalidity in relation to 
others: 
'So, talking has that import-, for me it's that important block ... It stops 
the thought process. It, because, although I may feel sort of ashamed and 
stupid about being that way, urn, that's telling somebody it just seems to 
put a block between that and the thought process that would have carried 
on of feeling, what's the point, so therefore why carry onT (P1 1). 
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P 17 describes how one of the emotions he wrote about in his diary builds up in 
his mind before he discloses it: 
'It's going through my head "Why did you do this. You're so stupid", 
you know "You don't belong on this planef '. What's going, I've had all 
kinds of different stuff going on in my head, you know ... I built it right 
up to the point where when I walked in the door I was more miserable 
when I walked in the door, than I was when I got the car, you know. Just 
stuff that was going on in my own head' (P 17). 
These comments raise the possibility that what escalates in the participants' 
heads is a cycle of despairing thoughts concerning their identity in relation to 
other people. 
Conclusions. Instances of helpful disclosure seemed, at least for about half of the 
participants, to be experienced as a release of tension. This release appeared to 
reduce the intensity of the emotion and interrupt a cycle of negative thoughts and 
feelings. There was some evidence in the interviews that these processes of 
inhibition may in fact be subsidiary to social considerations. It may tentatively be 
suggested that what 'builds up' is the individual's sense of alienation and social 
invalidity. This is suggested in the comments by P 11 and P 17 quoted above and 
is consistent with the inhibitory power of shame and identity related 
considerations which, as discussed in the previous chapter, seemed to play an 
important role in non-disclosure. 
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Ps 11 and 17 noted that interpersonal preoccupations lay behind the build up of 
their emotions. P 11 talked about how one of her experiences of disclosure had 
reaffirmed her knowledge that her friend valued her: 
'It reaffirmed what I knew to be true. Um, and so therefore it meant that I 
didn't churning it over in my mind all the time, getting bigger and bigger 
and more and more out of proportion' (P 11). 
P 17 relates the 'building up' of his emotion to his insecurity about how other 
people will respond to him: 
'It's when you hold things in and you don't talk it out, that's when it 
really does the damage, you know, when you don't say nothing, because 
you don't know what it's going to build up to. You don't know what that 
person's going to do' (P17). 
In conclusion while there is some evidence in favour of the inhibition model of 
disclosure, there are some tantalising suggestions that these inhibitory processes 
may themselves relate to interpersonal preoccupations - and specifically 
preoccupations regarding the individual's damaged and invalid identity. This is 
consistent with helpful disclosures being helpful to the extent that they reduce the 
individual's alienation and increase their sense of value in relation to others. 
Benefits of disclosure: the cognitive assimilation model 
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The cognitive assimilation model stresses the extent to which disclosure of 
distressing emotional experiences enables people to 'organise and structure the 
seemingly infinite facets of overwhelming events' (Pennebaker, 1990, pl. 12). 
This process, as noted in Chapter Three, has also been regarded as a central 
mechanism of change in psychotherapy (Stiles et al, 1990). In this section 
material in the descriptions of helpful disclosures that appears to support a 
cognitive assimilation model of the benefits of disclosure will be examined. 
Perspective. There appeared to be very few comments that fitted in with the 
cognitive assimilation model in the fourteen interviews. Only two participants 
who described more than one helpful disclosure appeared to regard greater 
clarity about their emotional experience as a benefit of disclosure: 
4 and it made me able to step away from the feeling a bit as well and 
look towards the future, and realise that however I felt at the time it was, 
times change and you're not going to feel like that again ... That things 
would move on, you know. [It's like it became part of a bigger context? ] 
Yes, yes' (M). 
PII emphasised 'perspective' gained as a result of disclosure. For each of the 
three emotions that she disclosed helpfully she said that one benefit was that it 
helped her put the experience in perspective: 
'I think it puts it into perspective, that actually events actually urn, this is 
not very rational. If I can just distance myself from what I'm feeling then 
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looking at it in the cold light of day, on paper sort of thing, this is not 
rational, and therefore I don't need to kill myself about it because um, life 
will go on you know, that there are other options and that and that yes I 
felt that way, at that particular time' (P 11). 
In both cases disclosure seems to have enabled the participant to understand their 
emotional response in a wider context that prevented the emotion from seeming 
overwhelming. In both cases this clarity also seemed to include an appreciation 
of a reality which made the emotion seem redundant. This seemed to include an 
appreciation of previously unseen options that gave them hope. In the case of 
P 11 at one point in the interview her increased sense of perspective is explicitly 
related to her ability to see clearly that her friend is supportive and valuing of 
her: 
'Uh, but, once I was distanced from the feelings a bit I could see that a is 
that she said to me a number of times, um, that she does like me, she does 
want to be friends with me, and that she doesn't want to hurt me. And 
that there's no intention of doing that, you know, intentionally [laughs 
slightly]. Um, and that based on that I could trust her' (P 11). 
This is consistent with the increased clarity achieved as a result of disclosure 
being related to the ability to differentiate between negative interpersonal 
expectations that are based on past experiences and expectations in current 
relationships in which the individual is secure and valued. 
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Evaluations of doing the diary. While participants did not on the whole refer to 
increased clarity, perspective and understanding in their descriptions of the 
helpfulness of disclosure experiences, these factors often emerged in the 
evaluative comments they made about filling in the diary. For instance; 
'It was helpful because it told me how I was behaving at the time. 
Watching, sit down and think about what I was feeling at the time, which 
I never actually thought before. That's the most helpful' (P5). 
'the fact is that you could you could sit there and you could look at the 
emotions, look at the things that go with it, fill it in and sit there and think 
about what was happening and, it it was helping the fact that you could 
go over it and sort it out as you was going over it what was going on' 
(P 7). 
However these comments were made in the context of doing the diary, not the 
actual disclosure experiences that were described in the interviews. As stated 
above only two participants appeared to make comments of this kind in the 
context of the actual face to face disclosures they described in the interviews. 
Research evidence in favour of the cognitive assimilation model comes mainly 
from studies of written disclosure that take place when participants are alone (see 
Chapter Three) and it may be that writing down emotional experiences makes 
these kind of 'perspectival' benefits of disclosure especially salient. However 
these benefits may not have been so salient when the disclosure took place in a 
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social context, where the response of the recipient may have been more salient 
than the more abstract individual understanding of the experience 2. 
Conclusions. There were few remarks concerning the importance of cognitive 
assimilation factors in the helpfulness of the disclosed emotions. However two of 
the fullest accounts in the data corpus suggest that at least for these cases 
increased clarity and perspective played an important part. The fact that 
participants' discussions of the helpfulness of doing the diary, rather than the 
helpfulness of disclosures they described in the interview, invoked factors to do 
with perspective and awareness of the emotions suggests that these helpful 
aspects of disclosure are especially salient when the disclosure is in written fonn. 
PI I's account suggested that increased perspective was related to the 
disconfirmation of her negative interpersonal expectations. 
Discussion of alternative theoretical explanations of the benefits ofdisclosure 
There was considerably less data in the interviews that supported either the 
inhibition or the cognitive assimilation models of the benefits of disclosure. 
While this may in part reflect the nature of the interview, which did not 
specifically focus on inhibitory or cognitive aspects of helpful disclosures, it 
suggests that a social understanding of the dynamics of disclosure which has so 
far been largely neglected in the literature has considerable power. The current 
findings do not invalidate inhibitory or cognitive explanations of the benefits of 
disclosure since these three accounts are not mutually exclusive. However a 
2 Further details concerning participants' comments about doing the diary are included in 
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number of comments by participants suggested that inhibitory and cognitive 
processes may be secondary to social considerations. 
Negative cases 
Helpful disclosure 
A number of experiences of disclosure which participants described as helpful do 
not seem to fit into the understanding of helpful disclosure which has been 
emerging. In two instances the disclosures appeared to take place in a different 
manner and the helpfulness of the experience appeared to have different causes. 
In two other cases, which have been referred to already in the section on the 
socially mediated benefits of disclose, the disclosure seemed to be of only 
limited helpfulness and there appeared to be somewhat different interpersonal 
dynamics involved. 
Venting rage. The two instances of apparently helpful disclosure which most 
clearly do not fit in are those of PS and P36, both of whom describe spontaneous 
expressions of rage directed at strangers as helpful. P5 lost his temper at another 
driver who cut him up when he was driving with his family. In his words: 
'I hit the steering wheel cos of me anger and I called and shouted out of 
the window. I shouted out of the window. The stupidity of the woman 
Appendix 11. 
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[inaudible] but urn. I was just angry. I said to [wife] to stick her fingers 
up too. I really felt like chasing her. I really did ... I was just shaking. ' 
P3 6 'just sort of exploded' with two teenagers who were messing around with an 
automatic door on a train he was travelling on, and like P5 he let off steam 
directly to the people who he was angry with. 
The most striking difference between these two emotional disclosures and the 
ones considered earlier is that in these instances neither participant seems in the 
slightest bit concerned either about what other people think of them or about the 
identity implications of having this experience. Both participants said that they 
did not feel 'stupid, silly or ashamed' of themselves. Both reported that their 
wives did not like the language they used. In P36's case he says his wife was 
'bothered by the language' he used and in P5's he says that he thinks: 
'the wife was a bit embaffassed. Cos she kept telling me to curb the 
language down'. 
However in neither case were they concerned about how they appeared to others. 
P5 said he 'wasn't really bothered' about his wife's reaction and P36 said he was 
'indifferent' to how other people felt towards him. As he put it 'It was my battle, 
you know, it was within me'. Furthermore in both cases, and in contrast to the 
emotional experiences that other participants reported, the emotion that they felt 
seemed to be ego-syntonic: 
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'So, OK, so, are there ways in which you think it was unhelpful? ] No. 
Urn, I think it's something to do with my age, James. [Laughs] - 
Sometimes you've got to treat like with like' (P36). 
'[In what ways do you think it was helpful? ] Get the anger out of me 
Something that I needed to do' (P5). 
It is possible that in both these cases the expression of rage made these men - 
both of whom also indicated elsewhere in their interviews that they normally 
inhibited emotional experiences because of their shame - feel more powerful and 
in control. It seems unlikely that such experiences can be regarded as therapeutic 
in the sense that other disclosures appeared to be because they did not lead to any 
enhanced sense of solidarity with other people. Indeed rage of the kind both men 
experienced may in some circumstances lead to further isolation and alienation 
from others - although in this context it is perhaps significant that these 
apparently helpful expressions of rage were both directed at strangers. 
Off-loading. Although P 13 said that one of the experiences of hatred she told her 
mother about was 'a bit' helpful a number of features of this disclosure 
differentiate it from other helpful disclosure experiences. 
Firstly she does not seem to think the recipient's response made any difference 
and in fact does not seem to be able to give a clear account of how disclosure 
impacted on their relationship. She says 'It doesn't matter whether I told her or 
not', she says she does not know how her mother felt towards her when she 
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disclosed and she says that she does not know whether talking about her feelings 
had an effect on her relationship with her mother. It seems then that the 
disclosure does not meet with a response that she experiences as supportive. 
Secondly it seems likely that the way in which this participant disclosed did not 
involve giving the other person a full and coherent picture of how she was 
feeling and what was going on for her. In the interview she gave almost 
monosyllabic answers to most of the questions, and she appeared reluctant to 
elaborate on her very brief answers, often saying things such as 'I don't know 
really', 'Can't really explain' and 'not sure'. It is possible she communicated in 
this way when she disclosed, making it harder for her recipient to understand 
how she felt and why. That her uncommunicative style of communication in the 
interview might be typical of her communication at home is suggested by a 
remark she made right at the end of the interview when she says 'I just feel 
stupid telling anyone'. 
The apparent lack of a supportive response and the possibility that the disclosure 
was in any case sparse and minimal are two of the factors that suggest that even 
if this disclosure was 'a bit' helpful, it was not very helpful. This is consistent 
also with the fact that she continued to feel angry after she disclosed and she 
reported two other very similar experiences of hatred in the interview which she 
disclosed to the same person and which she described as unhelpful. Analysis of 
this negative case suggests then that the significant benefits of disclosure depend 
on whether the disclosure 'meshes' with supportive responses of the recipient, in 
the manner suggested by Kelly and McKillop (1996). 
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Backing down. P30 herself recognises that the helpfulness of her disclosure is 
equivocal. She acknowledges her guilt by apologising to her mother after loosing 
her temper. The disclosure is helpful in the sense that it prevents ill-feeling from 
'dragging on' between them. However it also serves as a means of maintaining 
an unsatisfactory status quo in which it seems likely that the participant will 
continue to lose her temper with her mother over her mother's apparent inability 
to recognise her needs, for example her special dietary requirements. As she puts 
it 'if I think, you know, about the number of times this particular thing has 
happened, and me rushing to hospital because of something my mother did with 
my food'. As in the case of P 13 there is no evidence in the interview of a 
recipient response which validates the participant's point of view. Indeed P30 
talks at length about how her mother doesn't respond to her. Her response 
(quoted earlier) was: 
I just like this "Oh, well you know, and ulf'. Like it was all, I don't know 
it is very difficult with my mother to know what's going on'. 
As in the case of P 13 it appears that this instance of disclosure is not especially 
beneficial because it does not result in a response which leads to the participant 
feeling more accepted and more acceptable. 
Unhelpful disclosure 
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P19 presents the most challenging account of unhelpful disclosure, because this 
instance of disclosure appears to have been unhelpful in spite of the fact that the 
recipient responded very supportively. An attempt to identify the challenges 
presented in this case and to incorporate an understanding of it in the emerging 
picture of helpful disclosure will be attempted in this section. 
P19 described two undisclosed emotional experiences and one that was disclosed 
unhelpfully. Disclosure took place over the phone and the recipient was her CPN. 
The emotion she disclosed involved self-hatred and shame because she felt she 
was being abusive towards her children in the way that her mother had been 
abusive towards her. 
The CPN appears to have responded in a very supportive manner. For instance 
after P 19 has told her that she feels ashamed the CPN tells her that she does not 
think she is to blame: 
'she said like, she said it's not your fault, she says you can't be 
responsible for the way you've been brought up ... And she was just 
saying "The difference between you [inaudible] and your mother", she 
said "You're not like your mother", she said, "Don't ever think you are" 
she said, "Because you're trying to do something about it", she says, 
"You're trying to improve yourself by being a lot better mother", she 
says, "So you don't keep doing the same things to your children as what 
she done to yoif ". 
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P 19 comments that the CPN appeared to understand how she felt: 
'From the way she was talking and things like that on the phone, she was 
talking a lot as if she'd act-, she actually understood. You know, she 
understood what I was saying. She didn't give a feeling that I was being 
judged. It was just the feeling more or less that she knew, she knew how I 
felt, and how I was feeling'. 
In these respects the recipient's response is very similar to the responses given to 
participants who reported helpful disclosures. The recipient 'understood', she did 
not judge and she advocated a perspective in which the participant was not to 
blame for the things that she (the participant) felt ashamed of. This raises the 
question of what happened that made this disclosure unhelpful - it certainly does 
not seem to be lack of support from the recipient in this case. 
P 19 says that the conversation with the CPN 'sort of calmed me down' and 
although at the point that she phoned she felt 'really low' it 'actually bucked me 
up, sort of thing.... So I wasn't sort of feeling so low. Once I'd actually finished 
talking to her'. This suggests that the CPN's supportiveness was helpful. 
However the participant also says in the interview that talking made her feel 
ashamed of what she had done to her children and she felt bitter and angry at 
herself and her mother after speaking to the CPN. What this seems to suggest is 
that the conversation with the CPN was of limited and inadequate helpfulness. 
While it may have been a step in the right direction ultimately the strength of her 
shame and self-hatred was such that the helpfulness was a straw in the wind. A 
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number of factors may have diminished the effectiveness of the CPN's 
supportive response. Firstly what the CPN said may have had limited credibility 
to the participant, who may have regarded it as coming from a professional who 
was being paid to be nice to her. Secondly there exist such strong moral values 
about harming children in our society, and the notion of a mother damaging her 
children is so abhorrent to most people, that P 19 may have regarded the CPN's 
reassurances as unbelievable. This interpretation is supported by the fact that 
later in the interview P 19 talks about how she has been in court where her 
daughter (who is in care) has testified that her mother tried at one point to kill 
her. This suggests that P 19 has grossly violated normative standards of 
mothering - an extremely difficult thing to justify in our current moral climate. 
Common perceptions of people who maltreat children and the fact that P 19's 
behaviour had been exposed publicly in court may have undermined the CPN's 
attempts to make a distinction between the participant's behaviour and the 
behaviour of her own mother towards her. The tentative conclusion to be drawn 
may be that supportive responses may only help the discloser if they are 
sufficiently credible in the light of culturally held norms and values concerning 
the discloser's experience. 
In summary the case of P 19 seems to illustrate the fact that even a positive and 
supportive recipient may be unable to provide sufficient validation to counter 
extremely pervasive feelings of shame which may be held in place by powerful 
social norms. It suggests that the responses of recipients are constrained by the 
framework of social values within which both they and the person who discloses 
are operating. 
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Discussion 
Disclosure and shame 
A major objective of the qualitative study of disclosure experiences was to 
establish the plausibility of a social model of disclosure decisions and disclosure 
outcomes. This model was based partially on the theoretical insights of Goffinan, 
in particular his understanding of 'destructive information', information which if 
known would damage an individual's identity and result in shame and 
embarrassment. This social model of the disclosure process was contrasted with 
two other theoretical accounts of why disclosure is beneficial. While the findings 
of this study did not eliminate these alternative explanations they suggested very 
strongly that social considerations played a central role in disclosure decisions 
and disclosure outcomes. Indeed it was suggested that these alternative 
mechanisms could be subsidiary to social considerations. In keeping with the 
social model of disclosure almost every non-disclosing participant appeared to be 
seeking to conceal destructive information from people they thought would 
respond negatively. Almost every participant who reported an instance of helpful 
disclosure said they felt increasingly accepted and validated by the recipient. 
They were no longer the wary and alienated guardians of 'destructive 
information'. 
These qualitative findings support the social emphasis in the recent work of 
Kelly and McKillop (1996) and Finkenauer et al (in press) on the social basis of 
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disclosure decisions and outcomes. They extend these findings by examining 
disclosure decisions and outcomes in a clinical population and they suggest that 
in this population the GofErnanesque concern with the identity implications of 
emotional experiences and disclosure may be especially strong. One implication 
is that the cognitive model of disclosure which has been adopted in Stiles et al's 
(1990) Assimilation Model of change processes in psychotherapy needs to 
incorporate the shame-related reasons for 'warding off problematic experiences. 
The model would also benefit from a more social understanding of what happens 
when these experiences are 'assimilated'. According to the findings reported here 
assimilation may be as much an experience of 'moral' validation by other people, 
as it is a cognitive process of differentiation and re-organisation. (see Madill and 
Barkham, 1997). 
Implicationsfor psychotherapy 
As noted in Chapters Three and Five disclosure appears to be the main activity of 
clients in psychotherapy. The findings of the current interview study would 
therefore seem to be of relevance to a central process in psychotherapy. The 
habitual non-disclosure that characterises psychotherapy referrals and the helpful 
disclosure experiences they also reported both appear to revolve around an 
underlying concern with the presence or absence of validating responses from 
other people. Given this pervasive concern with how other people respond to 
them it seems likely that the kind of interpersonal support described by 
participants in their accounts of helpful disclosure constitutes a major non- 
specific factor in the effectiveness of psychotherapy. However the findings also 
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resonate with recent narrative approaches to psychotherapy. For instance 
Riikonen and Smith (1997) emphasise the importance of clients feeling that their 
experiences have been 'understood' a word which was used time and time again 
by the participants in the study. From a narrative point of view the participants in 
this study could be viewed as struggling with experiences which were 
'unaccountable' in the sense that they felt unable to make their subjective 
experience 'understandable' to other people. According to Bruner (1990): 
'Thefunction of the story is tofind an intentional state that mitigates or 
at least makes comprehensible a deviationfrom a canonical cultural 
pattern' (Bruner, 1990, p 49, italics in original). 
By implication the function of psychotherapy is to help the client find a narrative 
that re-connects them to other people by making their experiences identifiable 
and understandable to others. 
It follows from this that psychotherapy is very much a cultural activity - 
concerned with the meanings and the values attached to certain kinds of 
experience. A number of recent writers have drawn attention to how 
psychotherapy often involves identifying the 'subjugated voices' of the client's 
experience, and that these voices represent experiences which contravene 
dominant cultural norms and understandings (McLeod, 1997; Capps and Ochs, 
1995). In a recent paper Madill and Barkharn (1997) present a detailed case study 
of a therapeutic change event in which they demonstrate how gains in one 
woman's therapy appear to derive from the therapist's 'legitimisation of a 
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morally defensible account of the client's actions' (Madill and Barkharn, 1997, p. 
232). The findings of the current study are highly congruent with this 
interpretation of the process of psychotherapy. 
Limitations of the study 
While the qualitative study has provided an opportunity to look in some detail at 
disclosure processes in a clinical population the study is of course limited in a 
number of ways. 
Firstly in focusing predominantly on shame and shame-related factors the 
findings may not adequately represent the extent to which guilt is implicated in 
the process of non-disclosure. Material in the interviews suggested that for at 
least some participants guilt (as well as shame) played a major role in their 
reasons for non-disclosure. In defence of the study it could however be said that 
the main objective was to establish the plausibility of a shame-based 
understanding of the disclosure process and the intention was not to eliminate 
alternative elements which might also play a role. 
A second issue is that the diary only focused on four emotions - shame, guilt, 
hatred and disgust - and therefore all the disclosure decisions and outcomes 
relate to these emotions. This means that it is possible that the findings do not 
generalise to other emotional experiences. However participants did make many 
remarks that seemed to indicate that at least the experiences of non-disclosure 
were typical of how they normally deal with negative emotional experiences. 
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Nevertheless it would be useful to include other emotions in future studies. This 
is especially important as there was a subset of participants who kept the diaries 
for a week and reported none of the target emotions, although they did say that 
they had had other emotional experiences. Since there was no diary upon which 
to base the interview no information was collected about these people's 
disclosure experiences and it is possible that people with a different emotional 
repertoire could have a different orientation to disclosure. 
A third limitation is the relative paucity of data obtained on disclosure - and in 
particularly unhelpful disclosure. The conclusions drawn concerning helpful 
disclosure are based on information from only fourteen participants and the 
information on unhelpful disclosure is based on data from only four. It would be 
desirable to collect more information on disclosure per se, and this could perhaps 
be done by recruiting participants for future studies who are further on in their 
psychotherapy, and so potentially able to articulate and share more of their 
experiences. 
Finally the possibility that forms of shame which are interpersonally benign may 
play a part in beneficial experiences of disclosure has not been explored in detail 
despite the fact that some experiences of helpful disclosure also involved feelings 
of shame. Additionally factors relating to the participants' awareness of and 
ability to differentiate different emotions have not been considered. A 
preliminary attempt to explore these issues in the context of the current interview 
data is reported in Appendix 11. 
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Chapter Eight 
An Interview Study of Psychotherapy Patients' Self- 
Defining Memories of Shame 
Introduction 
In the diary and interview study described in the last five chapters it was 
suggested that shame associated with the anticipation of potentially negative and 
judgmental responses of others played an important part in the non-disclosure of 
many intense negative emotional experiences in the daily lives of 
psychologically distressed adults. This kind of shame appeared to be consistent 
with what in Chapter Two was termed 'marker shame'. As pointed out in that 
chapter mainstream research on emotion appears to have paid only recent 
theoretical attention to enduring and personality based emotional experiences 
(Magai & McFadden, 1995; Frijda et al, 1991; Singer & Salovey, 1993). 
However theorists of shame, it was noted, have long suggested that it is enduring 
personality based shame which accompanies or even precipitates 
psychopathology. For example both of the most influential and prolific 
psychological theorists of shame this century, H. Lewis and Tomkins, wrote 
independently about the dynamics of enduring shame. H. Lewis (197 1) saw 
shame as part of the superego, consisting in part of internalised representations of 
rejecting, scornful and humiliating responses by others. Tomkins (1963) saw 
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shame as an emotion which could become 'amplified' in an individual's 
personality by being associated with the remembrance of punishing responses by 
other people. Such shame 'acting at a distance', Tomkins argued, functions as a 
kind of early prompt to the individual to take evasive action in broadly similar 
interpersonal situations. 
A common feature of these theories is that feelings of shame are associated with 
the anticipation of negative responses by others, although these anticipated 
responses may be only vaguely, if at all, present in awareness. Consequently a 
particular difficulty with studying marker shame is the fact that shame of this 
kind is expected to be subtle and inarticulate (see Chapters One and Two). In the 
diary and interview study reported in preceding chapters an attempt was made to 
trace shame of this kind by asking participants about feelings associated with the 
imagined outcome of disclosure. In the current study an attempt will be made to 
approach marker shame directly by utilising the notion of the 'self-defining 
memory' developed by Singer and colleagues (Singer & Salovey, 1993; Moffitt 
& Singer, 1994), which, as pointed out in Chapter Two, is regarded by these 
researchers as a conscious counterpart of unconscious affective scripts which are 
largely tacit (Singer & Singer, 1994). Self-defining memories are defined as 
memories which are: vivid; affectively intense at the time of recall; frequently 
revisited whether in thought or conversation; linked to other memories; and 
fmally focused on the individual's enduring concerns or unresolved issues 
(Singer & Salovey, 1993). Moffitt & Singer (1994) (see Chapter Two) suggest 
that for participants with 'avoidance goals' self-defining memories could be seen 
as &cautionary tales' about the pursuit of particular goals. In the current study an 
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attempt is made to elicit the recall of self-defming memories which involve 
shame in a population of psychotherapy patients. In line with the existing work 
on self-defming memories it is expected that these memories will be associated 
with socially avoidant patterns of behaviour consistent with an underlying shame 
script in which the individual attempts to pre-empt rejection and negative 
responses by others. 
A second major aim of the study was to see if the diary and interview study 
findings concerning disclosure and non-disclosure could be replicated with a 
different sample of psychotherapy patients and in the somewhat different context 
of important memories rather than recently occurring emotions. This part of the 
analysis is reported in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
Method 
Materials 
A modified version of the protocol used by Moffitt & Singer (1994) to elicit self- 
defming memories was employed. Participants were asked to recall a memory 
that 1) happened at least a year ago 2) was still very clear and felt important as 
they thought about it 3) helped them understand who they were as an individual 
and might be the memory they would tell someone they wanted to understand 
them in a more profound way 4) leads to strong feelings 5) they have thought 
about many times and 6) evokes shame when they think about it. When 
participants had identified the memory that they believed most clearly fitted 
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these criteria they were asked a series of questions relating to 1) feelings 
associated with the incident they recalled 2) the effect of the incident on their 
subsequent lives 3) the effect of remembering the incident and 4) factors 
associated with the disclosure or non-disclosure of the incident both in the past 
and in their lives currently. The full interview protocol is presented in Appendix 
12. 
Procedure 
Participants were contacted by letter prior to the commencement of therapy and 
asked to contact the department if they were willing to take part in a research 
interview on the painful memories of those seeking psychotherapy. If they were 
willing to participate they were given an appointment for the interview. The 
interviews took place after patients had been assessed and prior to the 
commencement of therapy. It was made clear that participation was entirely 
voluntary and that they were free not to answer any question or to terminate the 
interview at any time. The interview itself lasted approximately one to two hours. 
Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed in full. 
Participants 
All participants were NHS referrals who had been assessed for psychotherapy by 
a consultant psychotherapist and were at the time of the study on waiting lists for 
treatment. Due to the fact that a comparatively small proportion of potential 
participants completed the earlier diary and interview study (see Chapter Four) it 
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was decided to recruit participants from two different psychotherapy 
departments. Overall 20 patients out of 87 who were invited to take part in the 
study actually completed the interview (23%). There was some difference 
between the two sites in this regard with only 11.1% (5/45) of invited 
participants from one department (department A) taking part and 35.7% (15/42) 
invited participants from the other (department B). This may have been because 
patients in the two departments were contacted at different times in the 
assessment process, with those in department A being contacted prior to their 
assessment interviews and those in department B afterwards. It is possible that 
those in the latter category were more interested in taking part as they had 
already had some experience of speaking about their difficulties to someone in 
the department'. 55% (11/20) of the participants were female. Unfortunately due 
to a problem with the tape recorder sides two, three and four of one interview did 
not register on the tape. Consequently for most of the analysis only 19 responses 
were available. 
Analytic strategy 
The data set that was finally obtained for this study was different from that which 
had been originally envisaged. Firstly a smaller number of participants were 
recruited than had originally been planned (it had been estimated on the basis of 
the previous study that approximately 50 participants would volunteer in the time 
available) and secondly plans for a follow-up interview were abandoned due to 
1 Unfortunately figures for department A are not exact as when the study began the secretary 
responsible for sending out the research invitation letters forgot to record when she had begun to 
include the research invitation with the appointment letters. However she estimated that she had 
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the ending of the researcher's contract and the imminent closure of department B 
following the loss of both the consultant psychotherapist and the secretary who 
had supported the research. In these circumstances it was decided to adopt a 
more qualitative approach to data analysis than had originally been planned. The 
strategy which has been adopted is the one outlined in Chapter Five and used in 
Chapters Six and Seven. Theoretically relevant themes have been identified, 
attention has been paid to the proportion of participants who contributed to each 
theme and an attempt has been made to examine cases which seem to be 
exceptional. Where appropriate a number of simple quantitative outcomes will 
also be presented. 
Experiences recalled by participants in the study 
Brief summaries of all the experiences recalled by participants are presented in 
Table 8.1. As can be seen in the table some of the memories were of extreme acts 
of violence. These included accounts by two women who described being raped 
and one by a woman who described the murder of an abusive member of her 
family by another close family member. Several other women described 
witnessing their father's violence towards other members of their family, 
including one who described how as a child she saw her father raping her 
mother. However not all the participants described violent scenes. Three people 
reported experiences in which they themselves had done something they 
considered deeply wrong. In one case it was an instance of sexual abuse, in 
another it was having an abortion and in the third it was having sex with a 
sent ten letters prior to the keeping of an accurate record, and the figures above have been 
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stranger. Other participants described situations in which their value as people 
appeared to have been undermined in some way, for example in one instance by 
the discovery of his wife's infidelity, in another by the humiliating consequences 
of a botched surgical procedure, and in another by the realisation. that there had 
been sexual abuse in her family. 
Table 8.1: Summaries of memories recalled in the study 
P INCIDENT SUMMARIES 
I Blushing and panicking when reciting a poem at a school open day when she was about 14. 
2 Trying to kill father when he was beating her mother when she was about 7. 
3 Going to see a therapist when she was suicidal and being told 'well what do you expect me to do about it? '. 
Subsequently attempting suicide. 
4 Telling mother he was gay. 
5 Sexually abusing a younger boy when he was an adolescent. 
6 Leaving work after becoming infatuated with a younger colleague and failing out with her and other colleagues as a 
result. 
7 Phone conversation in which she learned that her sister had been sexually abuso: l. This eventually unlocked memories of 
having been sexually abused herself as a child. 
8 A traumatic incident while working which resulted in short term injury and a longer term psychological effect which has 
prevented him returning to work. 
9 Giving up a highly prestigious course of study after only two terms, 
10 Sexual humiliation by mother and sister in front of friends (for masturbating and looking up girls skirts). 
II Witnessed mother being raped by father when she was a child of 8. After which mother took children and escaped to a 
distant part of the country. 
12 An abortion which P had aged 19 at the insistence of her boyfriend. 
13 Shielding her sister from her violent father at the age of three. 
14 Father dying when P was 8. 
15 Raped by two soldiers when she was 18. 
16 Raped by an acquaintance who had asked her out. 
17 The int"er of a violently abusive member of her family who was assaulting her by another member of her immediate 
family. 
18 A surgical procedure subsequently considered by P to be humiliating and unnecessary which has caused him continuous 
discomfort and difficulty in experiencing sexual pleasure. 
19 The discovery that his wife was being unfaithful to him 
20 An experience of casual sex with a stranger in a night-club which P had in order to please her husband. 
calculated on that basis. 
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Participants were asked to rate of a scale of 0- 10 (where 0 would be 'no 
noticeable feeling' and 10 is 'as strong as I can imagine') how strong their 
feelings were at the time of the incident. Excluding participants I and 2 (for 
whom an early version of the interview protocol was used that did not include 
this question) the mean level of intensity was 8.4. However the mode was 10 
(9/18 participants said 10). There was one outlier, P 14, whose score was I. S. 
This participant seems to have interpreted the question somewhat narrowly to 
refer only to his feelings towards his father (the incident concerned the death of 
his father), and not his feelings about other aspects of the situation, which he 
considered of pivotal importance in his life. Overall then the memories recalled 
by participants appeared to have been of extreme intensity and salience. This is 
consistent with the intent to elicit memories that were 'self-defining'. 
However there was less consistency concerning the degree to which the 
memories involved shame. In only 9/20 cases (45%) did participants report clear 
and unequivocal shame associated with the experience (see Appendix 13). In a 
finiher 45% (9/20) cases participants agreed at some point in the interview that 
they experienced shame, but equivocated or denied it elsewhere (see Appendix 
14). For example P 10 initially identified the experience he talked about as one 
involving shame: 
'When you say shame, I think er that incident when they were taking the 
mickey, that was shame'. 
However later in the interview he says: 
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'I don't know whether it was shame, but certainly it was embarrassment, 
it could have been shame, um. I'd have to think about it for a long time 
before I decided if it was shame but it was certainly embarrassment'. 
P1 1 changed her mind in the opposite direction. She originally denied that she 
had experienced shame associated with a number of disturbing incidents in her 
childhood: 
'Um. No, no cos I think I was quite strong, for them couple of years. I 
don't think shame came into it really. It was all to do about surviving, you 
know, this sort of idea. I had to keep strong and everything's alright, you 
know, so. Mmhm. ' 
However when she speaks about the incident where she saw her father raping her 
mother she acknowledges apparently quite powerful feelings of shame: 
'[And does that, is that connected with shame at all? ] Yeah, that was 
very, yeah, hm, so. ' 
And later she agrees that she feels shame in the present when thinking about the 
incident: 
'[And does the feeling of shame come back when you think about it 
then? ] Yeah, very much so. ' 
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The 'now you see it now you don't' quality of the shame reported by these 
participants could be associated with a number of factors. Firstly, and most 
obviously perhaps, for some participants identifying shame may have had 
unwanted interpersonal connotations (see Chapter Two). This was suggested by 
one ambivalent participant when she said at the beginning of her interview 'Not 
shame, no, not shame. I've done nothing to be ashamed of as far as I'm 
concerned anyway, nothing to be ashamed of (P 1). Other participants seemed 
unsure about the distinctions between shame and related emotions such as 
embarrassment or guilt. P 10, quoted above, seems to be unsure whether his 
experience is shame orjust embarrassment. Similarly P14 seemed at one point in 
the interview to be unsure whether his experience was guilt or shame: 
'there is a certain amount, um I'm using the word guilt, probably mean 
much the same as you, you saying about shame, about the fact that it 
didn't, you know it didn't affect me as perhaps it should have done. ' 
It is not clear whether this represents a genuine sense on the part of participants 
that their experience was not shame, or whether it is another manifestation of 
reluctance to acknowledge shame. 
Another reason for the 'vanishing' quality of shame reported by these 
participants might be that the shame is elusive and subtle which would be the 
case if the shame were marker shame connected with the events of the memory, 
but the memory was not actually utilised by the individual as a 'cautionary tale' 
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in the manner of a self-defting memory. This is consistent with the fact that the 
experiences these participants described seemed to involve many different 
emotions which may at the time have been more salient than shame. Indeed most 
participants who seemed clear about their shame described shame as an emotion 
which occurred after the main events of the memory. For example P 15 says: 
'But, um, I mean the only feelings, the feeling I had after the rape was 
basically shame and still shame. ' 
In the case of P9 feelings of shame seem to have increased over time after the 
incident: 
4as time's gone on it's become clear that it wasn't a very well thought out 
decision at all and urn so a sense of shame has come in and in fact I never 
tell anybody that 1, it may seem, I never tell people that I went there 
now. v 
45% (9/20) of the participants overall mentioned that their shame occurred after 
the main events of the memory. 
The idea that marker shame may have been associated with the memory even 
when the memory did not itself involve feelings of shame is consistent with the 
fact that a number of participants reported shame that was somehow connected 
with the planning and imagination of actions related to the event. This latter 
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possibility appeared to be the case for P 1, who as quoted earlier, initially denied 
experiencing shame: 
'Um, yeah. Group activities again. Uh, my daughter keeps asking me to 
go _ 
dancing, but I think, no I daren't because if I made a mistake I'm 
going to be embarrassed and go red, and ... I mean for a_ year old 
woman, you know, you really should be able to control yourself a little 
doing that. So there again, shame! Shame ... That I can't control it'. 
In this case the actual memory the participant recalled does not seem to function 
as a shame related cautionary tale, however she does seem to experience shame 
when the possibility of being embarrassed again comes to the fore. A number of 
participants who were uncertain about whether they experienced shame went on 
to identify shame when they explored how they would feel if others knew about 
the event: 
'Um, but again that's something um that brings shame in the respect that 
you can't speak about it. ' (P 17). 
'yeah, I just felt ashamed of it, because I mean you know I thought 
everybody would just say I asked for it. I (P 15) 
'I I would cringe at what people might think, whether what they would 
be thinking was a shameful thing in a sense you know, where's the 
governing margin and what you know, what is is shameful you know? 
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Shame is a word ... like I said I'm very good at probably 
justifying my 
actions at times because I sort of build a rationale behind them so I don't, 
I don't er, I probably would cringe and think ... shame. ' (P6). 
These participants seem to associate shame with the social implications of 
revealing the event to others (marker shame associated with non-disclosure will 
be explored in detail in the next chapter). This suggests that the memories may, 
like the unpleasant emotional experiences which were explored in the diary and 
interview study of Chapters Four to Seven be themselves regarded as 'destructive 
information' and therefore warded off by a marker shame script. In this case the 
memories gathered in the course of the study may not be part of a marker shame 
script, but rather may be acted upon by such a script. Further evidence in support 
of this proposition will be noted later in the chapter. 
Two participants denied experiencing shame altogether (Ps 7 and 13). One of 
them clearly seemed to associate shame with having done something wrong: 
'Shame ties up with me doing something wrong, yes. And I hadn't done 
anything wrong ... So, I can't equate to something where I haven't done 
anything wrong'. 
The sense is that she would consider acknowledging shame as tantamount to 
acknowledging guilt for the CSA which she and her siblings suffered. Shame 
therefore seems to have 'destructive' implications for her in Goffinan's terms. 
P1 3's interview was the shortest and sketchiest in the study and it is difficult to 
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be clear about why she differs from the majority. Nevertheless she says that the 
memory she recalled took place when she was only three years old (this was 
apparently the earliest experience recorded by anyone in the study) and at this 
age shame is probably not a well-developed emotion (Harris, 1989). However the 
shortness of the interview makes detailed comparison with other participants 
difficult. 
In summary despite the fact that the self-defining memory protocol clearly 
elicited intense and important memories in the lives of the participants over half 
of the participants had some difficulty in identifying shame in connection with 
the experience they described. This raises questions about whether these were in 
fact self-defining memories of shame. 
Recent occurrences of the memory 
In the preceding section doubts were expressed concerning the extent to which 
the memories evoked by the self-defting memory protocol were in fact self- 
defining memories of shame. In an attempt to see whether the self-defining 
memories really functioned as 'cautionary tales' (Moffitt & Singer, 1994) 
participants were asked to think of the most recent time they had remembered the 
experience prior to speaking about it in the interview and asked a number of 
questions concerning the effect of remembering on their state of mind and their 
behaviour. 77.8% (14/18) 2 were able to describe when they last remembered the 
2 Two participants were not included in this analysis, one (P20) because the relevant sides of the 
tapes of her interview did not record audibly, and one (P 18) because he had to leave before all the 
interview questions had been asked. The total n drops for some of the subsequent analysis when a 
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incident. For 55% (10/18) of the participants the incident had been remembered a 
week or less prior to the interview and in 84.6% (11/13) of recent occurrences of 
the memories participants agreed that this recall was 'typical'. 
Participants who could recall a time when they had remembered the events were 
asked a series of questions about the effect remembering had on how they 
wanted to act, how they actually behaved after they recalled the incident and how 
recalling the incident affected their relationships with other people. Although 
only 35.7% (5/14) of these participants agreed that remembering affected what 
they wanted to do, 50% (7/14) of them said that it changed the way they thought 
about other people. 21.4% (3/14) said that they felt less inclined to assert 
themselves (only one participant said that they felt more inclined to assert 
themselves, and one said he felt both more and less inclined to assert himselo. 
28.6% (4/14) said that they felt more inclined to make demands on others (only 
one participant said they felt less inclined). 35.7% (5/14) said that remembering 
made them less inclined to be with others (only one participant said they felt 
more inclined to be with others and one participant said both less and more). 
Only one participant said no for all the items (P1 1). This suggests that in general 
remembering had some effect on the participants' motivational states. In spite of 
this the fact that over a quarter of them said that remembering made them more 
inclined to make demands on others runs against the notion that remembering 
would make people more avoidant and less assertive. However making higher 
demands on others could perhaps also be interpreted as seeking more reassurance 
from others, or it could imply that the participant behaves in a more difficult or 
response has not been recorded (e. g. because it was inaudible on the tape, or because it occurred 
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aggressive way that other people find 'demanding'. Four participants revealed no 
tendency towards avoiding others (Ps 6,8,11, and 17) 
Moving on to participants' ratings of how they actually behaved after they 
recalled the incidents 46.1% (6/13) said that recall changed the way they behaved 
and 53.8% (7/13) that it didn't. However 57.1% (8/14) said that remembering 
had affected their relationships. Half of those who said that remembering had not 
affected their relationships (3/6) said that this was only because at the time they 
were alone. 42.8% (6/14) said that they became more withdrawn (and none of the 
participants said that they became less withdrawn). Two participants (15.4%) 
said that they avoided people they felt OK with before they remembered. 38.5% 
(5/13) said that they became more difficult with other people when they 
remembered and the same proportion (38.5%, 5/13) said that they became more 
angry with other people. Only one person said that they sought out relationships 
with people they felt would be accepting (8.3%, 1/12) and only one participant 
said that remembering prompted them to let someone else know how they were 
feeling (7.6%, 1/13), with 30.8% (4/13) saying that remembering prompted them 
to tell others less about what they were feeling. These figures seem to provide 
some weak support for the notion that remembering the incidents is associated 
with avoidant and aggressive interpersonal scripts. On the other hand a number 
of participants reported that remembering made them more committed to others. 
33.3% (4/12) said that they felt more committed to a particular person or people. 
25% (3/12) said that they felt more committed to living up to certain standards. A 
between sides of the tape). 
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number of participants (Ps 6,11,13 and 17) failed to indicate that recall had had 
any negative interpersonal effect. 
Given the generally low numbers, the fact that only 55% (10/18) of the 
participants in the study as a whole were able to describe recalling the incident a 
week or less prior to the interview, the lack of contextual detail associated with 
this quantitative part of the study, and the variability in the responses, these 
figures cannot be said to provide a convincing demonstration of the role of self- 
defting memories of shame in pre-empting participants' pursuit of their social 
goals. 
A ftirther problem is that far ftom using their painful memories as useful 
reminders of the need for self-protection many participants at various points in 
the interview indicated that they tend to actively suppress their awareness of the 
memory. This is illustrated by the following comments (all made by participants 
who were in fact able to describe a time when they recalled the incident): 
'Um [pause]. If I allowed myself to, I could think about it every night urn 
but I don't and it's only when we talk about it, about the family, that you 
know that's when I'll say something maybe but somehow I can control it, 
and I make myself not think about it'. (P2). 
'Oh, um, it's been a, it's been actually none, well in terms, because I want 
to forget about it. I mean I have thought about it a little, at little times 
throughout the years, I can't really say, it's never, it's not been like all the 
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time, it's just recently now where I just can't hold it in any more, cos 
there other things going on that I've got to remember and this just like, 
there's no more room [laughs]. ' (P 11). 
'I'm finding it a wee bit difficult inasmuch that the memory is not 
probably not my hottest subject because I think I've probably tried to 
switch off from it ... quite a bit and I spend most of my time actually 
just 
finding things to preoccupy myself to sort of avoid the now if you like. 
Uh. '(P14). 
'I was trying to pretend it didn't happen I suppose and that was my way 
of not telling anybody, I thought if I didn't tell anybody and I didn't think 
about or try not to think about it even though I did and I was having 
nightmares, um, you, you it was my way of dealing with it and my way of 
thinking well it didn't happen it was just a nightmare you know. Push it 
to one side, I mean, it'll get blocked away in a little room up in your head 
and it will stay there. ' (P 15). 
Although none of these participants seems to be entirely successful in blocking 
their awareness of the experience these comments hardly seem compatible with 
the memory as cautionary tale - certainly not one whose message is willingly 
attended to. Overall 42.1% (8/19) of the participants mentioned (without having 
been asked) in the course of the interview that they made some attempt to avoid 
becoming aware of the memory they recounted (see Appendix 15). Vv%ile this 
tendency seems to fit somewhat uneasily with the notion of the self-defting 
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memory of shame it is compatible with an association of the memories with 
scripts demarcating such painful experiences in the individuals' lives as 
'destructive information'. If the memories themselves contain 'destructive 
information' they may be warded off as a result of the operation of the script, as 
suggested in the preceding section. This makes sense since if one is not 
constantly aware that there is information about oneself which might undermine 
one's self-presentation then one may be more likely to 'pass' in Goffinan's 
(1963) words as 'nonnal'. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, then, the attempt to elicit self-defining memories of shame in this 
population seems to have met with only modest success. More than half of the 
participants had some difficulty in identifying shame in the experiences they 
recalled (despite the fact that the protocol specifically directed them to recall 
memories that evoked shame when they recalled it). Furthermore not all 
participants were able to recount a recent instance when they had recalled the 
incident (despite the fact that the protocol requested participants to recall an 
incident that they had thought about many times and which should have been as 
familiar to them as a 'picture [they] have studied or a song [they] have learned by 
heart'). Additionally, for a substantial minority of those who could describe a 
recent instance of remembering the incident, recall did not seem to be associated 
with socially avoidant responses in line with the memory functioning as part of a 
shame-based affective script. Finally evidence was presented which suggested 
that rather than being utilised as signposts directing the individual away from 
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potentially harmful situations nearly half of the participants actively sought to 
avoid experiencing or re-evoking the memories. These considerations prompted 
the suggestion that for many of the participants the memory they related could be 
thought of as 'destructive information' in its own right. Ilis would account for 
the fact that the memories themselves appeared in many instances to have been 
warded off. 
Since the study was intended to explore the extent to which the important 
emotional memories recalled by participants were subject to the same kinds of 
disclosure dynamics as emerged in the diary and interview study of Chapters 
Four to Seven the idea that the memories were subject to the operation of a 
shame-type script, rather than being of it, is amenable to study. In the next 
section data relating to the disclosure and non-disclosure of the experiences 
participants recalled will be presented. 
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Chapter Nine 
Psychotherapy Patients' Non-disclosure of Significant 
Memories 
Introduction 
The current chapter is an attempt to replicate and build on the findings 
concerning non-disclosure reported in Chapter Six and to ascertain whether the 
pattern of emotional isolation and disclosure found in the diary and interview 
study could be replicated in the slightly different context of psychotherapy 
patients' important emotional memories. The intention was to discover how 
robust the findings concerning psychotherapy patients' emotional isolation 
reported in Chapters Four and Six proved to be in a different sample of 
psychotherapy referrals and in the context of distressing and significant 
emotional memories rather than simply unpleasant emotional experiences. In 
addition to replicating and extending the earlier findings in this way it was hoped 
that, by virtue of being more wide-ranging, the interviews would provide 
information about the broader context of emotional isolation. 
Participants were (as noted in the previous chapter) asked whether they had 
talked about the self-defining memory they recalled both shortly after it had 
happened and also more recently. Participants who had not disclosed were asked 
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to talk about their reasons for non-disclosure. Material relating to the broader 
context of emotional isolation was elicited by asking questions about the effect 
the emotional experience had had on participants both in the past and more 
recently. 
Reasons for non-disclosure 
Habitual non-disclosure 
95% (19/20) of the participants showed evidence of habitual non-disclosure 
regarding the incident they spoke about in the interview (see Appendix 16). 
Typical comments included the following: 
'I much prefer to keep it to myself, yes. No question about that'. (P9). 
'it's not something you would talk about is it? It's personal and private 
you know'. (P8). 
'I just thought, you know, I don't want anyone to know, I don't want to 
talk about it, I'm perfectly fine, and I'm fine, that was it you know, I 
didn't, yeah'. (Pl 1). 
6normally no I wouldn't. I'd just keep it to myself'. (P3). 
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Just over a quarter of the participants (30%, 6/20) indicated that it was in their 
nature to keep things to themselves. For example: 
'I've always been quite a private person. Urn, I tend to sort of keep things 
to myself. (P19). 
'And urn, that's me, keep your own counsel'. (P10). 
'I mean that's, that's my very nature, it's not actually being open' (P 14). 
Some participants (21%, 4/19) suggested that the interviewer was the only person 
they had ever told: 
'No. Never. I've never talked about that to anybody but you, up until 
now'. 
'I don't ever talk, you're the only one I think I've ever talked about it to. ' 
(P5). 
'these are things I've never told anyone, so... ' (P 11). 
At the other end of the spectrum P 18 said that he 'would prefer' not to talk about 
it although if people enquired he would, suggesting that habitual non-disclosure 
of the incident was not so entrenched in his case as it was for most of the other 
participants. 
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There was one exceptional case, P6, who confessed that he had previously felt 
'compelled' to talk about the experience at the time that it was happening. 
However he also revealed that he was afraid of betraying his vulnerability to 
others: 
'I'm even though there are times that I can feel very nervous, I can 
feel very vulnerable, that side of me doesn't show very well and people 
see me more as in control and I, I've often seen that more as a disability 
now because there are some feelings which I don't express that well, 
probably because I feel ashamed to express them'. (P6). 
This suggests that this participant was selective in what he felt compelled to 
disclose. Elements relating to his feelings of vulnerability, he implies, remained 
hidden. 
In summary it seems that participants generally did not talk to other people about 
the intensely distressing emotional experiences that they recalled. This appears to 
parallel and replicate the finding of a tendency towards non-disclosure in the 
diary and interview study. In the earlier study 81.5% of the 27 non-disclosing 
participants made comments indicative of habitual non-disclosure. The finding in 
the current study that 95% of participants tended not to speak about the 
experiences that they recalled suggests that an important facet of the emotional 
isolation of psychotherapy patients might be a reluctance to discuss intense 
negative emotional memories. 
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Anticipated responses to disclosure 
In this and the following section the same categories have been used as in 
Chapter Six. Results for the categories relating to anticipated responses to 
disclosure are summarised in Table 9.1 and a complete list of statements in each 
category in this section is included in Appendix 17. A table in which the 
proportion of participants endorsing each category in this study and for non- 
disclosing participants in the diary and interview study is also presented (Table 
9.2). 
Table 9.1: categories of anticipated responses to the disclosure of memories 
P label upset 
others 
lack 
under. 
stand- 
ing 
Im. 
helpful 
posit- 
ive 
resp- 
onse 
lack 
inter- 
est/ 
attn 
not 
believ 
-ed 
conf- 
ident- 
iality 
trust point- 
less 
isolat- 
ion 
Pos- 
itive 
resp- 
onse 
other 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Totals 1 16119 1 
84.2% 
4/19 
1 21% 
4/19 
21% 
2/19 
10.5% 
5/19 
26.3% 
2/ 9 
10.5% 
0/19 
1 0% 
1/19 
1 5.3% 
4/19 
21% 
3/19 
15.8% 
J 4/19 
21% 
Labelling, blaming andjudging. As was the case in the diary and interview study 
the most common response that participants anticipated in the event of disclosure 
seemed to be labelling, blaming or judging by other people. Some participants 
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(Ps 1,3, and 18) feared that others would regard them as 'silly' or 'stupid' if they 
spoke about the incident: 
'To be told you're silly. And they think you can switch it off "what a silly 
thing to do, there's nothing to be embarrassed about" or "Oh there's no 
need to blush, there's no need to be embarrassed", you know. ' (P 1). 
'Er, I would think a lot of people, a lot of fairly shallow people, well I say 
shallow people who are close friends of mine, would probably say "Oh 
you're stupid, you shouldn't have had it done". Things like that. I think 
that's the way they would have reacted'. (P 18). 
Some thought that they would be regarded as crazy or mad (Ps 3,6 and 8): 
'you could go up and down _ 
High St. telling people and they'd think 
you were crackers'. (P8). 
'you think oh, they 71 be thinking there's something wrong with me, you 
know. Bit like that saying, what is it, says I, m not mad but they think I 
am, I say I'm not mad, they say I am mad but I was outvoted, it's sort of 
them outvoting you, stupid you know, saying you're mad. ' (P6). 
P 16 (like P6) feared people would think there was something wrong with her: 
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'Well, I've always I've always thought if I told somebody everything 
what had happened, everything like, they'll just think I must, there must 
be something the matter with me. Just seems so, you know, somebody 
can have so many of these things happening, you know. ' (P 16). 
Ps 5 and 12 thought that others would think they were disgusting: 
'I told you they would think I was bloody disgusting, and wouldn't even 
want to know me'. (P5). 
4people don't talk about things like that. Especially in those days. They 
did, they did class it as disgusting, dirty and shouldn't be done and 
everything else'. (P12). 
Some participants feared ridicule at the hands of others (Ps 10,15 and 19). For 
example: 
'Probably laugh at you, ridicule, yeah, and that's what you're um trying 
to avoid' (P 10). 
'I mean really I've kept, kept everything to myself. Perhaps through fear 
of being embarrassed or sort of laughed at'. (P19). 
A number of participants referred more generally to their fear of being judged by 
others (Ps 2,7 and 9): 
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'I would try on the whole to keep it quiet because I don't want to be 
judged by others so on that episode, so that's certainly an area where I 
don't want to be, I would prefer to avoid the judgement of others which is 
why I keep it quiet'. (P9). 
'I've been afraid of people judging me'. (P7). 
Other remarks were made which indicated the importance of how participants, in 
Cooley's phrase 'lived in the minds of others' (quoted in Scheff, 1988): 
'Um, no, no I think the fact that they'd be thinking something in their 
mind that I wouldn't know about and I didn't want you know, so. I don't 
know. I've got this teffible thing about it, people thinking about 
don't, if I do something wrong, I always have to do things right because I 
don't anyone thinking bad of me or any-, I mean it's still now, I still feel 
it now. And I'm always oh on edge like, cos er, or like worried about this, 
that and the other, or are they going to think this, are they going to think 
that. ' (P 11). 
'I didn't really want to tell anybody, um, in case they got sort of an 
impression of me sort of thing, you know. ' (P 19). 
For Ps 10,12 and 14 such negative impressions seemed to constitute information 
which could be used against them: 
241 
'by the very nature if you let somebody understand what really motivates 
you or what you're really feeling, it can by definition be used against you, 
if they were that way inclined'. (P 14). 
'I do tend to keep things to myself Cos I have, since I have had friends 
and it takes me ages to trust somebody. And when I do then I tell them 
things, but I always found that they either used it against me or they just 
weren't true friends. ' (P 12). 
Overall 84.2% (16/19) of the participants mentioned that fear of labelling, 
blaming or judging responses of the kinds illustrated above was an element in the 
non-disclosure of their emotional memories. In the diary and interview study 
70.4% of non-disclosing participants indicated that non-disclosure was 
associated with anticipated responses of this kind. The current finding appears 
then to replicate the finding of the earlier study that psychotherapy referrals 
appear to have salient emotional experiences in their lives which they keep 
private for fear that they would lead to adverse judgements on the part of others 
were they to be shared. Once again the findings are consistent with the idea that 
patients are attempting to contain and withhold significant 'destructive 
information' which would damage their standing relative to others if known. 
Other anticipated negative responses to disclosure. Table 9.1 shows that the 
labelling, blaming, judging category was by far the most important of the 
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participants also mentioned other anticipated responses which were present in the 
earlier diary and interview study, although these factors seemed somewhat less 
salient. 
26.3% (5/19) participants said that they anticipated that others would lack 
interest or not want to be bothered with what they said if they disclosed. An 
example comes from P2: 
'I just think they wouldn't care, they wouldn't be bothered, you know'. 
21% (4/19) said that they did not disclose for fear of upsetting others. An 
example of this category is the following remark from P 10: 
'I wouldn't like to burden my wife with it, you know or anybody I knew, 
I'd prefer to just keep it locked up on my own store of er, bad memories 
if you like'. 
21% (4/19) of the participants said that they anticipated that others would not 
understand them if they spoke about the experience, making comments such as: 
'I think they wouldn't understand. [Why do you think they wouldn't 
understand? Why do you think that is? ] Well unless it's happened to 
them, it's very hard to understand'. (P 12). 
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21% (4/19) of the participants said that they thought disclosure was pointless. A 
typical remark is that of P 19: 
'Um, well it's all over and done with now, so, um, it doesn't make much 
sense sort of resurrecting the past, um, I don't see it sort of serves any 
purpose. Urn, I think you should perhaps let sleeping dogs lie. ' 
10.5% (2/19) of the participants said that they anticipated unhelpful positive 
responses if they disclosed. For example P8 said: 
'Erm, people when you relate your experiences such as this to them, 
they're sympathetic and it's ... I'm not, like myself, as a character as an 
individual, I don't mind people saying "Oh that's a bit of bad lucV. But I 
don't want this, you know sort of what I call patronising sympathy, 
perhaps it's a bit wicked putting somebody down if they try to help you, 
but I don't want that much, you know, um, oh it's difficult ... that much 
association in that area with anybody'. (P8). 
10.5% (2/19) participants said that they feared not being believed if they spoke 
about the experience. As P 13 put it: 
'I think they wouldn't believe me. I've never known how to describe 
what happened between me and my brother. Urn, I wouldn't know how to 
go about telling people, I don't think they'd believe me. ' 
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Only one participant (1/19,5.3%) in the current study said that they thought 
other people could not be trusted with disclosure. This was P 12 who said: 
'there was nobody I could trust. I wasn't bom here, I had, I didn't have no 
family here, I didn't have no, I had some friends but they weren't 
friends that I can trust'. 
No participants in the current study related non-disclosure to fear that the 
recipient would betray their confidence. However a number of participants (e. g. 
P4, PS, and P 10) did say during the course of the interview that the anonymous 
and confidential nature of the research setting was an important factor in their 
decision to describe the events they spoke about in the interview. 
In addition to the anticipated responses of others 15.8% (3/19) participants said 
that they did not disclose because there was no-one available for them to disclose 
to. For example P14 says: 
'I don't think there was actually anybody immediately there that, who 
would listen I don't suppose'. 
This compares with 29.6% of the non-disclosing participants in the diary and 
interview study. 
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Table 9.2: Proportion of a) participants in the self-derining memory study 
and b) non-disclosing participants in the diary and interview study who 
mentioned each category of anticipated response to disclosure developed in 
the diary and interview study 
Categories ofanticipated Proportion ofparticipants Proportion ofparticipants 
response to disclosure endorsing category in setf- endorsing category in the 
defining memory study diary and interview study 
Labelling, blaming, 84.2% 70.4% 
judging (16/19) (19/27) 
Lack interest 26.3% 25.9% 
(5/19) (7/27) 
Hann/upset/ burden others 21% 55.5% 
(4/19) (15/27) 
Others not understanding 21% 33.3% 
(4/19) (9/27) 
Pointless 21% 25.9% 
(4/19) (6/27) 
Unhelpful positive 10.5% 33.3% 
responses (2/19) (9/27) 
Not believed 10.5% 18.5% 
(2/19) (5/27) 
Not trustworthy 5.3% 14.8% 
(1/19) (4/27) 
Confidentiality 0% 7.4% 
(0/19) 
1(2/27) 
The interviews also included several anticipated responses which were not 
present in the earlier study. Three participants (Ps 11,12 and 13) said that they 
would expect others to respond with shock if they disclosed the incident. For 
example P 11 says: 
'I wouldn't talk about it to anyone normally, cos it's, I don't know. It's 
this thing about shock on someone's face'. 
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P2 also said that one of the reasons she failed to talk about her father's violence 
when she was a child was because she realised it made her different from her 
peers: 
'I think I remember speaking to friends and saying "Does your dad ever 
hit you" and things like this and they used to just laugh and I just knew 
that they didn't so, I didn't say anyttling more'. 
These additional responses seem to be broadly compatible with the general desire 
of participants to avoid unwanted social consequences of disclosure. 
To summarise, while fear of labelling, blaming and judging responses seems to 
be the most important category of anticipated response, categories that emerged 
in the earlier diary and interview study also appeared for the most part in the 
current range of responses. However with the exception of the categories 
concerning others' lack of interest or attention and the pointlessness of 
disclosing, these categories were somewhat less frequently endorsed than in the 
diary and interview study (see Table 9.2). This may be because the recent and 
specific focus of the diary and interview study helped draw participants' 
attention to factors which were neglected as a result of the more general focus of 
the cuffent study. 
Exceptions. Nearly a quarter of participants (21%, 4/19) said that they also 
anticipated comparatively positive social responses to disclosure. P9, for 
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instance, said that he now thought that at least some people would think that the 
event he had tended to conceal was 'innocuous'. P8 said he would anticipate: 
'a degree of understanding. Urn, and that's and perhaps a smear of 
sympathy'. 
P15 said: 
'I don't expect to be treated any different, I'm no different to anybody 
else. ' 
She went on to say that she expected people to 'just accept it. P 17 said: 
4 Still I expect them to respond with shock ... but hopefully not to 
judge 
too harshly. And to try and understand. ' 
In three of these cases (Ps 9,15 and 17) their expectations of how people would 
respond seemed to have changed so that currently they would expect people 
around them to respond more positively than they did in the past. P9 had been 
surprised when he had told somebody close to him about the experience and this 
person had been relieved that it was not something more serious. P 15 now 
allowed herself to mention occasionally that she had been raped and P17 spoke 
tearfully in the interview about how she wanted to be more open and to stop her 
lifetime's habit of 'bottling' things up. These participants therefore seem to have 
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moved on to some degree from the habitual non-disclosure that seems to be 
characteristic of the participants as a whole. 
Summary. All but one participant, P6, seemed to have or have had in the past, the 
belief that other people would respond in an undesired manner should they 
disclose the memory they talked about, although as we have just seen a minority 
of participants seemed to be in the process of revising these beliefs at the time of 
the interview. While the majority of the factors associated with anticipated 
negative responses in the earlier diary and interview study seem also to play a 
part, by far the most important element to emerge in the current study was the 
'labelling, blaming and judging' category. This was also the category cited by 
most participants in the earlier study. The current findings suggest once again 
that non-disclosure of significant emotional experiences by psychotherapy 
patients is associated with the individual's desire to maintain a positive 
impression in the minds of other people. As such the findings add further weight 
to the dramaturgical model of disclosure proposed in Chapter Six. 
Individual and seýf-related reasonsfor non-disclosure 
Results for the individual reasons for non-disclosure (using the same categories 
as were used in the diary and interview study) are presented in Table 9.3. A table 
in which the proportion of participants who made remarks in each of the 
categories in both this and for non-disclosing participants in the earlier diary and 
interview study is presented in Table 9.4. A complete list of statements in each 
category is included in Appendix 18. 
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Table 9.3: categories of self-related factors associated with non-disclosure of 
memories 
P Shame etc Out of 
character 
Inability to 
justify own 
feelings 
Problems are 
own 
responsibil- 
ity 
Rejection of 
own feelings 
Reluctance 
to experience 
unpleasant 
emotions/ 
memories 
Other 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 (7) 
Totals Excluding 
12119 
63.2% 
2/19 
10.5% 
5/19 
26.3% 
0/19 
0% 
1/19 
5.3% 
6/19 
31.6% 
1/19 
5.3% 
1 
Shame and self-conscious emotions. 63.2% (12/19) of the participants said that 
shame was one of the reasons they did not talk about the experience they had 
recalled. For example: 
'I suppose it's because I'm ashamed and I didn't want people to enlarge 
on it. I wanted them just to think it and forget it. If I'd have talked about 
it they would have dwelt on it and may be watching me closer. ' (Pl). 
'I would feel ashamed, I would feel ashamed telling people'. (P2). 
'Because I felt so ashamed and people feel disgusted and and reviled by 
that. As much as I do myself. I wouldn't ever, ever take that chance. I 
couldn't. ' (P3). 
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'So a sense of shame has come in and in fact I never tell anybody that 1, it 
may seem, I never tell people that I went there now'. (P9). 
Table 9.4: Proportion of a) participants in the current study and b) non- 
disclosing participants in the diary and interview study who mentioned the 
categories of self-related reasons for non-disclosure developed in the diary 
and intprview qtiidv 
Categories ofseýflrelated Proportion of Proportion of 
reasonsfor non- participants endorsing participants endorsing 'I disclosure category in seýfldeflning category in the diary and 
memory study interview study 
Shame and other self- 63.2% 74.1% 
conscious emotions (12/19) (20/27 _ Out of character 10.5% 40.7% 
(2/19) (11/27) 
Inability to justify own 26.3% 37% 
feelings (5/19) (10/27) 
Problems own 0% 33.3% 
responsibility (0/19) (9/27) 
_ Rejection of own 5.3% 18.5% 
feelings 
. 
(1/19) (5/27) 
Reluctance to experience 31.6% 22.2% 
unpleasant emotions or (6/19) (6/27) 
memories 
Other 5.3% 4% 
(1/19) 1(1/27) 
'[Can you say why you chose to keep it to yourself? ] That's it, shame. 
[Right. That's where the shame came in? ]. Or embarrassment, yeah'. 
(PIO). 
This was the most frequently cited of the individual reasons for non-disclosure 
and was the second most frequently cited reason for non-disclosure in the study 
as a whole, after fear of labelling, blaming and judging. Despite this the figure is 
somewhat lower than the 74.1% of non-disclosing participants in the diary and 
interview study who said that if they disclosed they would feel ashamed. This 
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difference is probably due to the fact that participants in the current study were 
not asked directly about whether disclosure would make them feel shame as they 
were in the earlier study. In all but one case participants who noted shame as a 
reason for non-disclosure also noted fear of being labelled, blamed or judged by 
others. This is consistent with marker models of shame, such as H. Lewis' (197 1) 
model of superego shame, in which imagery of other people as scomful and 
rejecting plays a major part. The one case where a participant mentioned shame 
as a reason for non-disclosure and yet did not apparently expect to be labelled, 
blamed or judged if she disclosed was P17, who nevertheless still seemed very 
concerned about how others would evaluate her as her comment (quoted on page 
248) suggests. 
Reluctance to experience unpleasant emotionslinemories. The next most 
frequently cited individual reason for non-disclosure was participants' reluctance 
to experience unpleasant emotions or memories. 31.6% (6/19) of the participants 
mentioned this as 4 reason for non-disclosure. Examples include: 
'Because it makes me feel like I do now. I feel quite sick now. ' (P2). 
4you're admitting a lot aren't you if you ... you kind of... it reinforces 
for a while your feelings of inadequacy to go and admit there's a 
problem, it sort of um makes it harder, even if it eventually helps, it's 
hard to admit a problem to begin with'. (N). 
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This figure is slightly higher than the figure for non-disclosing participants in the 
diary and interview study which was 22.2%. As was the case in the earlier study 
it is not entirely clear whether this category of response is congruent with the 
dramaturgical model of non-disclosure. However P9 quoted above seemed to 
imply that the pain is partly to do with the feeling that one's identity is somehow 
inadequate or invalid. In the following remark by P2 there is a sense that if the 
experience can remain hidden and private it does not became 'real' in the sense 
of being a social reality: 
'Because to hear it makes it real and I'm too good at burying things to 
make them become real'. 
A similar impression is given in the following remark by P1 1: 
'I don't, I, I think I just wanted it to go away. I just, I thought by talking 
to people and stuff like that it would come back to me and I didn't want 
that. You know, I just thought, you know, I don't want anyone to know, I 
don't want to talk about it, I'm perfectly fme, and I'm fte, that was it 
you know, I didn't ... yeah'. 
These remarks imply that the 'painfulness' of the feelings and memories may be 
identity related. 
Inability tojustify ownfeelings or experiences. Other individual reasons for non- 
disclosure found in the earlier diary and interview study seemed somewhat 
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sparser in the current study. 26.3% (5/19) of participants said that they did not 
think they could justify or explain their experience. For instance: 
'I thought that something was wrong with me because I never heard of 
things like that, I never heard of anybody having an abortion, and I never 
heard, you know. Everybody seemed ... happy and everything was in 
place around me, and er, people don't talk about things like that. ' (P12). 
'when I went through my depressions I wanted a broken leg, or I wanted 
a heart attack, or I wanted to break out in a rash, so that people would 
know there was something wrong with me. You know because people 
just don't know. You can't explain to people how you feel about that. ' 
(P1). 
Is just something a mother and a father, you never hear of that, I think 
that's what it is. ' (P 11). 
These remarks suggest that these individuals are struggling with experiences 
which they think that people in their social milieu would have difficulty 
understanding or accepting. The number of participants mentioning this factor in 
the current study is slightly lower than was the case for non-disclosing 
participants in the diary and interview study where 37% of participants 
mentioned that this was a reason for non-disclosure. This may be because the 
interview protocol did not include a specific probe about shame as in the earlier 
study remarks of this kind were often prompted by asking participants whether 
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they thought they would feel stupid, silly or ashamed of themselves if they 
disclosed. 
Other setf-related reasonsfor non-disclosure. 15.8% (3/19) of the participants 
mentioned that disclosure would betray them as someone different to the 
character they normally portrayed. For example 
'I think I was, I always wanted to feel a very s-, you know determined 
character as you said, I wanted to try and sort of like, you know that a 
strong character, and by talking to anybody and by doing, by saying this 
it's like saying well I'm not very strong, you know'. (P 11). 
This was a considerably smaller proportion than the 40.7% of non-disclosing 
diary and interview Participants who made comments of this kind. However once 
again the lower incidence of this particular reason for non-disclosure may reflect 
the absence of a specific question in the interview protocol addressing shame- 
related factors in non-disclosure. Some evidence from the analysis of more 
general themes in the interviews will be presented later in this chapter which 
suggests that this factor remains important for the participants in this as well as 
the earlier study. 
Only one participant (5.3%, 1/19) said that non-disclosure was associated with 
rejection of their own feelings. This was P6 who said: 
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'there are some feelings which I don't express that well, probably because 
I feel ashamed to express them'. 
This contrasts with 18.5% of the non-disclosing participants in the diary and 
interview study. It seems likely that this did not emerge as a salient factor in the 
current study because of the focus on memories rather than emotional 
experiences as the unit of analysis. No participants in the current study said that 
non-disclosure was related to feelings of personal responsibility, contrasting with 
33% of the non-disclosing participants in the diary study. Nevertheless self- 
blame did seem to play a part in many of the participants' understanding of the 
situations they described. For instance P 19: 
'I didn't realise it was perhaps not my fault you know, after everything 
that I'd been told, everything had been sort of blamed on me sort of 
thing'. 
P4 seemed to blame himself for the abuse that he suffered: 
'Shame was like where I sort of accepted it, I let it happen, you know. I 
um, in a way I liked it in a way'. 
Elements of self-blame regarding the memory also appeared in the accounts of 
P9,12,14,16,17 and 19. There was one individual reason for non-disclosure 
categorised as 'other'. This was given by P 13 who said that she did not talk about 
the experience: 
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'Cos I, I'm meant to get on with my life, you know, not think about it all 
the time. You can't go on thinking about things like that all the time 
now% 
This remark suggests that the participant does not believe that it is appropriate to 
talk about her memory. It seems to dovetail with the comments made about being 
unable to justify or explain the experience (see above). 
Exceptions and summary. The current study replicates the diary and interview 
study in finding an association between non-disclosure and shame. While a 
smaller proportion of participants mentioned shame than was the case for non- 
disclosing diary and interview participants this probably reflects the fact that 
there was no specific question regarding shame and non-disclosure in the current 
study's interview protocol. Ihe fact that 1) the anticipation of labelling, blaming 
or judgmental responses from others and 2) shame were the two most commonly 
cited reasons for non-disclosure is highly congruent with the dramaturgical 
model of non-disclosure that emerged in Chapter Six. Indeed it seems probable 
that shame and the anticipation of negative labelling by others are two sides of 
the same coin, for marker shame involves an internalised social perspective as 
many shame theorists have pointed out (e. g. H. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992). 
Only two participants (10.5 %, 2/19) mentioned neither labelling or shame as a 
factor in non-disclosure, Ps 4 and 13. In the case of P4 this is probably because 
the bulk of the interview concentrated on an experience which he subsequently 
acknowledged was of considerably less significance to him than the experience 
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of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) he eventually revealed in the interview. Since 
his experience of abuse seemed to have been coloured by shame it seems likely 
that if there had been sufficient time to explore in depth his attitudes towards 
disclosure of this latter experience both fear of labelling, blaming orjudging 
responses and shame associated with non-disclosure would have emerged (his 
self-blame regarding this experience was noted earlier). P 13 has already been 
discussed as an exceptional case in Chapter Eight because she was one of only 
two participants whose memories appeared to contain no shame at all. This in 
itself might explain why neither labelling nor shame appear to be elements in her 
reasons for non-disclosure. However as mentioned in Chapter Eight her 
interview was also the shortest and sparsest in the study making it harder to 
identify exactly how she diverged from the other interviewees. She may have felt 
less comfortable than other participants talking and disclosing in the research 
interview itself, and consequently not revealed information that she felt might 
shame her or lead to judgements or labels on the part of the interviewer. 
Reluctance to experience unpleasant emotions or memories appeared as the next 
most important category in this section, although it was considerably less 
prevalent than shame. It was suggested that this element might dovetail with the 
dramaturgical account of non-disclosure as the pain associated with the 
experiences may in part at least be the pain associated with being aware of 
destructive information about oneself. Inability to justify ones' own experiences 
was a factor cited by a quarter of the participants. It was suggested that this might 
be linked to the fact that these participants felt that their experiences contravened 
social norms concerning what could or could not be discussed or accepted by 
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others. Two other factors, the experience contradicting one's public character and 
a sense that one's problems were one's own responsibility seemed rather less 
often endorsed by the participants in the current study, although it was suggested 
that these might nevertheless be important factors which may have been 
undeffepresented in the findings due to a lack of interview probes concerning 
individual and shame-related reasons for non-disclosure. 
Having replicated the key findings of Chapter Four and Six regarding the extent 
of and reasons for non-disclosure of emotional experiences by psychotherapy 
patients, in this fmal section of the chapter an attempt is made to look at broader 
themes that emerged in this more wide-ranging study. In this way it is hoped that 
in addition to developing an understanding of the operation of shame in the 
context of the social behaviour of disclosure it will also be possible to see how 
participants' experience of non-disclosure is itself part of a broader pattern of 
social concems and behaviour. 
The broader context of emotional isolation 
The emotional isolation of psychotherapy patients has thus far been examined 
solely in the context of the disclosure of emotion laden experiences. In this 
section it is suggested that non-disclosure is part of a larger pattern of perceived 
social disqualification and dislocation suffered by these individuals. The 
following analysis is based on some general themes which emerged in the 
interviews, often in response to questions about the short-term and long-term 
effect the memory they described had had on them. 
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Difference and marginalisation 
Many participants referred to a sense of being marginalised and different. For 
some this sense of difference seems to have come about as a result of the general 
circumstances of their upbringing 
'at the time it seemed the norm, but now obviously that I've grown up 
and met different people I know it's not and I feel ashamed because we 
were very poor. I mean my father was rich but we were very poor. We 
didn't have proper clothes, we didn't have, we didn't know how to eat 
properly because we didn't have much food, it's lots of things. I didn't 
have any social graces or anything like that and I felt ashamed. I just felt 
ashamed of being me basically, just felt worthless, you know, and other 
people talk about, you know, things they'd get for their birthday, or 
things that their mum and dad used to do with them and talk about, and 
that never happened with us and I felt ashamed because of that I 
suppose'. (P2). 
'I've always felt a very strong sense of ostracisation because my family 
were poor, because we were Christian, bible bashers, holy Joes. ' (P7). 
ter ... I don't know I suppose I grew up with thinking that um, the world 
doesn't like me and I'm not particularly keen on the rest of the world if 
you like'. (P 10). 
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'I just feel that I never had any preparation for life from my own parents 
... any guidance or anything. And 
I tried to, hard to be loved and took 
care of, but er there were just so many obstacles. I feel from bad parents I 
walked into a family that's not better. They never accepted me, being 
foreign. ' (P12). 
'I want to understand, maybe ... why has so many things happened and 
and why has fate if you want I suppose been cruel, why did someone 
adopt me and then not love me in a demonstrative way, um why when it 
took all the years to find my natural first mother did she say what she said 
then, well I didn't want you then and I don't want you now. Urn, was it 
anything I could have helpedT (P 17). 
'I mean not just in this particular incident but er a lot of the time all 
through my life I've had this problem, people don't understand a lot of 
the time the way I feel about things. [Yes, so that's something that goes 
back to your childhood? ] Yes, oh yes a long time. ' (P 18). 
Other participants spoke about how they felt marginalised and different in the 
wake of the events of the memory they described: 
'I felt unwanted. Urn, I felt that there's no point in going on because I 
couldn't have what I wanted in life. I hadn't got a, hadn't got a partner. 
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Urn, nobody seemed to listen to what I was saying, living on my own, 
just couldn't cope. ' (M). 
'I also felt ashamed that because a lot of the staff were women, I was the 
only male there, that I felt that they were all sort of gossiping about me 
and I was in isolation, I'd been marginalised by it all and I felt ashamed 
about my behaviour, you know, them thinking I was weak and like... ' 
(P6). 
'Yeah, def-, definitely ideas about ... not very good at making decisions, 
that kind of, well, or not very good at finding out um, not being able 
somehow to fit in very easily, find an environment that suits me, 
especially that one actually, being a bit of an outsider, yeah. Urn, not 
getting on teffibly easily with people. ' (P9). 
, urn ... I don't have much contact with my friends any more I mean from 
that point of view. Urn, people that were sort of around at the time, er 
perhaps didn't really know what to say to me or they felt quite 
embarrassed um and therefore they didn't sort of make contact, and 
perhaps they didn't know what to say and I didn't really know what to 
say to them. ' (P 19). 
well it just made you feel different. I mean like significantly different. 
I mean it was almost like having a physical handicap or something. I 
mean every one, all ... I mean uh, as I said I think things would perhaps 
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be a wee bit different now because different attitudes or whatever, but the 
fact that um everybody you knew had two parents, I'm just stating the 
obvious, and er... ' (P 14). 
Overall 73.7% (14/19) of the participants mentioned that they felt some sense of 
difference or marginalisation, although there were no questions explicitly aimed 
at exploring this issue. 
Values 
P14 quoted in the preceding paragraph refers to the possibility that the social 
norms which led to him feeling so different as a child might in fact have 
changed. A small number of other participants also made remarks in which it 
seemed as though they were aware that the social dislocation they seemed to 
have suffered was based on the evaluative practices of the culture they belonged 
to. P4 who spoke in the interview about his experience of coming out to his 
mother as a homosexual referred to the negative status of homosexuals within his 
community: 
'like homosexuality especially in our community it's like you know, it's a 
sin'. 
Generally however the participants who referred to the evaluative social context 
of their experiences pointed to the difference between attitudes in the past, when 
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their sense of difference or marginalisation presumably emerged and attitudes in 
their present context. P14 for instance went on to say: 
'I think it's probably one of the first labels I'd got, um because it's 
probably considerably different now when lots of children are in sort of 
single parent families and all the rest, but it was considerably different 
then and only having one parent was really like labelling and it seems to 
effect everything you did, I mean sort of um, I mean we were never like 
seriously hard up, but then again... ' 
P9 appears to have discovered an alternative way of evaluating his experience: 
'It has become less important, and I can see that there's an alternative 
way of looking at it. ' 
He goes on to say: 
'I have actually become more critical, yes I've become more critical of, 
of conventional values I suppose, yes. ' 
Although he acknowledges considerable ambivalence: 
'there's a sneaking suspicion that those values ... of success and 
achievement and things that they actually do matter to me and although I 
can see that there are plenty of alternative ways of being, of urn leading a 
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life, you know, I'm not, I think part of the problem is I haven't developed 
a complete alternative way of seeing things so it's still confused in a 
sense that I ... You know, conventional ambition, I'm quite critical of 
it 
but I don't know really whether that's something, that may well be a 
defence mechanism or largely a defence mechanism just to protect my, 
you know, because really ... I think I do ... I don't know, I think I'm still 
hooked into that achievement thing. Yeah. ' 
It is interesting to note in this passage how the participant's moral self-doubt is 
reinforced by his suspicion that the alternative moral framework he is moving 
towards merely reflects an inner flaw -a 'defence mechanism'. This appears to 
be an example of what Gergen (1994) calls 'cultural enfeeblement' resulting 
from the use of psychiatric labels which disguise social and moral relationships 
(see also Chapter Six). Other participants who seemed aware of the social 
evaluations affecting their predicaments were P 10 and P 15: 
'having experienced the world for another 30 odd years, urn, you realise 
that um the embarrassment and the guilt that you felt was because a) your 
age and b) of your background experience and so that you could urn, if I 
went back to that situation with the knowledge that I have now, I would 
have literally not, a) either have laughed it off or b) walked away or told 
them to shut up or... ' (P 10). 
'I told people, I've told, I've come out more in the open over the last year 
than I have, did before. Urn, I think more so because it seems more, it 
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seems more of an everyday occurrence when women are getting raped 
nowadays. In those days it was, it happened but you didn't hear of it that 
much. Um maybe it was because there was a lot of women like me that 
just didn't say anything about it, but nowadays it seems to be on the TV, 
on the news, in the papers, so when I say I've been raped and I hear other 
women that have been raped, it's not unnatural to admit it, and I don't 
feel ashamed to admit to it now. ' (P 15). 
There is a sense in these last two accounts that this perceived change in social 
values is liberating for the participant. It seems to provide them with a licence for 
greater social involvement, the possibility of re-negotiating a sense of social 
disqualification. This idea will be discussed further at the end of the chapter. 
In summary, remarks by a minority of participants suggest that their sense of 
perceived difference might be linked to the evaluative context and practices of 
their social world. 
Negative identity 
Implicit and sometimes explicit in the comments above is a sense that 
participants regarded themselves as inferior to other people. In fact 75% (15/20) 
of the participants made some explicit reference to this. This often occurred in 
response to a question about whether the experience they had described 
highlighted any beliefs or ideas they had about themselves. 
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'It gives me an inferiority complex. I feel inferior [inaudible]. That's the 
main thing I think, feel inferior'. (P 1). 
'I mean it changed my life, I mean confidence wise. I don't feel a real 
person [long pause]. It's difficult to explain. I don't feel, I don't feel that I 
should be worth living, I don't feel [pause]. How to explain it? I don't 
like the sound of my own name being called. I don't like looking in a 
miffor at myself. I find it hard to accept compliments. I find it hard that 
somebody can care for me. And I think, I think that that's due to that. 
Does that make senseT (P2). 
'It makes me think that I definitely am a really horrible and an ugly 
person and that I have been for years and that's why I'm still as I am. 
Yes. ' (M). 
'I should say 88% of the time I feel I am quite worthless. I've no 
prospects, no future, I haven't really done that much. That was the whole 
idea really I suppose of me doing this voluntary thing at 
_ 
because I 
would, I could say to myself "look what you're doing, you're doing 
something good". But when I think about all the other things it seems to 
knock that on the head straight away. ' (P5). 
'It's sort of like you know a Shakespearean tragedy where there's a tragic 
flaw and then everything goes wrong from then on in the hero, you know, 
there's something wrong with the person, there's something about them 
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that doesn't work and everything goes wrong as a result of that and ... it's 
almost as if I sometimes feel from, after that decision at - nothing 
else 
can go right, you know, nothing can quite recover so in that sense it's 
altered my life. ' (P9). 
'I was feeling a bit down at the time and urn, slap, bang, wallop it 
happens again. I feel as if I've got this invisible sign in my head that says 
"It's OK you can use this one". ' (P 16). 
'Um, but shame, um, I'm not sure really, it's hard to say. I know it had an 
effect but I'm not sure what the effect is. Urn, I think I just kind of lost 
my self-respect really. I think it's still taking me a long time getting that 
back. I'm still not even sure whether I've got it now or not. I still feel a 
lot of shame. It's, it's sort of carried over with me, like it's stayed with 
me it's not really left me, it's there like a chiP on my shoulder or 
something'. (P20). 
Remarks of this kind imply that these individuals feel that they have 
characteristics which make them unfit for or unworthy of respect from other 
people. The comments about 'values' above suggest that behind each of these 
self-denigrating remarks there are implicit social and moral evaluations about 
what makes a good or worthy person. 
Concealment and masking 
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Not surprisingly given their sense of themselves as unworthy and flawed many 
participants spoke about masking or concealing aspects of themselves: 
'Yeah I suppose so because, I haven't got much, I try to make out I've 
got absolutely tons of self-confidence and all this crap but nobody really 
knows me. And I haven't. I'm very good at projecting a different type of 
person to other people. I've learnt. I mean I work [inaudible] I told you 
[workplace]. They don't really know what I'm like, they only see what I 
project to them, what I want to project to them. Because I don't want 
them really to know me. Because they're [slight laugh] they're snobs, I 
don't mean it. I have to be careful, I don't want them to talk down to me. 
So I try very hard to be 'intellectual'. More accepted. ' (P5). 
4normally they say I'm a happy-go-lucky person, but it isn't, it's a front. 
When it's deep down it's like I'm very unhappy and very don't want to 
do anything. And that's the side, sort of most people don't see of me. 
Because when they come round I put on a different front, I try to be 
happy and there's times they're gonna get me when I'm not and they're 
gonna wonder why. That's the real me. ' (M). 
'I wanted to tell somebody in my own family so that I could feel a bit 
comfortable at home. It's like lead-, it's like, it's like um, I'm leading a 
double life and I'm acting, you know, which I don't want to do. ' (P4). 
'I tend to keep the appearance [sigh] as if I'm in control. I'm not. ' (P12). 
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'Um, that made me the person I am now? A lot of memories but I, in 
some ways have made me um, behave as an extremely strong person. But 
I'm not as strong as what I've always portrayed, or as other people have 
seen me. I've done that I suppose to hide behind. ' (P 17). 
'I think I was, I always wanted to feel a very s-, you know determined 
character as you said, I wanted to try and sort of like, you know that a 
strong character, and by talking to anybody and by doing, by saying this 
it's like saying well I'm not very strong, you know. ' (P 11). 
P 11 goes on to say 'I always felt nobody knows me properly'. She adds: 'I feel a 
mystery to everyone'. 
Overall 47.4% (9/19) of the participants made comments of this kind. The theme 
of masking and concealment clearly overlaps with the issue of non-disclosure 
which earlier analysis in this chapter and the analysis of non-disclosure in the 
previous diary and interview study in Chapter Six suggested was associated with 
the concealment of experiences which might lead to rejection or labelling by 
others. The theme of masking seems very much in keeping with participants 
having a pressing need to manage 'destructive information' about themselves, 
information that they feel would damage the way they are seen and cause them 
shame if it were known. 
Diminished social involvement 
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Many participants referred to some form of diminished social involvement 
subsequent to the experience they described in the interview. Comments included 
the following: 
'I couldn't sit in a room with a lot of people in case a person spoke to me 
and everybody focused their attention on me., (P I). 
6 several people have phoned me at work, obviously they've got to keep a 
monitor if you've got a sick file, but I just couldn't face them. I really 
didn't want to see them, and I didn't want them in my house. ' (H). 
'Um ... highlight, make me aware of, yes it does, um, that, you've got to 
avoid situations where you're going to be put on the spot, and 
embarrassed urn and again it's because they can't get at you if you 
insulate yourself from them. Yeah, you put a barrier up between, you and 
people. ' (P 10). 
'It is the fact that if you don't let anybody in, you don't get hurt. ' (P 14). 
'Well I don't go out. I don't have a social life at all actually. [Do you 
think that's partly to do with the shame that you experienced afterwards? ] 
Yes, it, it's fear like you know, that just. I don't feel comfortable any 
more with people'. (P16). 
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Overall 84.2% (16/19) of the participants made some reference to diminished 
social involvement. All of the exceptions (Ps 5,12, and 17) showed evidence of 
habitual non-disclosure which suggests that even if these individuals maintained 
high levels of social involvement it is unlikely that such contact would be self- 
revealing (this is probably less true of P17 than the others as this participant 
spoke movingly of her desire to change her lifetime's habit of 'bottling 
everything up'). 
Diminished social involvement seems consistent with comments made by 36.8% 
(7/19) of the participants about their lack of confidence. P 10 for instance links 
lack of confidence to lack of self-respect and to how other people view him when 
he attempts to communicate: 
'in here you lack within yourself if you like, um confidence, but also I 
think at the same time respect for yourself if that's not too difficult a 
thing to understand. You, how you perceive others seeing you, you know, 
and urn how they will translate your urn communications, your words, 
your thoughts into an assessment of you, yeah? Um and you always 
assume it to be at the bottom end of any scale. Yeah? You are not thought 
of as, what's the word to use [sighs] ... Worthy'. 
PII suggests that a lack of confidence in the wake of her childhood experiences 
has stunted the development of her personality. After saying how she is 'not very 
confident at all' she goes on to say: 
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'I think my um, through all what's happened to me, I think it has changed 
my um, or it's, talking about personality. I don't know whether it's like 
... stopped my personality actually 
developing to the full maybe, I don't 
know. Maybe it's hindered in some way, in terms of lack of confidence. 
But urn, I don't know. ' 
Comments by other participants included the following: 
'I think it's ruined my life completely. Um, I think, you know, my 
childhood was not very nice in many ways, urn, because of that it has 
ruined my adult life. It's made me more of [inaudible] and I should have 
been stronger. Urn, it's definitely made me have very, very low 
confidence. ' (P2). 
'I'd have thought it's just a tendency anyway in me, not to, not to quite 
belief in myself, at the last minute I've stopped believing in myself, you 
know what I mean. It's sort of a confidence thing. ' (P9). 
Tin, I didn't have any confidence at school at all. Confidence is the main 
thing. ' (P13). 
nie comments by Ps 10 and 11 suggest that low confidence of this kind is related 
to the negative identities participants felt they possessed. Both diminished social 
involvement and lack of confidence seem consistent with an overarching theme 
of perceived social disqualification. 
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Relationships 
In the diary and interview study there was some evidence (reported in Chapter 
Six) that non-disclosure of emotional experiences was associated with problems 
in the individual's close relationships. In the current study participants were not 
probed about the effects of non-disclosure on their relationships and there were 
no specific questions regarding the effect of the memory they recalled on their 
relationships. There were, however, a number of closed questions about the 
effects of remembering the experience on participants' relationships, the results 
of which were reported in the previous chapter. Despite the lack of probes 
regarding relationships some participants made comments which seemed to echo 
comments made in the diary and interview study and which also illustrate how a 
pattern of withdrawal and self-protection that seems to accompany a sense of 
social disqualification can have a negative impact on relationships. 
Four participants (Ps 5,10,11 and 14) mentioned how their tendency to 
withdraw from their most intimate relationships caused difficulties with their 
partners. For example: 
'I suppose it makes it a lot more difficult round people because they only 
see that side of me and the side they like. It's the same really with my 
wife you know. Sometimes she keeps saying "What's the matter with 
you? You're not speaking. What's the matter with you? " [Inaudible] I'm 
just saying "Oh shut up, leave me alone". ' (P5). 
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'... I think subcon-, urn ... the ability to close down, which I learnt then, I 
shut myself off, self-protection thing. Um ... it's Oled a couple of 
previous relationships and I mean it's put my present one on the rocks 
several times. And that's, urn, that's a thing I could directly link back. It 
is the fact that you know if you don't let anybody in, you don't get hurt. ' 
(P14). 
These comments are similar to a number of comments made by diary and 
interview participants. They suggest that being closely associated with someone 
who fails or refuses to account for their behaviour is quite stressful and upsetting. 
A second problematic set of relationship behaviours seem to revolve around 
aggression. Examples include: 
'I am more difficult now with people, I'm more quick to temp-, quick you 
know, to lose my ternper. ' (P 16). 
4 sometimes I find that I say things ... to him that I shouldn't, because he 
doesn't deserve them, because he is kind to me and he's always there for 
me. He's always stood by me. But, it's like ... I don't know it's, it's like I 
push him as far as I can, just to see ... how far I can go, do you know 
what I'm saying? '. (P17). 
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'I can be a very difficult person to get on with at times, when, especially 
if I've got things like this on my mind, like, urn, and if I'm thinking about 
an incident I can be quite difficult. [In what sort of ways? ] Very abrupt, 
um ... very ... not, I mean ... not moody, or maybe not show that I'm 
moody, but I'm very abrupt, I'm not very easy to get on with, every, 
anything anybody says is snapped at, you know, so, that's if I've thought 
about, I mean that didn't happen in the incident last week, but if I did 
think about it for another ten minutes or so or start pondering on it, I'll, 
you know for the next couple of hours until something else has made me 
cheery, I'll be quite an abrupt person. Or I would want to stay on my 
own'. (P 11). 
A remark by P 10 demonstrates how protecting the self against other people's 
judgements or labels may result in an aggressive interpersonal stance: 
'Urn ... to avoid being judged ... urn, well I've been urn I don't take on 
board urn other people's judgements of me, I've over a long time decided 
that if they don't like it they can lump it'. 
Perhaps similarly P3 says that she gives up 'trying' to make other people like 
her. 
It seems likely that in many cases withdrawn and aggressive behaviour go 
together. For instance when PS, quoted above, says to his wife 'Oh shut up, leave 
me alone' this appears to be quite a hostile response to her complaint about him 
276' 
being withdrawn. T'hree other participants, Ps 10,11 and 16 also seemed to refer 
to both types of behaviour in their relationships. 
Overall 42.1% (8/19) participants spoke about difficulties in their relationships 
associated either directly with the incident they recalled or indirectly when they 
thought about it. Given the much higher proportion of participants (80%) who 
referred to their diminished social involvement it is possible that the above 
remarks fail to represent the true extent of relationship difficulties associated 
with emotional withdrawal. The apparently negative impact of participants' self- 
protective pattern of withdrawal and/or aggression suggests that attempts to 
protect oneself from marginalisation or rejection from others may paradoxically 
lead to rejection which in turn is likely to reinforce the individual's isolation and 
alienation. Indeed a process of this kind appeared to account for some of the data 
in the diary and interview study as reported in Chapter Six. 
Summary and exceptions 
A summary table of the number of participants mentioning each of the themes 
discussed in this section is presented in Table 9.5. A complete list of statements 
in each category for each participant is included in Appendix 19. In Table 9.5 it 
can be seen that the three major categories that emerged were 
'difference/marginalisation', 'negative identity' and 'diminished social 
involvement'. The remaining categories can be understood as throwing further 
light on these core categories. There were no participants in the study who failed 
to make statements which fell into at least one of these categories. An attempt to 
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identify exceptions has been made by identifying participants who only endorsed 
one of these three categories. 
Table 9.5: categories of factors related to the broader context of emotional 
isolation 
P difference/ 
marginalis- 
ation 
values negative 
Identity 
conceal- 
ment and 
masidng 
diminished 
social 
involvement 
confidence relationship 
difficulties 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
totals 14/19 
(73.7%) 
7/19 (36.8%) 
1 
15/20 (751/o) 1 9/19 (47.4%) 1 16119(80%) 1 7/19 (36.8%) 1 9/19 (42.1%) 11 
Two participants referred neither to being different/marginalised or to having a 
negative identity, although they both made comments included in the diminished 
social involvement category. These were Ps 11 and 13. P1 1 seems to have been 
exceptional in this regard partly because she seemed to be very successful in her 
attempts to maintain a 'strong' persona. However behind this mask she revealed 
that she lacked confidence, and had suffered difficulties with her partner 
seemingly as a result of her withdrawn and aggressive behaviour. Earlier in the 
interview she also revealed quite strong shame associated with a number of 
painful and traumatic childhood memories. It seems, then, that the fact that P 11 
did not describe herself as marginalised or as having a negative identity may be 
because she herself identifies very strongly with the positive and 'strong' face 
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she presents to the world. P 13 is probably the least prototypical participant in the 
study (although she still seems emotionally isolated), although as has been noted 
before it is difficult to infer much from her interview as she seemed to be the 
most inhibited person in the study during the interview itself. The differences 
between her and other participants could conceivably be as much due to the fact 
that she felt unable to 'open up' in the interview as to the fact that the dynamics 
of her situation are different from the others. 
Only one participant, P5, failed to endorse both the marginalisation/ difference 
and the diminished social involvement categories. However the very strong 
comments he made regarding 'negative identity' suggest that he did feel 
marginalised and different from others and his revelation of the degree to which 
he conceals his personality from others (see above) indicated that his social 
involvement is compromised by a lack of intimacy. 
Only one participant, P17, did not make comments in either the negative identity 
or the diminished social involvement categories. In her case this is probably due 
to the strategy of social re-engagement she had embarked upon with the support 
of a number of key people in her life, including her supportive partner. 
In summary, it seems that participants in the study tended to feel that they were 
inadequate and flawed individuals. Presumably because of this they felt they did 
not fit in or were different from other people. There was some evidence in a 
number of interviews that this process of marginalisation reflected prevailing 
social norms and evaluative criteria. This uncomfortable self-knowledge would 
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explain the pattern of diminished social involvement described by the majority of 
participants, as well as the attempts at masking 'destructive' aspects of the self 
and the diminished self-confidence described by many of them. Finally there was 
some evidence that this pattern of withdrawal might create difficulties in close 
relationships. Such difficulties could potentially escalate into a cycle of 
alienation as some of the diary and interview data analysed in Chapter Six 
suggested. 
Discussion 
The attempt to replicate the diary and interview study's findings concerning the 
emotional isolation of psychotherapy patients appears to have been successful. In 
the current study a very high proportion of participants indicated that they 
habitually attempted to avoid discussion of the emotionally-laden experiences 
they described. Once again psychotherapy patients emerged as a group of people 
who seemed to be characterised by their emotional isolation. 
As was the case in the earlier study this characteristic pattern of non-disclosure 
was associated with the anticipation of negative responses to disclosure on the 
part of other people and the anticipation of negative consequences for the self 
should the individual disclose. The fact that the two most salient categories 
implicated in non-disclosure were fear of labelling, blaming and judging 
responses on the one hand and feelings of shame on the other underlines the 
dramaturgical considerations which emerged in the previous study. It seems that 
the psychotherapy patients who took part in both of these studies were dealing 
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with what Goffinan (1963) (see Chapter Three) termed 'destructive information', 
information which they sought to manage by remaining emotionally isolated 
from other people. This finding is also in keeping with the social model of 
disclosure dynamics put forward by Finkenauer et al (1997) in which the 
anticipation of negative responses and self-conscious emotions in the event of 
disclosure results in emotional secrecy. 
These findings lend ftuther weight to the notion that marker shame associated 
with anticipated responses plays an important part in the lives of Psychotherapy 
patients. However the fact that only 63.2% of participants mentioned shame as a 
factor in non-disclosure of their experiences may indicate that shame is not 
always implicated in non-disclosure in this population. Guilt emerged in the 
diary and interview study as another factor associated with non-disclosure for 
some individuals, and in the current study 31.6% of participants said that they 
did not want to disclose simply because they did not want to be aware of the 
painful feelings associated with the memory (although it was suggested that the 
pain involved might be related to identity concerns). However participants in the 
current study were not probed specifically about the role of shame in non- 
disclosure (as they were in the diary and interview study) and for this reason it 
may have been under-reported. 
In the concluding section of Chapter Six it was suggested that the diary and 
interview findings implied that the distress of psychotherapy patients might have 
its roots in a sense of perceived social invalidity. The thematic analysis that was 
reported in the latter part of the current chapter enabled this idea to be explored 
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in a somewhat broader context as participants talked about an intensely important 
emotional memory and the effect the memory had had in their lives. Most 
participants seemed to feel that they possessed characteristics which disqualified 
them from participating as valued members of their communities and some 
participants commented on the fact that their alienation was related to social 
attitudes. These evaluative concerns obviously fit in with the predominant reason 
for non-disclosure -a fear of labelling, blaming and judging comments by 
recipients. 
If the alienation and emotional isolation of psychotherapy patients are related to 
the evaluative practices of their society this has implications for how 
psychotherapy is conceived of and practised. Firstly it implies that psychotherapy 
will be especially concemed with these evaluative practices and how an 
individual can re-negotiate a position as a valued and worthy citizen. In this case 
the practice of psychotherapy requires a form of moral engagement in the client's 
world (Van Deurzen, 1998; Riikonen & Smith, 1997). Such an emphasis 
currently sits uneasily beside the empiricist rhetoric which underpins the 
professional identity of many therapists as McLeod (1997) and Pilgrim & 
Treacher (1992) have pointed out. However it does seem consistent with 
evidence that belonging to marginalised and devalued groups in society appears 
to be a risk factor for psychopathology (see Pilgrim, 1997). 
A second implication of the importance to patients of social evaluations was first 
suggested in Chapter One and then again in the discussion section of Chapter 
Six. It is that that cuffent thinking about psychopathology is limited in its focus 
282 
on the individual as the unit of analysis. The findings of both this study and the 
diary and interview study suggest that a more appropriate unit of analysis might 
be the relationship between the individual and their social and moral context. 
This would be consistent with some constructionist approaches to psychotherapy 
(e. g. Riikonen and Smith, 1997; Capps and Ochs, 1995) as well as with Smail's 
(1996) critique of the individualistic assumptions underpinning most forms of 
psychological treatment. If this is true the ramifications for clinical practice are 
substantial. In particular if the locus of 'disorder' is regarded as lying within an 
individual it follows that it is the individual who must change. However if the 
locus of the problem lies in the individual's difficulty in being integrated as a 
valued and worthy member of a community then in many cases it may equally 
make sense for treatment to focus on changing the social and political mores 
which exclude and marginalise them. It may be the society that requires therapy 
as much as the individual. 
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Chapter Ten 
Helpful and Unhelpful Disclosure of Significant 
Emotional Memories 
Introduction 
In this chapter additional material on helpful and unhelpful disclosure 
experiences from the self-defining memory study will be presented. 
Questions in the interview regarding helpful and unhelpful aspects of disclosure 
experiences were intended to determine whether the findings regarding 
disclosure in the diary and interview study could be replicated in the context of 
patients' significant emotional memories. In Chapter Seven on the disclosure 
experiences of the diary and interview study participants it was concluded that 
social considerations, especially those relating to participants' feelings of 
validation or invalidation, played a major part in both the decision to disclose and 
the outcome of the disclosure. It was further concluded that the social and 
identity relevant concerns of participants seemed to outweigh their concern with 
factors relating to two alternative explanations for the benefits of emotional 
disclosure - the cognitive assimilation model and the inhibition model. However 
due to the large proportion of participants in the earlier study who did not 
disclose any of the emotions they recorded in their diaries (approximately three 
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quarters of the participants did not disclose any of the emotions they recorded) it 
was acknowledged that these conclusions were based on limited evidence. Ile 
purpose of the current report is to see whether similar dynamics appeared to 
account for helpfulness or unhelpfulness of disclosures of the emotional 
memories reported by participants in the self-defining memory study. 
The chapter will consider three broad aspects of participants' accounts of 
disclosure: 1) factors relating to participants' decision to disclose 2) factors 
associated with helpful disclosures, and 3) factors associated with unhelpful 
disclosures. 
The decision to disclose 
Positive attitudes towards disclosure 
In the diary and interview study (Chapter Seven) it was found that despite the 
evidence that participants tended not to disclose their emotions, and often 
expected disclosure to result in negative consequences, many of them 
nevertheless indicated that they would like to disclose. This finding was 
replicated in the current study. 
89.5% (17/19) of participants saw disclosure as desirable, at least under some 
circumstances. Positive attitudes towards disclosure included the following: 
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I I'd like to actually, urn ... undo, some of the things that 
have been 
done, urn ... I mean I'd much prefer to 
be like ... it's not about ... 
I've 
been ... I'd like to be a 
far more open person. ' (P14). 
'I've gone all these years being strong saying it doesn't matter, and I kind 
of had indoctrination all my life, say, you mustn't tell people you've, you 
know, um, and that's what I've done for _ years ago, _ 
and a half or 
whatever, and now all of a sudden I don't want to be like that any more. I 
don't want to keep hiding, I don't want to keep being strong [very 
distressed at this point]. ' (P 16). 
'I think, there's just ... a release of dark secrets really, you 
know. Just say 
I think if I tell someone about it it will make myself, like a bit more, 
not open, just show my personality a bit better, relax you know and 
instead of having this feeling like you have to go in a comer and stuff like 
that you know this starting, you know, wiping darkness away ftom me. 
I've got this sense of like Oh you know, I'm all on my own, cos nobody 
knows about this, and nobody knows about that, so maybe if I tell 
someone and that's it I'm out in the open, there's sunshine, you know, 
yeah. ' (P 11). 
A few participants were more ambivalent. For example P 12: 
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'[do you prefer to keep it to yourself? ] Urn ... yes I do. I 
don't really but I 
do, it's hard to, it's hard to explain. I do but ... even, I've got a very, very 
best friend, um, but I still you know it's hard, hard to bring up. ' 
P1 said that she would only disclose if she could be sure it would help her, and 
P4 said that he would only disclose if it would help somebody else. 
Only two participants seemed to be absolutely set against disclosure. One of 
these was P2 who said that there was no point because she could not change what 
had happened it 'just brings it all back up and you relive it again and again'. The 
other was P5 who, when asked if he had any urge to talk to someone about his 
experience said: 
'No ... To be truthful I don't even know why I talked about it now. ' 
These two participants' remarks are in keeping with the general tenor of non- 
disclosure discussed in Chapter Nine. However, overall it seems that the trend 
towards secrecy reported in the latter chapter seems to be counterbalanced by a 
number of surprisingly positive statements about the value of disclosure. This is 
in keeping with the similar finding in the diary and interview study, reported in 
Chapter Seven. A full list of the statements participants made indicating positive 
attitudes to disclosure is included in Appendix 20. 
The importance of the recipient 
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A majority of participants indicated that their desire to disclose was contingent 
on who they disclosed to. As P7 put it: 
'I need to talk about it, and I need to talk about with someone who I 
trust. ' 
P4 talked about how he came to feel that he could confide in someone about the 
sexual abuse he had suffered: 
4we were just ta .g out sexual abuse one day you know, she was just 
saying that one of her, one of um, somebody in her area where she lives 
um somebody's been sexually abused and um I actually felt that, I felt 
that I could, because the way she actually responded towards that issue 
and it er was sort of similar to mine, I actually felt that I um, I, I could 
trust her and talk about it and um I actually started talking to her about it. ' 
Similarly P 14 says: 
'... because of the very nature of ... the subject, I'd only be telling 
somebody that I'd expect to be understanding. I mean I'd only tell 
somebody that was quite close I suppose. And thus you'd expect them to 
be understanding, well even you know the sheer fact that you'd tell 
them. ' 
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P7 goes on to express her frustration at would-be helpers who expect her to 
disclose before she has established this kind of trusting relationship: 
'I had this, I don't know if this is relevant but I'm sorry if I'm wasting 
your tape, but this guy ring me up, I'm sure his heart was good, I'm not 
now I mean that, and, and he said "Now tell me" he said, "what's 
wrong". [Laughs]. I said "You really, you honestly expect me to tell you 
what's really hurting me and made me feel suicidal? " And he said "Yes". 
I said "Well would you open your heart and tell me right now what's 
hurting you? " And he said "Oh, no, I wouldnY. And I said "Well, why 
are you expecting me to when I don't even know you! " And I sort of, you 
know, I laughed but I thought "urghh! ", you know, "God, do something 
with these people! " You know, realityP 
P8 compares the understanding he feels he can expect in the research setting with 
the lack of comprehension he expects from people elsewhere: 
'Because you're telling somebody else that is researching obviously, 
severe experiences in people's lives. Now you've obviously got some 
clear idea of people's problems and how to, and just how serious it is to 
them ... um as opposed to telling the milkman. ' 
Some participants talked about how they would test out potential recipients to see 
whether it would be safe to disclose: 
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6you assess them before you decide what level you're going to go in at'. 
(P8). 
'Um ... they seem to understand urn ... and they 
don't show any ridicule, 
so um from that you get confidence to, to let other things come out, 
yeah. ' (P 10). 
'I think I remember speaking to friends and saying "Does your dad ever 
hit you? " And things like this. And they used to just laugh and I just knew 
then that they didn't so, I didn't say anything more'. ' (P2). 
'Um. [Coughs). OK [hesitantly] I think at first like telling anybody 
anythirig first you think "Well how are they going to receive this? " And 
you tell them a little bit more and you put in a bit more to test the water if 
that's OK and a little bit more in and you know the feedback was good 
and I thought "Oh we can carry on here you know, it seems". And you 
know it, and yeah I felt OK you know, but always testing the water how 
much you give first, you know, because, otherwise if, if you, if you sort 
of let it all come out you know you're sort of rejected on a very 
fundamental level aren't you? If you know, if you, you know if you open 
your soul to somebody and all of a sudden they turn round and say "Oh", 
you know'. (P6). 
For some participants the ability of a potential recipient to keep what they said 
confidential seemed important. Over a third of participants (36.8%, 7/19) 
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mentioned that the anonymity and confidentiality of the research setting had 
made it possible for them to speak about their experiences in the interview itself. 
For example: 
'Talking to you it's entirely different because you're not close to me, and, 
you know, you don't know the real me. So it's easier talking to you 
because I'm just [inaudible], just a person, just an anybody. ' (P I). 
'It's not something you would go talking to everybody else about is it 
really? [No obviously not]. And the only reason I'm telling you is 
because I know it can't go anywhere. ' (P5). 
The following remark by P 10 makes the connection between anonymity and the 
potential 'damage' that disclosure could do to how he is seen by others: 
'[Can I in fact ask how has it felt so far talking about it today? ] ... In four 
walls, er, and it's going to be anonymously dealt with, urn it it doesn't to 
me then matter you know because it's still, when I walk out of there now 
this afternoon, basically it's still tucked up in that file up there and the 
draw's shut and it's locked it's not, you know it's not going round people 
that know me, in a work situation and and whatnot and giving people 
ammunition to look at me in a different light or look down on me, or. ' 
(P 10). 
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Overall 63.1% (12/19) participants suggested that if they disclosed it would be 
contingent on finding a recipient who had the appropriate qualities. A full list of 
participants' statements regarding desirable characteristics of recipients is 
included in Appendix 21. These qualities seemed to include understanding, 
trustworthiness and confidentiality. All these qualities and many of the remarks 
quoted above seem to be consistent on the one hand with an overarching concern 
with the potential 'destructiveness' of disclosure to the individual's identity in 
relation to others, and on the other with a desire to, in the words of P 11, 'wipe 
away the darkness' of such information by disclosing in a context where they 
will be accepted and understood in spite of their past experiences. These remarks 
also imply that while participants may choose to keep themselves to themselves 
they are alert to the possibility of disclosing if and when an opportunity to do so 
safely presents itself. 
Numbers of helpful and unhelpful disclosures 
Probably because the study was not limited to recent specific occurrences of 
emotion (as was the case in the diary and interview study) most participants 
spoke about experiences in which they had disclosed to other people. 73.7% 
(14/19) of the participants spoke about experiences of disclosure which they 
regarded as at least in some respect helpful. 63.1% (12/19) participants spoke 
about an experience of disclosure which they regarded as unhelpful. Just under 
half of the participants (47.4%, 9/19) described both helpful and unhelpful 
experiences of disclosure. While the number of accounts of helpful disclosure in 
the current study is exactly the same as the number in the earlier study there is 
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considerably more data on unhelpful disclosure (there were only four instances in 
the previous study). 
Helpful disclosure 
In this section accounts of helpful disclosures will be examined to see whether 
the social factors that appeared to account for much of the benefit of helpful 
disclosures in the diary and interview data played an equally important part in the 
helpful disclosure experiences reported in the current study. Following a note on 
the varying degrees of helpfulness in the disclosures a similar format to that used 
in Chapter Seven will be followed. Firstly elements related to a social account of 
disclosure dynamics will be presented. Then an attempt will be made to identify 
material related to two alternative models for the benefits of disclosure, the 
cognitive-assimilation model and the inhibition model. Following this 
consideration will be given to evidence which is problematic or exceptional, and 
the findings will be considered in the light of the conclusions drawn in Chapter 
Seven. 
Varying degrees of helpfulness 
Participants varied considerably in the degree of helpfulness they attributed to 
the disclosures they described as helpful. On the one hand some participants 
described highly beneficial experiences. P7 for instance said: 
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'Um ... you said helping, talking 
has been the only thing that's helped 
me9. 
Similarly P6 says: 
'when I do see him, you know, we get on the same wavelength, it's 
brilliant, you know, it's partly because we understand one another and he 
was very helpful. ' 
A full list of statements which seem to indicate clearly helpful disclosures is 
included in Appendix 22. On the other hand some participants described 
experiences of disclosure in which helpfulness was clearly limited, as seemed to 
be the case for P 18 talking about how helpful his disclosure was: 
'Not a lot, slightly but er not a lot. Mind you if probably if I hadn't said 
anything I'd have gone completely mad by now. ' 
Other participants described unhelpful aspects that seemed to work against the 
helpful aspects of the disclosure. For instance in the following account of 
disclosure by P9: 
&she also, I think she did make the judgement that it was a bit daft as 
well'. 
Or the following by P 19: 
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'I don't think they really understood how I felt at the time, um. As I say 
they did what they could, they sort of um were always there on the phone 
if I needed them sort of thing, you know, but er... ' 
Over half of the participants who talked about helpful disclosures described 
helpful disclosures that seemed to be compromised or qualified (57.1%, 8/14). A 
full list of statements to this effect is included in Appendix 23. In fact only 
31.6% (6/14) of the helpful disclosers gave accounts of disclosures which 
seemed unequivocally helpful to them. Further consideration will be given to 
elements which may have compromised the helpffilness of disclosures in a later 
part of this section. 
Socialfactors in accounts of helpful disclosure 
First of all, in line with Kelly and McKillop's (1996) suggestion that the outcome 
of disclosure will depend on the nature of the recipient's response to disclosure, 
participants' remarks about how the recipient responded will be examined. 
Understanding and supportive responses. Participants were asked both how the 
recipients responded to their feelings and what qualities they were aware of in 
the recipient when they disclosed. 92.8% (13/14) of the participants who 
described helpful disclosures referred to responses by the recipient which were 
supportive or understanding. Examples include: 
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'[And what was it that made you feel better, was it...? ] Urn just the 
comforting of it, somebody there to comfort me, while I was thinking 
about it and saying it and you know, I knew that, you know, they now 
understood why I was like that over a period of [inaudible] you know, 
SO. ' (P 11). 
'She understands me because she has known me since we met in 19-' 
(P8). 
'talking has been the only thing that's helped me, talking, not just talking 
but the person I speak to is key in that, their attitude to me, gentleness is 
one thing, one particular lady who helped me was wonderful. She totally, 
I mean she came to my home and I remember saying to her, it sounds 
stupid, you're real and you're here, and she didn't laugh, she just put her 
anus round me, she knew what I meant'. (N). 
'She felt sorry for me. She knows what I went through as well. ' (P 1). 
'Er, well the few I have approached, say my parents and friends, they 
always seem to be sympathetic. ' (P 18). 
A full list of relevant statements is included in Appendix 24. 
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Just under half of the participants who spoke about helpful disclosures (42.8%, 
6/14) said that the recipient had in some way affirmed the validity or legitimacy 
of their position. P6 expressed this very clearly: 
'It's good to hear that other people, well basically fuck up if you don't 
mind the phrase, and you know and people aren't together, cause people 
are very good, I think so in our society, are very good at putting on a front 
that they are in control and that everything's you know, but he's not and 
I'm certainly not when things go wrong. And it's nice to see other people 
do the same, you know, it's OK to mess up, you know ... He made me 
feel human whereas the people that I worked with, they didn't, they 
didn't make me feel human at all, I felt ... I felt as if there was something 
really wrong with me, you know. You know it's all about trying to feel 
normal, even now that I've done some very human things you know, that 
doesn't mean to say that I'm written off you know. ' 
P7 expressed a similar perspective: 
'Psychotherapy is so helpful, talking to this lady is so helpful, but it is, 
it's like ... I think it's Carl Rogers really, she's accepting, she's accepting 
me and my feelings with respect, not telling me "You shouldn't feel thaV. 
Not saying "Were you that blitzed? " She's just accepting me and my 
feelings and that's like um, I suppose it's like an ointment really, it's OK 
to be the way you are, not telling me I should be thinking or feeling 
something else. ' 
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These two statements seem to go to the core of what has been argued at various 
points throughout the thesis, that a major reason for beneficial disclosure is that it 
allows for the moral re-valuation of the discloser -a process which is obviously 
highly contingent on the attitude the recipient communicates to the discloser and 
what they disclose. Ps 3,9 and 19 noted similar processes although somewhat 
less emphatically. 
A few participants who described helpful disclosures (21.4%, 3/14) indicated that 
the recipient shared some kind of similar experience with them. As P6 says in the 
following quotation this can also have the effect of making the discloser feel that 
they are normal and that their problems are 'human' and acceptable: 
'he will often ... how he behaved in a certain situation, he would bring 
into say, you know, an experience he had with his wife, that left him 
[] and, and how, you know the emotions that he had welling up inside 
him. Um, how his logic would go. He would actually use his examples of 
how he felt and as I said before, he, he has a way of, because of some of 
the insightful things he would say, er, I knew that he had only 
experienced it, I knew that he had experienced something very similar 
and that, and the sort of, that the, the sort of humour, do you, if you like 
the idiosyncratic humour that was between us, it was something you 
could only experience, you couldn't sort of you know bring it about in 
any other way and, yeah, that made me feel good, it made me feel human 
and er, you know that's how he is basically. ' 
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P7, another participant who, as we have seen, clearly found disclosure very 
helpful, also implies that this was a factor: 
'I mean some like the lady who I said, you know who I said was 
wonderfully gentle, she was perfect, I felt safe with her, she was a 
Christian, she had been through it herself, which might be a really big 
key, as she knew something of where I was coming from and she wasn't 
judgmental, which is a big thing. ' 
In this remark P7 connects the recipient's similar experience to the fact that she 
was not 'judgmental' suggesting that this theme is congruent with the general 
theme of the recipient 'understanding' what the participant says in the context of 
letting them know that what they say is compatible with them being a valuable 
person. 
With the exception of one case, P 13, whose response will be considered later, the 
data implies that the benefits of disclosure are associated with the response of the 
recipient. 'Understanding' and valuing by the recipients seemed particularly 
important. Later some qualifications which emerge from a consideration of the 
varying degrees of helpfulness will be discussed. However before that 
participants' comments relating to social outcomes of disclosure will be 
presented. 
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The social impact of helpful disclosure. Participants were asked to say why 
instances of helpful disclosure were helpful, although they were not probed about 
the effect of disclosure on relationships as was the case in the earlier diary and 
interview study. In spite of this nearly half (42.8% 6/14) of the participants 
reporting helpful disclosures referred to social benefits arising from their 
disclosure. 
28.6% (4/14) made comments which overlap with their descriptions of how the 
recipient responded to them and which suggest that one outcome of disclosure 
was to make them feel more solidarity with other people. P6 has already been 
quoted at length saying that he felt more 'human' and 'normal' as a result of the 
way his recipient responded to him. PTs comment about her recipient's 
acceptance of her being 'like an ointment' has also been cited. P 10 seemed to 
value the fact that as a result of his disclosure his attitudes and behaviour would 
be understandable to his recipients: 
'they've taken it I hope as information, you know, as perhaps one of the 
many, many complicated things in the past that's forming my attitudes 
and reactions to situations today. ' 
PII also seems to derive relief from the fact that following disclosure her 
behaviour has become more understandable to the recipient: 
'[And what was it that made you feel better, was it ... ?] Um just the 
comforting of it, somebody there to comfort me, while I was thinking 
300 
about it and saying it and know, I knew that, you know, they now 
understood why I was like that over a period of [inaudible] you know, 
SO. 
9 
In these two cases the participant seems to be relieved that the account they have 
been able to give justifies something about their current behaviour that is or has 
been problematic. This is consistent with a suggestion, made on the basis of 
some of the data presented in Chapter Six, that non-disclosure and negative 
concomitants of non-disclosure might actually lead to fin-ther isolation and 
labelling since an individual who silences themselves in this way is unable to 
give an adequate account of their behaviour. 
In three cases participants indicated that disclosure had resulted in the 
disconfinnation of a negative interpersonal expectation associated with 
disclosure. One of these is P6 whose detailed comments about his helpful 
disclosure have already been extensively quoted. Disclosure in his case seems to 
have disconfirmed his expectation that other people do not 'mess up' and that 
there is something 'wrong' with him. P9 talks about how the recipient of his 
disclosure disconfirms his belief that the event is a damaging 'skeleton' in the 
cupboard: 
'when I told her this thing about - she sort of said 
"Oh well that's 
not... " Fairly relieved really, I mean that's a minor point it's not as if 
you've got a previous wife or a child or something you know that you 
haven't told me about, and um, you know a lot of people obviously have, 
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I mean as skeletons in the cupboard go I suppose it's quite innocuous 
really". I mean I'm kind of aware of that as I'm talking about it. ' 
P l's recipient said that she had never noticed the characteristic (connected with 
her memory) that she believed was very stigmatising. She says: 
'That was very helpful because I thought "Oolf -) you know "great, she's 
[age] and she's never noticed if' sort of thing. ' 
Two participants also commented that disclosure in the interview itself was 
helpful in dispelling a negative interpersonal expectation. In P7's case it was 
whether a man could be trusted with information that was personal and painful: 
'Well in a way I'm trusting you and that's good for me, though I have to 
say I'm not sure you're trustworthy and that's not a personal insult at all, 
it's just where I am, I'm trusting you and then that's quite something so 
that's helpful for me if I can actually really work that through in my 
mind, I'm trusting you with something very personal and painful. ' 
P IS made a similar comment: 
'[How has it felt so far talking about it today? ] Not very good. [Laughs] - 
It's been OK, I mean, it's not the first time. [Not very good? ] Well, it's 
the first time I've actually really sat and talked to anybody to this extent 
about it, um, I'm not sure I'm going to cope when I walk out the door, but 
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No, I'm fme, it's good to be able to talk about it, especially as you9re a 
man, don't take that the wrong way, but urn it's, I'm not quite sure how 
it's going to affect me when I go out that door. ' 
Additionally several participants' comments about the positive responses of their 
recipients indicated that they contrasted this response with what might have been 
expected. P7 mentions a number of things that the recipient of her disclosure did 
not do. She was not 'judgmental', she 'didn't laugh' and she did not tell P7 that 
'it was rubbish'. Similarly P 10 talked about how his recipients 'don't show any 
ridicule'. 
In summary many participants mentioned that disclosure had resulted in 
interpersonal benefits. These benefits seemed to revolve around on the one hand 
being understood and valued and on the other disconfirming negative 
interpersonal expectations. However less than half of the participants mentioned 
these benefits. Ilis may reflect the fact that this aspect of helpful disclosures was 
not probed. It may also reflect the fact that not all of the disclosures were 
experienced as unequivocally helpful as mentioned above. 
Summary ofsocial elements in helpful disclosures. As was the case in the earlier 
diary and interview study there appears to be ample evidence that social 
considerations play a part in both the decision to disclose and the outcome of 
disclosure when it is helpful. Just as in the first part of this chapter it appeared to 
be the case that participants wanted to disclose to people who would be 
understanding, trustworthy and able to keep their confidence, so when it actually 
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came to disclosure helpfulness was associated with recipients who were 
described as understanding, supportive and valuing. Some participants reported 
that as a result of this they felt more understood and that the experience helped 
disconfirm negative interpersonal expectations about disclosure. These social 
considerations are compatible with the dramaturgical or Goffrnanesque dynamics 
proposed in Chapter Six in which disclosure decisions and outcomes are related 
to the individual's need to manage the potential 'destructiveness' of information 
about the self. 'Ibis perspective is also of course congruent with the two major 
factors which emerged in the data on why participants do not disclose - fear of 
labelling, blaming and judging and shame (Chapter Nine). 
In the following paragraphs evidence relating to the two alternative theoretical 
accounts of the benefits of disclosure noted in Chapter Three will be examined. 
The cognitive assimilation model 
No participants appeared to have noted that the helpful disclosures they 
described led to greater self-awareness or clarity. However two participants did 
say that their participation in the interview itself had led to greater clarity or self- 
understanding. P9 appeared to have developed greater clarity about his 
experience as a result of talking about it in the interview: 
'I managed to see a bit more of, that it can be seen as a positive step, what 
I did and it can be seen as um, you know a move towards defining my 
own life. And um, yeah it just kind of clarified a few things for me, made 
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a few connections that I hadn't really quite seen. I'm trying to think be 
more specific, it's hard but, you know, yeah, it just began to, it helped me 
see how it does fit into the pattern a bit more and it helped me see how 
some other things led up to it. So it did start to order it for me more, yeah 
defuiitely. ' 
P8 said that the interview had helped him identify new aspects of the situation 
that he had not been aware of before: 
'I, it's surprised me that there was so much I hadn't noticed, from the 
questions you've posed really [ ... ] I've learnt something new, um about 
the shame side of it and about my response to it, yeah. ' 
P 17 seems to imply something similar when she says: 
'Each time I talk it releases something. [Yes, have you felt that happening 
today? ] Mm. I found that's felt very much about the shame. ' 
Finally P6 says he is seeking some kind of understanding when he talks to people 
about his experience: 
'it's sort of trying to concertining it together, but occasionally I mention it 
and say why would somebody want to ignore me for so long, you know, 
what was it all about? And I get different answers from different people. 
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If all these four participants are included that means that 21% (4/19) of the 
participants mentioned factors associated with the cognitive assimilation model 
of disclosure in the course of their interviews. The fact that these factors do not 
seem salient may well reflect the fact that there were no questions in the 
interview specifically enquiring about participants' increased self-understanding 
or clarity as a result of disclosure, however the fact that these four participants 
made comments which refer to it suggests that it may be one aspect of helpful 
disclosure. There are some suggestions in the study that self-understanding may 
occur as a by-product of 'being understood' by another. It is implied to some 
extent in P9's account (the fullest account that seems relevant to the cognitive 
assimilation model) quoted above in which he talks about how his increased 
clarity involves the realisation that the apparently shameful event may actually 
be seen as a positive step in which he began to define his own life. In this respect 
becoming clearer and putting things into perspective can be seen as an outcome 
of developing an account of one's experience in which the individual can be 
understood by others as, in Riikonen and Smith's (1997) words 'a morally 
worthwhile person' (p 109). 
The inhibition model 
Over a third of the participants (35.7%, 5/14) who described helpful disclosures 
made comments that suggested disclosure was beneficial because it reduced 
tension. The three clearest examples are: 
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'I've come away on a number of occasions feeling ... um ... 
lighterjess 
urn down, less depressed if you like. ' (P 10). 
'sort of sometimes it helped to give me a lift up from depression, YOU 
know it was a bit of relief from depression and anxiety about it. ' (P 18). 
'It was just the release of it more than anything else, um, see up until then 
I'd sort of been the bad guy in the whole thing. And I think it was my 
way of sort of, by telling other people was letting other people realise just 
what she was like sort of thing, you know. That it wasn't all me, you 
know, or as I'd been led to believe. So I guess by telling someone else it 
made me realise I perhaps wasn't so bad. ' (P19). 
The following remark from P 13 is perhaps a slightly tenuous example: 
'a bit relieved to talk about it to someone'. 
And this fmal example from P 16 suggests that she feels something has been 
released although she does not say so in as many words: 
'[And have you found talking about the experience in any ways helpful? ] 
yeah. I'm not, I don't get so upset now as I did at first ... I feel as 
if 1, you 
know, I've done all my and everything'. 
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In addition to the comments above there were two comments made by 
participants about their experience of the interview itself. One of these was a 
comment by P 17, already quoted, who said that 'Each time I talk it releases 
something'. The other comment was made by P14 who said about the interview: 
'Urn ... Yeah, um, in a general way as I said I mean oddly enough 
it's 
quite relaxed me'. 
If all of these responses are counted it means that half (7/14) of the participants 
who reported helpful disclosures made some reference suggestive of the 
inhibition model. 
As noted in Chapter Seven the three models of the benefits of disclosure are not 
mutually exclusive. In that chapter it was suggested that feelings of release might 
naturally accompany the sense of relief that would follow an experience of 
disclosure when a negative interpersonal expectation is disconfirmed. In the 
current study this seems most likely in the case of P 19 who (as quoted above) 
relates a feeling of 'release' to the moral re-evaluation that occurs following his 
disclosure when (presumably as a result of the feedback he gets) he begins to 
stop feeling 'the bad guy in the whole thing'. A similar interpretation could also 
plausibly be made for P10 whose disclosure, as noted previously, seemed to be 
characterised by disconfirmation of his expectation of ridicule and the use of 
personal information as 'ammunition' against him. 
Interim summary and conclusions 
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As was found to be the case in Chapter Seven there was considerable evidence 
that social considerations were important in participants' decisions to disclose 
and in the degree to which they regarded the disclosure as helpful. While there is 
some evidence in favour of the other two models of the benefits of disclosure, 
this suggests once again that, as Kelly and McKillop (1996) have argued, the 
outcome of disclosure is related to the nature of the recipient's response. 
Exceptions and limitations 
At the beginning of the study it was stated that the findings regarding helpful 
disclosure were complicated by the fact that just over half the disclosures 
reported as helpful also contained elements which compromised that helpfulness. 
In the next paragraphs three factors that appear to limit the helpfulness of broadly 
positive recipient responses will be considered. 
Lack ofdepth. In Chapter Seven it was argued that in one case where a 'helpful' 
disclosure seemed to be mixed with unhelpful features this might be attributed to 
the participant's manner of disclosure. Indeed it seemed that the disclosure in 
question may have amounted to little more than the participant saying that she 
was 'fed up' and leaving it at that. However so far in the thesis little attention has 
been paid to the manner in which participants disclose. Nevertheless it seems 
likely that the manner of disclosure will often influence it's outcome. Indeed this 
is also strongly indicated in research by Pennebaker and his colleagues. For 
example in Pennebaker and Beall (1986) (described in Chapter Three) 
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participants who only gave a factual account of an upsetting experience did not 
appear to benefit from disclosure. A number of those for whom the helpfulness 
of disclosure seemed to be limited acknowledged that they had not given the 
recipient a very full account of the experience: 
'[You talked about it to your daughter? ] Yeah, not in depth. ' (P 1). 
'[So would you actually talk to her about how you felt about it? ] No, I 
wouldn't. But then I think she would know, you know. ' (P 13). 
'I didn't really go into great details because I was a bit ashamed as well. ' 
(P4). 
One participant seemed also to have compromised her ability to communicate by 
getting dnmk: 
'I think it was helpful but I had to get pissed before I'd talk about it. I had 
to get absolutely blotto first. ' (M). 
In each of these cases the participant seemed somewhat equivocal about the 
value of disclosing. These cases constitute half of the instances of 'semi-helpful' 
disclosure (50%, 4/8) and remarks of this kind were also made by many 
participants describing unhelpful disclosures (see below). It seems then that even 
when recipients of disclosures are generally positive and accepting the 
helpfulness of the disclosure is likely to be compromised if the manner of 
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disclosure distorts the recipient's ability to respond accurately to what they are 
saying. In dramaturgical terms this seems consistent with the idea that in order to 
re-value what the discloser takes to be 'destructive information' that information 
must be open to inspection by the recipient. In this sense the discloser must take 
a risk that the recipient will not respond in a validating manner, although material 
in both this and the earlier study strongly suggests that participants will have 
made quite detailed risk assessments before taking the plunge. 
The limitations ofsympathy. In both the earlier diary and interview study and the 
current study some participants indicated that one of their reasons for non- 
disclosure was their desire to avoid certain kinds of apparently positive and 
sympathetic responses from other people which they nevertheless found 
unhelpful. A clear example of an unhelpful 'positive' response to an actual 
disclosure appears in the following account of partially helpful disclosure given 
byP19: 
'I mean, I don't think people really understood how I felt and as I say 
they were just sort of sympathetic and that was it sort of thing, you know, 
just forget it and get on with your life sort of thing. ' 
Here the recipients' sympathy seems to be tempered by the message that it would 
be unacceptable for the participant to go on feeling the way he does, that what he 
'should' do is 'forget it and get on with' his life. A response of this kind seems to 
indicate that the participant's experiences are not regarded by the recipient as 
entirely acceptable, and to the degree that this is the case sympathetic responses 
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of this kind may be experienced as invalidating. In this regard there may be an 
important distinction to be made between participants who experienced their 
recipients as 'sympathetic' and those who experienced them as 'understanding'. 
Interestingly all of the five participants who said that their recipients were 
'understanding' or that they 'understood' (Ps 6,8,10,11 and 17) described 
disclosures which seemed to be unequivocally helpful whereas all of those who 
described their recipients as sympathetic (Ps 19,3 and 18) seemed ambivalent 
about the helpfulness of their disclosures (although it should be noted that one 
participant, P3, described the recipient of an unhelpful disclosure as 
'understanding'). Once again this seems to reaffirm the importance of the 
evaluations that are communicated by the recipient to the discloser. In the cases 
examined in this paragraph the recipient may only be accepted in a conditional 
manner, the 'destructive information' may be re-affirmed as 'destructive'. 
The clearest example of this comes Erom. P3. P3 appears to believe that she can 
only be a 'morally worthwhile person' if she is able to have a child. For example 
she describes how not having her own family makes her feel like a 'loner': 
'I mean when I was on holiday I felt very jealous that the families with 
their children - couldn't cope with it. I thought that should be me. I 
shouldn't be here on my own. I should have a family and kids. I felt very, 
very, very jealous, thinking they're happy, they've got everything. 
They've probably got good jobs, whatever they do, but here's me, I'm a 
loner again. I'm on my own. ' 
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So central is this view of how she should be that she says that she does not see 
life as worth living if she cannot achieve it: 
can never have a child through any means, people throwing me back, 
it's going to upset me so much, I wouldn't wanna live because that is my 
life. ' 
In this context P3 describes how the recipient of her disclosure, a therapist, 
responds by apparently whole-heartedly supporting the participant's perspective 
as she talks about her difficulties getting IVF treatment: 
'[I think you said before actually, that she responded sympathetically. ] 
Yeah, she did and she more or less said she knew the reasons why I'd 
done it. It was because I wanted help from my practice with this, this and 
she agreed that they were laxadaisical in not sending out the information 
and she agrees that I could get stressful by that [ ... ] she agrees that the 
fact this happened because they are, that's how they deal with things and 
she said yeah it would helped with me if they were more forward. ' 
The problem with this, as the participant acknowledges, is that 'I knew she 
couldn't do anything, she all she said to me was, keep on at them'. The sting in 
the tail would seem to be that by agreeing with the participant in this manner the 
therapist has tacitly supported the social evaluative criteria, so salient to her 
client, that a woman cannot belong or be valued unless she has a family. 
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PI 3. P 13 was the only participant who said an experience of disclosure was 
helpful at the same time as failing to indicate that the recipient was supportive in 
any way. Given that this participant seems to have found it difficult to open up in 
the interview itself this may have been because she did not communicate any of 
the positive attributes that the recipient possessed in addition to having a 'blank 
expression' and being unable to understand the recipient. However, given that 
P13 was one of those who seemed not to have disclosed in depth it could have 
been the case that she blamed herself for the lack of helpfulness of the disclosure, 
but nevertheless regarded her attempt to disclose to the recipient (who was a 
psychiatrist) as a helpful step in the right direction. Unfortunately, given the lack 
of detail in the interview, sadly once more it seems that all that can be done is to 
note that her responses did not seem clearly to fit the general pattern. 
Summary and conclusions regarding helpful disclosure 
On the whole the findings in Chapter Seven concerning helpful disclosure have 
been replicated. There is considerable evidence both in the participants' accounts 
of factors relating to participants' decision to disclose and accounts of actual 
disclosures themselves that the way that the recipient responds is a key element 
in the outcome of disclosure. This supports the perspective of Kelly and 
McKillop (1996) who argue that the research literature on emotional disclosure 
has paid insufficient attention to the role of the recipient in mediating the benefits 
(and, they point out, harms) associated with disclosure. However the current 
findings also suggest that the manner of disclosure may influence the degree to 
which supportive responses (or potentially supportive responses) can be utilised. 
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Further to Kelly and McKillop's work the current data also seems to echo the 
dramaturgical themes which emerged in the diary and interview study. 
Comments by many participants seemed to indicate that what they hoped to 
achieve and what they did achieve when disclosure was helpful was a reversal or 
disconfirmation of expected negative judgements. This was consistent with the 
fact that sympathetic responses which nevertheless did not seem to be 
'understanding' seemed to be less helpful since in these cases it would appear 
that the evaluative criteria responsible for making certain information about the 
self 'destructive' remained unchallenged. In the fmal section of the chapter an 
attempt will be made to see whether social and dramaturgical themes are also 
prominent in the participants' accounts of unhelpful disclosures. 
Unhelpful disclosure 
63.1% (12/19) of the participants provided some details of unhelpful experiences 
of disclosure. The following analysis will be based around three aspects of the 
accounts: the manner of disclosure, the response of the recipients, and the effects 
on the individual of unhelpful disclosures. 
Manner o disclosure )f 
Nearly half of those who described unhelpful disclosures indicated that their 
disclosure had lacked depth (41.7%, 5/12): 
'I mean I did hold back' (P2). 
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ca. brief explanation really is all that is required to satisfy any interest'. 
(P8). 
'I was just admitting to something that had happened. i didn't feet 
anything. I sort of came up with the subject and dropped it just as quick. ' 
(P15). 
'I have mentioned it, I mean to a few of me friends now, but they don't 
know what happened like in detail. ' (P 16). 
'[Did you tell them how you felt or do you think ... I No I don't think 
I 
really told them how I felt. ' (P 19). 
It also seems likely that P3's unhelpful disclosure lacked depth: 
'I said I've tried to talk to somebody about it but I just don't feel, I'm 
kind of walking around in a daze, I said I have been, I said somebody 
could be talking to me and I'd be like on cloud ten, I wouldn't be 
registering. ' 
Lack of depth of disclosure seems likely in at least two more cases. P6 
acknowledged that he tended to conceal feelings of vulnerability and it is 
therefore possible - especially given his sense of insecurity (see the later section 
on effects of unhelpful disclosure - that his unhelpful disclosure lacked depth in 
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this regard. Finally when P 11 describes her instance of unhelpful disclosure she 
simply says that her mum 'found out something'. This remark suggests that P 11 
is distancing herself from actually being the agent of disclosure, which implies 
that disclosure was reluctant and partial. 
The evidence for a lack of depth in the unhelpful instances of disclosure 
underlines the fact that disclosure outcome is likely to be dependent on the 
manner of disclosure as well as on the response of the recipient, as was suggested 
in the previous section. It seems likely that this lack of depth is related to the 
anticipation of negative responses from the recipient if they were to know too 
much. In this respect it would be congruent with the findings concerning the 
reasons for non-disclosure reported in Chapters Six and Nine. 
Although not all participants who spoke about unhelpful disclosures revealed the 
manner in which they disclosed one case was clearly exceptional. P14 spoke of 
an unhelpful instance of disclosure to a psychiatrist in which he appears to have 
spoken in depth about his experiences and to have become emotional as he did 
so: 
it was just a case of er ... it was like emotional, whatever that had been 
put on hold then it just came out, urn and er yeah I mean I did get quite 
upset. ' (P14). 
The reasons why he experienced this as unhelpful will be considered later in the 
section. 
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Recipient responses in cases of unhelpful disclosure 
83.3% (10/12) of the participants indicated that a recipient had responded in a 
manner which appeared to be invalidating (the full list of relevant statements is 
included in Appendix 25). P2 said that her recipients were 'critical' of her. P6 
said that he felt that his recipients 'didn't want to listen' and were sometimes 
annoyed with him. P7, having been asked if there were any unhelpful aspects of a 
helpful disclosure she had described, said: 
'[Sighs] Only with those people that lacked respect for me, my faith, 
didn't treat me with dignity, didn't have sensitivity and didn't listen, and 
were judgmental [laughs] in any way, any time that came into it. ' 
P8 having initially said that people would be 'sympathetic, understanding'. 
However he then said to the interviewer 'you must appreciate that they wasn't 
there, they don't do my job' and agreed that he did not think they would be able 
to understand. P 18 spoke about how he tried to speak to a doctor but 'was 
whipped through in about two minutes without really listening to what I was 
saying'. 
A subgroup of the descriptions of unhelpful disclosure seemed to fit in with the 
experiences recalled by participants who described 'semi-helpful' disclosures 
where recipients were sympathetic but also dismissive. P3 described how a friend 
of hers: 
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'understands because he's had a friend, and he's been in that situation, 
not himself, but with somebody like that, so he understands. So he 
doesn't think I'm a bad person'. 
However she goes on to say: 
'but he doesn't want me to be like this. He thinks that you can just snap 
out of it. But I mean you can't. You can't. It's like turning over a leaf in a 
book, you can't just change. You know. Youjust can't. ' 
If her recipient wants her to be different this seems to undermine his apparent 
acceptance, and would seem likely to reinforce P3s belief that there is 
something wrong with her. Other examples include the following one described 
by P14 (speaking in this instance about disclosing to his wife and not the 
exceptional case when he spoke to a psychiatrist mentioned above): 
'the few times I've like talked to my wife about it I actually um ... she's 
the sort of person that would um well she'd, she's like just too practical, 
um "Oh that happened _ years ago, well not, _ years ago, 
it's not 
applicable now". But I mean she's a very day-to-day sort of person. ' 
Similarly P 15 spoke about disclosing to her ex-partner: 
'he like he said I should let the past go. ' 
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P1 6's friends seem to have had a similar attitude: 
'Um ... they just say "Oh dear", 
like. [Laughs slightly]. [They say "Oh 
dear"? ] Yeah. [And is that what you'd expected them to say? ] I don't 
know. I'd have liked one of them to at least you know, to be able to talk 
to, bring it up again like But I don't feel as if I can do that. I think people 
expect me just to carry on ... you know, put it aside. ' 
Finally P 19 described how his friends: 
'sort of, you know they were very vague, they didn't want to sort of uh, 
you know, basically they were saying sort of "Get on with your life and 
forget about her like" you know. I mean it's easier for other people to say 
that. 1 
In his case there appears to be little difference between his descriptions of 'semi- 
helpful' disclosure and his account of unhelpful disclosure (and indeed it is quite 
hard to differentiate between the two in his interview). This subset of 
invalidating responses is noteworthy because the invalidation is subtle and often 
mixed with apparently supportive responses. It sheds more light on one of the 
'reasons for non-disclosure' categories - that of unhelpful positive responses. It 
is easy to see how responses of this kind might reinforce a participant's sense 
that an experience if disclosed conveys 'destructive information' about the self. 
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There were three instances in which there was no evidence that the recipient was 
invalidating. In one of these, that of P 11, the recipient, her mother, was 
'annoyed' and 'upset'. Rather than being an invalidating response she seemed to 
be annoyed and upset because she was concerned for her daughter with whom 
she clearly had a close relationship. In this instance it seemed as if the 
unhelpfulness of the disclosure might be related to the guilt that the participant 
felt at upsetting her mother (if she had kept it secret she would not have upset her 
mother). This seems to amount to an instance where the social response is related 
to the negative outcome of disclosure, even though that response is not clearly 
invalidating. In the case of P 10 the unhelpful disclosure is not described in detail 
but occurred in the interview as an adjunct to his description of helpful 
disclosure. In his case unhelpfulness seems to be related not to an actual 
invalidating response from the recipient but to fantasies about how the recipient 
might have responded to him. P1 O's instance of unhelpful disclosure will be 
discussed in more detail in the next part of this section on the effects of unhelpful 
disclosure. The final exception, P14's description of disclosure to a psychiatrist, 
is the most striking as he describes how: 
'I probably thought that she wouldn't think it, anything derogative of me 
by telling her. [ ... ]I didn't take her as a threat'. 
As was shown earlier he also appears to have disclosed at an emotionally deep 
level. The reason that he described this experience as unhelpful was because 
having 'bonded' with this psychiatrist she then left the service and this seems to 
have confirmed his fear of being abandoned if he revealed his vulnerability: 
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'cos this person that I started to depend upon had gone again. ' 
This could perhaps be construed as a delayed invalidating response, although, as 
the participant himself acknowledged it was clearly not intentional but reflects a 
system in which junior doctors are rotated around different departments. 
Notwithstanding these exceptions it seems that unhelpful disclosures are 
generally associated with responses by the recipient which appear to be 
invalidating. It seems that many of these invalidating responses are quite subtle 
occurring in the context of apparently benign responses. These findings seem to 
provide finther evidence in support of the social and dramaturgical approach to 
disclosure dynamics. 
Effects of unhelpful disclosure 
The material in the current interviews is somewhat less extensive than material 
from the diary and interview study with regard to the effects of disclosure since, 
as mentioned above, there were no specific probes concerning this. Iluee sub- 
themes that did seem to emerge will be discussed. 
Letting slip destructive information. Some participants described how 
experiences of disclosure had resulted in feelings of increased exposure and 
insecurity about their status in relation to others. This was clearly expressed by 
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P 19. He had earlier said that he feared people getting 'an impression' of him if he 
disclosed, and added: 
'I just didn't want people to think I was perhaps weak and sort of er, 
insecure or, um a bit soft sort of thing'. 
When the interviewer asked him whether he thought this had in fact happened in 
the experience of disclosure he talked about, he replied: 
'Yeah I think so, yeah definitely. Yeah it didn't have the desired effect. I 
mean, I don't think people really understood how I felt. ' 
P6's experience of unhelpful disclosure also seems to have left him feeling very 
exposed and vulnerable to the negative opinions of other people: 
'I made the, I made the awful mistake in talking about it to _, er, 
which 
wasn't a good idea, and as soon as I'd imparted all that I had to say, then 
I would start feeling insecure because I'd think that I wasn't either 
understood or that it was actually, um, showing some vulnerability in me 
that I didn't want to be opened up, you know, it was leaving myself wide 
open and I didn't feel safe that they had that information about me. ' 
P6 goes on to talk about how as a result he felt: 
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'more like the outsider, yeah, very much so, there seemed to be them and 
me, I was always the peripheral character there, or felt that'. 
For these two individuals the feelings of exposure seem to have been triggered at 
least in part by the way other people responded to them (see above for the ways 
recipients responded in both cases). 
P 10 appeared to experience similar anxieties in the absence of negative feedback 
of this kind. In the following passage he describes how he feels sometimes when 
he has spoken to the social worker or CPN who are the 'understanding' 
recipients of the helpful disclosures he described previously: 
'I've been up there and I've come away and thought, pher, you know, 
why did I tell them that, you know, what was the reason for going down 
that course and saying some of the things I did, whether I'd er, the fact 
that I might believe them or urn that's my outlook on life, is why did I tell 
them that you know and will they not now look at me in a slightly 
different perspective, you know, being too fatalistic or urn pessimistic, 
and er, and having tried to explain why, have they urn, or will they say 
"Well this is personal experience which wasn't good, being, being tainted 
or coloured by his own feelings of depression and making it worse, 
making his outlook go down in urn. hope if you like um expectation". 
Mm. Difficult to explain. ' 
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What seems to be at issue for this participant is whether the recipient would 
regard his feelings as understandable in the light of the experiences he disclosed, 
or whether the recipient would regard what he said as evidence of some kind 
internal dysfunction. The fact that he feels so insecure about this in the absence 
of any apparent (at least from his account) evidence of a negative response 
suggests that his social antennae may be especially alert and prone to interpret 
even an absence of response as evidence of a negative (though unstated) 
evaluation on the part of the recipient. P3 describes an attempt at disclosure 
which also results in her jumping to conclusions about what is going through the 
recipient's mind: 
'Hate people not answering. There was one person here that I first came 
to see and er she says, - Oh never mind what she said. She says "Do you 
mind if I tape record you? " I said "Yeah I do mind actually". Because she 
was new and she sat there and I sat there. I looked at her, she said about 
one word, I says "I'm not staying, I'm off'. Because she didn't know how 
to handle it. It was probably her first thingy and I thought "I'm not giving 
you information for you to sit there and just think I'm a pratt, and I'm 
off '. And I never came back for two years. ' 
The experiences of these two participants suggest that participants in some cases 
may be hyper-alert to signals of negative evaluation when they disclose. 
Overall 33.3% (4/12) of participants who described an instance of unhelpful 
disclosure referred to feelings of interpersonal exposure and vulnerability. 
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Pain without gain. A number of other participants seemed to regard unhelpful 
disclosure as an uncomfortable or painful experience which had no benefits: 
'I know in my own mind my memories and the effect they have on me. 
know why I'm the type of person I am today, and I don't find it beneficial 
to talk about it because I can't change it. I can't go back and change 
what's happened and that was the only thing that would help me was if I 
could change me now, make myself more confident. Um. Make me feel, 
you know, important, or worthful and I can't see a way of making me do 
that and I think just talking about it just brings it all back up and you 
relive it again and again. ' (P2). 
'You're just bringing back all real memories again, which you put to one 
side, you don't think about, you just forget about it and then when you 
open up again it just brings, opens up old wounds. ' (P 15). 
In keeping with this P 11 says that she 'felt awful' following disclosure to her 
mother and that 'it hasn't like taken anything off my shoulders. ' P8 also seems to 
consider disclosure both uncomfortable and pointless: 
'It gets boring when you have to relate the same facts all the time, and 
because they are facts they are constants, they're not going to change. ' 
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The four participants quoted here represent 33.3% of the participants who spoke 
about unhelpful disclosures. It is possible that these responses fit in with the 
notion that some participants cannot envisage any change or re-negotiation of the 
evaluative criteria by which others would or could judge them. This is certainly 
compatible with the quotationfirom. P2 above when she says she cannot imagine 
how anything could change so that she would feel more 'important or worthful'. 
As shown in the earlier section on helpful disclosure feeling more important and 
worthful seems to be exactly what happens in many cases of highly beneficial 
disclosure. There is a similar sense in P8's remark above about the 'facts' of the 
matter being immutable - what he seems to overlook is the fact that how we 
evaluate the facts can change. These participants seem disempowered when it 
comes to engaging and entering into dialogue with the evaluative and moral 
framework of both their assumptive and their social worlds. 
WithdrawaL Perhaps the major effect of unhelpful disclosures was that it seemed 
in many cases to lead to some kind of withdrawal from other people. P2 talked 
about wanting to run away from the recipients of her disclosure. P6 left his job. 
P3 in the incident with the therapist says that she did not try therapy again for 
two years. P7 talked about how she would never go back to a doctor who she 
seemed to have felt was invalidating. P 16 said that she had stopped trying to talk 
to her friends and wished she had not told them. P 19 said: 
'It was up to me to sort everything out'. 
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By this he seemed to imply that he had resolved that others could not help him if 
he disclosed. Overall half of the participants who described unhelpful disclosures 
seem to have withdrawn from others as a result (50%, 6/12). It would seem that 
unhelpful experiences of disclosure often confirm participants' mistrust of others. 
Summary. The available data on the effects of unhelpful disclosure suggests that 
participants may be very concerned about the implications of destructive 
information on their status in relation to other people if the response they receive 
is not validating. Two participants seemed to draw negative conclusions about 
what the recipient was thinking based on quite slender evidence, suggesting that 
participants are conservative in their estimates regarding what counts as a 
positive response. For many participants unhelpful disclosure appeared to lead to 
ftirther social disengagement (a process which the thematic analysis in Chapter 
Nine suggests may already have been well advanced), presumably reinforcing 
their mistrust of other people. It was speculated that participants who regarded 
their disclosure experiences as all pain and no gain might regard the evaluative 
criteria associated with a general pattern of non-disclosure as immutable and 
impervious to influence. 
Summary and conclusion regarding experiences of unhelpful disclosure 
The generally invalidating responses of recipients of disclosures which were 
described by participants as unhelpful is strongly supportive of the social and 
dramaturgical approach to disclosure. However many of these disclosures 
appeared to lack depth suggesting that the manner in which the individual 
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disclosed may also have diminished the likelihood of receiving a beneficial or 
validating response. The evaluative concerns of the participants and the 
evaluations of recipients often seemed to be quite subtle. On the one hand the 
disclosers often seemed to play safe by controlling the depth at which they 
disclosed. On the other hand recipients seemed often to convey negative 
evaluations indirectly - communicating support at the same time as conveying to 
the participant that their feelings or experiences were not appropriate topics of 
discussion. When combined these two factors suggest that would-be disclosers 
(at least among psychotherapy patients of the kind who took part in the study) are 
involved in a kind of dance of attunement with would-be recipients, a process 
clearly in keeping with explicit comments of a number of participants reported 
earlier in the chapter about testing potential recipients before entrusting them 
with significant disclosures. There was some evidence in a minority of accounts 
suggesting that some participants effed on the side of caution interpreting neutral 
responses as negative evaluations of the personal information they had disclosed. 
In summary this analysis of unhelpful disclosure experiences suggests that the 
social response remains all important, although disclosers may have sought to 
control and limit the potential damage caused by negative recipient responses by 
judiciously tailoring their level of exposure. Finally, when participants perceived 
that the response to disclosure was negative this often seemed to add to the 
pattern of social withdrawal that was noted in Chapter Nine. When a negative 
response is perceived it may reinforce the individual's isolation. 
Discussion 
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The current findings seem to support a number of factors that emerged in the 
analysis of disclosure experiences in the diary and interview study. Firstly most 
participants despite evidence that they preferred generally to keep their emotional 
experiences to themselves expressed a desire to disclose and a belief in the value 
of disclosure if they could find the right context and/or person. As in the earlier 
study characteristics of desirable recipients and contexts are strongly consistent 
with Goffinanesque considerations regarding the potential 'destructiveness' to 
the self of the infonnation disclosed. Secondly the current study replicated the 
salience of the response of the recipient in the apparent outcome of disclosure. 
Disclosures that were helpful seemed to be associated with supportive and 
understanding responses by the recipient, and disclosures which were unhelpful 
seemed on the whole to be associated with invalidating responses by the 
recipients. Thirdly, while there was less data on the effects of disclosure in the 
current study, there was some evidence in support of the earlier finding that 
participants felt more understood and in some cases were able to disconfirm 
negative interpersonal expectations as a result of validating responses to 
disclosure. Finally as in the earlier study social and dramaturgical factors seemed 
to be more salient in participants' accounts of deciding to disclose and the 
process and outcomes of disclosure, than factors associated with the cognitive- 
assimilation and inhibition models (although as in the earlier study there may 
have been some bias in favour of the social perspective in the questions that were 
asked). 
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In addition to replicating the earlier findings the current study adds to them in at 
least two respects. Firstly there appeared to be a less clear distinction between 
helpful and unhelpful disclosure than was the case in the diary and interview 
study (although a number of unhelpful features of apparently helpful disclosures 
were identified in the latter). This greyness in the outcomes of disclosure seemed 
to be attributable in part to the fact that participants often disclosed in a partial or 
incomplete manner. It also seems to have arisen because of recipient responses 
which combined supportiveness on the one hand with an invalidating attitude 
towards the participants' experience on the other, possibly reflecting norms of 
politeness which prevent people from being openly critical or dismissive. This 
suggests that the discloser is protected from negative evaluations of others by the 
fact that he or she has limited their self-exposure and by the fact that evaluative 
feedback is covert. However the downside is that it is harder to know whether a 
recipient is actually understanding and validating. In these circumstances the 
discloser will often have to infer how well the information they disclose is being 
received, and in the absence of disconfirming responses participants may fear the 
worst. A second addition to the findings of the earlier study is that apparently 
validating responses may be experienced as unhelpful when they fail to tackle the 
evaluative core of an individual's sense of marginalisation. This process might 
have been at work in the case of a woman who seemed to feel that she would 
only be valuable as a person if she could have children. It appeared as though the 
therapist validated her desire to follow this through but failed to deconstruct the 
evaluative criteria linking acceptability and value in women to having a family 
and children - in effect tacitly supporting her client's connection between having 
children and being valued. 
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Conclusion 
In Chapter One it was argued that existing research on shame and 
psychopathology has paid insufficient attention to the social context in which 
shame is experienced by people with psychological disorders. Two studies 
(reported in Chapters Four, Six, Seven, Nine and Ten) were subsequently 
conducted which attempted to examine the role of shame in the context of 
psychotherapy patients' experiences of disclosure and non-disclosure of 
emotionally salient experiences. In both studies shame appeared to play a role in 
maintaining the isolation and apparent marginalisation of psychotherapy patients. 
The fact that shame appeared to be associated with the participants' fears of 
negative responses, in particular labelling, blaming or judgmental responses, 
suggests that the self-censorship associated with shame is itself related to a 
broader context of social evaluative practices, and some preliminary evidence in 
support of this was presented in Chapter Nine. 
It was argued in Chapter Two that clinically relevant shame may occur more in 
the context of anticipated social action than actual negative interpersonal 
outcomes, making it harder for people to identify and harder to study than more 
overt emotional episodes. This kind of anticipatory shame was termed marker 
shame. An attempt to study marker shame directly using Singer's notion of the 
self-defming memory met with limited success (Chapter Eight). However both 
this and the earlier diary and interview study illustrated how anticipatory marker 
shame appears to have a significant effect on psychotherapy patients' social lives 
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by pre-empting the extent to which they confide distressing emotional 
experiences to other people. 
In Chapter Three it was suggested that an understanding of shame is relevant to 
the emerging literature on the benefits of emotional disclosure. In this respect a 
striking finding in both of the two studies was that psychotherapy patients 
seemed to be chronic or habitual non-disclosers of their emotional experiences. 
This contrasts with the available evidence on the 'social sharing' of emotions by 
participants in similar studies with non-clinical populations and suggests that an 
understanding of disclosure processes may of central significance to an 
understanding of psychopathology and the generic aspects of psychotherapy (a 
point in keeping with the finding that what mental health patients want most is 
someone to talk to). Both studies uncovered evidence in favour of a 
dramaturgical account of disclosure dynamics in which participants attempted to 
manage potentially 'destructive' information about themselves by either 
concealing experiences or by revealing them to people regarded as trustworthy 
and understanding. The evidence in favour of social and shame-related 
considerations suggested that current cognitive-assimilation and inhibition 
models of the benefits of disclosure are over-individualistic and neglect 
important social determinants of disclosure outcomes, as originally argued by 
Kelly and McKillop (1996). 
In general the work reported in this thesis seems to point to the need for a less 
intrapsychic and a more social understanding of shame, psychopathology, and 
the mechanics of therapeutic disclosure. In particular it suggests that it may be 
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fruitful to pay attention to the social and evaluative contexts which underpin the 
experience of shame and may foment psychological and emotional problems, a 
suggestion with resonates with social constructionist approaches to 
psychopathology and psychotherapy, such as those of Riikonen and Smith (1997) 
and McLeod (1997). 
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APPENDIX 1 
TERFORMATIVE' SHAME 
A. Shame and the 'gpiDeasement' hypothesis 
Castelfiranchi & Poggi (1990) argued that shame is associated with a display 
whose function is to 'communicat[e] ... the individual's sensitiveness to others' judgements ... the individual's sharing of their values' and 'their sorrow over 
any possible faults or inadequacies' (p. 240). Such a performance in their view 
constitutes 'an acknowledgement, a confession, and an apology, aimed at 
inhibiting others' aggression or avoiding social ostracism' (p. 240). Keltner 
(1995) has termed this view of shame the 'appeasement hypothesis. ' 
Evidently if such a performance is to be effective it must be recognisable by 
others. Ibis is potentially problematic as the literature on the display of shame 
has demonstrated that for many theorists and researchers shame does not have a 
clear display. Castelfranchi & Poggi (1990) regarded the blush as the primary 
vehicle of the performance. However work by Leary et al (1992) and Leary & 
Meadows (1991) demonstrates that blushing is associated with many other 
emotions as well, in particular embarrassment. Nevertheless Keltner's work on 
people's ability to differentiate displays of shame from those of other similar 
emotions clearly supports the appeasement hypothesis (Keltner, 1995; Keltner & 
Buswell, 1996; Keltner & Harker, in press) even though some of his findings 
suggested that people may require greater contextual information than is 
necessary for the identification of emotions which have clearer facial displays 
such as anger or disgust. 
Keltner & Harker (in press) advance two other strands of evidence in favour of 
the appeasement hypothesis. Firstly they cite two as yet unpublished studies 
which appear to demonstrate that displays of shame can reduce aggression from 
other people and increase people's level of sympathy. Young et al. (described in 
Keltner & Harker, in press) conducted one study in which participants acting as 
jurors in a simulated trial were required to make judgements of a hypothetical 
defendant who displayed either anger, shame, or no emotion at the time of 
sentencing. They found that defendants who displayed shame were given shorter 
sentences. Keltner et al (described in Keltner & Harker, in press) presented 
participants with a series of photos of individuals displaying different emotions 
and asked them to imagine that these people had committed a social 
transgression. Participants were asked to rate the emotions they felt in response 
to each individual photograph. In this study it was found that shame displays 
elicited noticeably higher levels of sympathy than did the display of 
embarrassment. The second strand of evidence advanced by Keltner & Harker in 
favour of the appeasement hypothesis concerns the similarity between the shame display in humans and the submissive displays of other species. They note that 
similar displays in animals lead to reconciliation following social transgressions. 
In a short time Keltner has given considerable impetus to the appeasement view 
of shame and has collected evidence which so far appears supportive. However it is not clear how his view of shame (based as we have seen on studies in which 
people identified the prototypical shame display as shame) fits in with the 'ugly' 
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view of shame that has emerged from the work of Tangney (e. g. Tangney, 1995). 
For example the appeasement function of shame seems out of place next to 
Tangney's (e. g. Tangney, 1995) findings that shame is associated with a 
'resentful, seething kind of anger. ' Anger of this kind would surely 'leak' and 
undermine the appeasing effects of the shame. A related question, acknowledged 
by Keltner & Harker (in press) is that displays of shame do not always seem to 
be associated with reduced aggression and reconciliation. (Intriguing in this 
connection is Malatesta-Magai's recent (1996) finding of a 'decoding bias' for 
shame in individuals who are securely attached - i. e. these individuals recognise 
displays of shame more readily than people with other attachment classifications 
- which suggests that their greater capacity for relating positively may be 
partially based on their skill in recognising and responding to other people's 
attempts to construct a positive sense of themselves). As yet we do not fully 
understand the dynamics of the connection between shame and appeasement and 
shame and angry or maladaptive responses. However recent research on shame 
and appeasement indicates that we should continue to pay close attention to the 
interpersonal nature and functions of shame. 
Both Castelfranchi & Poggi (1990) and Keltner (1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; 
Keltner & Harker, in press) are theorists who combine a biological and 
evolutionary perspective with a sensitivity to the interpersonal adaptiveness and 
function of shame. Keltner in particular can be seen as an heir to Ekman, in his 
attempt to specify emotional displays, but one who has broadened his remit to 
include the interpersonal purpose of those displays. Keltner's emphasis appears 
to differ markedly from that of Gilbert & McGuire (in press) whose explanation 
appeals to biological factors which are seen as fundamentally dysfunctional and 
maladaptive. 
Appeasement and social constructionist theories ofemotion 
Keltner's emphasis on the interpersonal agenda of emotional enactments 
dovetails with the concerns of social constructionist theorists of emotion. A 
social constructionist account would seem to favour the appeasement analysis of 
shame in addition to raising some areas of enquiry into shame that have been 
neglected in current research. 
While there are different shades of opinion in social constructionist theory about 
emotion (Armon-Jones, 1986) the principle emphasis of social constructionist 
theories is that emotion can only be properly understood by paying attention to 
the social context and the social uses to which emotion it is put. According to 
constructionists emotions derive their meaning and their role from shared cultural 
understanding. Ibis means that particular emotions may be prescribed in certain 
situations in order for people to maintain their identities and also in order to 
achieve certain objectives. For example grief may be 'prescribed' following the 
death of a spouse (Averill, 1994) and anger may constitute a socially sanctioned 
means of objecting to other people's violations of their rights (Averill, 1982). 
('Anger has a privilege' as Kent says in KLng Lear). Constructionists share a 
distrust of the 'essentialism' of other theories of emotion, the assumption that 
words such as 'shame' or 'anger' refer to hidden entities or 'detachable 
phenemena' as Sarbin (1986) puts it. Rather, since emotions are seen as 
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fundamentally social phenemena constructionist thinking suggests that they can 
only be understood in the contexts within which they function. Harre expresses 
this concern as follows: 
There has been a tendency among both philosophers and psychologists to 
abstract an entity - call it 'anger', 'love', 'grief or 'anxiety' - and try to 
study it. But what there is are angry people, upsetting scenes, sentimental 
episodes, grieving families and funerals, anxious parents pacing at 
midnight, and so on. There is a concrete world of contexts and activities. 
We reify and abstract from that concreteness at our peril. 
(Harre, 1986, p. 4). 
Although as Harre's comments imply constructionist theorists tend to be opposed 
to naturalistic 'basic emotions' theories there are strong and weak versions of 
constructionism (Armon-Jones, 1986). Oatley (1993) has recently pointed out 
that naturalist theories of emotion and constructionist theories have different 
ranges of convenience and may well, in the end, prove to be complimentary. 
The relevance of social constructionism in this context is that constructionists 
regard emotions as 'performative' (Parkinson, 1995) or as having 'illocutionary 
force' (cf Harre, 1991). In this sense a constructionist view of shame is resonant 
with the appeasement hypothesis of Castelfranchi & Poggi (1990) and Keltner 
(1995). As Keltner argues, and has begun to demonstrate, displays of shame can 
exert a mollifying influence on people who have the power to punish the 
individual. In this sense shame could be regarded as the performance of an 
apology and a sense of contrition (as Castelfranchi & Poggi note) and may also 
be 'prescribed', as is suggested in Harre's (1991) description of shame as a 
'creditable emotion for discreditable acts' (p. 159). While, sadly, constructionist 
research along the lines of Averill's (1982) study of anger has not yet been 
conducted on shame research of this kind could fruitfully complement the 
research of Keltner and his colleagues. A constructionist agenda in shame 
research could usefully open up the role of shame in the wider moral order and 
also focus research attention on the social uses of identifying one's experiences 
as shame. 
B. The relationship between marker shame and performative shame 
A uniting factor in both models of shame is the goal of being valued or esteemed. 
Both kinds of shame are fundamentally concerned with the motive of social 
inclusion. However each form of shame appears to be associated with quite 
different interpersonal expectations. While performative shame implies that an 
individual has some confidence in the willingness of the interpersonal 
environment to re-accept them in spite of their shortcomings, marker shame 
embodies negative interpersonal expectations that make exposure of 
shortcomings and the seeking of social participation especially risky. In keeping 
with these implicit interpersonal contexts the function of the two forms of shame 
can also be contrasted. While performative shame can be understood as 
lubricating entry into valuing social contexts marker shame appears to function 
as a means of pre-empting social rejection. In terms of the messages projected to 
others performative shame appears to involve an individual voluntarily accepting 
and acknowledging lower status while an individual experiencing marker shame 
may, in contrast, angrily attempt to maintain their claims to status (in the process 
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of which the goal of being valued by the other is presumably lost). While 
performative shame needs to be communicated either by being displayed 
physically (cf Keltner & Harker, in press) or verbally marker shame is likely to 
remain subtle and may be indistinct from the avoidant behaviours it is associated 
with. Finally performative shame is likely to be associated with positive 
interpersonal outcomes while marker shame would appear often to be 
interpersonally destructive as well as being associated with psychopathology 
(although marker shame may still be adaptive in the kind of interpersonal 
environment in which it developed, a point that will be developed below). 
Degrees ofsymbolisation 
It is possible that these two forms of shame are not necessarily completely 
distinct, since under certain circumstances marker shame may well be translated 
into performative shame. In this section it is argued that the degree to which 
marker shame is identified as shame mirrors the degree to which an individual is 
engaged in an attempt to have their identity reconciled with the values of those to 
whom shame is presented. 
Bucci (1995) has suggested that the categorisation and identification of an 
emotion comes at the end of a process of emotional exploration and it is possible 
that while psychodynamic ideas about unconscious or subsymbolic emotional 
phenomena relate to the undifferentiated end of this process of emotional 
exploration the social constructionist model of shame as performative relates to 
the more articulated and symbolised end of the emotional spectrum. The review 
of marker approaches to emotion in Chapter Two and the clinical literature on 
maladaptive shame suggest that marker shame can occur at a variety of different 
levels of awareness. Singer and Singer (1992) argue that there are various levels 
at which generic script-like memories become automatic, and they suggest that 
the more generic and abstract the representation, the less conscious awareness the 
individual will have of it. H. Lewis has referred to 'bypassed shame' in 
psychotherapy patients and suggested that this occurs as a 'wince', 'blow' or 
'jolt' accompanied by an obsessive cognitive focus on 'doubt about the self s 
image from the other's point of view' (H. Lewis, 197 1, p. 197). She contrasts this 
with 'overt, undifferentiated shame' which is easier to observe, but where the 
individual still appears unable to acknowledge or identify their feeling, at least 
until it is receding, often saying only that they feel 'lousy' or 'tense' or 'blank' 
(H. Lewis, 1971, p. 197). Neither of these levels of awareness seem as accessible 
as Singer's notion of the self-defining memory that provides a conscious 
emotional commentary on one's pursuit of salient goals. However H. Lewis' 
distinctions could map on to the two most abstracted levels of Singer and 
Singer's taxonomy, with the overt, 'undifferentiated' shame corresponding to the 
generic script level of abstraction, while the 'bypassed' shame corresponds to the 
even more automatic operation of what Singer and Singer (1992) call a 
cmetascript. ' Going back to 'Tom', this might be the automatic application of 
the heuristic 'Never trust authorities, they will always disappoint you. ' These 
different degrees of symbolic representation of the marker shame may - if the 
social constructionist perspective is correct - be understood in terms of the degree 
to which an individual is willing to enact shame. 
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An implication of the point of view adopted'here is that the subsymbolic, script- 
like components of shame may only be identified as 'shame' when there exists 
some interpersonal opportunity for restitution of the self. However paradoxically 
if the individual has as a goal the desire to be included and valued by others this 
should intensify the marker shame warning signals. Shame, then, is likely to 
become more intense and painful as the individual attempts to move closer to the 
other person, and is likely to be experienced more the more that person is valued. 
This means that the individual in these circumstances might experience 
considerable ambivalence. On the one hand they may see an opportunity to move 
into a valuing relationship - perhaps because they believe the other is in some 
way different to people encountered previously. On the other hand their past 
experience - encoded in the marker script - may be telling them to escape 
forthwith. This implies that when people work to overcome marker shame they 
may at some point flip rapidly between the two types of shame. Magai, Distal 
and Liker (1995) report that shame and aggression are emotional dispositions 
that are associated with an ambivalent attachment classification which suggests 
that individuals who are unsure about the prospect of being valued by others may 
switch easily between aggressive attempts to maintain their identity and shame- 
like bids for reconciliation. Interestingly Magai et al. found that contempt was 
associated with an avoidant attachment classification, suggesting that contempt 
might block awareness of the goal of being valued by others. 
If this analysis is correct the first step in inculcating experiences of pro-social or 
performative shame (shame which is labelled and articulated) must be to foster 
the notion that social participation is a worthwhile goal. Deliberate attempts to 
shame people by humiliating them are likely to fail if they reduce the extent of an 
individual's identification with those before whom they might feel ashamed. If 
others are construed as enemies shame is unlikely to be experienced. Tomkins 
(1995) alluded to this aspect of shame when he wrote 'You cannot be ashamed, 
per se, unless you find the other exciting or loveable in some way, and you wish 
to maintain that bond' (p. 392). 
C. Marker shame, performative shame and psychotherap 
There is some evidence which suggests that clients in psychotherapy may 
construct their experiences into particular emotional roles which reconnect them 
in beneficial ways to other people (Holzer et al, 1997). This idea is in line with 
recent social constructionist approaches to therapy. Riikonen and Smith (1997) 
for example note that 'people can be seen to be taking moral and relational 
positions when they are 'entering into' or changing emotional states and when 
they do 'emotion talk" (p. 130). For Riikonen and Smith therapy involves the 
development of an interpersonal 'understanding' of the client's difficulties which 
enables the client to continue living with a sense of respect and dignity. In 
keeping with this they write: 
it should be clear that understanding is not simply a question of 'taking in 
the facts' - feeling understood is very much a question of moral knowing, 
specifically that we can hear what the person is saying from the 
perspective of believing that they are a morally worthwhile person. This 
most usually means that we can see the events they describe in the 
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context of a narrative which is exemplary of some values they and we 
support (or prize). 
(Riikonen & Smith, 1997, p. 109). 
From this perspective shame experienced and expressed in psychotherapy is seen 
as enabling and facilitating a moral regrading of the client. A number of existing 
perspectives on the experience of shame in psychotherapy will be reviewed and 
reconsidered in the light of this theoretical approach. 
Theoretical Perspectives on shame in psychotherapy 
H. Lewis (197 1) focuses on the value of acknowledging unacknowledged 
experiences of shame in psychotherapy. She advocates taking what she calls a 
'phenomenological stance' towards the shame in the session, focusing on the 
subtle shifts of emotion related to the client's superego states, the 'domain of 
superego upheavals under the press of threatened affectional ties' (P. 24) as she 
puts it. If the therapist is able to acknowledge these feelings and convey to the 
client that they are acceptable, this will interrupt the otherwise inevitable 
operation of the defensive script or in H. Lewis' terms a manifestation of the 
shame-rage sequence. Once the shame can be acknowledged and accepted in this 
way, the client may be able to see how the experience of marker shame 
originated in themselves. As H. Lewis (I 987a) says 'Bringing to the patient's 
awareness that they are in a state of shame or guilt is itself emotionally relieving 
to the patients, for whom it becomes very clear that it is they, not the analyst, 
who are judgmental' (p. 24). For Lewis, then, the value of therapy lies in 
enabling the client to recognise the transference basis of their (marker) shame. 
Kaufman (1989) echoes H. Lewis' understanding, stating that the therapist 
should 'approach' and 'validate' the client's experience of shame. He suggests, 
finther to Lewis, that this will enable the client to recognise that the transferential 
shame belongs to past relationships, preserved in memories that Kaufman refers 
to as 'governing scenes. ' In this way Kaufman suggests internalised shame can 
be 'returned' to its 'interpersonal origins', and the individual emancipated from 
its destructive effects in the contemporary valuing relationship with the therapist. 
In summary both H. Lewis and Kaufinan argue that therapy confronts the client 
with the reality of a valuing and accepting relationship which when experienced 
should invalidate the need for shame. Both writers describe how the therapist's 
task is to help the client acknowledge unacknowledged and subtle experiences of 
shame. 
Ward (1972) and Weiss (1995) focus on shame that is more clearly manifested in 
psychotherapy. They both note that shame is frequently displayed by clients 
shortly before they reveal something in therapy that has previously been hidden. Ward (1972) argues that shame arises in therapy when the client is able to reveal 'a weakness, a problem, an imperfection, an inexpertness, or a limitation' (p. 235). He also observes that prior to revealing weaknesses or problems 'the 
patient probes and tests the therapist to determine his probable attitudes and 
reactions, pro and con' (p. 236). Since revealing weaknesses and problems is 
essential for therapeutic progress he concludes that 'Unless one feels shame to 
some extent, one cannot emerge successfully from any well-worn pathologic behaviour pattern' (p. 232). Weiss (1995) observes that clients want to confess 
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secrets in the course of therapy, however they are reluctant to do so because 
'They fear that the analyst will react unfavourably by shaming them, making 
them feel guilty, punishing them, rejecting them, etc. ' (p. 70 1). Like Ward, 
Weiss suggests that clients attempt to test the therapist. If the therapist passes the 
test by for example intervening in a way which reduces the patient's fear of 
abandonment the client will tell the secret. By overcoming 'the sense of shame, 
guilt, fear, or expectation of external danger' (p. 701) they free themselves to 
'seek certain desirable goals' (p. 70 1) which previously appeared unattainable. 
Each of these theoretical perspectives on shame and psychotherapy suggest that 
acknowledging shame or shameful information is a central process in therapy. 
This process of acknowledgement is consistent with the process of symbolising 
shame from unsymbolised marker emotions which is outlined above. However 
none of these theorists appears to see the experience of shame as powerful and 
communicative in its own right. Rather they regard acknowledging shame as 
helpful to the degree that it enables clients to recognise that their interpersonal 
expectations are erroneous, and their shame therefore unwarranted. These two 
assumptions - that enacting shame has no role to play in its own right in therapy, 
and that the interpersonal expectations associated with marker shame are 
erroneous or dysfunctional - are both questionable. 
Firstly it is suggested, in line with the performative model of shame, that shame 
has an active role in structuring the relationship between the client and the 
therapist. This relational aspect of shame is seen in the appraisals associated with 
shame which highlight the goal of being valued by the other and the fact that one 
identifies with the other person's view of oneself - even though that view may be 
critical or negative (Crozier, 1995; Terwijn, 1993; Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990). 
Simply to acknowledge that one sees the world in this way implies that one 
wishes to learn and to find ways of fitting in with the other person's value 
system. Furthermore there is the communicative aspect of the emotion - the fact 
that either physically or verbally one communicates that one considers oneself 
one down in relation to the other, and that one accepts that this is appropriate. If 
the social constructionist and appeasement models of shame are correct this 
emotional communication should make it easier for the other individual to adopt 
reciprocal emotional roles, roles which confer reassurance and re-acceptance of 
the individual who communicates shame. Taking a slightly broader perspective it 
might be the case that this kind of emotional relationship produces the optimal 
conditions for one individual (in this case the client) to enter and learn the belief 
system of another (in this case the therapist). The process of psychotherapy may 
involve the conversion of experiences which sever interpersonal connectedness 
(the domain of marker shame) into experiences which are symbolised in such a 
way as to re-connect the individual to valued others (performative shame). 
Secondly the idea that in psychotherapy the interpersonal expectations implicit in 
marker shame are revealed as erroneous, which appears to be a central 
presumption in H. Lewis', Kauftnan's and Weiss' theories, may be misleading. 
For one it denies that the marker shame reflects actual rejection and stigma in the 
individual's lives. In Chapter One it was argued that the presumption that 
pathological shame reflected an unfounded affective bias is challenged by 
evidence showing that individuals with pathology appear in many cases to have 
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endured experiences which might be considered genuinely humiliating. The 
expectation of humiliation and rejection upon which marker forms of shame are 
based would therefore appear to be reasonable. 'Me objection could be made that 
in many cases, such as child abuse, the humiliation and re ection took place in j 
the past and is therefore dysfimctional in the present. However, as Hagan & 
Smail (1997a) have observed, it cannot be assumed that individuals are no longer 
subject to the same interpersonal pressures as they were in their pasts. 
Furthermore as Smail (1997a), Pilgrim (1997) and Parker et al (1995) have all 
argued therapeutic theory and practice is itself replete with subtle negative moral 
judgements about clients and their experiences. In contrast it may be more 
accurate to emphasise, in line with the models put forward by Ward (1972) and 
Weiss (1995), that clients in psychotherapy are actively seeking to disconfirm 
their negative expectations. They do this by sounding out and testing their 
therapist to see whether it is safe to reveal more of themselves, and perhaps too 
whether it is safe for them to allow themselves to experience and communicate 
shame. 
APPENDIX 2 
ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF SELF-REPORTS IN EMOTION 
RESEARCH 
Most of the existing research on shame has been based on self-reported 
experiences of shame. How much should we rely on this kind of self-report data 
in attempting to understand the nature of shame? Ibe following outline of the 
arguments about the admissability of self-report data on emotions draws on 
lengthier discussions of this topic by Scherer (1986), Averill (1982) and Oatley 
& Duncan (1992). 
The obvious reason for using self-report in the study of emotion is that since 
emotional experiences are subjective phenomena which may be experienced in 
private and which are not always acted out behaviourally the only means we have 
of studying what they are like is to ask people. Self-report methods are in 
Scherer's (1986) words: 'The only alternative for assessing those aspects of the 
emotional response that are related to subjective experience, that is the feeling 
component itself, and the subjective impression of the expression and 
physiological reactions' (Scherer, 1986, p. 21). However they are not without 
problems and there are a number of threats to the validity of data collected in this 
way. These are firstly that self-reports will yield distorted data due to ego- 
defensiveness. Secondly that they will be distorted because participants tend to 
provide socially desirable responses. Thirdly that the data is likely to be 
misleading due to the inaccuracies of memory. And Fourthly that people may 
actually be incapable of reporting on emotional processes and so merely furnish 
the researcher with cultural stereotypes of what emotions are supposed to be like. 
There seems little that one can do to eliminate biases due to unconscious ego- 
defences in self-report data of the kind that has generally been collected, and this 
might well be more of a problem for shame than for other emotions since shame 
is so closely associated with hiding. Indeed H. Lewis (197 1) suggests that there 
may be 'some intrinsic connection between shame and the mechanism of denial' 
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(p. 196). None of the self-report studies referred to in this chapter could be 
regarded as immune from such distortions. The most likely consequence of ego- 
defences are that participants minimise the significance of or simply omit reports 
of shame, and it is encouraging in this respect that researchers generally appear 
to be able to elicit reports of shame - even intense shame - from their research 
participants. The problem of distortion due to social desirability effects can be 
minimised by ensuring that participants' responses are anonymous and will not 
be fed back into their social contexts (Scherer, 1989; Averill, 1982). This appears 
to have been a precaution taken in all of the self-report studies reviewed in this 
chapter. The problem of inaccurate memory can be reduced by firstly ensuring 
that participants are asked to remember recent emotional experiences (Scherer, 
1986, suggests that they be experienced not more than one month previously) 
and secondly by providing cues that specify what information the researcher is 
seeking. 
The issue of whether self-reports yield accurate versus stereotypical information 
about emotional states has attracted more debate than the other validity issues 
because it pertains to the more general question of whether it is worth conducting 
such studies at all. The debate stems from research in which it was demonstrated 
that people reliably provide inaccurate reports about physiological or 
environmental variables which influence their behaviour. For example Mandler 
(1961, cited in Oatley & Duncan, 1992, p. 281) found that correlations between 
verbal reports and physiological measures of autonomic variables such as heart 
rate and sweat gland activity were not often significant and sometimes not even 
positive. In a famous review of research of this kind Nisbett & Wilson (1977, 
cited in Averill, 1982, p. 156) concluded that: 'When reporting on the effects of 
stimuli, people may not interrogate a memory of the cognitive processes that 
operate on the stimuli; instead, they may base their reports on implicit, a priori 
theories about the causal connection between stimulus and response'. Nisbett & 
Wilson's argument has come under attack (for a review of the criticisms see 
McClure, 199 1, p. 47 -5 5). One criticism is that they overgeneralise from 
research which focuses on automatic cognitive processes and they consequently 
fail to recognise the predictive validity of reports of internal states. As Averill 
(1982) points out 'No one denies that people are often unable to describe the 
cognitive processes that mediate behaviour. However, people are typically able 
to describe the reasons for their behaviour, that is, the rules that help guide their 
responses' (p. 156). Oatley & Duncan (1992) make a similar point: 'If we allow 
that a 10% error rate (say) is acceptable in many scientific predictions, we should 
compare this with rates of error in arrangements to meet someone, or to pick up 
one's child at a certain time and place, which are as good or better than this' (p. 
282). A related point made by Averill (1982), one that resonates with the social 
constructionist approach to emotion, is that people's stereotypical knowledge 
about emotion is itself an important topic of study - indeed such beliefs help to 
constitute the emotion. As Averill puts it the fact that self-report data may reflect 
social norms and rules 'is no ground to derogate the self-reports - particularly if 
the purpose of the research is to elucidate those social norms and rules' (Averill, 
1982, p. 156). The argument in favour of using self-reports is, then, that these 
reports - even if they miffor stereotypical notions of emotion - nevertheless 
reflect key elements of the experience. Indeed these may be the aspects that are 
most useful in predicting people's future behaviour and intentions. Having said 
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this it is possible that misleading stereotypical notions about emotion emerge in 
self-report data that is stripped of its context (Parkinson & Manstead, 1992). 
A fmal point about the use of self-report is that it evidently only captures a part 
of the full spectrum of emotional experiences. This is acknowledged by Oatley & 
Duncan (1992) who comment that people are unable to report on Tme-grained' 
patterns of emotional expression, autonomic reactivity or verbal and non-verbal 
accompaniments of emotion. As they say: 'People are unable validly to report 
such patterning, any more than they can say exactly what arm movements they 
used to raise their hand to vote at a meeting' (p. 282). In this context we should 
remember that some theorists refer to shame as an extremely subtle and 
inarticulate experience (e. g. H. Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1988; Retzinger, 1991) and 
that most existing studies are unlikely to have captured such Tme-grained' 
experiences of shame. 
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APPENDIX 3 
EMOTION DLARY 
CO VER PAGE 
We would like you to keep this special diary of some emotions. 
Please watch for these emotions: 
Guilt 
Shaine 
Hatred 
Disgust 
There are two pages to fill in for each emotion, pages one and two. 
We would like you if possible to fill in one of these two page sections 
for each of these different emotions should you experience them 
during the week. 
Please do the first two pages when you have any of these emotions, 
starting now. 
Please then do pages 1 and 2 for "Emotion Two" when you have a 
different one of the emotions on the list. 
Please repeat this procedure until either you have filled in a section 
for all the four emotions, or you come back to the hospital in a week's 
time. 
Personal 
Please be as frank as possible. We only want to know about emotions 
generally. So dodt put your name on the diary. 
We would like this information though, if you would not mind. 
1. Age 
2. Date when you started the diary .......................... 
Thank you very much indeed for doing this diary 
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"EMOTION ONE" -PAGE I 
Fill in pages 1-2 when you have an emotion that we are asking about. 
1. Which emotion? (Tick one. ) Guilt Shame Hatred 
Disgust [] 
2. Did you have any bodily sensations? (tick one or more. ) 
Tenseness (of body, jaw, fists) [] Trembling [] Heart beating noticeably ] Irregular 
breathing [] Blushing [] Stomach (churning, butterflies) [] Sweating Feeling hot 
] Feeling cold [] Other []- please say what it was ................................ 
.............................................................................................................................................. 
...................................................................................................................................... 
3. Did thouahts come into your mind that were hard to stop, and made it hard to 
concentrate on anything else? (Tick one. ) Yes [] No [] 
If you answered'yes' please say what these thoughts were: ............................................ 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
.............................................................................................................................................. 
...................................................................................................................................... How long did these thoughts last (Tick one. ) Less than 10 minutes [] Between 10 
minutes and one hour More than one hour but less than a whole day A day or 
more [] 
4. Did you act or feel like actine emotionall in any way? 
Yes [] No [ ]. Please say what you did or felt like doing ............................................ 
.............................................................................................................................................. 
5. How strong was the actual feeling of emotion? (Ring a number below. ) 
No feeling noticeable 0 12 345679 10 As strong as I can imagine 
6. How long did the emotion last? ...... hrs ...... minutes 
7. Was the feeling mixed, so that there was more than one emotion at exactly the 
same time? (Tick one. ) No [] Not sure [] Yes 
If Yes, what emotions were in the mixture? 
8. What was the next feeling you had after the emotion you are describing here 
(Tick one. ) 
Anger [] Anxiety Disgust Embarrassment [] Fear [] Guilt Happiness 
] Hatred [] Sadness Shame Depression [] Other [] Did not feel emotional 
afterwards [] 
9. Who were you with? (Please tick) Alone [] Friends [] 
Family [] Spouse/partner [] People at work [] Acquaintances Strangers 
Psychotherapy group [] Professional (e. g. doctor, priest, counsellor) [] Other 
If there were other people there, do you think they were aware of what you were feeling? (Please tick) Yes [] No [] Don! t Know []. 
10. What do you think triggered off the emotion 
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"EMOTION ONE" - PAGE 2 
11. Did you tell anyone about this? (Tick one. ) Yes [] No [] 
If you replied YES could you answer the following questions. If you answered 
NO could you go on to question 17. 
12. Who did you tell? (Please tick) Friends [] 
Family [] Spouse/partner ] People at work [] Acquaintances Strangers 
[] Psychotherapy group Professional (e. g. doctor, priest, counsellor) 
Other [] 
13. How difficult was it to share this? (Ring a number below. ) 
Not difficult at all 0 12 3456789 10 Almost impossible 
14. Which of the following emotions did you feel as you were deciding to talk 
about the emotion you have been describing in this section of the diary? 
(Please tick for all the emotions you felt) 
Anger [] Anxiety [] Disgust [] Embarrassment Fear Guilt 
Happiness [] Hatred [] Sadness [] Shame [] Depression [] 
15. Did you feel better as a result of telling somebody how you felt? 
Yes No 
16. Did you feel worse as a result of telling somebody how you felt? 
Yes No 
If you answered NO to question 9 ("Did you tell anyone about this") can you 
answer the following two questions: 
17. Were you afraid about how others might see you if you told them? (Tick 
One. ) Yes [] No [] 
18. Did the thought of telling anybody make you feel any shame? (Tick One) 
Yes[ ] No[ ] 
APPENDIX 4 
CONTINGENCY TABLE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GENDER X REPORT 
OF AN INSTANCE OF SHAME 
Female Male Totals 
Instance of shame 12 5 17 
No shame instance 17 4 21 
Totals 
_ , 
29 9 38 
361 
APPENDIX 5 
TRIGGERS OF GUILT, HATRED AND DISGUST 
Table One: Triagers for experiences of imilt 
P TRIGGERS 
5 A news item about a boy being raped reminded him of the fear he experienced when being raped 
himself [unfortimately it is not clear from the diary or a follow-up interview why this elicited 
guilt] 
9 Something sexual she had done which made her think she was a bad person [SI 
10 Things remind him of his son's death and this makes him want to be alone. He then feels guilty 
about the way he responds to his wife 
II Upsetting a f1dend, thinking she should keep the peace and make sure everybody is happy. 
Thinking: 'I should have kept my mouth shut - its all my fault' 
12 Feeling she has let her daughter down - she feels inadequate, guilty and a failure with her 
daughter. 
14 Felt she was neglectful of her mother after speaking to her on the phone 
15 A general feeling of guilt about 'not being well ... not being able to cope... 
feeling [she's] 
putting on people'. She recorded her thoughts as 'lack of self worth' 
16 Guilty about not taking legal action about the sexual abuse she suffered, because the man abused 
someone else in the family who she felt responsible for protecting 
17 Not thinking in an orderly fashion at work - connected with flashbacks to childhood. Thinks 
'why are you still doing this'. The emotion is a response to the same situation as his instance of 
shame 
18 Guilty about how badly daughter treats an elderly relative who looks after her - feelings of 
failure and incapability. Her thoughts are that she should have been a better parent and her 
daughter's behaviour is all her fault [S] 
19 Kids playing her up and fighting and her punishing them as her parents punished her which she 
hated them for [S] 
20 Guilty that a man who is infatuated with her is booking a holiday for her [S] 
23 Reflecting on how she's been angry with people in the past who have tried to help her 'on 
reflection, you know, they were just, they were being there for me, but I couldn't thank them' 
24 Psychotherapist suggesting that the way she acted as if she ruled the house was a way of getting 
back at her abuser. Thought it was not fair on her partner, although she thought he also needed to 
be punished for betraying her trust. 
25 Calling at a friend's and interrupting her when she knew she would be busy 
26 The fact that her children are in care [S] 
27 Taking her anger out on her son when its not his fault 
28 Picking cl-dld up from school when she is off sick, because it looks as though there is nothing 
wrong with her. When people see that she looks alright she feels guilty that she is not at work [S] 
29 Inability to perform sexually 
30 Over-reacting angrily to her mother 
33 Talking about abuse in childhood and feeling to blame and disgusted 
ý15 A dream in which she acts unpleasantly and her partner takes her baby away from her 
36 Feeling he's wasting people's time at the clinic - there are people worse off 
37 A 'stupid' argument with her mother, felt guilty because her mother 'was only trying to be nice' 
3ý8 Can't help family financially because he can't work (due to injury) 
[S] indicates that the emotion was described as being mixed with shame 
Guilt (see Table One) appeared, not surprisingly to be characterised by the 
perception of wrongdoing or imposition on others with 76% (19/25) referring to 
some kind of negative effect of themselves on others, and the strong possibility 
that this may be the case in most of the other instances (e. g. P9's reference to the 
sexual thing she had done that made her feel guilty, or P17's description of not 
thinking in an orderly fashion at work). This appears to confirm that the 
experiences of guilt recorded in the diary really were experiences of guilt (see 
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Lewis' 1971 description of guilt). Guilt seemed typically to have been 
experienced in the context of ordinary daily interactions, typically with mothers, 
children or friends, with 72% of guilt instances (18/25) appearing to be of this 
kind. This contrasts with shame where as noted above there seemed often to have 
been a preoccupation with past experiences, or a precipitating effect of 
psychotherapy. For shame only approximately 18.7% (3/16) of instances could 
be counted as being triggered in daily interactions in this way, and typically in 
shame there seemed to be a greater sense of abnormality or singularity both 
about the self and the circumstances in which the shame took place. 
Tabl e Two: Triggers for experiences of hatred 
P TRIGGERS 
2 Participant attributed feelings of hatred towards her abuser and ex-partner to her 'periods' 
3 Thoughts about how her mother had failed to protect her from sexual abuse, and chosen not to 
listen when she had told her later on about it 
4 
I 
Not being able to hold his own in an argument about politics, in which the other person 
humiliated him 
.5 
Another driver cut him up and could have caused an accident which hurt his children 
7 Discovery that someone close had been abused - hatred towards the 'sick and perverted' people 
who abuse, and anger towards wife because she didn't understand 
9 Thoughts about her partner's parents being abusive, anger towards partner for not being more 
assertive 
II A friend had double-booked seeing her with another friend, which made her feel she was being 
used 
13 Friend let her down 'as usual, 
' 15 Friend. went out and left her alone for 'first time' 
. 
17 Self-hatred caused by flashbacks to his scenes of violence and physical abuse in childhood. 
19 Thoughts of her mum hitting her as a child and how she felt then and now hating herself for 
doing the same to her children [S, G] 
22 Memories of ex-partner abusing her in ways which he didn't have the right to do 'the more I 
think about it the more of the hate comes into me' 
24 Tried to deceive husband into believing she was going to sleep with him when she was not. 
Hated him for finding out 
25 Feeling intruded on by men visiting a betting shop below her flat 
27 Speaking to a man in the housing dept who was very arrogant and unhelpful 
. 
28 Husband ignoring son's friend and not replying to him 
32 'thou s' ( no interview) 
34 'thinking about the situation, driving past a place that triggers memories' (no interview) 
36 Teenagers 'arsing around, with automatic train door rý377 
1 Teenager in street breaking things and making res dents' lives miserable 
100% of the triggers for hatred (18/18, with two instances excluded because the 
participants did not provide any information about the focus of the hatred) 
seemed to concern harm done by others. 22% (4/18) of these instances actually involved harm that was done by others to others rather than the self (for instance 
the abusive parents of one participant's partner). The remainder concerned harm done to the self. 
Table Three: THimers for emeriences of diqoiiqt 
TRIGGERS 
Self-disgust which occurred when she weighed herself. Thoughts 'how had I got to this state? Why couldn't I beat the feelings from past? Would I ever be able to climb up out of this mess 
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(and s out) 
2 Not very clear if self or other - related to thinking bad things about ex-partner. Thoughts 
4,. mting revenge on abuser. ' Also said going to counselling and being depressed 'triggered off 
the feeling of disgust and thinking bad things about wanting hiM to die' 
3 Thinking about her self-image and how she has had to 'claw back all the time, to regain her self- 
respect after being abused. Not clear whether disgust at self or abuser 
8 Looked at the mirror and thought she was ugly (self-disgust) 
10 Disgust with himself for not being able to control his feelings 
16 Having to think about her abuse in assessment interview. Not clear whether self-disgust or 
disgust with abuser/abuse 
17 P didn't know. Thought it was probably to do with past experiences. Wanted to end his life and 
'no reason for me to be here' thoug 
18 , Disgust towards daughter who expresses great resentment to her, and towards herself for setting 
a united front with her abusive father to her daughter 
22 Didn't want to talk about it, but it was a memory about being badly treated by her ex-partner. 
Thought 'why did I let it happen? Why did he treat me this wayT 
24 Disgusted at herself for lying to her children about why she was coming in to the hospital. 
Thought: 'why can't I be normal? why have I let these things go on so long? Did I really hate 
what happened or did I secretly enjoy it? ' 
28 Disgusted by husband's behaviour towards the children and his ignoring her. Also connected 
with disgust about husband having an affair 
31 Ex-partner breaking promises he has made to their son. Thought 'how utterly selfish this 
particular person is' 
33 Disgust with herself for letting sexual abuse happen in childhood, triggered by talking in 
assessment 
34 Looking in mirror thinking 'why did it happen' 
There appeared to be no universal theme in the accounts of triggers for disgust 
(see Table Three) although many of them appeared to involve some kind of 
recoil from their image of themselves, so that much of the disgust reported 
appeared to be self-disgust. Self-disgust was explicitly mentioned in 57.1 % cases 
(8/14). This may have accounted for the despairing quality of the thoughts 
recorded by many of the participants for this emotion, for example 'why can't I 
be normal? ' (P24), 'why couldn't I beat the feelings from the past? ' (P 1) and 'no 
reason to be here' (P17). Only two instances of disgust appeared to be clearly 
focused on disgusting actions by others which took place in the week that they 
completed the diaries and which did not appear to involve any 'contamination' of 
themselves (P31 and P28 - although in this latter case the emotion was mixed 
with shame, suggesting that even here it may have 'contaminated' her feelings 
towards herselo. 
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APPENDIX 6 
SEMI-STRUCTURED FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW TO THE DIARY STUDY 
ON THE EXPERIENCE AND DISCLOSURE OF EMOTIONAL 
EXPERIENCES BY PSYCHOTHERAPY PATIENTS 
THE INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONS FOR EACH EMOTION RECORDED 
1) IF EMOTION DISCLOSED: - 
(i) Can you describe the circumstances in which you disclosed? 
Where were you? 
What was happening? 
How did you build up to it? 
What do you think prompted you to tell someone about this? 
(ii) How did you feel after telling about this? 
(iii) Did talking about it make you feel stupid or silly or ashamed of 
yourself? 
(iv) Do you think talking about your feelings was helpful in this instance? 
Yes [] No [] In what ways do you think it was helpful? In what 
ways do you think it was unhelpful? (are there any ways in which you 
think it might have been unhelpful? ) 
(v) a] How do you think other people felt towards you when you told 
them about your feelings? 
b] Were you bothered/pleased about how they felt towards you? 
(vi) What effect do you think talking about your feelings had on your 
relationship with the people/person you told? 
2) IF EMOTION NOT DISCLOSED: - 
(i) If you can can you explain why you chose not to tell anyone? 
(ii) Do you think that if you told somebody you would feel stupid, or 
silly, or ashamed of yourself? 
(iii) What would have to be different for you to tell someone about this? 
(iv) Do you think that not talking to anyone about the way you felt had 
any effect on your relationships with other people? 
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APPENDIX 7 
TABLE SHOWING DATA ON HABITUAL NON-DISCLOSURE 
P 17VTER VIEW AM TERM 
2 a) Although P has recently disclosed sexual abuse to a counsellor and a friend she talks about how 'its always been a 
dark secret'. 
b) She talks about how she has been 'like covering up, so nobody else in the family clicks onto what's you know, 
wrong'. She thinks after counselling she'll be able to tell people. 
31) 
4 'after a while these things are less interesting if you keep going on about them, they get boring. I tend to try not to. So I 
try to avoid talking about [it most of the? ] time' 
5 a) P said kept everything to himself because his abusers told him not to tell anyone and he assumed this was normal 
b) P said that 'I normally keep urn things to myself... ' 
6D 
7 a) P says that nobody else needs to know: 'If I told anybody about it I wouldn't forgive myself really. Because what it's. 
I think II just want to live with it my own way, and just let me and the wife and whoever else was involved sort it out 
her own way. No, nobody else needs to know about it' 
b) P says that emotional experiences has no 'bearings on anybody else': 'I chose, well the reason I chose is because I 
didn't think it had anything to do with anyone else. It was something that uni I'd done. I was ashamed of what I'd done, 
and that urn [pause] and it was something that I had to sort out myself. And it had no bearings on anybody else, and 
nobody needed to know. Of what I'd done and why I was feeling this way. So no, I didn't find any reason to tell 
anybody. It had nothing to do with anybody else' 
c) P indicates his determination to keep experiences associated with his sexual abuse to himself. 'It does because I won't 
talk to, I will not talk to anybody. Not even my wife' 
8 a) 'I don't find it easy to disclose anyway', b) 'I'm a very private person, and I find it really difficult' 
10 'You know, and II find it I've got friends, you know, but I don' t discuss anything like this with friends, or. And basically 
I'm just on my own really, and rve got to sort it for myself. ' 
IID 
12 a) P says she'd find it very difficult to talk family or friends: 'I mean L they obviously know that I've had problems, but 
to break it down and talk to them about emotions, but. I'd really find it hard. ' (though she says she finds it easier to talk 
to a doctor or a CPN). 
b) P says 'it's not something that I actually have spoke about really'. 
13D P talks about how she can't 'get it out' of her: '[Inaudible] when I was sitting [inaudible] said something to me as well. 
Cos I get angry. I get angry, but I cant get it out of me. So I just sit there quiet and take no notice, Well, I pretend not to 
take any notice, but I do really. 
14 a) 'I really don't feel I want to drag all the emotions up, um, with people, I just find it better left unsaid' 
b) 'Not no, it just didn't seem relevant to tell anybody' 
c) 'I don't know really. I don't think I would discuss it with anybody. I really don't think I would' 
d) 'whenever I'm unhappy I don't talk to other people about it I find it very hard. ' 
15 a) P keeps her intense feelings of guilt to herself 'I don't talk about it' 
b) if anybody sees her when she's feeling this way she says she hides it 
c) P says 'cos you can't express it really, so youjust keep it inside. By just keeping it inside. Um. But I don't find it easy 
to share, that particular feeling. ' 
16 a) P very clear that she wouldn't talk to anyone about her CSA: 'No I wouldn't tell anybody'. 
b) I couldnt see myself telling anybody! 
c) 'If s not an option'. 
d) *I don't want anybody to know. That's what happened to me. [Mm] I don't want anyone to know anything that had 
happened'. 
e) 'Yeah. [Yeah]. The only way I can conceive of telling anybody is if I was telling it to them about somebody else. 
Min] But not as me'. 
f) 'I just.. I wouldn't be telling anyone. ' 
17 [says re 'pointless' category that talking to his wife would be 'life beating a dead horse] 
Is a) 'L I don't really share ... out my feelings and thoughts very much' b) 'I somehow keep it all bottled up' 
c) 'I don't really discuss anything to, with other people. Not much. ' 
19 'Nine times out of ten I don't bother to say anything, because I just think, you know, he's judging me, on certain things, 
by saying that I am a lousy parent to the extent that he says I've got no control over my children' 
20 D 
21 
I 
a) Said that she had never discussed emotional situation with anyone apart from interview and therapist. She said 'I feel 
that uh, its like c ng a load that you don't want to carry that cos vou can't share it sometimes its unbearably hard'. 
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b) 'I'm not open, I'm not an open person'. 
22 a) Interviewer asks P if she is nervous about talking in the interview. She says: 'You know to me ething p vate 
and I just don't want to share it with anybody'. 
b) 'I dodt know, I just think its private. Why should I share it? You know, you know. I just believe leave it the way it 
is, 
you know'. 
c) 'as I just said before, its something um, you just doift talk about You just try to keep it private. ' 
23 a) P describes herself as a 'closed person': ' Urn, I think that's just me generally. I'm quite a closed person, and I don't 
discuss how I feel about anything, so it would be natural for me not to tell anyone about anything that I feel 
(inaudible]... I tend to bottle things up. ' 
b) 'I'm just so used to not talking about things, that I just don't think I could really. ' 
24 a) 'I dont think I'd be telling anyone. No, no I don! t think I would have done. Nothing can change really ... I can't 
imagine talking to anyone about it'. 
b) 'I would. I would feel silly and stupid. Yeah I would, very much. I'm a very private type of person. ' 
_25 26 a) 'the problems I've got at the momen% I'd rather keep them to myself than... '. 
b) 'I try to hide all my feelings'. 
27 
28 a) ' Urn. I find it hard, urn, to talk about, sometimes I think, Oh its best that I just ignore it, and I find that way I bottle 
things up. And I try to block it out myself, but the time I'm just getting all worked up, but, sometimes I think, well its not 
worth telling anybody'. 
b) 'Urn, its just the way I bottle things up for so long, and I just keep it to myself. Like another thing as well, being silly, 
urn, well perhaps to others it might be something trivial, you know, its nothing to worry about. But to me, you know, it 
was'. 
c) ' Uh. its like I say, (inaudible] I just tend to bottle things up myself and uh just try and put it to the back of my mind 
... 
[And do you know why you try to bottle things up? ] 'That' s something rve always done ... rve never 
done anything 
different'. 
d) ' if there's anything emotionally I doift really say anything, unless, you know, I have to ... You 
know I try to keep it 
you know, a front, and just dont tell, you know, anybody. ' 
e) 'I've always done this, and thafs the way I do, I doift realize that I'm doing it but sometimes I choose that rd, you 
know, that I want to keep it to myself. I doret want people to know', f) 'Anything to do with myself I try, like I say, I try 
and bottle things up'. 
29 D 
30 a) Before I turned on the tape she said that writing down and talking about personal things was something she didn't Re 
doing - and that was probably another reason for not filling in the diary. 
b) Yes, yes. I sound very so-, rm not solitary, I have got friends. But I dorft go as far as they think I do with them, 
perhaps. 
c) (reluctance to disclose in interview) Mm, because I grew up with the feeling of disgust I mean intense disgust. And 
uh, that's something I try and put away from me, because it disgusts me about me too, although it had nothing to do with 
me. Urn, but uh, I have actually used the term I am disgusted by something that happened. But again it's to do with 
someone else's actions, which I found nauseating, really nauseating. Urn, but uh, I don't want to talk about that if You 
dorft mind! 
31 D 
33 a) P says she finds it hard to talk about CSA: 'I find it hard to talk about it I Yeah. I Because my mother didn't believe 
me for so long, I find it really hard to like talk to someone about it'. 
b) P also seems to inhibit disclosure of her experiences more generally: 'I don' t think r1l ever be able to tell people, you 
know. They'd have to be like, really, really close friends because I dodt knowjust.. I expect its the way rve been 
brought up, rve never been able to, if somethings happened I mean, you know, keep it to yourself That' s how I feel. rd 
feel dreadful if I had to tell anybody, you know, anybody and everybody. I mean its really difficult to, like, to say urn to 
work, rve got to go out. I mean they, they dont know what' s happenedý or what's gone wrong'. 
c) "Im not one for telling people how rm feeling. I expect them to read me Paughs slightly]. ' 
35 '1 would feel its not the right thing to do! 
36 a)'Has it happened? I really haveret spoken to many people. [Inaudible] professional people, even then I still feel, 
uncomfortable! 
b) 'I don' t know, you see, rve been very good over the years at building up brick walls. ' 
C) 'It was a whole gamut, gamut of things, and urn, because uh, the guilt grew even More, and has done progressively, 
urn. it's something I find I don't want to share, to people who, well I don't think it's any of their business [laughs 
slightly]. There we are. I don't really think it's urn, if we're talking about colleagues or, or, or close friends I don't think 
it is, uh, I don't think it's of any value. ' 
37 
38 a) 'No, well I tend to coop it away ... I tend not to involve them now, as much as possible, you know, so. That's basically the trouble, I bottle it up'. 
b) 'I just keep it to myself, you know 
c) 'Yeah, because I've always bottled it up. I've always sorted me own problems out, you know what I mean? ' d) 'as I say, I tend to bottle it up more than anything, instead of telling anyone'. 
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[D - indicates that the participant disclosed all emotions reported in the diary, and was not 
therefore interviewed about non-disclosure of emotional experiences] 
APPENDIX 8 
SUMMARY TABLE OF MATERIAL FROM INTERVIEWS ON 
ANTICIPATED SOCIAL RESPONSES RELATED TO NON-DISCLOSURE 
P CATEGORY 17VTER VIE W AM TERM LIS UALVA RY 
(expected 
response) 
2 (i) negative response (i) Mother accuses her of raking up the past, and they end up arguing. 
(ii) harm/bother to others (ii) a) Would make mother more ill, b) Would split the family which is in any case 'fragile'. 
(iii) lack of understanding (iii) a) Thought ex-boyfiriend would understand but he didn't b) People wouldn't understand 
because she puts on a pretence of being happy (so they wouldn't believe her). 
(iv) not believed (iv) Because it happened so long ago, and she's covered it up so well. 
4 (i) negative response (i) Believes other people would get 'fed up'. 
(ii) harm /bother to others (ii) Says his mother thinks that he is trying to upset her if he tam to her. 
(iii) lack of interest/ (iii) People ask about feelings for 'entertainment value', but after a while 'these things get 
attention less interesting if you keep going on about them, they get boring'. 
5 (i) negative response (i) a) He may be told he's 'stupid' which he says is 'one word I can't stand', b) Fears that if 
he disclosed his sexual feelings concerning another group member he would be kicked out 
of his therapy group. 
(ii) lack of understanding (ii) Says that he doesn't disclose because other people don't understand. 
(iii) confidentiality (iii) Concern that people wouldn't keep maintain confidentiality and that this would 'rock 
the boat' of his marriage. 
(iv) trust (iv) Says that he doesn't trust people in the group (and that there is no 'bond') and fears that 
he'd expose himself as being different - 'a one-off. 
7 (i) negative response (i) a) People would look at him differently if they knew about his CSA b) When he has a 
tantrum people think 'he's got a screw loose'. 
(ii) harm/bother to others (ii) Didn't want to talk about one emotion because he didn't want 'anybody else brought 
into it' - referring to a relative whom he had discovered had also been sexually abused - 
protecting her from further exposure. 
(iii) lack of understanding (iii) a) Went into tantrum because he felt his wife wouldn't understand about his CSA, b) 
Talked about how he couldn't explain his tantrunis because other people would not 
understand what had happened to him. 
8 (i) negative response (i) People would think she was 'stupid' and tell her what she was feeling was 'wrong'. 
(ii) harm/bother to others (ii) Her friends get upset if she tells them. 
(iii) lack of understanding (iii) Other people don't understand. 
(iv) unhelpful positive (iv) Doesn't want her friends' 'reassurance', sympathy or to cry on people's shoulders 
responses because she doesn't find this helpful. 
10 (i) negative response (i) a) People such as his wife tell him 'you shouldn't be like this, pull yourself together' and 
that 'just makes me feel a lot worse', b) His wife says to him 'I suppose this is another 
bloody depression'. Then he wants to be left alone until he can respond better. 
(ii) lack of understanding (ii) Agrees with interviewer that he felt that other people wouldn't understand. 
(iii) unhelpful positive (iii) Says he's had many people making 'silly statements' or giving 'good advice' or making 
responses comments such as 'life goes on'. P rejects these because he feels the people that make them 
haven't actually experienced what he's experienced. 
(iv) lack of interest/ (iv) a) Conversations with his wife revert back to her problems and he feels he doesn't get a 
attention response from her (it falls on 'deaf ears'), b) People he knows would think he was joking if 
he tried to talk to them. 
12 (i) negative responses (i) a) Agreed with diary question that she was afraid of how other people would see her if 
she disclosed, b) At end of the interview she said that her non-disclosure was associated 
with her feeling unsure of herself and unable to account for herself if the other person's 
reaction to her was negative. 
14 (i) negative responses (i) Believes other people would think she was 'barmy' or 'crackers'. (ii) harm/bother to others (ii) Doesn't want to 'burden' others people with her 'depression' or her 'problems'. (iii) lack of understanding (iii) Doesn't feel people will understand and thinks they will think she is abnormal if she I 
- 
tries to explain about her family. 
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14 (i) negative responses (i) Believes other people would think she was 'barmy' or 'crackers'. 
(ii) harm/bother to others (ii) Doesn't want to 'burden' others people with her 'depression, or her 'problems'. 
(iii) lack of understanding (iii) Doesn't feel people will understand and thinks they will think she is abnormal if she 
tries to explain about her family. 
(iv) unhelpful positive (iv) Feels people would give her 'a lot of advice that I probably wouldn't take'. 
responses 
(v) lack of interest/ (v) Thinks other people would think it was 'boring' if she spoke to them. 
attention 
1 
(vi) pointless (vi) Says 'I just don't see the point in discussing things with people'. 
1 
15 (i) harm/bother to others (i) Feels that if she talked to anyone she'd be 'putting upon people' and that they have better 
things to do than listen to her 'wallowing in self-pity'. 
(ii) pointless (ii) 'It's not that they could do anything anyway'. 
16 (i) negative responses (i) a) If others were to see her 'inner weakness' they might take advantage of her, b) People 
would think that if she'd been sexually abused she must have brought it on herself, c) 
People can't judge her if she doesn't tell them. 
(ii) not believed (ii) Fears that she might not be believed (re sexual abuse). 
(iii) confidentiality (iii) If others were to have this information about her (about CSA) she would be vulnerable 
because they might tell other people. 
17 (i) negative responses (i) Fears that others might think he was a 'freak'. 
(ii) harm/bother to others (ii) Says his wife is 'sick and tired' of hearing it 
(iii) pointless (iii) Feels disclosure would be 'like beating a dead horse'. 
18 (i) harni/bother to others (i) a) When she does talk about what's happening she gets upset and feels that other people 
then feel obligated, b) Doesn't want to encroach on other people's time. 
(ii) pointless (ii) Doesn't think others can help her, and thinks there is 'no point' telling people. 
19 (i) negative responses (i) Husband will judge her and say that she is a 'lousy parent' who has no control over the 
children. 
21 (i) negative responses (i) P says that she was 'very anxious' about how I would respond to the emotional 
experience she wrote about She became tearful when she told me how she feared I would 
sit in judgement' and categorise her. 
(ii) unhelpfid positive (ii) Is worried husband would tell her not to worry and everything was fine if she told hinL 
responses She would consider this to be him telling lies and not taking the situation seriously. 
22 (i) harm/ bother to others (i) a) Talking about her abusive partner would ruin her daughter's life, because her daughter 
sees him as a father figure who is there to protect her 'to tell her he's not the perfect dad 
what she perceives, it would, um, be ruining two lives really, instead of one', b) P expresses 
a fear of being judged when she says that she felt better after confiding in her doctor 
because 'I think somebody was there to listen and they wasn'tjudging. ' 
(ii) not believed (ii) Doesn't think that other people would believe what her partner has done to her. 
23 (i) haimilbother to others (i) If she told people close to her how she was feeling she'd feel guilty and that she'd let 
them down. 
(ii) unhelpful positive (ii) a) When she spoke to a psychotherapist in past she told her parents and they said 'don't 
response be so ridiculous, pull yourself togetherl You've got everything going for you', b) Finds it 
difficult if people say that she hasn't been that bad, because she thinks that they are lying. 
24 (i) harm/bother to others (i) Even if someone could understand P says she wouldn't want to tell them because she 
wouldn't want 'to be a burden on them'. 
(ii) lack understanding (ii) a) Felt assessor wouldn't understand her because she seemed so young and pretty, and 
probably hadn't experienced what P had gone through, b) Said that though people say they 
understand they don't really. 
(iii) unhelpful positive (iii) Doesn't tell people about things that make her sad because she doesn't want their 
responses (especially men's) sympathy which she regards as 'access to manipulate me'. 
(iv) not believed (iv) P says that people just would not believe that her marriage is not a happy one. 
(v) pointless (v) Says that she would not talk to people about emotion because 'nothing can change 
really'. 
25 
26 (i) negative responses (i) Told people in the past and found that they looked on her in an 'entirely different 
perspective' -a worse one. (ii) lack of interestt (ii) People 'might not just be bothered or want to sit there and listen'. 
attention 
(iii) trust (iii) Says that she can't trust anybody. 
27 (i) negative responses (i) Felt available recipient of disclosure might be judgmental. 
1 
Oi) trust (ii) Felt she couldn't trust available recipient enough to talk to her. 
8 (i) neg e responses (i) a) P says that she feels people 'don't care' and that they would see her differently and 
think she was 'stupid' and 'not very strong'. 
369 
30 (i) negative responses (i) Says that she'd worry about what the other person would think. 
(ii) hami/bother to others (ii) Fear of betraying her close family (generally her mother) and being disloyal if she spoke 
about feelings connected with her family. 
(iii) trust (iii) Nobody in her life who she feels she could trust to stand up for her 'no matter how they 
look'. 
33 (i) harm/bother to others 0) a) Can't talk to husband because 'he doesn't like the details' and 'he knows the person' 
(re CSA), b) Doesn't want to 'burden anybody with a problem'. 
(ii) unhelpful positive (ii) Says that in one way she would like to tell someone, because they would feel sorry for 
responses her, but at the same time she doesn't want people to feel sorry for her. 
(iii) lack of interest/ (iii) P says that a former counsellor had had great difficulty U*g to talk to her mother 
attention about the sexual abuse. She comments that 'some people listen, don't they, and some people 
don't'. 
(iv) not believed (iv) P talks about how her mother didn't believe her when she talked about the sexual abuse 
to her. 
35 (i) negative responses (i) Spoke about how she would never speak to anyone 'who's in a cosy little life... who 
wouldn't have the first clue of what you were on about, and think it completely odd, not to 
be looking on the bright side of life'. 
(ii) lack of interest/ (ii) Talking to work colleagues or most friends would be 'inappropriate' because P doesn't 
attention think they are very interested and it would make them feel uncomfortable. 
36 (i) negative responses (i) Talking about it would cause arguments with his wife and bring up things which 
'inevitably take their toll'. 
(ii) harm/bother to others (ii) a) Doesn't want to 'dump' on others (that makes him feel worse), b) With regard to 
therapy he feels that he shouldn't be 'taking up people's time' and that other people who are 
worse off should be 'at the top of the queue'. 
(iii) lack of understanding (iii) P wouldn't expect anybody to understand. 
(iv) unhelpful positive (iv) P says he doesn't 'want the sympathy touch, or that type of reaction'. 
responses 
(v) pointless (v) a) Decided there would be no point in 'dragging the issue up again' with his wife 
because it would cause an argument, b) P doesn't think talking with colleagues or close 
friends is 'of any value'. 
37 (i) other (i) P said that the reason she hadn't told anyone was simply because she hadn't yet seen her 
partner, but she would tell him when she saw him later in the day (if it had been really bad 
she would have phoned him). 
38 (i) negative responses (i) a) A 'normal' person would say 'he's round the bend' as soon as you turned your back 
after telling them, b) His wife might not agree with what he said, in which case he is 'likely 
to go up the wall again' and this will 'double' the problem. 
(ii) harm/bother to others (ii) His wife's work involves her taking care of people's problems and he doesn't want to 
make her have to listen to him when she comes home because then 'she's having it twenty 
four hours a day'. 
(iii) lack of understanding (iii) P says he can't make people understand that he now has problems which mean he can't 
sort out other people's problems as he used to do, 
(iv) unhelpful positive (iv) a) P says that he is 'back to the same thing' when he tells somebody and they say 'well 
responses no, you ought to do so and so here', b) P refers to unhelpful practical advice (about getting a 
mobility allowance) given to him by psychiatrist 
(v) lack of interest/ (v) P says his wife 'don't uh you know, choose to get involved with it now'. 
attention 
(vi) pointless (vi) Says he can't see any point in telling his wife because 'she ain't going to make it better 
... She's not able to help in any way ... to make it easier'. 
APPENDIX 9 
SUMMARY TABLE OF MATERIAL FROM INTERVIEWS ON 
ANTICIPATED SELF-RELATED RESPONSES ASSOCIATED WITH NON- 
DISCLOSURE 
P CATEGORY INTERVIEW NUTERIAL/SUMMARY 
2 (i) shame etc (i) a) Shame (because happened so long ago it shouldn't make a difference and fear that she 
won't be believed) b) Shame (related to being 'let down') c) Shaine (because others won't 
understand). 
(ii) out of character (ii) a) Emotion contradicts how she presents herself 'the family see me as a laugh, and a 
sense of humour and all that stuff, and, um, I don't know how they'd see me if I said 
anything', b) Given how she normally presents herself her story would not be given 
credence 'Because I put on this pretence of being happy and all that stuff. Urn, I don't think 
they'd understand. They probably say, um, 'you seem all right to me' and all that stuff. ' 
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(iii) inability to justify own (iii) a) Agrees with interviewer that she feels it wouldn't be appropriate to talk about her 
feelings abuse with people outside counselling, b) Seems to feel there is no script for talking about 
it 
It's just the actual thought of saying. How do you start a conversation? * 
4 (i) shame etc (i) a) 'I'd feel stupid', b) P says he would feel stupid and ashamed because the feelings are 
girly', c) P says he would feel ashamed because he couldn't control his feelings. 
(ii) rejection of own (ii) a) P relates rejection of his emotional experiences to gender toles: 'It's this thing about 
feelings men not talking about their emotions. Uh. It's a girly thing to do'. b) shame related to 
inability to control feelings, c) P says that 'I shouldn't feel this about it' - his emotional 
experience is notjustifiable. 
5 (i) shame etc (i) P agrees that he'd feel 'stupid, silly and ashamed of himself if he disclosed undisclosed 
emotions (relates this to lack of trust lack of bond, and a sense that he might be different 
(ii) inability to justify own 
from others). 
(ii) P says he didn't disclose emotion 'Because I might have to explain why. Well I don't 
feelings really like to get into a situation where I have to explain everything that I think and do. ' 
7 (i) shame etc (i) a) P says 'talking to anybody really would make you fee as amed of it. ' (referring to 
CSA), b) P feels shame about his 'tantrum': 'once it's over, then I feel silly, I feel ashamed. 
Because I think to myself, why did I do that? What was the point of it? What was the whole 
point of doing that? All I've done is made myself look stupid'. 
(ii) out of character (ii) P says 'its something, what it is it's not something you want to tell everybody is it? It's, 
it's um. When people look at you they don't expect that you know, something's happened 
to you% 
(iii) inability to justify own (iii) a) 'I just didn't know what to say. Um. In a way it's like saying, I didn't know what 
feelings how to explain to the wife, the way I reacted', b) Inability to explain because it would affect 
third party: 'I couldn't tell anyone how I was feeling because I'd have to try and explain 
why I was feeling that way, and it would mean involving the other person ... It would've 
have to involve a lot of unnecessary explaining to do. ' c) P talks about how the anger builds 
up inside and 'you can't release it, because by releasing it, um, you've got to try to explain 
to people why you're feeling this way, why you're reacting this way. Without telling them 
what happened', d) 'I can't I just can't tell anybody really how I feel. I can't, just can't 
explain it. She, she wants to know why I go into these rages, and I can't "plain it'. 
(iv) own responsibility (iv) a) 'it was nothing to do with anybody else, it was my business', b) 'it was something I 
had to sort out myself, c) shame is related to 'not telling somebody (about the abuse) 
sooner. The fact that when it first happened I should have told someone. And thatý it went on 
for years, and I never told anybody. And it could have been stopped' and says 'If I'd told 
my parents when it first happened, then I wouldn't be living like this. Cos it'd have been 
sorted out'. 
8 (i) shame etc (i) a) Would feel 'stupid' because if she told friends they would say 'Oh don't be silly, you 
know, that's wrong, it's not true' b) Would feel all three (stupidý silly, asharned) if disclosed 
because would be reduced to 'relying on other people to help me' and would not be 'in 
control of the situation'. 
(ii) out of character (ii) P talks about how disclosure would betray the identity she maintains with others: 'And 
I've always been really strong and in control. And to tr- to to then be reduced to relying on 
other people to help me, and, um. Other people usually tell me their problems, and to tell 
them, it's too difficult for me... I've kept it together up to now, but I think it's just so 
difficult um, to put myself in a position where I'm not in control of the situation'. 
10 (i) shame etc (i) a) P would feel embarrassment and shame if disclosed because he can't deal with 
situation and feels he's a failure, b) Would feel shame because he would feel he is not in 
control and he'd feel inadequate and not in charge of his own thoughts, c) P would feel 
'stupid, silly or ashamed of himself because if he disclosed he'd feel 'at a disadvantage'. 
(ii) out of character (ii) a) [related to being afraid of how others might see him if disclosed] Th, the reason that 
being is I've always been a very, very strong character. And my, I've had a lot of family 
problems, and I've always been the one who's been, who when I've been you know.... I 
was always the one who was sort of called upon to sort any problems out'. b) Shame related 
to fact that P has 'coped with so many devastating things that's happened to me. Uh , and I've got through that Uniý I feel as if I'm a failure really'. c) P talks about only being able to 
disclose to people who didn't know what he has been like before -a 'strong, type of person 
that nothing sort of got to me, and all the crap that sort of fell on my head.... I just used to 
carry on with a smile'. 
(iii) inability to justify own (iii) a) P talks about how he can't explain things to his wife because conversations always 
feelings end up focusing on her problems, b) P talks about how he doesn't want to have to explain 
himself 'Ijust wanted to be left alone andjust carry on on my own, without having to 
explain myself c) P says he could only talk about his feelings in an environment where he 
doesn't know people and therefore 'where I don't I haven't got to justify myself to people'. 
(iv) own responsibility (iv) P feels that 'you're there on your own. You know your own problems. You've got to 
sort them out yourself. It's easier said than done. It took a lot for me to come here'. 
(v) rejection of own (v) a) P says he feels shame about not being able to control his own thoughts and feelings, feelings b) He says that if he cried he would feel vulnerable and at a disadvantage because he would 
have shown his 'weakness'. 
L12 10) shame etc (i) P says ihat if she were to talk to family or friends she would feel shame (relate 
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(ii) out of character 
not being able to explain her emotions). 
(ii) P relates not disclosing experience to fact that it contradicts how people see her: 'it's not 
something that I actually have spoke about really. Just mind. I think because I'm seen to 
have this really good relationship with my children and probably too, because I am, 
constantly trying to work it out, and work it out with her, you know, and LI think it's a 
sense of failure really, about it But I don't compound it by having people know. ' 
(iii) inability to justify own (iii) a) P talks about how difficult she finds it to speak to family and friends about her 
feelings feelings 'Ijust find it hard to clarify it really, you know, tojust explain oriust, yeah, to talk' 
(she says that talking to professionals is more helpfid because they help her explain why she 
has the emotions), b) When P talks about what could be different she says that if she were 
stronger she would be able to 'explain' things to people even when their reactions were 
negative. 
14 (i) shame etc (i) a) P says she would feel stupid and ashamed if she disclosed (because she feels people 
wouldn't understand her relationship with her parents and would think there was something 
abnormal about her if she tried to explain how she felt about her family), b) P says shame 
prevented her disclosing again (because she felt she 'put a damper on what should have 
been a perfectly nice enjoyable evening' and she couldn't justify why she felt so irritated by 
people). 
(ii) inability to justify own (ii) a) 'I can't explain it but I feel bad because I feel like that There's no reason why I 
feelings should', b) 'I felt terrible all day Sunday, because I couldn't justify the way I felt', 0 'Well I 
feel ashamed and put the damper on what should have been a perfectly nice enjoyable 
evening. Um, I didn't want to do that Couldn't justify why everybody was irritating me so 
much. Couldn't understand myself why I felt like that Um, I don't know why I have these 
feelings, but it's quite common', d) P thinks that people will think she is 'abnormal' if she 
tries to explain how she feels about her family. 
15 (i) shame etc (i) a) P said that she didn't tell anybody because of the guilt, b) P also said that she thought 
that she would feel 'stupid' if she told anybody and that she was feeling 'silly' about the 
way she was feeling, c) P also said she felt her feelings were silly and that she felt ashamed 
after she disclosed another emotional experience to a friend. 
(ii) inability to justify own (ii) 'Its not something I can express so easily to people that are close to me. Um, because it 
feelings seems so silly. P agrees with interviewer's suggestion that 'it seems sort of irrational, or 
something? ' 
(iii) rejection of own (iii) 'I was feeling silly about what I was feeling'. 
feelings 
16 (i) shame etc (i) a) P agrees that if she told somebody she would feel ashamed (related to thinking she 
would not be believed or that people would think that she had brought the CSA on herself), 
b) P agrees for next emotion that if she told somebody she would feet ashamed (because of 
what happened and that it happened to her), c) P says same for third non-disclosed emotion 
(she is ashamed of people judging her). 
(ii) inability to justify own (ii) P was scared that therapist would recognise that she felt guilty and she would have to 
feelings explain why she felt this way about the CSA: 'if she had said to me why didn't you do 
anything then I would have felt that I had to give her reasons as to why. I couldn't have just 
left that I would have had to have given my side then. You know to reason why I did or 
didn't do something. I would have had to have given a reasoned explanation for that 
Because again about thinking bad of me. ' 
(iii) reluctance to (iii) 'if I don't tell anybody people can't remind me about it. And then eventually, when the 
experience unpleasant memory gets distant, you can blank it forget it happened, you know pretend that it didn't 
emotionstmemories happen, or it didn't happen to me'. 
17 (i) shame etc (i) a) P said that the thought of telling his manager made him feel shame ('because no matter 
what I say he's going to say "no, you're wrong! "), b) P said that the thought of telling 
anybody apart from his wife made him feel shame ('because I'm not supposed to have these 
feelings. I'm supposed to be self-disciplined'), c) P says shame related to 'things that I 
didn't thh* about or should have thought about', d) P agrees that the thought of telling 
somebody made him feel shame 'because, uh, these are things that I should have a handle on 
where I don't'. 
(ii) inability to justify own (ii) a) P described a feeling of shame caused by his feeling that he is unable to explain things 
feelings 'I can't express myself the way other people can. I can't seem to communicate at times, I 
feel... there's times when I feel that I can't get my point across, no matter what I do'. P goes 
on to say 'I was disgusted with myself that I can't explain things properly'. 
(iii) problems are own (iii) a) P blames himself for his problems: 'That's why I said I was stupid, because if I just 
responsibility thought a little better, you know, if I get my mind to think a little better I wouldn't have, I 
feet I wouldn't have the problem in the first place'. b) P believes he 'should' 'have a handle' 
on things (see shame etc above), c) P believes that solving his problems is solely down to 
him - non-disclosure related to 'I had to make a stand where, you know, I'm trying to 
redirect my life around, and it's something I'd better handle on my own'. 
(iv) rejection of own (iv) a) (Related to shame - see above) 'I'm not supposed to have these feelings, I'm feelings supposed to be self-disciplinedý you know'. b) (Related to shame) 'I just don't think about 
things the way I should'. 
Is (i) sh etc (i) a) P says that if she told somebody she would feel ashamed and stupid (because of 
'letting them know, of things I've been througlL You know, I'm not the same person that I 
usually portray'), b) P says that if she told somebody she would feel ashamed ('because it 
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would appear that I'm not taking on as much responsibility as I ought to'), c) P relates non- 
disclosure to her guilt over 'encroaching on their time so much' 
(ii) out of character (ii) See (i) a) above - disclosure would cause her shame because she is not the same person 
(iii) problems are own 
that she 'normally portrays'. 
(iii) a) P says that she can't see how other people can help because 'I feel it's all mental 
responsibility pressure, and I've just got to learn to be stronger. And s-, still stems from me', b) P feels 
that solving her problems is down to her 'I just feel as though it's down to me. I've got to 
try and work it out somehow', c) Again P relates non-disclosure to her sense that only she 
can do anything about her difficulties 'I'm the one that feels the emotions, and I'm the one 
that wants to do something. I don't really discuss anything to, with other people. Not much'. 
19 (i) shame etc (i) a) P says she would not feel ashamed if she were to tell her husband, but she thinks she 
would feel 'silly' ('and that to the extent that it would have took me back to being a small 
person again'), b) P talks about how in the past when she has talked to husband about her 
emotions with her children she has felt 'stupid' because he says that she has no control over 
her children and that she is a lousy parent, c) P says that she would not disclose situation 
because she doesn't want to 'be made to feel silly' because people say she has no control 
over her children, however she says she wouldn't feel ashamed. 
00 reluctance to (ii) P says that she would not disclose because it would intensify the feelings and make her 
experience unpleasant aware of painful memories: 'I think if I told people how I was feeling, then it would have 
emotions/memories made the feelings that I'd had more tense. Cos at the same time it would, I know for a fact it 
would have took me deeper back into my past than what I wanted to go back, To the fact 
that with [husband] I talk about some things. But then once I've actually opened it up I find 
myself talking more and more about it and going that far back that, you know, I go back to 
old memories, and I didn't want that'. 
21 (i) shame etc (i) P says she would feel shame if she disclosedL She said it was an extremely shameful 
thing because 'women of my age are um, normally perfectly capable of having, urn, a sexual 
relationship with their husband, they are expected to have a sexual relationship, there's no 
reason why they shouldn't. For whatever reason LI don't or I can't uni, and that is an 
extremely shameful thing. Urn, I should be able to, Urn, its, he's an extremely caring man, 
so there's no reason why I shouldn't be able to'. 
(ii) inability to justify own (ii) Related to shame (above) many 'shoulds', says that there is 'no reason' why she should 
feelings be as she is (repeated twice in quote above). 
(iii) reluctance to (iii) P hoped that if she didn't tell her husband her feeling 'would go away and it wouldn't 
experience unpleasant be happening'. P seemed to see this as an attempt to prevent her shame becoming an 
emotions/memories interpersonal reality: 'I think that if I actually tried to explain how I was feeling and why it 
would make it sort of uni, not real, because the whole thing was teal to me anyway, but sort 
of, um, it would cement it ... to actually tell him that would compound 
I think all the other 
um, or would compound the knowledge that he had'. 
22 
23 (i) shame etc (i) a) P says that if she were to say how she is feeling to people close to her she would feel 
guilty and that she'd let them down, b) For second emotion P said she would feel ashamed if 
she told somebody (because of 'how like I've been and how I've treated people'. 
(ii) out of character (ii) P says that she would find disclosure difficult because it would shatter people's image of 
her: 'I suppose thatý sort of people who know me um, that they see me as sort of fairly 
successful, confident person, and that's not really where it's at. So it would be kind of like 
shattering that image'. 
(iii) reluctance to (iii) P didn't disclose 'in case anyone reinforced the feeling that I had'. 
experience unpleasant 
emotions/ memories 
- 24 W shame etc feel she had (i) a) P said that she would feel stupid if she told somebody (because she would 
been 'caught out'). She wouldn't feet ashamed, b) P said that she would have felt ashamed if 
she had told anyone (because they would then be able to tell that 'I was lying. I wasn't as 
happy as I portrayed'), c) P said that she would feel silly and stupid if she told anyone 
(because 'Certain things happened I somehow feel I could have stopped'). 
(ii) out of character (ii) a) P doesn't want to disillusion people about the happy marriage she has appears to 
have: 'Because they could just see an outwardly thing. They could see us, we're all at a 
wedding together, all the children, my husband, and we all looked so happy together as a 
family, you know. They're saying "there's not many marriages that last [x] years". And, if 
I'd said to them we'd got problems, I just didn't want to disillusion them', b) Same situation 
(related to shame - above). If she disclosed: 'They could tell that I was lying. I wasn't as 
happy as I portrayed' c) P becomes angry with herself for 'giving in to my feelings' which 
she says 'I shouldn't do. Because I portray an image of being a very strong person. I'm not 
an emotional person at all', d) P only wants husband to 'see a very hard exterior' and 
doesn't want him to 'see me as err, softening up', e) P says her friends 'see me as a very 
orderly person, in control of their family. Very strong willed' and she would never open up 
to any of them because she would then feel 'soft and easy to break down'. (iii) problems are own (iii) See (i) c) P feels responsible for 'certain things' that happened in her childhood and she 
responsibility feels she 'could have stopped' them. 
(iv) rejection of own (iv) P says she is angry with herself for giving in to feelings (see (ii) c) which she says 'I feelings shouldn't do'. 
25 0) other (i) P said that the emotional experiences she recorded in the diary were 'not import 
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enough' for her to tell anyone about: a) 'It just didn't seem important enough. That's all. - 
Maybe because I sort of feel like that all the time anyway... It wasn't something that was 
sort of life or death or really sort of extreme', b) 'it wasn't kind of mega, it9s not kind of in 
that league of, you know, sort of self-destruction or anything, you know, it's not big 
enough', c) 'I mean I did feel really guilty. But the sort of things I tell people about is if you 
know, I've Cut my wrists recently, or, you know, I want to kill myself, or... Vaughs). Not 
sort of feeling guilty about going to a friend's house'. 
26 
_ 27 (i) shame etc 0) a) P said she thought she'd feet ashamed if she told anyone about how she'd shouted at 
her son: 'I think because uh, I don't know, I just I'm ashamed of myself, and you know, it's 
like, if I told anyone as well, they'd be ashamed of me, and think "Oh no. she shouldn't be 
doing things like that I don't want to be associated with her", you know, I suppose that 
that's what it is, I've always had that as well, you know, being ashamed of myself when I do 
something wrong, I shouldn't do that, you know, and that's probably why'. b) P says that 
she often feels very guilty, but denies that she does. Relates it to feeling guilty when she was 
(ii) problems are own 
younger and She was being sexually abused. 
00 '1 think it's the whole thing with my son, is something I feel I should deal with myself . 
I responsibility 
28 (i) shame etc (i) a) P said she did not disclose because of the shame (which was about how her husband 
treated her with no respect). Said she would also feel silly, b) P said that she thought if she 
were to disclose emotion she would feet stupid, because other people would probably think 
her fears were stupid, c) P said that if she were to ten somebody about emotion she would 
feel ashamed 'Thinking uh obviously there's something wrong with me, why it's happened. 
Um. and the, you know, they'd probably think "Olf'. you know, I've let the family down 
and things like that', d) P said she'd feel ashamed if she told anyone (because 'my husband 
has chose somebody else instead of me. Obviously I've got no value. That's what I felt, he 
prefers somebody else to me. Urn, that he's actually left me for somebody else'. 
(ii) out of character (ii) P says that she fears if she discloses that people will 'think different thoughts of me, 
think, see me as somebody else, and uh, that I'm not very strong, all those feelings'. 
(iii) problems are own (iii) P appears to feel that she is to blame for her marital break-up - see (i) c) above - 
responsibility 'obviously there's something wrong with me, why it's happened'. 
30 (i) shame etc (i) P says she would feel ashamed if she told somebody (because she would have spoken 
negatively of someone else she feels she should be loyal too), 
33 (i) shame etc (i) a) P says she would feel ashamed if she told somebody (because of what happened 
[CSA] and the fact that she didn't put a stop to it), b) P says she would feel ashamed if she 
told somebody if they weren't a counsellor, c) P says that if it weren't for the guilt she feels 
about the abuse she could explained things to somebody 'If I wasn't feeling guilty because 
of that I would have explained and told someone. ' 
(ii) problems are own (ii) a) Example from (i) a) about feeling ashamed because she didn't put a stop to the abuse, 
responsibility b) P says that because her mother didn't believe her she felt guilty 'As if it was my fault'. 
(iii) reluctance to (iii) a) P says that because her mother didn't believe her about the abuse 'I've been going 
experience unpleasant through life, like, thinking about putting it at the back of my mind, because mum didn't 
emotions/memories believe in it Did it really happen? ' b) 'I turned myself of from it, and I'm not talking about 
it... I try to cut if out completely'. 
35 (i) shame etc (i) P said that she is 'not in tune with shame enough' but that she would feel 
uncomfortable' if she told anyone about her feelings and the dream that they were 
associated with. Feeling 'uncomfortable' would be associated with thinking 'Oh, shouldn't 
have done thatl'. 
(ii) reluctance to (ii) P says that when she woke up from the drearn 'I need to shake, I need to shake my head 
experience unpleasant and I need to walk round... I need to get rid of this' and 'OIL That was a dream, it wasn't 
emotions/memories real, that was a dream, and, you know, get rid of it'. Once she has woken up she says 'I'd try 
to control it, I'd go back to trying to control myself'. She also talk about how 'I would try 
and go through the normal routine of having a walk, of looking out the window, tying to 
distract myself. 
36 (i) shame etc (i) P says he would feel ashamed if he told anyone (because 'I wouldn't expect anybody to 
understand' and 'I don't think others would sort of take in as being part of the character they 
see me as'). 
00 out of character (ii) Related to shame (above). P goes on to say that 'People have an impression of me, yeah, 
which, I hide behind a fagade ... Yeah, outwardly at work I'm sort of a outgoing. 
jolly, 
happy, sort of guy, you know. Inside myself I'm churning away like a, like I do'. 
37 
38 (i) shame etc Wa) P would feel ashamed and 'degraded' if he told anyone (because previously people in 
his neighbourhood had put him 'on a kind of pedestal' and he is unable to help people like 
he used to and like people expect him to), b) P would feel ashamed if he told 
someone(because 'I've been around long enough now, to be supposed to be able to sort my 
own problems'), c) P would feel ashamed if he told someone (because the way he treated his 
dog is 'totally, totally out of character'). 00 out of character (ii) a) (Related to shame see (i) a)) P's says that he would feel ashamed if he told anyone 
his former status as somebody that people 'looked at to sort anything out', b) 
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(Related to shame (i) c) above) P says he would feel ashamed if he told someone because 
his action is 'totally, totally out of character', c) P says that his enforced inactivity due to an 
industrial injury that prevents him working is 'not him': 'to sit in a room and just like watch 
four walls, and television all day, that ain't me, you know, it's never been me'. 
(iii) problems own (iii) 'I think in my own mind, as I say, nobody's going to sort this out You know, I know, at 
responsibility the end of the day, what's going to sort it out is me going to work. ' 
APPENDIX 10 
MATERIAL FROM INTERVIEWS RELATING TO THE NEGATIVE 
EFFECTS OF NON-DISCLOSURE 
CATEGORY AMTERLIL FROM17VTERVIEW 
(i) isolation (i) 'I went for a promotion at work, and I was turned down for management work because 
staff had commented to the manager that my mood swings. And they said that sometimes 
on shift I don' t hardly talk to urn other members of staff. But rm not purposely doing it, 
its like they said to me that I been [inaudible] sometimes, like just withdrawn into 
myself. ' 
(ii) hostility/irritation 00 a) 'Um, yeah, because over the last month or so rve been really depressed and that. 
rm on anti depressants at the moment. And um, because of not talking about it, all my 
anger and all my hurt is inside, and, how it comes out is me being snappy towards my 
family and argumentative. Not meaning to, but just its come out the wrong way, because 
not being able to talk about it and my mum and dad have said Oh whaf s wrong with you 
and I can't talk to you these days, just that, rve just don't know how to start the 
conversation off, and say, by the way mum and clad rve been going to this clinic and that, 
itjust hasn! t happened, and so its come out the wrong way. I've just been feeling 
miserable.... [Right, OX So you held this in? ] Yeah, its still all in side, [And then you 
feel angry because you feel you caift talk about it? ] Yeah, yeah. ' b) 'Um. Like I said uh I 
was feeling really irritable.... I went for a promotion at work, and I was turned down for 
management work because staff had commented to the manager that my mood swings ... And so I was turned down for promotion because urn rve just been really irritable at 
work. I say, not meaning to. but its just come out the wrong way. Cos I can't tell all the 
staff members Oh by the way, I've been abused. I mean I could say to a friend it happened 
to her, I could tell a hundred people that rve been abused, but unless one of those hundred 
have been gone through the same as me, they don't know how rm feeling. ... 
[Yeah. So 
you felt misunderstood? ] Yeah. [Do you think thafs what makes you angry? ] Yeah. Also 
I cant tell everybody. Ijust can't. My munijust said rve got to keep my problems at home 
and not bring them to work. But because Ive been going to counseling it just been on my 
mind twenty four hours a day. ' 
(iii) negative effect on (iii) a) 'And uh hatred towards um, the abuser, and uh, towards my ex-boyfriend because I 
relationship just feel let down by him, because he wasret understanding, enough towards me. And I 
have been really miserable over the last few months, and um, he just put it down to me 
being miserable as a person. But rve not been able to tell him about me being abused or 
how I felt and so, I just feel let down because I thought he'd be more understanding. ' b) 
'No. I just kept it to myself. And thafs whafs hardest really keeping it to myself. Because 
people just think, the family and that, just think that rm moody. Oh A. 's in one of her 
moods again. And just don't understand what rm going through. ' c) 'Um. Yeah, Urn. I 
just come across as like really miserable, and just withdrawn really, just really withdrawn, 
and agitated. And, that's how I come across to people. And yes, it has affected my 
relationships, which rm close with a lady at work, cos rve told her about what happened 
to me, and uni, she said that urn rve come across as urn really miserable at work and rve 
taking it out on other members of staff. And I didn't realize how my behavior was being 
shown at work. I didn't realize that I was that miserable and that withdrawn. Didn't realize 
how it was being effected. But I know now because rve been turned down for promotion, 
I didnt know that I was coming across so badly, I didn't know, I didn't realize I was had 
that much effect, I just blamed it on all, so I don't know, I suppose I just blamed it on my 
colour, and thought they didn' t promote me because rm black and all. It wasn't that 
because I realize rve been miserable because my mum and dad have said that as well. I 
suppose rve been denying. [Yeah] it to myself. My feeling, rve been denying it, and 
trying to carry on as normal. but it hasn't turned out that way. ' 
(i) isolation (i) 'I excluded him. For the next few days [You sort of just didn't acknowledge him? ) 
(ii) hostility/irritation 
Well, I talked to him, but on a superficial level. Not uh, encouraging conversation. ' 
(ii) 'Um.. I probably took it out on my mother, She's the person I have most contact with. 
And, AI saw other people in a different light UIL Uh, as enemies. Wanting to do the 
same thing! 
I (i) 'No. no effect I (i) 'No. os what they don't know can't hurt ver' 
I, IM IOU14LIUll I (i) 'Ana wny, tcough I its it does have a bearing on the relationshin. because vou! re too I 
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embarrassed to tell em. Youre too ashamed to tell em why it happened all them years 
ago. It stops from, it stops you from forming very close relationship with someone 
because you, it's something you go to sleep at night and think about Its something that 
can, its a smell, that can put you into a mood. ' 
(ii) negative effect on (ii) a) 'Um. Yeah. It did. Urn. Cos its not knowing these things. Um. They couldtet 
relationship explain a lot of things that happened to relationships. And why, [roughs] its it does have a 
bearing on the relationship, because you're too embarrassed to tell em. Youre too 
ashamed to tell em. why it happened all them years ago. It stops from, it stops you from 
forming very close relationship with someone because you, it's something you go to sleep 
at night and think about. Its something that can, its a smell, that can put you into a mood. 
Urn. Seeing a person who looks anything like that person. Can put you into a mood and 
start you thinking about everything. And when you're asked whaf s wrong you caret tell 
the person whafs wrong. You caret explain why all of a sudden your moods changed. So 
yeah, it would put a strain on relationships because going out to socialize, glimpse of 
someone, a smell of something, could trigger off memories, like, smell of chemicals. Cos 
where I was abused was in like aa workshop, all the time. And the smell of the 
chemicals. And now every time I smell them chemicals it brings back the memories of 
what happened. So urn, yeah. Anything. You caift put a [? ] on it. ' b) 'And [clears throat] 
this is what affects our relation, that I will not talk to her about this. And she can't 
understand why when I do these kind of things I will not talk, I will not tell her how I feel. 
Urn. Cos I caret I just caret tell anybody really how I feel. I care t, just caret explain it.... 
Woret explain why rve done it won't explain how I was feeling, whafs brought it on, and 
just dismiss it then, just hoping it will go away, that nobody will pick up on it My wife 
wants to know why Im doing it, and because I caret explain, and will not explain to her 
she doesif t find it any use to carry on. ' 
8 (i) isolation (i) 'Urn, possibly, yeah, because I tend to isolate myself and people say that urn, I 
withdraw. And I do... perhaps I um was a bit more solitary than normal'. 
(ii) no effect (ii) 'Urn. Not really. There's no one. No-one really knows what happened so. Knows that 
I didn't tell anyone. Again perhaps I isolated myself a bit more, particularly in the last 
week I've probably been more introspective but, I've been very up and down over the 
past few months anyway, so I don't think seriously that people would have been that 
aware that there was any difference. ' 
10 (i) isolation (i) a)'I I feel as if I don't want to get close to anybody. And, you know, that causes major 
problems.... I felt as if uh I was on my own, and my attitude was well its your problem 
yoifve got to sort it And I tried to pretend it to sort of, its a big charade you see, you 
know, you feel, wha% tears of a clown, you know, you're laughing but you don't want to 
laugh. You' re putting a front on for people, because, you know, I used to have such a 
fantastic sense of humour, L you know, nothing sort of got to me. And my personality 
changed. You know, where I'd got lots and lots of friends, and I tend not to sort of get 
involved now. You know, rm a bit of a loner. ' b) 'Yeah. When you're moody and you 
want to be sort of, how is it put, Oh, you cut yourself off. You know you cut me out, you 
cut yourself off. Yeah, I probably do that, I do do that But that is the only way I can cope 
with it At the moment Uh, by sort of just sitting there with my own thoughts and not sort 
of thinking about other people. You know trying to trying to sort it for myself' c) 'If s the 
kinds, when I've, my mood changes, and A and I get'Oh you there again? I suppose this 
is another bloody depressioif. And Ijust think, 'go away, leave me alone. I just want to be 
left on my own, until I feel better, and I can respond better. You know, I don' t like it, I 
don't like, I mean I caret figure out why I do get like this, you know. Uh. And why I got to 
the stage where I dont want to get close to anybody. You know, even my own wife. ' 
(ii) no effect (ii) 'Not really. Yeah, yeah. I'd like to talk to my wife about it. I'd like to sit down and 
talk to her, but we end up rowing and it ends up reverting from me to her, and I think I'm 
just wasting my time. So tha% that's why I don't do it'. (iii) negative effect on (iii) a) 'But it's uh, when you come to, it's come to a head now. You know, sexually, we 
relationship haven't got a sex life. LI feet as if I don't want to get close to anybody. And, you know, 
that causes major problems'. b) 'It's the kinds, when I've, my mood changes, and uh, I 
get 'Oh you there again? I suppose this is another bloody depression'. AndIjustthink 
"Go awayl Leave me alonel" You know, I don't like it, I don't like, I mean I can't figure 
out why I do get like this, you know, I 
12 (i) no effect (i) 10y- Do you think that not talking to anyone about the way you felt had any effect on 
your relationships with other in this case? ] Urn. I find it hard, um, to talk about 
sometimes I think, Oh its best that I just ignore it and I find that way I bottle things up. 
And I try to block it out myself, but the time Im just getting all worked up. but 
sometimes I think, well its not worth telling anybody. [Yeah, OV- So not talking about it, 
did that have an effect on, on how you related to other people, do you think as well? ] Urn, 
I don't know really. No. ' (ii) negative effect on (ii) 'I doret know, I can't say for sure. Probably just with the daughter in question. I mean 
relationships thafs that's the one I worry about I Do you think it had an effect on your relationship with 
her, the fact that you didn't talk about it? ] What that it continued, and it goes on and I feel, 
that its time something happened, and its not [inaudible] it actually restricts our 
- 
relationship, which I know it does. ' 
14 isolation Pi) (i) a) 'I talk, I very seldom talk about how I feet. Yes, it does, it cuts me off from people. 
I'm very superficial with People, rm very hard to get to know, and Ive, I d2fLs1a Ive 
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done that deliberately but certainly I know, I'm aware of it, that rm very hard to get to 
know. I think people find me unapproachable. ' b)'Mm. The way it makes me feel very 
withdrawn. Whenever Im unhappy I doift talk to other people about it. I find it very 
hard. 
I just think it's pointless. ' c) 'Yes, it does, its, again it isolates me, it sets me apart, and 
I 
feel miserable, I feet that the next time we're all supposed to be doing things together I'll 
probably make an excuse to get out of it But on the other hand I dont want to be on my 
own, and, you know, but I do, as I say, isolate myself. And then I panic because then 
everybody's gone away, so. That' sa difficult thing whatever. ' 
15 (i) no effect (i) a) 'Urn, no obviouslyjust, nobody knows. ' b) 'I don't talk about it ... So nobody 
knows. It doesn't effect the relationship, cos, nobody knows. By the time I see people 
that's, it's gone ... That feeling has gone. [OK. So nobody actually sees you when 
you're 
feeling that way? ] No. Or if they do I hide it. ' 
(ii) negative effect on self (ii) 'Urn, cos you can't express it really, so you just keep it inside. ... 
[And when you 
(iii) other 
suppress it what do you think happens then? ] It just eats you up inside. ' 
(iii) 'Trust mainly. Its knowing if I can trust them. Um. If they'll understand and if theyll 
really care. [Yeah. So not talking make, makes you feel less trust? ] Yeah. [very soft]. ' 
16 (i) no effect (i) a) 'Well, because it was something, I wasret, my feelings werenýfvelated to something 
that happened at the time I was recounting those feelings, you know if somebody went out 
there and hit me. [Mm. ) It wasn't like that [Mml So. At that time I wasret seeking Support 
or, anything, so, I don! t think it would have affected anything. It weren' t something that 
had happened at that time, do you know what I meanT b) 'A really difficult question Us 
it? ] Yeah. [Can you say why its difficult? ) Because you're asking me to say did somebody 
have a reaction because you didift do something. I Min. Well I suppose the other side of it 
would be if urn, not talking about it had had an effect on you as it were, and that had had 
an effect on how you were with other people. ] People... People that know me know, you 
know, how close to come and when to stay away. [Mmhm] And urn, they know that Im 
going to get a piece of anything that I don! t want them to, to be part of [Mm]. You know, 
you wouldn' t do it to strangers, and people that know you, know me, start to learn how 
you operate. Urn. So, I just. I dont think they'd know. [Mm], Some people might know if 
I was maybe upset about something but, not many would notice, So then, no, I don! t think 
it would have an effect on them. ' 
17 (i) other (i) 'I don't know. I don't know [laughs]. I don't have any answer to that Sorry 
18 (i) isolation ae. os ecomere yumsu en, o re yw 
I can become quite uh, abrupt. I just want to be left' b) 'Yeah, it does, because I'm just 
so, LI just want to be left alone to either to [inaudible] my guilt and shame. [Sorry? ] To 
like mulling (? ] my guilt and shame. I just don't want anybody to become part of it 
because they carft help me. You know, so L its as if I close up, I don't want any sort of 
interference, and you know, people do approach me, I can be quite, as I say abrupt. ' 
(ii) hostility/irritation (ii) a) Yeah. Cos LI become really, urn, sullen ... LI can become quite uh, abrupt. 
' b) 
'You know it's as if I close up, I don't want any sort of interference, and you know, 
people do approach me, I can be quite, as I say abrupt' 
(iii) negative effect on (iii) 'Yes. My partner is, urn, in the, the, pulling the short straw all the time, you know, 
relationship he's been the brunt of it all, and on this occasion as well, yeah. I was quite, snappy with 
him, because of it. ' 
19 (i) hostility/irritation (i)a) '[Yeah. What do you think it was that he picked up? Your anger, or your ... 
II don't 
know, I think it was an anger [inaudible] anything, because I think he, he was aware that 
what I wanted was an argument or something. [Mm], And I think he was aware that I was 
out to deliberately go at him. .... So I think it was the case 
it was the anger he picked up 
on. ' b) 'It made me feel I was angry. I was angry at the kids, like, like I said because they 
wasn't listening, and all this that and the other. And I think the anger came across that I 
was still angry at other people as well, and that to the extent that, [name of husband] 
couldn't do no right everything he was doing was wrong. [Yeah]. You know, to, it doesn't 
matter what he'd done everything was wrong full stop. So I think, yeah, because of the 
anger, he was on the receiving end of it as well. [Laughs]. ' 
(ii) negative effect on (ii) 'I think, I think it had on D. more than anybody, to the extent that [name of husband] 
relationship in the end actually got up, and he went out on his own, after, you know, sort of 
arguments, and things like that. Which is a thing D. has never ever done. And he's never 
got up and gone out on his own without me. Whereas this time he did do it, that's why I 
say I think it had an effect on (name of husband]. ' 
21 (i) isolation Urn. I don! t know, I think uh sometimes its, its almost like being sort of another he ' `s 
Iw n you 
ýr 
on, yoq! e not unt, anything to do with, urn, a sexual reference and its, and w 
ax it its all around all the time. Urn, because I doet participate or find it ) ut =el 
i 
Zy 
difficult to, to know what people are on about, and to stand back so, urn, 1. I'm 
sort of standing back from them, putting myself off from them, rm not open, Im not an 
open person. Um, not like how rd like to be, in that sense. ' 
(ii) negative effect on self (ii) 'Urn. Yes, Min. I feel that uh, its like carrying a load that you dont want to carry that, 
cos you caift share it sometimes its, its unbearably hard, um. ' 
L22 I (i) negative effect on ut - 
(i) 'Yes, because, urn, I've got a boyfriend now that's very, very nice person, bTI 
ýfeels 
377 
relationship ays on e rm, I'm, I'm always on the defensive, if you know what I mean, rm always on the 
defensive. rm afraid to get too close, in case... rm not saying he's going to do it, because 
he's a lovely person, but um, its the same thing, thoughts thafs going into my mind, if I 
get too close am I going to be hurt again. [Do you think that not talking about it makes 
that worse? ] Maybe. Maybe, [And do you think that not talking to anyone about the way 
you felt in this case, had any effect on your relationships with other people? ) The same. 
I'm always on the defensive. I'm always. Its something I cannot help, rm always on the 
defensive. And I know I'm doing it. [YealLI I'm very aware of it. But its something I just 
cannot help. (So its sort of like trying to make sure that people don't know how you feel? ] 
Thaf s right yeah. Get too close to. Yes, uh-huh. 
23 (i) isolation (i) 'Yeah, because I tend to go a bit introverted and spend a lot of time on my own and 
stuff. [And how does that affect relationships? ] Um. I just doret really communicate. Just 
kind of shut away for a while. Yeah. [Do you think that not talking to anyone about the 
way you felt in this case had any effect on your relationships with other people? ] Yeah, 
because I tend to go a bit introverted and spend a lot of time on my own and stuff. ' 
(ii) hostility/irritation (ii) 'I suppose so. Yea1*4 I suppose it does. Urn, because when I feel that I caret talk to my 
parents, then sort of after I feel angry that I can't talk to them so I feel sort of quite a lot 
of anger towards them, and I suppose that comes out in my general behaviour. And sort of 
how I interact with them. [And can you can you just say what kind of behaviour that 
would be? ] Urn. Just sort of, just snapping and, you know, sort of not really engaging in 
conversation. ' 
24 (i) hostility/irritation (i) a) 'Yes, I would imagine it affected, the kids, and my husband. ... Because 
I became 
very aggressive if I was questioned. I spoken to them anyway I become very aggressive, 
very angry and annoyed. I didift want anyone talking to me. And he was getting annoyed 
himself. He reckoned each time I go out like that, instead of helping, I'm worse, I'm more 
aggressive. ' b) No, the only person it effects unfortunately is um my husband and the 
kids. He gets very tense and wants to know, because if I think about things like that I do 
become very aggressive. When I say aggressive I mean um, I get very angry, and I raise 
my voice, Im impatient as well. [What is it that you're angry at? ] rm angry at myself 
Mm, the majority of the time its myself. Sometime it's him, but the majority of the time 
it's myself, for giving in to feelings, giving into my feelings. I shouldn' t do. Because I 
portray an image of being a very strong person. rm not an emotional person at all. Even if 
I feel it um I will not show it I mean the emotions ra show are aggression and anger, 
but nothing soft and weepy, that is not me. [Mm. ) That' sa portrayal of a someones very 
wimpy and easy to manipulate. And I won't allow myself to be manipulated. J So its a 
sense that these emotions just you' re angry with yourself for, if anything happens you, the 
other people would, you feel other people are trying to make you feel those emotions that 
you don't want to feel? ] Yeah. (And then you get angry? ] Yeah. They're trying to question 
me to find is there a problem? And rin angry for them for even daring to question me. ' 
(ii) no effect (ii) 'The only effect it had it sort of confirmed what they said, you know, we were a happy 
family. It didn't change how I felt or anything. Just made me feel rm living a very 
deceptive life. A lie. Which I wish it wasn't but it just is. ' 
(iii) negative effect on (iii) a) 'No, the only person it effects unfortunately is urn my husband and the kids. He 
relationship gets very tense and wants to know, because if I think about things like that, I do become 
very aggressive. When I say aggressive I mean um, I get very angry, and I raise my voice, 
I'm impatient as well. ' b) 'I doift know how it's affected him. Not talking to him is 
definitely affecting it an awful lot. Cos he wants to sort of get into my inner mindL I am 
not giving the opportunity. And he gets annoyed, because he feels we're not sharing. rm 
not being co-operative, or I don' t want to involve him in, you know. He feels if Im upset, 
maybe if I told him the reason why I was upset he'd be able to help me, but he calf t help 
me. And so I refuse to say anything to him. It's just one vicious circle. [He couldn' t help 
you because? ]: Maybe its just because I dont want it. [Yeah. ] Stubborn. [Your sense is he 
would, he would be patronising? ] Yeah. He isn't going to patronise me. ' 
25 (i) no effect (i) a) 'no', b) 'no'. 
26 (i) negative effect on (i) 'But as he says, at the moment he knows I caret open up to him and its hurting him 
relationship more than its hurting me. And its a horrible feeling, because you know, someone's so 
close to you, and you caift tell him how, what you feel, and how you are feeling. It's a 
horrible feeling altogether. [So do you think that not talking to anyone about the way you 
felt had any effect on your relationships with other people? ] I doff t know. Ut sounds like 
it might have an effect on your relationship with him? ] Its having a taint on our 
relationship at the moment because as I say I will not open up to him, but I mean the 
other men rve been with before him, Ive opened up to them, and they've seen me in an 
entirely different light to what my fella sees me now sort of thing. ' 
27 (i) no effect (i) 'I dont think, no, I don't think it's had an effect on my relationships with them but its 
had an effect on my relationship with myself. ' (ii) negative effect on self 00 a) 'I dOnt think, no, I dolft think it's had an effect on my relationships with them, but 
its had an effect on my relationship with myself. [Right So what's that? Can you say a bit 
more about that? ] Urn, it's just the fact that it must be something to feel guilty about. You 
know if I can't talk about it to somebody, there must be a legitimate reason. [Right, so it 
builds up] Yeah. [That if you doift tell somebody then you can, that's a sign that ... 
I Yeah, 
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it to be happening. ' b) 'Whereas if I suppose if I didnt that, that, there's a real reason for , write at all, or tell anybody it would have built up, and thaf s when the mental explosion 
happens, and depression comes setting in and everything. [So, whafs the mental 
explosion. ] Well if s similar to a nervous breakdown Vaughs], and you just feet like yoleve 
got so many thoughts going on round your head, and then the one day you just go 
absolutely crazy, and burst out into tears, and can! t stop crying, and then youre in a 
depression for two weeks. 
28 (i) no effect (i) a) 'Uh, no. I don't really know. [Yeah. Is that because its quite normal for you not to 
talk, so, yeah ... ] ý&m [So things would probably stay the same? 
] Yeall' b) 'Um, well, 
my friends I think they'll just take it uh, knowing that, you know, how rm feeling 
anyway, so they wouldn't uh pressure me into saying anything. They'd leave it up for me, 
you know, to tell them. ... So in a sense 
it wouldn't make much of a difference. ' 
(ii) negative effect on (ii) 'I think by, um, by bottling things up in this case, I dont think it has helped, because 
relationship obviously you build, um, a barrier up uniý knowing whaes happened with me and my 
husband rve noticed by not talking things just get worse and worse. I Mm. ] But he! s the 
type that you cant really talk to about feelings, uh, so itjust gets worse. [So how does it 
get worse? What happens when it gets worse? ] Um, you just, on both parts you just stop 
speaking. You have nothing to say, you just, you know, you dodt exist really. I try and 
um, carry on as if nothings happening when it is. IMM. ] And you dont seem to have any 
control over it, you just let it slip. And then it just gets worse then. ' 
30 (i) no effect (i) 'Not talking about it I know if I did, and this is self-protection, rd feel worse about 
myself, and rd be worried about what that person would think of while I was talking 
about, or discussing, or expressing my disgust at mother. Not really no. ' 
33 (i) no effect (i) '[Inaudible] What happened you see, I turned myself off from it, and rm not talking 
about it. [Yeah. So you don' t, it doesn't come into your mind at all, unless somebody sort 
of drags it up? ] Yeah. I try to cut it out completely. ' 
(ii) negative effect on (ii) 'Yeah. I Can you say what those effects were? ] Well people don't understand it, what 
relationship yoifre going through. Say for instance the girl that sits next to me at work, sometimes Im 
down, and she must think 'whars wrong with hee. It does effect you. [And so, how would 
it effect your relationship with her? ] Well it has. She's not as friendly any more. [ Right. ) 
But I don' t feel that she's close enough and she! s got any business to know, where rm 
going, and why. It does effect it. ' 
35 (i) hostility/irritation (i) 'You could say that I would have gone to work certainly far more tired, more irritable, 
m0 i re likely to be more angry. I Yeah. ) It does have a knock on effect on the fact that I 
carry it all, which is why rm, why rm here in the f irst place, because the carrying things, 
the boa age ' the problems, is too much for me. [Right, and does that connect with 
the 
a 5, erý t ng s thal something to do with it? ]Oh, absolutelyl I So where does the anger come in 
as a result of.. you had the guilt in the dream, and you pushed that aside ... 
] Then Im 
tired, You know, somebody, somebody keeps, you know, biting their nails, and that noise 
would really start to get me [laughs slightly] angry. Its little things I shouldret, that 
shouldn' t really bother me, that I would be very angry aboutý like a constant noise getting 
in my head. Or a constant, 'I hate people biting their nails' and you know [sniffs] sniffing, 
I hate sniffing. And it would, in the end I would say'FOR GOODNESS SAKE CANT 
YOU BLOW YOUR NOSEI'Do you know what I mean, and that's anger, and like, you 
know yes. Oh for God sake, why do they have to put me through thatl (Yeah. ] That sort of 
thing. Yeah. Ut seems like it makes you feel a bit more fragile. ] Yeah. ' 
36 (i) no effect (i) 'No. [ No. Basically you just left things as they were? ] As they were. And then you 
just build up a, put another brick on the top. [And would you say if you had talked that 
would have had an effect on your relationship, your relationships? ] I don't think so, no. 
No. I wouldn't any, um, benefit for me, you know, from a selfish point of view. (Yeah. ) 
Um, when the immediate family know, um, they've sort of wised up to the way to, how 
they expect me to behave, and they know when I come through the door what I'm like, 
and treat me accordingly. They've been through, they've been through as much as I have 
in some ways. If I had I said anything it wouldn't have affected any relationship at all. 
Not close relationship. I couldn't have discussed it with people outside of the immediate 
family. ' 
37 (i) other (i) 'LOY, So you're going to tell him anyway. And do you think that not talking to anyone 
um, since then has, about the way you felt, has had any effect on your relationships with 
other people? ] No, because it was all right this morning with A., I did her hai 
morning. [Laughs]. Instead of last night. [ Yeah] And didn't see I., because I didn't get up 
when he did. Or I think I just got up as he was leaving. (Yeah, so it sort of blew over. ] 
Yeah. ' 
38 (i) isolation Ye:. (i) TheY, I think it does. It tends, you know, back to the same thing, if you're going 
r t ou even ound for a paper, normally if I was at work and I'd seen a chap that lived three 
or four doors away I'd spend a few minutes chatting with him, you know, even if it's only 
about the weather. but sometimes I think you walk past and you, just tend, not 
intentionally, you don't, *sorry I'm not going to talk to you, you just walk straight past. 
Your mind's wandering, you know. Because you know, I've come across that at the 
comer a lot .... Passing the time of day with _a 
person, I mean it's a normal thing to you, so 
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why shun him, you know. And then, I used to get back in the house, I'd think well, I bet 
old S. up the road thinks I'm a bit of a whatsit, you know'. 
(ii) hostility/irritation (ii) 'Yeah, I tend to be a bit mappy. Urn, uh, the easiest thing, I mean, if I try to do 
anything in the house, you know, which is difficult I mean I might start something, but 
it'd take me flipping six months cos the condition I'm in, you know. I can't afford to Pay 
anybody to do stuff, it's still got to be done, you know. But it's like somebody if you 
couldn't put a screw in, or dropped the screw on the floor, you know, I just got no 
patience for anything, or anybody half the time, you know, uh. And I think it does rub off, 
you know. ' 
(iii) no effect (iii) 'No, no. I don't think so. ' 
(iv) negative effect on self Ov) Inability to concentrate: 'I mean it's like writing or anything, I mean I can hardly hold 
the pens now, because of me fingers and, but you can be writing down what you say, or 
trying to. you're doing it in your head, but when you come to read it back you've missed 
words out you've done this, and you think, you know, you know, even some of the 
spelling, you've missed letters out you know, put something that ain't, you just get side- 
tracked, you know. Cos I don't think your mind's functioning, it's functioning, but on the 
wrong things. It's not functioning on what should be priority, you know what I inean. ' 
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APPENDIX 11 
'DOING EMOTIONS'IN THE DIARY AND RTMRVIEW STUDY 
Introduction 
So far in the diary and interview study reported in Chapters Four, Six and Seven 
the emotional experiences recorded by participants have been treated as if they 
came into being independently of the study. However it is quite possible that 
doing the study itself constituted part of the interpersonal context which helped 
give body and expression to the emotions which were reported. In this appendix 
data relating to the participants' experience of doing the diary will be examined. 
An attempt will be made to uncover evidence concerning processes of emotional 
construction which took place as the participants engaged in the task set for them 
by the researcher - recording experiences of shame, guilt hatred and disgust in a 
structured emotion diary. 
The theoretical background to this report is the social constructionist ideas about 
emotion which as the author has argued elsewhere (in a paper available from the 
author) have been neglected in the literature on shame (see also Appendix 1). In 
Harre's (1986) words 'emotions are strategic. They play roles in forms of action. 
And actions occur in situations' (p. 2 1). The suggestion in this report is that the 
demands of the research themselves created an interpersonal situation which may 
have had an effect on the emotions which were reported. For example it may 
have been the case that by asking participants to attend to and record emotional 
experiences of the kind requested in the diary a tacit interpersonal signal was 
being given to the effect that experiencing such emotions was legitimate and 
even understandable in the current context. Furthermore participants could have 
inferred that the expression of intense and negative emotions would be met with 
understanding and support in the context of research under the auspices of a 
psychotherapy department. 
The current report is a preliminary attempt to approach constructionist dynamics 
of this kind by examining a) comments participants made about the difficulty and 
helpftflness of doing the diary and b) the relationship between helpfulness and 
the reporting of different emotions in the study. The report will end with a case 
study which, in addition to illustrating many of the themes encountered in 
Chapters Four, Six and Seven, shows how the process of emotional construction 
seems to have worked for one participant. 
The difficulty and helpfulness of doing the diary 
Participants were given several lines at the end of the diary in which to write 
down aspects of doing the diary that they found difficult or helpful. Many 
participants neglected to do this and this led to a number of full and revealing 
answers when participants were asked about the experience of the diary in the 
follow-up interviews. 
Difficulty 
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The major difficulty reported by participants was the difficulty they had 
identifying their feelings. Often this was because the feelings occurred together. 
P 16 talked about how all the feelings 'seemed to roll into one'. P 11 said the diary 
was difficult 'because quite often I felt sort of shame and guilt, and bits of of sort 
of like feeling hatred, and bits of disgust, all together, so it was sort of like, 
actually which is the predominant one here'. P31 referred to how difficult she 
had found this process: 'it was very hard ... because I had to really sit and sort 
these feelings out. P6, P7, P12, P28, P29 and P33 made similar remarks. 
Sometimes participants said that it was hard to find words for their feelings, for 
example P29 who said 'I found it hard to put into words how I felt' and P 12 who 
felt the study would have been more helpful to her if she could have found 'the 
right words'. 
Overall 32.4% (11/34) participants said that they had difficulty distinguishing 
emotional experiences, and this was the most common reason given for finding 
the diary difficult. While this finding may in part reflect the particular emotions 
that were studied it also suggests that in addition to emotional experiences being 
withheld for the reasons analysed in Chapter Six it is quite plausible that 
participants had emotional experiences that they did not communicate simply 
because they could not themselves distinguish or make sense of what they were 
feeling. 
The four emotions included in the diary may have been particularly difficult to 
differentiate. Shame and guilt especially have often been seen as the same 
emotion (e. g. Power and Dalgleish, 1997; Tomkins, 1963). That this accounts for 
some of the difficulty identifying emotions is suggested by P31 who said: 
'I mean you can relate to the feelings you've got, but, if you put it down, 
it's hard to write down exactly what you're feeling [Yeah] because they 
can be put quite close, can't they, those feelingsT 
A similar remark was also made by P 16. Experiences of this kind may also be 
equivalent to the problematic and 'warded off emotional experiences that Stiles 
et al (1990) suggested were the central focus of therapeutic work. The author has 
previously suggested (paper available from author) that these experiences could 
be understood in Bucci's terms as subsymbolic emotional schemas that could 
have a motivational impetus while remaining in a marginal and shadowy form of 
consciousness. This appeared to be the case for P36: 
'that's just like I've um, physically swallowed a pillow, so I'm sort of 
full, I'm full up to about here. Yeah? And everything that may trigger an 
emotion just seems to pile up. But you don't, physically, you don't have a 
sensation of feeling anything. It goes in here, and sort of plops down in a 
bottomless pit. ' 
In a slightly different vein P23 talked about how the emotions were so familiar 
and so much a part of everyday life that, like breathing, it was hard to be aware 
of them: 
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'I think I've just got so used to them being there that you know, it's just 
like a sort of cycle really of anger and guilt, and it is difficult to actually 
sort of take a step back and think well you know, when did I feel this or, 
because it's just it's so sort of inbuilt into how I think, and how I arn. ' 
A second reason for finding the diary difficult was that it conflicted with 
participants' tendency to suppress painful emotions. For example as P28 put it: 
'I found it difficult because obviously I don't. Anything to do with myself 
I try, like I say, I try and bottle things up and, but when you've actually 
got to write it down it's a different thing, you know, a different matter 
altogether. ' 
P 14 said that: 
, the difficult part is going over it again. [Yeah]. Because I try to push 
these things out of my mind. Last Sunday I spent all day trying not to 
think about last night, but concentrate on today, and, you know, it was 
sort of when I had to sit down and fill this in, I had to think about the 
previous evening, which I prefer not to. So, that's difficult'. 
P20 said that: 
'it made me think about things I didn't want to think about' and that she 
wanted to put off doing the diary after having had a stressful couple of 
days 'because 1,1, it made me anxious to look at it, and made me feel 
scared ... I looked at it, and it really made me feel, I don't know what I'm doing here'. 
Several other participants referred to the fact that doing the diary stiffed up 
uncomfortable feelings. For example P1 wrote simply 'stiffing of feelings' ,P8 
wrote 'writing down the thoughts/triggers were difficult (i. e. painful to recall)' 
and P32 wrote 'difficult to bring back memories'. P 15 saw a positive side to this 
as she referred to the fact that writing the diary actually stopped her from pushing 
aside her feelings: 'it stops you suppressing it, it stopped me from suppressing 
what I was feeling'. It is not clear to what extent this desire to avoid the pain of 
these feelings overlaps with participants' difficulties distinguishing the different 
emotions. However it seems plausible that a habit of disregarding emotional 
experiences (because they are painful) could lead to an emotional life of 
diminished clarity. Overall 20.6% (7/34) participants made comments of this 
kind. 
In three cases participants reported that they found keeping the diary secret from 
those around them difficult. For example P24 reported: 
'Occasionally I had problems because, if the children were around ... I'd 
never do it in front of my husband. So as soon as I felt each emotion I'd 
sort of slip off somewhere. Maybe the kitchen, dining room, or 
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somewhere. The the kid would come in "Mum, what are you writing? " 
And then I'd be covering it up from them'. 
P 10 said that: 
'The most difficult thing was filling this in while my wife was around. 
Uh, I didn't find anything difficult filling it in really. It was just the sort 
of you know, trying to do this while she was there. [Yeah]. Because I 
think this is personal to me. ' 
Similarly P5 referred to 'when I felt difficult about it was mainly other people, 
cos it's private and confidential, it's something I didn't want no-one to see. ' 
Helpfulness 
Participants' comments about the diaries' helpfulness generally referred to an 
increase in clarity and understanding of their emotions. Helpfulness seemed, 
then, to be related to the activity that participants found so difficult - actually 
distinguishing and acknowledging the emotions. Sometimes participants referred 
to things they had noticed for the first time as a result of doing the diary. For 
example P 16 said that she noticed a number of idiosyncratic and powerful 
physical sensations associated with her emotions which she did not think she 
would have become conscious of if she had not done the diary and P 10 said that 
doing the diary made him aware of how frequent certain thoughts and feelings 
associated with his depression were. Other participants referred to how doing the 
diary had enabled them to hold on to things which otherwise would have simply 
been forgotten. As P37 said 
4you're sort of writing it down then, so you can see what's happening. 
Cos sometimes things just they're left, and that's that, and they're said, 
but they're not getting down to look at, you know what I meanT 
P 19 said that it was helpful 'remembering because usually, like I said, usually 
something happens, is dealt with, and it's forgot. Whereas with that, you can 
actually remember it, because you're filling it in daily'. Identifying the feelings 
and aspects of their context seemed often to be associated with a new ability to 
think about their experience. P5, for example, said: 
'It was helpful because it told me how I was behaving at the time. 
Watching, sit down and think about what I was feeling at the time, which 
I never actually thought before'. 
II said that: 
'It was identifying what was going through my mind. It was making me 
stop and think "hold on a minute what, what are the thoughts that are 
going through my mind here that I'm listening to, that are causing me to 
keep acting the way I am"'. 
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A particularly rich account was provided by P21 who will is the subject of a case 
study later in this report. She had recorded only an instance of shame: 
'Before it just used to happen. But having to sort of think about it in um, 
in the, in a sort of clinical sense, and write down what, that really helped 
... being able to sit down and say OK, it's shame that I feel, um, then I 
can say "well why do I feel shame? What is it that is making me feel 
shame, and just such a strong, to have such a strong emotion? " [MMI. 
And, also having to write down exactly what, what sort of makes that 
feeling happen. I think about it a little bit deeper than I, I normally would 
have done. ' 
Often participants used spatial or visual metaphors to describe how the diary had 
helped them. P28 said she did not find the diary helpful but nevertheless talked 
about how it enabled her to put her experiences into perspective and how seeing 
it written down 'you sort of say "well oh I did feel like that" and you could space 
it out like that'. P3 said that it made dealing with the emotions easier because 
with the diary you could 'see it at a distance'. P7 said that it was helpful because 
'you could sit there and you could look at the emotions, look at the things that go 
with it'. P2 said that writing down the emotion 'gave place for the emotions to 
go' and P27 said that 'To be able to even if it's not sort of telling somebody to 
have it written down, and get it out on paper, it's taking it a bit away from 
myself . 
In summary a particularly powerful recurring theme appeared to be the 
helpfulness of locating experiences in a symbolic medium at one remove from 
the ongoing stream of experience. Ibis appeared to have given some participants 
a welcome sense of distance from their emotions, others a sense of increased 
understanding, and yet others a sense that they could make new choices (e. g. P19 
and P 15). 
These remarks are highly congruent with the reports on the value of written 
disclosure collected by Pennebaker (e. g. Pennebaker, 1993) and research by 
Pennebaker and Francis (1996) both of which stress the beneficial effects of 
increased clarity and cognitive organisation which occurs as a result of disclosure 
(see Chapter Three). 
However, despite the fact that remarks of this kind were so common some 
accounts suggested that, consistent with the social dynamics identified in 
Chapters Six and Seven, other processes were equally important. This is 
highlighted by the fact that a number of participants appeared to be decidedly 
lukewarm about the value of self-awareness. P17 for example when asked if he 
found doing the diary helpful says: 
'T, vIm, yeah, in ways. Um, some bit. You know, um. It got me in touch 
with what's going on, it you know, because I think people should be in 
touch with their feelings, because it gives them an idea of how they fit in, 
and, you know, how they react, so, I would say a bit'. 
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This makes little sense in the context of earlier remarks made by this man in 
which he talks about being suicidal because he feels he is no value to others. P23 
says that becoming more aware of her feelings was not helpful because 'it's 
something I'm aware of anyway. Urn, so, I don't think it's sort of destructive or 
constructive, it was, sort of fairly indifferent to it. ' There is a sense here that it is 
just more of the same old thing, an air of resignation. P14 suggests why being 
aware of things might not help very much per se: 
'Well it's helpful in so much as I'm actually writing down what I'm 
feeling. [Yeah]. Urn. I think those feelings are wrong. So yeah, it's helped 
me to acknowledge it I guess'. 
Later she talks about how she used to drink in order to escape from her 
consciousness of these emotions: 
'I think this is where the drinking came from, I constantly suffer from 
guilty feelings and feeling shame, because perhaps I'm not a good person, 
and, and I reach a point where I can't cope with feeling like that any 
longer, and I start drinking and I don't want to do that any more. ' 
In all of these accounts awareness of the emotion only seems to lead back to a 
position where the invalidity of the self and the self's experiences are reinforced. 
This suggests that becoming aware of emotions is only helpful when those 
emotions can be recognised as valid and understandable. When this is not the 
case suppressing them makes sense. Habitual attempts on the part of participants 
to suppress their emotions were noted earlier, indeed P 14 goes on to talk about 
how good she is at blocking things herself. 
Remarks such as those just cited suggest that being clear about one's emotions is 
painful and useless if the emotion serves to undermine one socially. This more 
social perspective highlights the social constructionist concerns about the 
interpersonal meaning and consequences of disclosure. In this respect a number 
of participants mentioned that doing the diary seemed to have opened up an 
avenue of communication with someone. P6 illustrated this when he said that 
despite not wanting to fill in the diary 'It has been very helpful. lbere's no way 
I'd have spoken to [name of wife] about it if I hadn't, she'd got the diary there to 
sort of back me up'. P21 said that she thought that realising her experience was 
one of shame was 'bound to help me when I come back to see [name of 
therapist]. ' P3 8 talked about how although filling in the diary helped him become 
aware of the triggers of the emotion, its value also lay in communicating to 
someone who could understand how he felt: 
'What I found most helpful was seeing the situation I am in down in 
print, and it covers what I am feeling, so there are some people that are 
trying to understand what a person like me is going through'. 
The sense that the diary helped to give validity to experiences which otherwise 
would not be communicable was also expressed by P13 who wrote that the diary 
was helpful because 'I could write down how bad I felt for a change instead of 
keeping it all in'. Normally, as she said, 'I just feel stupid telling anyone'. 
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While the remarks above suggest that for some participants disclosing emotions 
by writing them in the diary was part of an attempt to make their experiences 
understandable some participants also hinted that the diary actually provided the 
emotional labels that they needed to do this. In the following extract, once again 
from P21, a probe by the interviewer seems to elicit a clear indication that the 
labels provided by the diary format were used to structure an experience that had 
previously been inchoate and undefted: 
'Before it just used to happen. But having to sort of think about it in um, 
in the, in the, in a sort of clinical sense, and write down what, that really 
helped. [And did that give you the understanding that it was shame, that 
maybe you hadn't thought about before? ] Yeah. [Right. ]. Yeah. Yeah. I 
just used to feel awful before [laughs]. Urn, but trying to categorise it, it 
helped. [Yeah]. And it's bound to have helped when I come back to see 
[name of therapist]'. 
Here P21 seems not only to have appropriated the word 'shame' from the diary 
but she also seems to be using it in a particular context where she considers it 
will be helpful to her. This suggests, as social constructionists have emphasised 
(e. g. Gergen, 1994), that categorisation is an act that reflects the social 
relationships within which it is embedded. In this case it seems to legitimise the 
experience, a process which also seems to be indicated in P6's reference to the 
diary 'backing him up' when he talks to his wife about his emotional experience. 
Another participant, P 15, actually expressed some uncertainty about the extent to 
which the experiences she recorded in the diary were really her experiences or 
had become the experiences the diary required: 
'Yeah I thought [clears throat] filling the diary in actually makes you 
concentrate more on on the emotions that you have at the time. [Yeah]. 
Because I'm very aware, I'm very conscious of having to do this. [Yeah]. 
Um, and sometimes you have to kind of think about am I really thinking 
this? Or is it just triggered off by by, you know, having to do thisT 
However it appears that the diary label of guilt enabled her to identify a new way 
of conceptualising her experience which seems to give her a handle on it: 
'Whereas before you, you're not sure of it, like anxiety and stuff like that, you're 
not really sure of it, it's just there'. 
Conclusion 
A review of participants' open-ended responses to a question about what was 
difficult and what was helpful about doing the diary revealed that a particularly 
common difficulty was actually distinguishing and identifying emotional 
experiences. However this difficult process also seemed to be helpful because 
most participants mentioned that doing the diary had to some degree helped them 
because they were able to understand or reflect on the experiences with greater 
clarity. Thus far participants' remarks were highly congruent with existing 
literature on the cognitive benefits of emotional disclosure, however a second 
theme also emerged in which it appeared that greater awareness of emotions was 
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only helpful when it appeared to make experiences more 'understandable' or 
'acceptable'. In this context it was possible that the diary had itself contributed to 
the 'construction' and 'legitimisation' of emotional experiences which may have 
been useful to participants as they contributed to a 'therapeutic' understanding of 
their emotional experiences. 
Quantitative ratings of helpfulness and difficulty 
Participants were asked to rate both how helpful and how useful doing the diary 
had been to them on a ten point scale. There was no correlation between the 
difficulty of doing the diary and its helpfulness (r = -. 02). The mean difficulty 
was 4.7 with a range of 10 and a standard deviation of 3.2. Further analyses 
revealed that 1) There was no significant relationship between number of 
emotions reported and difficulty of doing the diary (r = -. 14). 2) There was no 
effect of gender on difficulty (F (df 1,33) = . 25, p, = . 62). 3) There was no effect 
of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) on difficulty (F (df 1,33) = . 065, p, = . 8). And 4) There was no correlation between participant's age and difficulty (r = . 03) 
The mean helpftilness was 5.4, with a range of 10 and a standard deviation of 
3.3. A similar lack of correspondence was obtained between the characteristics of 
the sample and the ratings of helpfulness. Thus 1) There was no significant 
relationship between number of emotions reported and helpfulness of doing the 
diary (r = . 05). 2) There was no effect of gender on helpfulness (F (df 1,34) = 
. 34, p =. 56). 3) There was no effect of CSA on helpfulness (F (df 1,34) = 1.75, 
p= . 19). And 4) There was no correlation between participant's age and helpfulness (r = . 03). 
Interestingly reporting an instance of shame did appear to be associated with 
finding the diary more helpful with the mean helpfulness rating of those 
reporting shame being 6.7 and the mean rating of those who had not being 4.3, a 
difference which was statistically reliable (F (df 1,34) = 5.39, p<0.05). 
However participants who reported an instance of shame did not appear to find 
doing the diary more difficult (F (df 1,3 3) = . 06, p= .8 1). A contrary effect on helpfulness was found for reporting an instance of guilt, with guilt being highly 
negatively associated with helpfulness of doing the diary. The mean rating of 
those who had reported an instance of guilt was 4.3 for helpfulness, for those 
who had not it was 7.7. This difference was highly significant (F (df 1,34) = 
10.57, p<0.005). Again there was no association between reporting of guilt and 
difficulty of doing the diary (F (df 1,3 3) = . 02, p= . 89). 
The finding that participants who reported shame found the diary helpful fits in 
nicely with a social constructionist approach to shame. It can be accounted for by 
the fact that acknowledging shame meant that the individual perhaps felt that 
they were able to reconstitute their identities in the therapeutic context by 
acknowledging their perceived shortcomings, in a manner that was eliciting 
support and value from the 'therapy community' of which the research was one 
part. 
It is somewhat harder to explain the findings concerning guilt. One possibility is 
that experiences of guilt seemed to be embedded in everyday difficulties in 
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relationships with relatives, friends and children (see Appendix for Chapter 
Four), and did not therefore reflect an engagement in the therapeutic review of 
their identities and experiences that appears often to have been taking place when 
people reported shame. Moreover the literature on guilt suggests that guilt is 
adaptive because it motivates people to make reparation for harm they may have 
done to others (e. g. Tangney, 1995). However analysis of the emotional acts 
associated with guilt revealed that in this population apology or reparation in the 
context of an experience of guilt was mentioned only once in twenty five 
instances (see Chapter Four). This suggests that while the participant experiences 
guilt they may not be able to use their guilt in interpersonally beneficial ways, 
and may therefore be trapped in interpersonal situations where they feel both 
harmful to others and powerless to do anything about it. At the same time 
disclosing these experiences may not invite the same degree of responsiveness or 
acceptance as the disclosure of shame, as guilt does not appear to have such a 
powerful communicative agenda as shame (as the data in Chapter Four on other's 
awareness of guilt, and Keltner and Buswell's 1996 failure to discover a facial 
display corresponding to guilt suggest). 
No associations were found between reporting hatred and helpfulness (F (df 1, 
34)=. 02, p =. 88), although there was a non-significant trend for hatred to be 
negatively associated with difficulty (the means were 3.84 for subjects who 
reported an instance of hatred and 5.69 for those who did not. An ANOVA 
showed F (df 1,33) = 3.07, p= . 08). There was no association between reporting disgust and helpfulness (F (df 1,34) = . 76, p= .3 9) and no association between 
reporting disgust and difficulty doing the diary (F (df 1,33) = 8.54E-5, p =. 99). 
Conclusion 
There appeared to be an association between finding doing the diary helpftil and 
reporting an experience of shame and guilt. The results can be taken as a 
tentative confirmation of the hypothesis that reporting shame may be a positive 
experience in some circumstances. However the negative association between 
reporting guilt and finding the diary helpful was not expected. One possible 
interpretation is that shame opens the individual up to what Lindsay-Hartz et al 
(1995) refer to as a 'social determination' of the self, whereas in the case of guilt 
a positive interpersonal outcome tends to depend on the emotional person 
themselves making reparation. Consequently in the case of guilt the individual 
would appear to be less open to supportive and reassuring feedback from other 
people. Additionally, as suggested above the action tendency of guilt may have 
been unfulfilled or blocked. These findings contrast with those of Tangney (e. g. 
Tangney, 1995) in which shame is generally associated with psychopathology 
and guilt with psychological health. However this difference can be accounted 
for if one accepts that shame can be adaptive in some contexts while it is 
indicative of psychological (and social) maladjustment in others. Furthermore, as 
argued in Chapter Two, it is possible that different forms of shame can be 
differentiated - one which maintains social and emotional isolation (marker 
shame) and one which may play a role in social re-engagement ('illocutionary' 
shame). The differences between these two forms of shame are illustrated in the 
next section. 
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Disclosing shame: the case of Mrs. D 
In one case the dynamics associated with labelling and disclosing an experience 
of shame became apparent in the course of the follow-up research interview. This 
case provides an opportunity to witness an instance of beneficial disclosure in 
action as the participant reveals her feelings and thoughts as she discloses in the 
course of the research interview. This case was not typical, however it does 
illustrate the interpersonal and constructive dynamics that may take place in a 
helpful disclosure of shame. While the clarity of the emotional construction that 
seemed to take place in the diary and interview is unique in the study, Mrs. D. 's 
interview constitutes an apt summary and illustration of many of the themes 
which have been encountered in Chapters Four, Six and Seven. 
Mrs. D. (P21) is a married woman in her late 40s. In the diary she described one 
very intense experience of shame that lasted for about 30 minutes, and was 
followed by intense rumination which continued for the rest of the week. It was 
the only emotional experience of note that took place during the week. It was 
triggered by knowing (she says from the way her husband was breathing beside 
her) that he wanted her to make love with him, and her feeling (she says she 
froze) that she could not do it. The shame was associated with thoughts that she 
was not a good enough person, and her husband deserved someone better than 
her. She felt her lack of sexual responsiveness was extremely shameful and 
abnormal. She did not disclose the emotion to anyone, and felt very anxious and 
ashamed about mentioning it in the research interview. 
Alienation 
In the diary Mrs. D. reports that she had thoughts during the episode of shame 
'that I wasn't a good enough person, that I should do something to make the 
feelings stop, that my husband deserved someone better than me'. She describes 
how she felt she could not live up to her husband's expectations because of her 
inability to initiate sex with him. Behaving and feeling the way she does she 
considers to be highly deviant: 
'Um, and women, women of my age are um, normally perfectly capable, 
um, of having, um, a sexual relationship with their husband, they are 
expected to have a sexual relationship, there's no reason why they 
shouldn't. For whatever reason I, I doift or I cant, um, and that is an 
extremely shameful thing. Um, I should be able to. Um, its, he's an 
extremely caring man, so there's no reason why I shouldn't be able to. ' 
Mrs. D. sees herself as failing her husband, and as failing to live up to the 
prescriptive norms of her society. Furthermore she indicates that there can be no 
explanation for her deviant behaviour, there is 'no reason why [she] shouldn't', 
she repeats twice. Her husband is 'an extremely caring man' too, which appears 
to make her feelings even more inexplicable and unjustifiable. The social 
violation committed by her feeling the way she does seems to mean that she 
rejects her experience, as she puts in the quote from the diary above she thought 
that she 'should do something to make the feelings stop'. She appears to feel that 
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she has no socially legitimate 'voice' or justification for feeling the way she 
does. 
Consistent with Mrs. D. 's sense that her feelings contravene important if tacit 
social standards, she also indicates in the interview that she fears what would 
happen if she disclosed. At an emotional level she agrees in the diary that the 
thought of telling anybody made her feel shame, and in the interview she agrees 
that she thinks she would feel shame if she were to tell anybody. This prediction 
was bom out in the interview, when at the end she agreed that she had felt shame, 
in addition to anxiety, when she talked about the experience in the interview. She 
imagines two different kinds of response from potential recipients of disclosure. 
With her husband she says first of all that she is frightened of the way he might 
react if she told him: 
'I doift think I could ever tell anybody other than somebody I felt, um, 
could help me. Um. My husband, uh, I don't know. I doift know what 
he'd have to do to enable me to tell him. I really doift. Um, possibly not 
react. I think maybe rm frightened of his reaction. ' 
She also mentions that when she felt anxious and ashamed about disclosing in 
the interview this is associated with a fear that the interviewer will 'sit in 
judgement' over her. This assumption appears to be very painful for her, as she 
becomes tearful when she mentions it: 
'you're the very first person who rve ever spoken to about this, um, other 
than the therapist I'm seeing. Um, anxious about your reaction [laughs]. 
How you would ... Whether youd judge me, whether you'd sit in judgement. Which I, um, [begins to cry] excuse me... ' 
Thus allied to the shame Mrs. D. seems to dread a social response in which either 
she is not taken seriously, or others judge her. 
Consequences of non-disclosure 
Like other participants in the study Mrs. D. 's non-disclosure seems to be 
associated with feelings of isolation and social alienation. When asked whether 
not talking about the feeling had any effect on her relationships with other people 
she talks about the burden of keeping her feelings secret: 
Mm. I feel that uh, its like carrying a load that you dolft want to carry 
that, cos you can't share it sometimes its, its unbearably hard, um. ' 
The interviewer goes on to ask her if that has any effect on how she actually 
relates to people and she talks about how she feels unable to engage fully with 
other people, because of her hidden sense of inadequacy: 
'Um, I don't know, I think uh sometimes its, its almost like being sort of 
another person, youre not, um, anything to do with, um, a sexual 
reference and it's, and when you think about it it's all around all the time. 
Urn, because I don't participate or find it extremely difficult to, to know 
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what people are on about, and to stand back so, um, 1, I'm sort of standing 
back from them, putting myself off from them, I'm not open, I'm not an 
open person. Urn, not like how I'd like to be, in that sense. ' 
It seems in this passage that any reference to sexuality reminds her of the social 
disqualification she associates with her feelings about sex. In addition there 
appears to be a secondary source of social disqualification in her lack of 
openness. Like enjoying sex, perhaps being open is a required standard that she 
fails to meet. 
In spite of the fact that she does not disclose the emotion to anyone else, it 
nevertheless appears to have preoccupied her for the remainder of the week. She 
says that she 'dwelt on it' and she agrees with the interviewer when he asks her if 
she kept thinking about it all week. Indeed she implies that this emotion was so 
powerful that it blotted out any other emotional experience during the week: 
'Um, and because its so strong and so, sort of takes me over, um, I don't 
remember anything else. Just that. ' 
Her rumination seems to centre around what how she could have behaved in a 
more acceptable manner, and her fear that she will react in the same way again: 
'I just keep reliving that, thinking of the things that maybe I should have 
done, or could have done, or, and its like sort of, and then I dread the next 
night, and the next night, cos its the same. ' 
This highlights the disjunction between Mrs. D. 's private internal world and her 
outer social world. In hiding what would disqualify her (she feels) from a valued 
place in her social reference group, she experiences not rejection from other 
people, but an inner kind of self-ostracism (Lewis, 1971). She does not receive 
negative feedback from others, but she does not receive support, validation, or 
comfort from others either. 
Shame 
The case of Mrs. D. illustrates both 'marker' shame and illocutionary or 
performative shame. The following analysis illustrates a process in which marker 
shame appears to crystallise into illocutionary shame. 
Common to both forms of shame is the perceived sense of social shortcoming or 
deviance. This is powerfully expressed in a passage we have already quoted in 
which Mrs. D. talks about how she 'should' be capable of having a sexual 
relationship with her husband, and how this is 'an extremely shameful thing'. As 
we have seen she is also highly anxious about whether the interviewer will 'sit in 
judgement' on her when she has spoken about her experience in the interview. 
However where the two forms of shame differ is in the means through which 
each operates to maintain the individual's place vis a vis their social partners. In 
marker shame the strategy is to hold back from exposure of shameful 
characteristics or experiences. In illocutionary shame the individual remains with 
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both their shame and all their shame-related characteristics exposed, seeking 
readmission to the group or the relationship albeit at a lower status. 
Marker shame. Many features characteristic of marker shame emerge in the 
interview. Firstly there is the negative social response which is anticipated should 
she reveal her experience to others. This comes out in her discussion of how she 
would be 'frightened' of her husband's reaction if she told him, and he would fail 
to take her 'seriously' by trying to convince her there was no problem. It is 
evident too in her deep fear of being judged by the interviewer. There is also 
some suggestion of the anticipation of shame if others were to know about the 
experience, as she says that she would feel ashamed if she told somebody how 
she felt, and she agreed in the diary that the thought of telling anybody made her 
feel some shame. 
Secondly there is clear evidence that her shame fimctions as a signal to avoid 
social exposure that would 'compound' or 'cement' the deviant identity that she 
feels she must possess because of her experiences. Thus she says near the 
beginning of the interview: 
'Um. I think it was that if I actually said it, if I actually tried to explain 
how I was feeling and why, it would make it sort of um, not real because 
the whole thing was real to me anyway, but sort of, um, it would cement 
it I 
Disclosure to her husband would intensify the experience of shame, as predicted 
by the marker theory, because it would turn her internal reality into an 
interpersonal one. The interviewer says 'make it worseT and she continues: 
'Um, yeah. Yeah it would make it worse because then, um, [clears throat] 
as far as rm, as far as rm aware he knows obviously of the, of the general 
feeling, but um, I dodt think maybe he's aware that I had that feeling tun, 
and so to actually tell him that would compound I think all the other um, 
or would compound the knowledge that he had. Make it, um. I doift 
know maybe I felt that if I diddt tell him it would go away and it 
wouldret be happening, or... ' 
Later on in the interview she talks about how she 'stands back' from other 
people, and how she is not 'open' when she is with other people. Again (in a 
passage already quoted earlier) this seems to be due to her sense of shameful 
difference: 
'its almost like being sort of another person, you're not, um, anything to 
do with, um, a sexual reference and its, and when you think about it its all 
around all the time. Um, because I don't participate or find it extremely 
difficult to, to know what people are on about, ... I, I'm sort of standing back from them, putting myself off from them ... I'm not open... not how I'd like to be, in that sense. ' 
Not liking sex does not seem to be 'sayable' in her environment. Additionally in 
not being 'open' as she'd like to be she runs the risk of developing a secondary 
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kind of deviance to the first, one which could become another source of marker 
shame. The main point here, however, is that 'marker' shame appears to motivate 
non-disclosure and concealment in her relationships, the function of which 
appears to be that of preventing others from compounding or cementing her own 
negative and shameful self-image. 
171ocutionary shame. The unusual feature of this particular interview is that Mrs. 
D. may be constructing an account of her shame during the research that does 
have illocutionary force. There are a number of factors in the interview which 
make this seem likely. 
There is evidence that Mrs. D. 'discovers' the notion that her experience is one of 
shame as she engages with the research and the constructs associated with the 
way the research is structured. Thus she says in a number of places that it was 
very useful for her to learn to classify her experience as one of shame, and that 
this is something that she would not have done prior to the interview. At one 
point the interviewer asks her directly whether doing the diary gave her the 
'understanding that it was shame' that maybe she hadn't thought about before. 
She agrees with this and says: 
'Yeah. Yeah. I just used to feel awful before [laughs]. Urn, but trying to 
categorise it, it helped. ' 
As she says elsewhere 'before it used to just happen', now she seems at least to 
have a good word for what happened. 
But what use is a word? There is an indication in the interview that being able to 
label her experience as shame in this way helps Mrs. D. to provide an account of 
her experiences that in the context of her therapy might be validated. 
Immediately after saying that it is helpful categorising the experience, she says: 
'And it's bound to have helped me with, when I come back to see [name 
of therapist]. ' 
In this sense the diary and the interview can perhaps be seen as part of an 
emotional socialisation process that is one component of the process of 
psychotherapy. This remark of Mrs. D. 's is doubly interesting because it shows 
her spontaneously implying that she will disclose this new view of her 
experience to her therapist, in sharp contrast to the picture of shame that the rest 
of the interview has painted, in which her deviance remains hidden, at the cost of 
social involvement. This link between the use of the word shame and a 
movement towards a certain kind of social interaction suggests that labelling her 
experience as such has illocutionary force within the peculiar social setting of 
psychotherapy (and perhaps psychotherapy research). As noted above the notion 
of emotions as social roles which invite complementary responses from others is 
central to social constructionist theories of emotion (eg Averill, 1994; Harr6, 
1986). It may be that in readily adopting the role of shame, Mrs. D. has discovered a highly adaptive lower status role in relation to her therapist, since it 
can be assumed that therapists reciprocate shame with validation and the offer of 
understanding which might help reconstitute or 'normalise' her experiences. 
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In this context it seems that the interview itself constitutes an example of Mrs. D. 
utilising the roles of shame and sadness in an adaptive and therapeutic way. 
During the interview Mrs. D. obviously offers the interviewer a considerably 
detailed account of her experience of 'shame' - as we have seen she describes 
her lack of positive sexual responsiveness as 'extremely shameful'. In this sense 
she could be understood as developing an account of her experience in which 
'shame' helps to make her experiences understandable - especially to researchers 
who are particularly interested in shame. That this account is associated with 
both the acceptance of a lower power role and also a process of empowerment in 
the relationship is implied near the end of the interview. ý&s. D. becomes tearful 
at the one moment in the interview when she expresses acute consciousness of a 
power differential between herself and the interviewer. In response to the 
question 'what was your anxiety aboutT she says: 
'Um, having to admit to someone else, you! re the very first person who 
I've ever spoken to about this, um, other than the therapist I'm seeing. 
Urn, anxious about your reaction [laughs]. How you would ... Whether 
you'd judge me, whether yoiYd sit in judgement. Which I, um, [begins to 
cry] excuse me... ' 
Her tears seem to invite kindness rather than judgement in this context. They 
occur at a moment in the interview where she also seems to be more at ease with 
the interviewer, as she is able to laugh at the judgmental reaction she feared. 
Thus she seems to offer the interviewer an emotion that implies having less 
power at a moment when she feels more empowered in the relationship. (Being 
able to comment on one's fantasies and expectations within a relationship is 
likely to be indicative of greater empowerment, cf. Riikonen and Smith, 1997). 
The illocutionary force of this communication of her inferiority through her tears, 
and the evoked response of kindness to them, seems to underline and reinforce 
the fact that a more equal relationship exists in reality than she expected or 
anticipated. 'Ibus in her next utterance Mrs. D. can laugh slightly at the same 
time as acknowledging that she is having a hard time, and that her self- 
presentation deviates somewhat from her normal standard: 
'[Laughs a little] I'm having a hard time here. Thank you [after the 
interviewer passes her some tissues]. I've got black eyes now. ' 
In her next comment she laughs again, and is able to claim a much stronger 
position in the interaction, one in which she no longer has to mind what the 
interviewer thinks: 
'Mm. I mean I don't mind if you do [i. e. sit in judgement), and I dolft 
know. [Laughs]. I just didift want to, um, to know, that, that you would. ' 
Mrs. D. therefore appears to have reality-checked her expectation of a 
judgmental response to her shameful experiences against the response of an 
actual conversational partner, and found that she was able to claim much more 
'validity' in the interaction than she had assumed. Her decision to take this risk is 
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presumably dictated by an assessment of the context and nature of the 
relationship in which she has disclosed - she has said earlier in the interview that 
she would only think of disclosing if she thought someone could 'help' her. This 
passage suggests that the kind of 'help' that she seeks is help in negotiating 
validity in relation to others, validity which encompasses the experiences that she 
feels disqualify her from full and valued social participation. A finther possibility 
is that the word 'shame' is less likely to be used spontaneously by people if they 
are not engaging in a relationship in which their 'shame' could have a positive 
illocutionary force. Thus much of what we have called 'marker shame' may be 
unlabelled. 
Conclusion 
An analysis of the disclosure that takes place during this interview suggests that 
some of the social processes associated with the benefits of emotional disclosure 
can be seen in operation. Notably the construction of 'one-down' emotional 
discourse around shame, and the expression of tears that communicate distress 
and elicit validation seem to lead to an equalising of the status of the interactants. 
This equalisation process appears to counter the assumption of a negative and 
judgmental response. 
Summary 
Data from participants' open-ended responses concerning the difficulty and 
helpfulness of doing the diary was examined. Ibis suggested that participants 
often had a vague or undifferentiated understanding of their emotions and that 
the chief benefit of doing the diary was that it helped participants to clarify their 
feelings. Ratings of difficulty and helpfulness of doing the diary were examined 
statistically and the main finding was that helpfulness of doing the diary was 
positively correlated with having reported an instance of shame and highly 
negatively correlated with reporting an instance of guilt. It was argued that the 
diary may have helped participants to structure their feelings in a way that they 
may have considered was more understandable to other people. In this respect 
the correlation of reporting shame with helpfulness was interpreted as tentative 
evidence in favour of shame having illocutionary or performative power - 
effectively appealing for a new social determination of their identities - in the 
social context of therapy (of which the research was a part). A case study showed 
how 'marker shame' could, in the research and therapy setting, coalesce into 
shame which appeared to have performative value. 
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APPENDIX12 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
In this interview I will be asking you to recall things which may be painful to 
think about at the moment. 
Research in the past has suggested that talking in detail and confronting painful 
memories from the past is a painful but important first step in mastering 
distressing emotional experiences. We are doing this study because we think that 
detailed research on these kinds of emotional memories and how they have 
affected people's lives is necessary in order to get a better understanding of how 
people's emotions can change during psychotherapy. 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and if at any time you wish to 
stop talking about a particular memory, or prefer not to answer a particular 
question, that is fme. I am only asking you to say as much as you can at the 
moment, and will not press you if you choose not to talk about anything. 
Given the personal nature of the emotional memories that you may talk about 
here it is important to emphasise that the data in this study is kept strictly 
confidential. Tapes and transcripts of the interviews will be kept under lock and 
key, data will be identified only by number, and care will be taken to remove any 
features which might identify an individual from any published report of the 
research. 
I am going to see if you can recall particular kinds of emotional memory. These 
may be the kinds of memory that you do not normally talk about. 
want you to remember something that 
1. Happened at least a year ago. 
2. Is a memory from your life that is still very clear and still feels important to 
you even as you think about it. 
3. Is a memory that helps you to understand who you are as an individual and 
might be the memory you would tell someone else if you wanted that person to 
understand you in a more profound way. 
4. Is a memory that leads to strong feelings. 
5. Is a memory that you have thought about many times. It should be familiar to 
you like a picture you have studied or a song you have learned by heart. 
6. And fmally: Is a memory which evokes shame when you think about it. 
If more than one memory comes to mind the one I would like you to select is the 
one which feels most important to you now. 
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The kind of memory that I am hoping you will be able to recall is the kind of 
memory you would tell someone you were very committed to helping get to 
know the'real you'... the kind of memory that you feel conveys powerfully how 
you have come to be the person you currently are. 
Do you have a memory of a particular incident in mind? 
I would like you now to describe the memory in as much detail as you can. 
Please say where you were, what other people, if any, were involved, and what 
happened. 
After you have described the incident in as much detail as you can I will ask you 
some specific questions to do both with the original experience and how 
remembering it affects you now. 
([If person reluctant to talk about the memory that comes to mind] If you 
prefer not to mention the experiences which you have remembered I will 
simply move on and ask you questions about what the effect of the 
experience has been on you. ) 
Thank you. O. K. now I will ask quite a lot of detailed questions about this 
experience and the effects it still has on you. I realise that thinking about this 
experience in as much detail may be difficult. 
I hope you will be able to bear with me, however if at any point you do not feel 
you are able to go on you must say so, and we can either move to another 
question or if necessary stop the interview. 
SECTION ONE - QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AT THE TIME 
1. ) nat emotions? 
What emotions did you feel? 
At what point did you feel shame and what was the shame concerned with? 
2. ) Strength offeeling 
On a scale of 0- 10, where 0 would be 'no noticeable feeling' and 10 is 'as strong 
as I can imagine', how strong were your feelings at the time? 
On a scale of 0- 10, where 0 would be 'no noticeable feeling' and 10 is 'as strong 
as I can imagine', how strong were your feelings of shame at the time? 
3. ) Effect on life choices 
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Do you think the emotions you experienced at the time have had any impact on 
any major choices you made in your life? For instance has it affected the kind of 
work you choose to do, or the kind of things you do for pleasure, why you 
choose to do one thing rather than another? 
I'm now going to ask the same question, focusing on the shame part of the 
experience. 
Do you think the shame you felt had any impact on any major choices you made 
in your life? Has that affected the kind of work you choose to do, or the kind of 
things you do for pleasure, why you choose to do one thing rather than another? 
4. ) Disclosure history 
Therapy often involves talking about painful experiences we have been through 
in the past and I am interested to know more about how other people have 
responded up until now if and when you have talked about this experience. The 
next questions are about whether you were able to communicate how you felt 
about this incident at the time that it happened. 
Tbinking back to the incident you described: 
Did you talk to anyone about how you felt afterwards? 
[if you did ... ] Please can you say who you talked about it to (for example 
was it your spouse, a close friend, a professional such as a doctor or a 
priest, a parent, an acquaintance). 
On the whole did you find talking about the incident helpful? Can you 
say what it was about the conversation that was helpful? 
Was talking about it in any way unhelpful? [If so] Can you say what it 
was about the conversation that was unhelpful? 
How did other people/this person respond to your feelings when you 
talked to them? 
What qualities or characteristics of the person/people you spoke to were 
you most aware of when you were talking, and afterwards? 
(If didn't talk about it. ) If you didn't talk about how you felt, can you say why 
you chose to keep it to yourself? 
[If felt shame] You said that you felt ashamed at the time of the experience/after 
the experience: - 
Do you think that other people who were present knew that you felt 
ashamed? 
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(if disclosed and felt ashamed) Did you tell anyone that you felt ashamed at the 
time? 
Did you talk about it to people/a person who was there when you felt 
ashamed? 
(If didn't talk about it and felt ashamed) If you didift talk about your shame, 
would you have liked to talk to someone about it? If so, who? 
5. ) Meta-emotion question (focused on past) 
Thinking back to the time of this incident you have been telling me about, did 
you feel it was OK or not OK to have the kinds of feelings you have described? 
If no, what was it about your feelings that didn't feel OK? 
Can you describe how having these feelings used to make you feel? 
Did you feel ashamed or guilty about having these feelings? 
4. ) Functionladaptiveness 
Now I would like you to say if you think anything positive or useful came out of 
the experience? 
[If yes] please can you say what that was: 
Everything considered (what caused your feelings, your responses, the 
consequences etc), do you think you learned anything from this experience? 
[If yes] Can you say what that was? 
I now want you to consider the shame part of your experience. Do you think 
anything positive or useful came out of the shame part of your experience?: 
[If yes] Can you say what that was? 
Do you think any expression of your shame led to other people accepting 
you more? 
Do you think you learned anything from the shame you experienced? 
Do you think the experience you described made you try to avoid other 
situations which might have been upsetting? 
Do you think avoiding these other situations had anything to do with any 
shame you felt? 
To what extent do you think the experience you described was negative or 
harmful? Can you explain in what ways it was negative or hannful? 
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SECTION TWO: QUESTIONS INVOLVING BOTH THE PAST AND THE 
PRESENT 
1. ) Socialisation 
Now I am going to ask some questions about how other people behaved towards 
you both at the time of the original incident and since then. 
Do you think this incident had any impact on how you were perceived by your 
family, friends, or your peers (at school/work)? 
Do you think this incident had any impact on how you were treated by family, 
friends or peers at school/work? 
Can you remember how people treated you when you had similar feelings at 
other times in your past? 
In the past how have you tended to think other people would respond to you if 
they knew about this incident, or if you told them? 
How do you expect people to respond to you if you tell them about this incident 
now? 
2. ) Predictive strength 
The next questions are to do with how much of an effect this incident has had on 
you, and how much of an effect the memory has on you now. 
Firstly, if you were put in the same situation now, do you think you would feel 
the same way? 
Secondly, if you were put in the same situation now are you afraid that you 
would behave in the same way? 
Do you think you would feel the same amount of shame if you were to be put in 
the same situation again? 
3. ) Social consensus 
It may be that you think that in the circumstances that you have described it is 
right and natural to have the feelings that you described. In the next few 
questions I would like to ask you about this aspect of the feelings you described. 
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Do you think that in the same circumstances other people would have felt the 
same? 
Do you think that it would be appropriate or inappropriate if other people in the 
same circumstances were to feel the same as you felt? 
It may also be that you think that in the circumstances that you have described it 
is appropriate or inappropriate to feel shame. Do you in fact feel that it is in any 
way appropriate or inappropriate that you should be ashamed in this way? 
4. ) Disclosure Now 
I asked a few questions before about whether in the past you have talked with 
people about the experience you described. In the next few questions I'm going 
to ask some questions about whether you talk to anyone about it now. 
So, firstly, do you in fact talk to anyone about this experience now? or do you 
prefer to keep it to yourself? 
[If have talked] Have you talked to many people about it? Can you say who you 
have talked to about it? 
(for example have you talked about it to your spouse, a close friend, a 
professional such as a doctor or a priest, a parent , an acquaintance). 
What, if anything, did you hope to gain from talking about your 
experience? 
Have you found talking about the experience in any ways helpful? Please 
can you say in what ways you found talking about it helpful. 
Have you found talking about the experience in any ways unhelpful? 
Please can you say in what ways you found talking about it unhelpful. 
How have other people responded/ how has this person responded to your 
feelings when you talked about it? 
What qualities or characteristics of the person/people you spoke to were 
you most aware of when you spoke to them? 
Do you remember how you felt when you told them? 
What effect do you think telling her/him/thern had on how she/he/they 
saw you? 
[If haven't disclosed] If you dorft talk about the experience can you say why you 
choose to keep it to yourself? 
How would you expect to feel if you told someone about it? 
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Do you feel any urge to talk to someone about these experiences? 
[If yes] Can you say what you would hope to get out of it? 
How has it felt so far talking about it today? 
5. ) Meta-emotion question focused on the present 
I asked you before if in the past you felt that it was OK or not OK to have the 
kinds of feelings you experienced at the time of the memory you described. I 
now want to ask you about how you currently view these same feelings. 
Firstly then, do you now feel it is OK or not OK to have the kinds of feelings 
which you had during the incident you described? 
If no, what was it about your feelings that doesn't feel OK? 
Can you describe how having these feelings makes you feel? 
Do you feel ashamed or guilty about having these feelings? 
SECTION TBREE: THE PRESENT 
1. ) Virulence ofmemory 
Moving on now to the context in which the memory of this experience (these 
experiences) normally comes to your mind. 
Can you say approximately how often you recall and think about these 
experiences? 
Very frequently, frequently, sometimes, seldom, never. 
2. ) Occurrence ofinemory 
Can you think of the last time you thought about this event? Please describe as 
clearly as you can the circumstances in which you thought about it. 
Would you say that this is typical of the circumstances when you think about it? 
OK, I'm now going to ask you a number of questions about this recent time when 
you thought about it. 
3. ) Effect of memory recall on action tendency 
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Remembering emotional experiences can change the way we think about 
ourselves, other people, and what we want. In these next questions, as for the 
question above, I want to keep the focus on the last time you thought about this 
incident. 
Firstly: 
Did remembering these events have an effect on what you wanted to do? If so 
can you explain how that was? 
Did remembering these events change the way you thought about other people? 
If so can you explain how? 
Did remembering these events make you feel more or less inclined to assert 
yourself? If so can you explain how? 
Did remembering these events make you feel more or less inclined to make 
demands on other people? If so can you explain how. 
Does remembering these events make you feel more or less inclined to be with 
other people? Can you explain why. 
4. ) Effect ofmemory on behaviour 
When you thought about it did it affect what you actually did in any way? 
Please can you say in what ways remembering this incident affected what you 
did. 
Specifically, did it make you more likely to: - 
avoid certain people 
avoid certain kinds of situation 
present yourself differently to how you might otherwise have presented 
yourself. 
- would you say you became more or less apologetic when you 
have this memory in mind? 
- would you say you became more or less respectful of other more 
powerful people when you had this memory in mind? 
- would you say it made you more or less deceitful when you had 
this memory in mind? 
5 -) Emotional sequelae 
How did you feel after you thought about these experiences? 
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Can you say on a scale of 0-5, where 0 is not at all, and 5 is very intense, how 
much you felt the following emotions: 
anger 
sadness 
anxiety 
depression 
self-disgust 
guilt 
embarrassment 
shame 
relief 
gratitude 
6. ) Effect on relationships 
I would like to know if thinking about these past experiences had any effect on 
how you feel and act in your current relationships. 
Did thinking about it have an effect on how you were with other people 
do you think? 
not at all a little _, moderately __, a 
lot 
_, 
extremely _ 
Did thinking about it make you more or less withdrawn from other people 
do you think? 
a lot more more _, same _, 
less 
-, a 
lot less 
Did thinking about it make you avoid any people now who you felt O. K. 
with before you recalled it? 
a lot more _, more -, same -, 
less 
-, a 
lot less 
Did thinking about it make you feel more or less committed to any other 
people? 
a lot more _, more _,, same _, 
less 
_, a 
lot less 
Did thinking about it make you more or less committed to living up to 
any particular standards now? 
a lot more _,, more -, same _, 
less 
_, a 
lot less 
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Did thinking about it make you more or less difficult with other people, 
do you think? 
a lot more _, more _, same _, 
less a lot less 
Did thinking about it make you more or less angry with other people, do 
you think? 
a lot more _,, more _, same -, 
less 
_, a 
lot less 
Did thinking about it make you seek out relationships now with people 
who you feel would be more accepting? 
a lot more _, more _, 
same _, 
less 
_, a 
lot less 
Did thinking about it prompt you to let other people know how you were 
feeling? 
a lot more _, more _, 
same _, 
less a lot less 
7. ) Appeasement vs avoidance effect in relationships 
Did thinking about this past experience make you try harder or less hard to make 
other people like you? 
Did thinking about it make you try harder or less hard to avoid being judged by 
other people? 
8. ) Source of maladaptiveness 
Now I'd like to ask you which out of two possible situations would cause you 
most distress? 
A: the fact that other people can go about their business without feeling this kind 
of shame 
B: the fact that other people respond unkindly to the shame you experience. 
9. ) Beliefs 
It is possible that important emotional memories are connected to long-lasting 
beliefs we have about ourselves. I want to ask you about this aspect of your 
experience in the next questions. 
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Does remembering these events highlight any beliefs or ideas you have about 
yourself? 
If so, please can you say what they are: 
Do you think that this episode has in any way changed how you think of 
yourself, or the aspects of yourself connected with your shame? 
Does thinking about these experiences highlight any beliefs or ideas you have 
about what is possible for you, or what the future holds for you? 
10. ) Factors associated with maintenancelrecovery 
Now, finally, leVs look at how things might change, or might have changed since 
the incident you talked about: 
Do you think you will ever stop feeling ashamed about this? 
How do you think it would be possible for this to happen? 
I'm going to ask a series of questions about various things which may have 
changed since you originally felt this shame. 
Have other people's attitudes towards you changed for better or worse? 
Have people in your important relationships understood you better or 
worse since the events you have been talking about? 
Have new people you have encountered since then understood you more 
or less? 
Have you become more or less critical of the people you were originally 
ashamed with? 
Have you decided that what you were ashamed of is more or less 
important? 
Have changes in your self since then made you more or less ashamed of 
who you are? 
Have you thought more or less about this incident with the passage of 
time? 
EXPERIENCE OF THE INTERVIEW 
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Finally I wonder if you could say in a few words how it has felt like for you to do 
this interview? 
Do you feel it has been in any ways unhelpful for you? 
[If yes] Can you say in what ways it has been unhelpful? 
Do you feel it has been in any ways helpful for you? 
[If yes] Can you say in what ways it has been helpful? 
Do you think talking today has in any ways changed how you feel and think 
about your emotional experiences? 
[If yes] Can you explain how? 
APPENDIX13 
CASES OF CLEAR SHAME IN THE SELF-DEFINING MEMORY STUDY 
P CLEAR SHAME 
3 Shame felt 'afterwards; When everyone told me how stupid I was'. 
However P also says that the therapist 'made me feel so small that I'd, I'd wasted his time' and that 'I felt more 
humiliated when I came out of there than when I went in'. 
4 'It's the thought that her thinking of me urn having physical relationship with another man and er I thought you know 
quite ashamed, quite ashamed of it. Because what her expectations that are not, are not the same as mine'. 
Felt shame afterwards. 
5 Felt shame immediately after the incident. ('I sat on the bed and I thought Christ what have I done? [Pause] I shouldn't 
have done that now what are you going to do? I didn't think you know Oh God is this going to be my life from now on? 
I just felt really frightened at what I'd done and I thought God you know, what's going to happen, you know? ') 
9 Shame was present to some extent at the time of the original incident but has been strong retrospectively: 'It's not 
something I've entirely escaped, mid the feelings of, of shame, well a lot to do with just being a fool for giving up 
something that so many people would work so hard to, to getý you know... ' 
Most of the shame has come after the incident 'as time's gone on it's become clear that it wasn't a very well thought 
really decision at all and uni so a sense of shame has come in and in fact I never tell anybody that I, it may seem, I never 
tell people that I went there now'. ... 'I suppose 
it dredges up all these feelings of inadequacy... ' 
I felt always very ashamed of that decision and uni ashamed of, in a way of how that whole period went' 
12 'Er ... well first of all I felt ashamed for letting myself get pregnant, but I feel that was the lack of knowing, or of having 
no education in ... or about sex life. But when I had the abortion, I just felt dirty. I just ... I 
just wished I'd never done it. 
[And is that shame still with you in some way or was that ... ] It is. ' 
is Shame comes after the actual rape. 'But, uni, I mean the only feelings, the feeling I had after the rape was basically 
shame and still shame'. 
'I think after I came round, uni ashamed. Yeah, there was part of me that felt ashamed at the time because of what was 
happening and I had no control over it and I couldn't stop them. They were taking something from me that was mine. 
Urn, and the shame afterwards, that's why I never told anybody, I just wanted to put it out the back of my head, I never 
told anybody for years. You know, I never mentioned it to anybody. So 1,1 lived with the shame for a long time'. 
18 '[And at what point did you feel shame, what was the shame concerned with? ] Er... Well I think this shame, is partly a 
sort of feeling of nakedness that I now have down there, I feel as if it's exposed, as if, almost as if people can see it. I 
also feel that er, I've been dirty as it were and I've had to have [refers to the operation], and any woman that I confronted 
with it would sort of think that Yeah, I wished I'd known that these things were going to happen, I never would have 
had it done'. 
'Er Oh .... it's sort of hard to say really ... er I feel as if I've let myself down, that I was dirty, that er, degraded, felt as if I'd been subjected to a degrading operation. I felt really degraded afterwards. ' 
19 1 'And how, on the same sort of scale, how strong were your feelings of shame at the time? ] At the time ... urn probably not that high, it's just sort of afterwards, um, things sort of, you know when when you stop to think about things like, 
you know you tealise, it's well everybody's going to be sort of laughing at you and whatever. Urn probably about 8 or 9 
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sort of, but not at the present time like you know. [That was sort of afterwards, it got high afterwards? What in weeks or 
hours or ... ?] Um. Probably, sort of thing you 
know when I had time to sort of think about what had been going on. 
Perhaps a couple of hours after, after that incident sort of thing, you know. Um, as I say, not sort of straight away, more 
anger straight away but sort of later the sort of shame and embarrassment at what had sort of been going on. ' 
20 'And he gave me his telephone number, but of course when I phoned it it was the wrong number. And, you know, I just 
felt so, I remember feeling so betrayed really, that, so ashamed that I'd done this and so betrayed by the person I'd found 
myself doing this with had just tossed me away like a used tissue really basically. ' 
'And I remember standing up in the bedroom in my murn's house telling my friend about it, and it was like a look of 
disbelief on her face, like how could you? Like she didn't believe me or something, and just the look of real shock in her 
eyes as well. And that I think added to the shame too, really'. 
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APPENDIX 14 
CASES WHERE PARTICIPANT WAS AMBIVALENT OR EQUIVOCAL 
ABOUT THE EXPERIENCE OF SHAME IN THE SELF-DEFINING 
MEMORY STUDY 
-P 
AMBIVALENT OR EQ UIVOCAL RE SHAME 
I (i) Denial of shame: Frequently during the interview she denies experiencing shame (e. g. 'Not shame, no, not shame. 
I've done nothing to be ashamed of as far as I am concerned anyway, nothing to be ashamed of '). 
(ii) Acknowledgement of shame: However she talks about her current shame about blushing ('Um, yeah. Group 
activities again. Uh, my daughter keeps asking me to go line dancing, but I think, no I daren't because if I made a 
mistake I'm going to be embarrassed and go red, and ... I mean for a forty nine-year old woman, you 
know, you really 
should be able to control yourself a little doing that So there again, shame! Shame ... That I can't control 
it') 
2 (i) Denial of shame: P not sure that shame characterises memory (Trn not sure that shame's the right word'). 
(ii) Acknowledgement of shame: Then goes on to say 'But I do feel ashamed about that [wanting to kill father when he 
was attacking mother] because I didn't feel remorse. I would have wanted him, at that stage, you know, just to leave my 
mum alone, but I wasn't brave enough to carry it out and I think the shame really was, was the fact that I couldn't carry it 
out. ' Later she talks about a more general sense of shame about her background: 'at the time it seemed the norm, but 
now obviously that I've grown up and met different people I know it's not and I feel ashamed because we were very 
poor. I mean my father was rich but we were very poor. We didn't have proper clothes, we didn't have. we didn't know 
how to eat properly because we didn't have much food, it's lots of things. I didn't have any social graces or anything like 
that and I felt ashamed. I just felt ashamed of being me basically, just felt worthless, you know, and other people talk 
about, you know, things they'd get for their birthday, or things that their mum and dad used to do with them and talk 
about, and that never happened with us and I felt ashamed because of that I suppose. ' 
6 (i) Denial of shame: a) 'It's not a word that I actually - it's one of those words which I think people don't use very often, 
um, I don't know if, I don't know if shame is something that I experience a lot, maybe I should [laughs]. ' b) 'Yes, 
perhaps shame is, I know what the word means and, and I can understand the concept of shame in that I know to do 
shameful things. [Hesitates]. I find with a lot of this sort of thing there are often words which people would quite easily 
say, but whether you're actually experiencing them or not is another thing. Does that make senseT c) 'shame is one 
where I'm not totally au fait with although I have experienced things which I've looked back at times in my life and I've 
thought no that wasn't good you know and you know I feel sorry for that. Maybe a bit of shame, somewhere between 
sorry and something else I s'pose. But yeah. ' d) later still 'I... I would cringe at what people might think, whether what 
they would be thinking was a shameful thing in a sense you know, where's the governing margin and what you know, 
what is is shameful you know. Shaine is a word ... like I said I'm very good at probably justifying my actions at times because I sort of build a rationale behind them so I don't, I don't er, I probably would cringe and think ... shame. 
' 
(ii) Acknowledgement of shame: P says the incident provokes shame. a) Various reasons for the shame - girl he was 
infatuated with was much younger and he should have been wiser, felt he was becoming similar to a mental health 
patient. Also felt ashamed because of how colleagues responded to him ('I also felt ashamed that because a lot of the 
staff were women, I was the only male there, that I felt that they were all sort of gossiping about me and I was in 
isolation, I'd been marginalised by it all and I felt ashamed about my behaviour, you know, them thinking I was weak 
and like... '). b) Recently: 'But I thought right, I'm gonna give her reasons that I understand, rin gonna be bloody nasty 
here, I'm gonna swear at her, I'm gonna call her a few names, I did that and um, I walked away and surprising enough 1. 
I'm ashamed about it but I felt quite good about it, I felt like I'd equalled the score you know and I'd said goodbye and 
that's it. ' 
8P somewhat equivocal about the degree to which he felt shame. '[er, I don't know if you felt any shame that, you know 
that was one of the things I asked about earlier, did that come into it? ] (Sighs] No, um, 1,1 did feel that an indirect, what I 
would say was an indirect shame, because I was backing out of doing my duty for that day. I was turning away from 
something, there was something there 
10 (i) Uncertainty whether experience was shame: a) 'I don't know whether it was shame, but certainly it was 
embarrassment it could have been shame, um. I'd have to think about it for a long time before I decided if it was shame 
but it certainly was embarrassment'. b) 'Shame probably is there but it's um, it's mixed with other emotions. Shame 
inwardly you feel, yeah you would, you do feel shame, but it's embarrassment and upset and it's ... because you've 
been 
found out, or ... because the subject is taboo ... yeahyeahyeah. ' 
(ii) Acknowledgement of shame: 'When you say shame, I think er that incident when they were taking the mickey, that 
was shame' 
11 (i) Denial of shame: a) After being asked if she experienced shame 'Um. No, no cos I think I was quite strong, for them 
couple of years. I don't think shame came into it really. It was all to do about surviving, you know, this sort of idea. I had 
to keep strong and everything's alright, you know, so. Mmhm. ' b) 'No I don't know about it I don't know whether I had 
shame ... I don't urn [very hesitant over this question] Urn ... I don't know I think that could be, I think there should be 
another word used really'. ... she thinks that might be 'maybe not determination, but to stop people prying ... like I think it's all to do about that', 
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(ii) Acknowledgement of shame: a) After talking about a number of incidents which become increasingly personal she 
finally describes the time she say her mother being raped by her father. Interviewer asks '[And does that, is that 
connected with the shame at all? ] Yeah, that was very, yeah, hin, so'. b) P says she experienced shame when she saw the 
terrified look on her mother's face, and she felt 'shamed you know because of my dad really'. She says she then tried to 
forget about it However she says the feeling of shame comes back when she thinks about it ('[And does the feeling of 
shame come back when you think about it then? ] Yeah, very much so. '). 
14 (i) Uncertainty about shame: P suggests that he is unclear about the distinction between shame and guilt 'there is a 
certain amount, urn I'm using the word guilt, probably mean much the same as you, you saying about shame, about the 
fact that it didn't. you know it didn't affect me as perhaps it should have done. And urn ... I think at the end of the 
day, I 
mean you always ... at that time I actually felt responsible 
for everything, so you know you only see things through your 
own eyes, especially at that age. ' 
(ii) Felt shame 'once the initial event was over' and he began to have contact with people outside the house again: 'it was 
when the event had started sinking in that it was real, in as much that it was, a change had happened and as I said, when 
this labelling started to happen, urn and, I mean from that incident, from that time I hate sympathy. ' 
16 (i) Denial of shame: 'I don't know if you'd call it shame. I felt urn it was my own fault, I should never have gone in 
there. He obviously must have thought I was asking for it, I mean I'm not naive, I knew in the end that was, that's all 
what he wanted like. [Did any shame come into it or, was there guilt, or? ] Just guilt I suppose. I couldn't tell anybody. I 
couldn't tell my two older lads. Cos they knew him you see. ' 
(ii) Acknowledgement of shame: a) '[so when you, you know not telling anyone, was that because you felt guilty or 
because you felt ashamed to tell anybody? ] Well it felt yeah, I just felt ashamed of it because I mean you know I 
thought everybody would just say I asked for it You know, I should never have gone in. I couldn't believe it. Just all 
happened so quick, you know, and this it was like one minute he was alright and the next he was a raving nutcase'. b) 
'[At what point did you feel shame? ] Well afterwards I suppose when I went and came out. He just sat on the sof& Then 
I sort of went into, I can only describe it as shock like, I just denied it had happened. You know, in my mind, I mean I 
knew it had happened but I sort of made myself think it hadn't happened. It wasn't till ... after 
Christmas that I actually 
acknowledged that it had happened. And I don't know why or what triggered, what started me remembering it like. ' 
17 (i) Uncertainty about shame: a) 'Urn, but again that's something urn that brings shame in the respect that you can't speak 
about it. If people say to me, they automatically presume you're divorced, which I've never said, I've always said no 
I'm not I'm a widow, urn, but if people ask oh I'm sorry how did he die, I automatically say, oh it was a car accident 
urn, and not go into it Um, because you can see the horror. Therefore it's best not to say anything. [The horror on 
people's faces. ] Yeak Ps that, is that connected with shame for you do you think? You know, the actually not telling 
people, is it partly because you feet ashamed or is it mainly because you don't want to see the horror on people's faces? ] 
I honestly don't know which it is. ' b) '[So at what moment did the shame come on, do you think that that was because of 
shame when you said ... ]I don't know, I honestly don't know'. P goes on to say she was too busy 'sorting the children'. 
c) re strength of shame P says 'At the time? I would have said zero. [Yes]. And yetý why did I not want the sirens on and 
that? I don't know if that was shame or I just didn't want the attention. I think basically I didn't want people to know'. 
(ii) Acknowledgement of shame: 'And it's fimny, you talk about shame. I remember saying please will you not put your 
sirens on. [Tearful]. And it's a fumy thing to say but, I just didn't want them to put the sirens on. I didn't want people to 
know. But I had to have them. And I didn't know what else to do'. 
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APPENDIX15 
ATTEMTTS TO AVOID THE MEMORY 
P ATTEMPTS TO AVOID CONTACT WITH THE MEMORY 
I (i) Removes self physically from reminder: Moved to a different town in an attempt to 'move away from some of the 
memories and start again, and build a new life'. 
(ii) Drinking: Drank more because drinking made her feel that 'I wasn't bothered ... I could tell myself that things were 
alrightý I'd have a drink and then I'd got to sleep and be alright cos I'd get up and have a shower and go to work and that 
would be it. Like it eased it in a way'. 
2 (i) Removes self physically from reminder: a) 'It was, um, when I was talking to my sister and as I say a lot of things come 
out over these past few months when we talk about it I just, I just didn't want to talk about it And I didn't actually say to 
her about the incident but itwas in my mind and I hadto getaway from her. Ijust had to leave. So, that was only a couple 
of days ago. b) '[When you thought about it did it affect what you actually did in any way? You said it made you want to 
get out] Yeah, it did. It made me feel sick and I just wanted to get out and I went I left' 
(ii) Mental self-control: 'Um, (pause) If I allowed myself to, I could think about it every night wn but I don't and its only 
when we talk about it, about the family, that you know that's when I'll say something maybe but somehow I can control it 
and, and I make myself not think about it. ' 
3 
4 
5 (i) Distraction: 'I feet safe if I'm, I enjoy being away from home, I feet safer when rin away from home sometimes. [What 
do you feel safer from? ] My own thoughts, feelings, I doWt have time to think about those feelings ...... . So I 
don't I can 
put myself away really, I can become somebody else. And thats nice, ' 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II (i) Distraction: '[So it would have come into your mind, you would have thought about it what had a feeling of some so 
of about.. ] Just ugh, just take it out of my mind again. [And then get it out of your mind quick. ] Yeah, that's it- [OK. And 
what would you do to get it out of your mind, you ... ?] I'd probably, cos 
I'm quite a busy person anyway and urn I always 
like to keep myself busy, I'm always on the go, if I've got nothing to do I'm like, like a little busy bee, like trying to go 
around, trying to do something you know, but I've just always got things to do so, that's another, that's another reason 
why I don't Re to sit and think about it I just think, oh I've got this to do now, you know, So. 
(ii) General avoidance: 'I Re documentaries, but I don't like documentaries like... I don't know, no I do, I think 
documentaries are alright, cos I like things like that, but when you've got like, ooh there's like films about paedophiles and 
stuff like that, Ijust oh I can't I can't even. I was atworkone day andtheywere talking about afihnthatwas onthe other 
week and like a friend that I work with you know told me some bits and pieces of it and I actually, went stuff it I don't 
warittotalkabout it I don'twantyou to say anything about it I said I didn't see itbut I heard a couple of things, ooh 
12 1 
13 (i) Mental self control: a) '[What when you try to think about it it's difficult? ] Yeah, yeah. [What because your mind 
wants to get away from it all? ] Well mostly because my mind wants to get away from it. Mm. ' b) Difficult because she 
usually avoids thinking about 'problems from the past' 'cos I know they're there, but I don't think about them. Just want 
them, get rid of them really'. 
14 (i) Mental self control: 'I'm finding it a wee bit difficult inasmuch that the memory is not probably not my hottest subject 
because I think I've probably tried to switch off from it ... quite a bit and I spend most of my time actually 
just finding 
things to preoccupy myself to sort of avoid the now if you like. Uh'. 
15 (i) General avoidance: a) '[can you say why you chose to keep it to yourself? ] Shame. [Shame. OK]Iwastryingto ... 
pretend it didn't happen I suppose and that was my way of not telling anybody, I thought if I didn't tell anybody and I 
didn't think about it or try not to think about it even though I did and I was having nightmares, um, you, you it was my way 
of dealing with it and my way of thinking well it didn't happen it was just a nightmare you know. Pushittooneside, I 
mean, it'll get blocked away in a little room up in your head and it will stay there. Urn, and if you didn't talk about it then 
it wouldn't come out. ' b) '[Can you say approximately how often you recall and think about these experiences? Is it very 
frequently, or frequently, or] No, not very often, I try not to. [Seldom? ) Very seldorn. ' c) 'the feeling I had after the rape 
was basically shame and still shame, you know but at the time I couldn't tell you, I couldn't tell you because a lot of it's 
been blocked out as well. [Because you try to avoid thinking about it? ] Yes. ' 
16 0) Mental self control: 'Then in the morning, I just ... (sighs) I just carried on as if nothing had happenedý you know, taking 
my little boy to school and I just carried on like, nobody knew. I didn't tell anybody. And I didn't, for a while I just ... it just wasn't there any more. ' 
(ii) Distraction: '[Well, when you remembered it, did it make you feel like doing anything in particular? ] Yes I always 
want to get up and, you know, get up and go downstairs or something and watch telly. (To sort of distract yourself? ] Yeah. 
[Uml. If I dwell on it too long I get really depressed. ' 
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17 (i) General avoidance: 'Um, guilty that not just that other things, I wonder if because I've gone 0 this time pushing 
feelings away... um... things have happened to me, and L yeah, I've put them away and got on with my life. But I'm now 
starting to question if did I do that because they were painful? Or did I do it because at the end of the day I'm maybe not 
very nice ... and, I didn't care anyway? ' 
18 
19 
413 
APPENDIX16 
HABITUAL NON-DISCLOSURE 
P MATERL4, L FROM MERVEEW 
I (i) 'I don't talk about blushing to anybody. You're honoured because you're a psycho-wotsitt' 
(ii) 'No. Never. I've never talked about that to anybody, but you, up until now'. 
(iii) 'But I don't talk about it Push it to the back of my mindý and just hope nobody notices'. 
(iy) '[And do you talk about this experience now? ) No, I keep it to myself . 
2 (i) 'I normally I keep it to myself . 
(ii) 'Well, it was just recently, urn, my family have started talking about it, but I don't like talking about it I 
don't know why we've suddenly started to but we have. Like I've got three other sisters and a brother. Urn. but 
that's why I feel ashamed I don't wanna talk about it I don't wanna hear. ' 
(iii) 'I don't find it beneficial to talk about it because I can't change it' 
(iv) In childhood a) 'No. We'd been told not to say anything to anybody. So nothing was said'. b) 'Urn. we 
used to have a priest that would come round and talk but we weren't allowed to talk or you know, show your 
feelings. You just didn't show your feelings. So there was never really a time that I've said I was scared or 
frightened, you just didn't say that. Um. ' c) 'Urn, I was very nervous as a child, very. And I just buried 
everything. Just teamed to bury it'. 
3 (i) 'normally no I wouldn't. I'd just keep it to myself. 
(ii) 'Because I couldn't tell my friends what I was feeling. I couldn't tell them that' (because of fear that friend 
might not let her see her children). 
4 (i) Re sexual abuse: 'I've only told one person about this, you know, just my supervisor, yeah. I've actually not 
mentioned it to any counsellors either'. 
(ii) 'Yeah I prefer to keep it to myself. Now I do' (re coming out). 
5 (i) (a) 'I don't ever talk, you're the only one I think I've ever talked about it to. [Yeah. Sure. OKI. It's not 
something you would go talking to everybody else about is it really? [No, obviously not]. And the only reason 
I'm telling you is because I know it can't go anywhere. ' (b) 'I've never talked to anyone'. (c) re wife 'I can't 
really talk to her, I would never ever talk to her about things that are going on in here (points to head] because I 
feel that she shouts at me sometimes because of the way I am with the children, not, I'm over-protective 
towards them and I know why I'm overprotective towards them because I'm frightened that something like that 
might happen to them. And it's always in the back here. But I can't tell her that, so I panic constantly'. (d) 'I 
told you I never have, you're the only person I've ever, ever told' ... 
'even my own doctor I'd never talked to 
about it'. 
6 (i) Re feelings of vulnerability. 'I'm ... even though there are times that 
I can feel very nervous, I can feel very 
vulnerable, that side of me doesn't show very well and people see me more as in control and L I've often seen 
that more as a disability now because there are some feelings which I don't express that well, probably because 
I feel ashamed to express them' 
(ii)Howev P also says that he felt compelled to talk to others about what was going on: 'it just became the 
subject of my life, you know, I was trying to find somebody to discuss it with so really I could get clarity and 
hopefully hear what I wanted to hear, you know, that's I don't know what I wanted to hear, that was the other 
thing, I didn't really know what I wanted to hear, I just wanted to talk about it, just made it more comfortable, I 
thought it would, but with my work friends, no, no. ' 
7 (i) Re church: 'I stopped going because I don't understand, they want to know the details and I can't and I 
won't tell them, it's not their business to know'. 
(ii) 'it's not something you would talk about is it, it's personal and private you know'. 
(iii) 'Yeah, but it's such a terrible thing isn't it. How can you tell ordinary people, they're ordinary people 
aren't they but, I don't know. [But most people just wouldn't understand sort of .. ?] 
Well it's personal anyway 
isn't it you don't go telling those ... You wouldn't 
I don't suppose, tell a personal things to ... even 
if it's in- 
laws, you don't do you so'. 
8 (i) 'I don't relate this to other people. I mean [name of wife] knows, urn, Dr 
_ 
knows and you know, but 
outside of that, I wouldn't tell anybody'. 
(ii) P attempts not to display his feelings a) 'I knew the shock was setting in and I didn't want it to show'. b) 
'I've got the character and personality to hide it Because it's such, what shall I say, it's ... such a 
high profile 
position. You've got to remain, urn, inhuman sometimes, what's the word automated, you know, not not let 
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anything show on your face'. 
(iii) 'I've nothing to hide, but I wouldn't mention it to strangers, they'd probably think I was crackers. ' 
9 (i) 'a sense of shame has come in and in fact I never tell anybody that I, it may seem, I never tell people that I 
went there now ... It's really strange that isn't itý maybe partly it's because it's easier to write 
it out and, and 
now I can write it out of my personal history sort of thing'. 
(ii) 'I was insecure you know, I didn't Re to let on what I felt'. 
(iii) 'I much prefer to keep it to myself, yes. No question about that'. 
(iv) 'The other thing, the thing I didn't talk about that's closed off, is, is um. Oh I don't know ... for a start the 
question is about whether I can actually bring myself to talk about it'. 
10 (i) 'I found it was also better to be, oh not to get into a confrontational situation, urn, keep your thoughts to 
yourself and be sort of inward looking you know and suppress any outward signs of emotions, er, self control it 
might be called, er, whatever. Urn... to not let your emotions be seen to becoming out, urn, expressed. ' 
(ii) 'I've had a urn a range of er a range of meetings, er sessions with different people and urn perhaps allowed 
me to open up a little bit more and talk about urn things that are locked up inside my head or where ever urn 
which I haven't talked about for, well I haven't talked about ever, yeah? Not urn ... some things that I've got at 
me in the past that I've talked about, I've never mentioned before, except up there and now perhaps down here 
this afternoon'. 
(iii) 'I would keep it to myself, yeah, as much as, as I said earlier you know it's OK revealing it where it's 
contained, but I wouldn't want it to be I wouldn't like to burden my wife with it you know or anybody I knew, 
I'd prefer to just keep it locked up on my own store of er, bad memories if you like'. 
Ov) 'And urn, that's ... that's me, keep your own counsel'. 
(v) 'I haven't told anybody bar, perhaps in here and at (name of social services centre]. ' 
(i) 'No, no. 1,1 never ever talked to anybody about anything, no'. 
(ii) 'I just thoughtý you know, I don't want anyone to know, I don't want to talk about it I'm perfectly fine, and 
I'm fine, that was it you know, I didn't ... yeah. ' 
(iii) 'I prefer to keep it to myself'. 
(iv) 'these are things I've never told anyone, so... ' 
(v) 'I never wanted anyone to find out'. 
(vi) 'It depends what sort of person you are, I think I'm the type of person I just keep things to myself just to, 
just I think it's easier. And I don't have to go through it again and explain it all, you know, I just keep it to 
myself you know, people don't have to ask questions then you see, so'. 
(vii) Re parents' divorce: 'I mean I never, I never talk to mum about it or ... I never, I didn't talk to anyone'. 
12 (i) 'there was nobody to share the pain with anyone. I couldn't even ... tell my best friend, even now, nobody knows about it' 
(ii) 'No. Nothing. I couldn't even speak to the doctor'. 
(iii) 'But then again I'm that type of person because ... I do tend to keep things to myself, Cos I have, since I have had friends and it takes me ages to trust somebody. And when I do then I tell them things, but I always 
found that they either used it against me or theyjust weren't true friends! 
(iv) 'No. Not really because I can't talk to anybody. I feel that I can't talk to anybody. The person that I want to 
talk about he doesn't want to know'. 
(v) '[do you prefer to keep it to yourself7] Urn ... yes I do. I don't really but I do, it's hard to, it's hard to 
explain. I do but ... even, I've got a very, very best friend, urn, but I still you know it's hard, hard to bring up. [Have you told her or talked to her about it? ] No I haven't. ' 
13 (i) 'generally I don't say anything'. 
(ii) 'Well I wouldn't know how to go about telling people, I wouldn't know how to put the correct words in my 
mouth urn for them to understand'. 
14 (i) [Did you talk to anyone about how you felt afterwards? ] Not at the time. Not at all. ' 
(ii) 'I think it urn, well I think the fact that I never really expressed anything at the time in any direction even, I 
mean that one incidence when we were er, when they first came back, was I think the only time I ever cried. 
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Urn ... and I don't know whether that was a self-defence 
thing, urn I just put the barriers up, but that was 
something sort of that appeared to work for a while then and I've never been able to urn get out of the habit of 
doing that. ' 
(iii) 'I've got to admit it's not the sort of thing I've had, you know, brought up in these sort of situations, but 
actually outside I wouldn't wantý bother to mention it'. 
(iv) 'I mean that's, that's my very nature, its not actually being open'. 
1 
15 (i) 'Um, and the shame afterwards, that's why I never told anybody, I just wanted to put it out the back of my 
head, I never told anybody for years. You know, I never mentioned it to anybody. So LI lived with the shame 
for a long time'. 
(ii) '[did you talk to anyone about how you felt afterwards? ] No. [Not at all? ] No. I shut it outý I didn'twantto 
think about itý I didn't want to talk about it I was tying to pretend it didn't happen. ' 
(iii) 'Um, at the time I didn't have any family, and friends, I mean, what friends I had didn't live in the area 
anyway, so that nobody knew. I never told anyone, so. ' 
(iv) re father's inappropriate sexual behaviour towards her: '[Sighs] My dad tried when I was about 13, um, but 
once again I never, I never told anybody'. 
16 (i) 'I just carried on as if nothing had happened. I never told anybody! 
(ii) 'I didn't tell anybody. And I didn't, for a while I just ... it just wasn't there any more. ' 
(iii) 'I'm not talking about it to anyone at the moment, sort of except now like. ' 
17 (i) 'Because I've gone so many years, you know, like I've said to you, I've gone over _ years with everything bottled up. And not even realising I suppose that it was bottled up, I just thought it was fife. ' 
(ii) 'And it's fimny, you talk about shame. I remember saying please will you not put your sirens on. [Tearful], 
And it's a funny thing to say but I just didn't want them to put the sirens on. I didn't want people to know. ' 
(iii) 'the memories that I don't have to dig very hard to find them, they're very much on the surface. Urn, I've 
just managed for years to cover them over, like wallpapering a crack'. 
(iv) 'I don't really speak to anyone about it. ' 
18 (i) 'Er. well the ordinary person I wouldn't really have tell them I think they would respond in the way I've just 
described. You know, why did you have it done, that's stupid, I'd never have done that'. 
(ii) 'Er, I've been talking to my father about it I would prefer not to be talking about itý er, sometimes talk to 
my brother about it and my best friend in [name of town]. You know I tend to avoid discussing it with them, 
but if they enquire, I'll discuss it yeah'. 
19 (i) 'I've always been quite a private person. Urn, I tend to sort of keep things to myself. ' 
(ii) '[Can you remember how other people treated you when and if you had similar feelings at other times in 
your past? ] Um, well friends, I didn't, I've never really sort of opened up'. 
(iii) 'the thing is I mean I haven't told people. Um, I've sort of you know kept things to myself, um, as I say, 
I've told my mother one or two things in the past but, I mean really I've keptý kept everything to myself 
Perhaps through fear of being embarrassed or sort of laughed at'. 
(iv) 'Well I've always been the sort of person that sort of keeps things bottled up, but I don't think it, s 
particularly healthy'. 
20 (i) 'I just decided to tell them that he'd slept around and not [laughs) really mention what had happened with 
me. So I guess that must say that I felt really, that I wanted to hide it, to bury it to cover it up, to pretend that it 
had never happened really'. 
Note responses to questions regarding disclosure were not recorded, therefore P20 is excluded form most 
analyses. 
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APPENDIX17 
ANTICIPATED RESPONSES TO DISCLOSURE 
P CODE NATERLAL FROM INTERVEEW 
1 (i) labelling, blaming or (i) a) 'To be told you're silly. And they think you can switch it off "What a 
judging silly thing to do, there's nothing to be embarrassed about" or "Oh there's no 
need to blush, there's no need to be embarrassecr', you know. But I know that 
[coughs], you know, I know that, but I can't stop it You know, I wish I 
could'. 
(ii) lack of understanding (i) a) 'I don't think people would understand it I don't think people can 
understand it People who haven't gone through it and don't blush and things 
like that don't understand. They don't understand how crippling it is. They 
really do not understand. ' 
(iii) pointless (iii) a) 'I don't think it could help. I don't think talking could help. Like I say, 
I mean the hypnotherapist came, he tried to hypnotise me to stop it, and that 
didn't work, so talking about it's not going to help. ' b) 'I don't think anybody 
could help. I really don't think they can. I'd like to know if they could. If 
somebody could'. 
2 (i) labelling, blaming or (i) a) 'Um, they probably think it was my fault, you know, just playing up as a 
judging girl. I would feel ashamed, I would feel ashamed telling people'. b) 'I always 
feel as though I'm being judged. U111, whether I think about it or not. If I do 
think about it them by telling you, I would be thinking that you are judging 
me and saying God there's a potential murderess there or, because you don't 
know me, you'd label me as something. That's how I feel. ' 
(ii) lack understanding (ii) 'I always think that they wouldn't believe it, they wouldn't understand. 
Um, they probably think it was my fault, you know, just playing up as a girl. I 
would feel ashamed, I would feet ashamed telling people'. 
(iii) lack of interest/attention (iii) 'I just think they wouldn't care, they wouldn't be bothered, you know'. 
(iv) not believed (iv) 'I always think that they wouldn't believe it'. 
(v) pointless (v) a) 'the one question I've always wanted to ask my dad is 'why? ' That's 
the only thing I want to know is why, I just I can't see how talking about it 
helps. Maybe I'm wrong ... 
if I can't see a solution to the problem I can't see 
the point in tackling the problem because it's not going to be solved, is it? ' b) 
'Because I know in my own mind my memories and the effect they have on 
me. I know why I'm the type of person I am today, and I don't find it 
beneficial to talk about it because I can't change it. ' 
(vi) other (vi) being different: 'I think I remember speaking to friends and saying does 
your dad ever hit you and things like this and they used tojust laugh and I just 
knew then that they didn't so, I didn't say anything more'. 
3 (i) labelling, blaming, (i) a) 'the friends that I did have they haven't been through anything like that 
judging so they just think it's stupid anyway'. b) re boyfriend 'Think he might wonder 
what he's going out with a looney for basically. Might think he's going out 
with someone that was unstable and that and he might not want to go out'. c) 
Re interview itself 'Um, quite useful, yeah, yeah. But I mean I don't know 
what you're dihiking. You're probably thinking, 'oh this stupid woman sitting 
here telling me all this crap'. I don't know. I know with my counsellor what I 
can say to her, 'look what is up front'. And she says 'not I don't get bored 
honestly. I do have a hard time with ya. But you could be sitting there 
thinking 'Oh is it tea break time, I've got to go now'. I don' t know how. ' 
4 (i) upset/ burden others (i) Re sexual abuse: a) 'I was frightened, I was frightened of, if I told my 
mum, I told my dad, you know, how are they going to react, and that family is 
more stronger than ours and urn I'm going to cause problems and um, and uni 
I just sort of left it andjust let it happen'. b)'I mean, I mean I'm happy 
talking about it here because you don't really, you only know me now, you 
didn't know me before and you won't know my, my cousin that's actually did 
it Like, I mean, I couldn't talk to any of them, even however close I was to 
my family, because I don't want, I don't I don't want their ch, their feelings 
towards that person to change because of me. ' c) 'I think um as well if I was 
to take it to the law, you know, what about all the family, you know, pride and 
everything, what's gonna happen and all because of me, you know and um, 
it's best just to keep it hidden really'. 
5 (i) labelling, blaming, (i) a) 'Because I felt so ashamed and people feel disgusted and and reviled by 
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judging that As much as I do my self I wouldn't ever, ever take that chance. I 
couldn't' b) 'I told you I think they would think I was bloody disgusting, and 
wouldn't even want to know me'. 
6 (i) labelling, blaming. (i) a) 'Well LI think if they, if they know that vulnerability then that would 
judging make them back off, yeah, because that's been my experience, you know, that 
they'll back ofr. b) 'Um, respond or feel, yeah. I'll, start the feeling bit, I'd 
think they feel I'm a bit obsessive sometimes and that maybe, yes a shameful 
thing again that maybe ... you know that there's something wrong with me. But I clearly know in the sort of reality of things that it's not about something 
being wrong with somebody, that's not very helpful either, but but sometimes 
that does creep in, you think oh, they'll be thinking there's something wrong 
with me, you know. Bit like that saying, what is iý says I'm not mad but they 
think I am, I say I'm not mad, they say I am mad but I was out voted4 it's sort 
of them out voting you, stupid you know, saying you're mad'. 
7 (i) labelling, blaming. (i) 'I've been aftaid of people judging me and even the Church I had started to 
judging go to when I moved up here, I stopped going because I just don't understand, 
they want to know the details and I can't and I won't tell them, it's not their 
business, you know'. 
8 (i) labelling, blaming, (i) a) 'I've nothing to hide, but I wouldn't mention it to strangers, they'd 
judging probably think I was crackers'. b) 'You could go up and down _ 
Mgh Street 
telling people and they'd think you were crackers'. 
(ii) unhelpful positive (ii) a) 'Erm, people when you relate your experiences such as this to them, 
responses they're sympathetic and it's ... I'm noý like myself, as a character as an individual, I don't mind people saying oh that's a bit of bad luck, but I don't 
want thisý you know sort of what I call patronising sympathy, perhaps it's a 
bit wicked putting somebody down if they try to help you, but I don't want 
that much, you know, um, oh it's difficult ... that much association in that 
area with anybody'. b) 'I feet belittled when people are clearly patronising, I 
feel, well perhaps a bit humiliated, you know, like I'm an object to be pitied'. 
(iii) lack interest/ attention (iii) Re the 'miflanan': 'Well they'd brush over it, they haven't got the skill, 
they haven't got the knowledge you know, that you've obviously got'. 
(iv) positive response (iv) 'I would anticipate a degree of understanding. Um, and that's, and 
perhaps a smear of sympathy'. (Ibis seems to point in the opposite direction 
to the remarks above). 
9 (i) labelling, blamin& (i) a) 'not to talk about it has a lot of it has to do with, oh it's just like 
judging anything else, it's personal to you ... you can't talk because, because of the fear of... that you'll be attacked in some way that will hurt you know ... like I used to be, you know, with - my girlfriend' 
b) 'Well ... yeah there is a link there because um, obviously I do [sighs] it has led to judgements about 
me and inn, and thinking about it, when I think about um, the episode it kind 
of um ... well 
I'm just, certainly as I'm thinking about it I'm trying not to ... I 
would try on the whole to keep it quiet because I don't want to be judged by 
others so on that episode, so that's certainly an area where I don't want to be, 
I would prefer to avoid the judgement of others which is why I keep it quiet' 
c) If disclose now 'I think there are still people who would react a bit 
differently, but I don't know if I particularly care any more how they react 
but, you know people who, who would say Oh well [P's name] if you chuck 
up things like that it's no wonder you're not in a very good job, you know or 
whatever, you know, I can imagine people, plenty of people who would see it 
that way, who would, urn, see it as you know a sign that I was, that I don't 
know, I'm no% not very ambitious or not very sort of, not really, I don't know, 
not really able to make a success of things or something, or not really 
comfortable achieving anything! 
(ii) positive response (ii) P believes now that some people would think it 'innocuous': 
10 (i) labelling, bl g, (i) a) '[In the past how have you tended to think people would respond to you 
judging if they knew about this incident or if you told them? ] Probably laugh at you, 
ridicule, yeah, and that's what you're um, trying to avoid'. b) Contrasts 
disclosure in anonymous research setting with how he feels disclosure would 
be responded to elsewhere: 'In four walls, er, and it's going to be 
anonymously dealt with, um it it doesn't to me then matter you know because 
it's still, when I walk out of there now this afternoon, basically it's still tucked 
up in that file up there and the draw's shut and it's locked it's not, you know 
it's not um. it's not going round people that know me, in a work situation and 
and whatnot and giving people ammunition to look at me in a different light 
or look down on me, or'. 
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(ii) upset/ burden others (ii) a) 'I wouldn't like to burden my wife with it, you know or anybody I 
knew, I'd prefer to just keep it locked up on my own store of er, bad 
memories if you like'. b) 'I wouldn't want to worry her with it'. 
(iii) isolation (iii) in past: 'you didn't want to broach the subject and you'd probably have 
no one to broach it wift I mean if your mum and your older sister are taking 
the mickey out of you over, you know looking down a blouse or looking up a 
girl's skirt, or, you've been playing with yourself or whatever, um. ... I can't 
see my father urn listening to me and taking it, you know, or doing anything 
about it, so who do you take it to, you know, who do you discuss it with? ' 
(i) labelling. blaming, (i) a) 'I'd always be thinking like Oh God mother they know this now and 
judging what's going through their minds and you know, so'. b) 'Um, no, no I think 
the fact that they'd be thinking something in their mind that I wouldn't know 
about and I didn't want you know, so. I don't know. I've got this terrible 
thing about it, people thinking about ... I don't, if I do something wrong, I 
always have to do things right because I don't anyone diinking bad of me or 
anym, I mean its still now, I still feel it now. And I'm always oh on edge like, 
cos er, or like worried about this. that and the other, or are they going to think 
this, are they going to think that That could be anyone, you know, so. ' 
(ii) upset/burden others (ii) '[have you talked to anyone about it? ] No. No. I wouldn't have really at 
all. I'm ... because 
like mum found something out urn like month ago and she 
was really annoyed, well she was upset and everything, so um. ' 
(iii) unhelpful positive (iii) 'No, L cos they tend to feel sorry for you and ... you think, well I was 
responses strong through it you know, and we're alright'. 
(iv) other (iv) Shock- a) 'I wouldn't talk about it to anyone normally, cos it's. I don't 
know. It's this thing about shock on someone's face, or ... just ... I don't know, whether it ... for some reason ... urn if you're like actually ashamed, 
you know using your word but, shamed in the sense that there so - you know, 
this actually happened and you know you don't want to say it to anyone, you 
know'. b) 'I think they would probably be shocked. I mean, in order to stop 
that shock, I didn't want to tell anyone'. 
12 (i) labelling, blaming, (i) a) 'I do tend to keep things to myself. Cos I have, since I have had friends 
judging and it takes me ages to trust somebody. And when I do then I tell them things, 
but I always found that they either used it against me or they just weren't true 
friends'. b) 'people don't talk about things like that Especially in those days. 
They did, they did class it as disgusting, dirty and shouldn't be done and 
everything else. ' 
(ii) upset/ burden others (ii) 'I would still feel the same and I might upset somebody ... by telling them because they might not understand or they would feel sorry, or ... I 
(iii) lack of understanding (iii) a) 'So really I ... thinking about 
it now, it would have been better to have 
some professional help at the time, not necessarily talking to a friend because 
... friend wouldn't understand'. 
b) 'It's just not done, is i% not ... done ftg to. It's like opening the wounds and at the end of it er I would still feel the 
same and I might upset somebody ... by telling them because they might not 
understand or they would feel sorry, or... ' c) 'I think they wouldn't 
understand. [Why do you think they wouldn't understand, why do you think 
that is? ] Well unless it's happened to them, it's very hard to understand' 
Ov) trust (iv) a) 'Because there was nobody I could trust I wasn't born here, I had, I 
didn't have no family here, I didn't have no, I had some friends but they 
weren't ... friends that I can trust'. b) 'I do tend to keep things to myself. Cos I have, since I have had friends and it takes me ages to trust somebody. And 
when I do then I tell them things, but I always found that they either used it 
against me or they just weren't true friends'. 
(v) pointless (v) a) 'I don't think it would make any difference talking to anybody now'. b) 
'What's the point it won't bring back anything will it? I'd be just going over 
and over the same thing [sighs], getting upset and the feeling would be still 
there ... tomorrow and the day after. ' 
(vi) isolation (vi) 'I can express myself but there is nobody to express it'. 
(vii) other - shocked (vii) 'I think they would be shocked, urn ... because I tend to keep the 
appearance [sigh] as if I'm in control. I'm not'. 
13 (i) lack of understanding (i) 'Well I wouldn't know how to go about telling people, I wouldn't know 
how to put the correct words in my mouth urn for them to understand. Its all 
something, you know ... But I suppose lots of people have these traumas, as a 
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child4 as children and not be able to talk about them. They wouldn't know 
how to put it across at all. ' 
(ii) not believed (ii)'l think they wouldn't believe me. I've never known how to describe 
what happened between me and my brother. Urn, I wouldn't know how to go 
about telling people, I don't think they'd believe me. ' 
14 (i) labelling, blaming. (i) a) 'I suppose its ... it's this, it just comes back to this thing you know about judging I will not be hurt again, but if you let it ... by the very nature if you let 
somebody understand what really motivates you or what your really feeling, 
it can by definition be used against you, if they were that way inclined, but I 
mean ... [In what ways? Why would people be able to use it against you? Um ... ... Well that's perhaps the wrong way of put-, if... People can only hurt you if I mean if you let them in in the first place. ' b) 'I mean its stopped 
me talking to some people if I thought um ... ... ... its letting them know that 
you're vulnerable I suppose! 
(ii) lack interest/attention (ii) a) '[What about in the past, have you, how have you tended to think that 
other people would respond to you, if they knew about what happened? ] 
That's the type of thing I mean to anybody else its no big deal. I wouldn't 
expect them to give a damn. Because I mean really um ... ... ... ... 
I mean I've 
got to admit I mean its probably even the attitude I'd take myself Vf 
somebody else ... ?] Yeah 
I mean, so what, those things happen. Urn, Its 
nobody else's problem. ' b) 'I think initially, I don't think there was actually 
anybody ... nobody asked me 
for one thing. But on the other hand I mean, 
there wasn't, there wasn't anybody immediately there that, who would listen I 
don't suppose! c) 'Well they'd got their own problems, I mean [inaudible], 
obviously, but well perhaps it was her way of dealing with it but my mother 
got bogged down with practicalities, I mean initially there was obviously 
arrangements and whatever and then she had to like, she was a housewife 
then, and then she had to find ajob and sort of so And urn, I don't know 
whether, I mean I can't remember actually whether she did ask me or not, but 
UM, ... .... 
(iii) isolation (iii) a) See (ii) b) above 'I don't think there was actually anybody immediately 
there that, who would listen I don't suppose'. b) 'At the moment I don't ... it 
sounds a bit extreme but there probably isn't anybody. Cos urn, ... maybe because of one reason or another I have got rather isolated recently. ' 
15 (i) labelling, blaming, (i) 'I think. I don't know, but I think going back I think they would probably, 
judging I don't know they probably think I'm sort of oh keep away, you know, she's 
been violated or, urn, men would probably think of me as a big joke or you 
know they wouldn't. if I was in a relationship they think oh you know we 
don't want to go with her because she's been, been with somebody else, two 
at the time, you know, it, I think, I don't really know because as I say I was on 
my own at the time, so. I think men react different then than they do now. ' 
(ii) positive response (ii) Exceptional comment re present 'No different to, I'm no different to 
anybody else. I don't expect sympathy, I don't expect a cuddle, I don't 
expect I'm sorry, I don't expect ... its not something that comes out in a 
sentence, its not something that comes out in everyday conversation. Urn, if 
the subject does come up you're obviously talking about something that 
evolves around that or close to it Um. or somebody else that its happened to. 
But no I don't expect to be treated any different, I'm no different to anybody 
else. [OF, But you'd expect people to respond sympathetically, or, you 
know, accepting it ] Just accept it It happened and there is nothing I can do 
tochangeit. It doesn't make me... it makes me a different person, but 
doesn't make me a worse person. 
16 (i) labelling, blaming, (i) a) 'Well it made me start thinking there was something in me that was 
judging making, made, [inaudible] you know. Every time I tried to have a relationship 
or something, I always ended up being (inaudible, followed by interviewer 
saying'what? '] you know somebody being violent. Ijustthoughtlwasjust 
paranoid that nobody knew again because I thought people would think Oh 
my God, you know, she's like a walking disaster area. I didn't want me mum 
to know. Me mum had never been able to accept what had happened like 
when I was a child. I thought if I could pretend it never happened it 
wouldn't matter like, you know nobody, if nobody knew ... ... I could just go on as if it was, everything was normal. ' b) 'Well, I've always, I've always 
thought if I told somebody everything what had happened, everything like, 
they'll just think I must, there must be something the matter with me. Just 
seems so, you know, somebody can have so many of these things happening, 
you know. Some people go through life and they have nothing don't they? I 
seem to go from one to the other. [So it sounds like you feet that if you told 
people about the rape that they would have thought it was something to do 
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with you rather than something more, that done to you? ] Yeah. ' c) 'I didn't 
want, I was horrified about anybody finding out ... ... At the time I found it 
easierjust to pretend it never happened ... ... and make everything 
look 
normal, in front of everybody, although I mean it wasn't normal but, I was 
paranoid about, making sure that everybody thought it was, I was, that 
nothing had happened and I'd never been there. ' 
(ii) lack interest/attention (ii) a) 'I think people expect me just to carry on ... you know, put it aside'. b) 'I think my friends are a bit panicky in case I start talking about it agairL They 
don't like, you know. So, I don't tak I don't talk to any of them now about 
anything. It's a bit embarrassing really. Sometimes I wish I hadn't told them. ' 
c) 'I'd have liked one of them to at least you know, to be able to talk to, bring 
it up again like. But I don't feel as if I can do that. I think people expect me 
just to carry on ... you know, put it aside'. 
17 (i) positive response (i) a) unsure, bordering on positive: '... People I work with now... I'm not sure 
about um because they've only known me 7 years in that job. They didn't 
know my husbandý they don't know my history and ... there may be 
speculation, LI don't know, um, hopefully they've known me long enough to 
know the kind of person I am. But they never had the background 
knowledge, so I don't know. [So you're not sure how they would respond? ] 
No. ' b) Concern with possible judgement but optimistic: '... Still I expect 
them to respond with shock ... but hopefully not to judge too harshly. And to 
try and understand'. 
is (i) labelling, blaming, (i) a) 'Er, I would think a lot of people, a lot of fairly shallow people, well I 
judging say shallow people who are close friends of mine, would probably say oh 
your stupid you shouldn't have had it done, things like that. I think that's the 
way they would have reacted. ' b) 'Er, well the ordinary person I wouldn't 
really have tell them I think they would respond in the way I've just 
describedL You know, why did you have it done, that's stupid, I'd never have 
that done'. 
19 (i) labelling, blaming, (i) a) 'Urn, I tend to sort of keep things to myself and you know, I've never 
judging been in that sort of situation sort of telling other people my business sort of 
thing, you know. Um, so I mean from that point of view I didn't really want to 
tell anybody, um, in case they got sort of an impression of me sort of thing, 
you know. [So what sort of impression would you be concerned about? ] Urn, 
well I've always been quite a strong person, sort of strong minded and quite 
sort of, urn self-de-, you know sort of self reliant, um, and I just didn't people 
to think I was perhaps weak and sort of er, insecure or, um a bit soft sort of 
thing, you know. ' b) 'I mean really I've kept kept everything to myself. 
Perhaps through fear of being embarrassed or sort of laughed at' 
(ii) lack of interest/ attention (ii) 'Urn, well the thing is I mean it all happened so long ago I mean they 
probably wouldn't be that bothered. Urn. [What the divorce? ] Yeah, oh, if I 
told them now? Oh I don't think they'd be that interested to be honest with 
you, um, as I say as far as they're concerned I mean, that's its all over and 
done with like, you know. Everything's been finalised and that's it, you 
know. 
(iii) pointless (iii) 'Um, well it's all over and done with now, so, um, it doesn't make much 
sense sort of resurrecting the past, um, I don't see it sort of serves any 
purpose. Urn. I think you should perhaps let sleeping dogs lie'. 
20 1 iI 
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APPENDIX18 
SELF-RELATED FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH NON-DISCLOSURE 
P CODE MATERIAL FROM INTERVIEW 
1 (i) shame and self-conscious (i) a) 'I suppose it's because I'm ashamed and embarrassed and I didn't want 
emotions people to enlarge on it I wanted them just to think it and forget it If I'd have 
talked about it they would have dwelt on it and may be watching me closer. 
You know what I mean? And I'd have felt as if they were watching, me 
waiting for me to do it again. ' 
(ii) inability to justify own (ii) a)'... when I went through my depressions I wanted a broken leg, or I 
feelings wanted a heart attack, or I wanted to break out in a rash, so that people would 
know there was something wrong with me. You know because people just 
don't know. You can't explain to people how you feel about that'. 
2 (i) shame and self-conscious (i) a) 'I always think that they wouldn't believe it, they wouldn't understand. 
emotions Um, they probably think it was my fault, you know, just playing up as a girl. I 
would feel ashamed, I would feel ashamed telling people'. b) 'Well, it was 
just recently, um, my family have started talking about it, but I don't like 
talking about it I don't know why we've suddenly started to but we have. 
Like I've got three other sisters and a brother. Urn, but that's why I feel 
ashamed I don't wanna talk about it. I don't wanna hear. ' 
(ii) reluctance to experience (ii) a) 'Because to hear it makes it real and I'm too good at burying things to 
unpleasant make them become real'. b)'Because it makes me feel like I do now. I feel 
emotions/memories quite sick now. ' c) 'I panic and I get too involved and it all comes out and just 
flashes. I can see everything. My worst part of me is I've got such a good 
memory. d) Re one friend: 'I have spoken to her in the past about certain 
things, um, but then I tend to move away from it as it gets too painful., 
3 
4 
5 (i) shame and self-conscious (i) 'Because I felt so ashamed and people feel disgusted and and reviled by 
emotions that As much as I do my self. I wouldn't ever, ever take that chance. I 
couldn't. ' 
6 (i) shame and self-conscious (i) a) 'there are some feelings which I don't express that well, probably 
emotions because I feet ashamed to express them' b) 'Very nervous, very unsure of 
myself, unable to, you know I'd know what I want to say but I wouldn't be 
able to string it together cos I didn't know if my voice would shake and I 
wouldn't get it out and then I would look really weak because I didn't want to 
appear weak because I felt weak. ' c) 'Yeah ... yes I suppose in a, yes, I ... I 
would cringe at what people might think, whether what they would be 
thinking was a shameful thing'. 
(ii) rejection own feelings (ii) see (i) a). 
7 (i) reluctance to experience (i) P did not tell husband about abuse for some time: 'I didn't tell him straight 
unpleasant away about my sister because I just couldn't, I mean, it's like you, you're 
emotionstmemories having to face something in your mind that you know to talk about it, you're 
sort of making it more real. ... I 
didn't tell him for, I think, about two or three 
years'. 
8 (i) inability to justify own (i) 'it would be more explaining to them, you know. And at the end of the day, 
feelings you can sit here, anybody can sit here and ask me why it happens and I don't 
know. So it would be frustrating'. 
9 (i) cause of shame and other (i) a) 'So a sense of shame has come in and in fact I never tell anybody that L 
self-conscious emotions it may seem, I never tell people that I went there now' b) 'I'd always tell them 
about 
_ 
college, but not about the first, cos it just makes me feel a fool and 
it also, ... 
I suppose itjust dredges up all these feelings of inadequacy'. 
(ii) inability to justify own (ii) 'Maybe it's because I ... 
it might be that way round, that I can't really 
feelings work out what it was like and therefore I don't want to talk about it because I 
can't um, find the language that actually urn expresses what it was, I don't 
know, I don't know really. 
(iii) reluctance to experience (iii) a) 'you're admitting a lot aren't you if you ... you 
kind of... it reinforces 
unpleasant emotions/ for a while your feelings of inadequacy to go and admit there's a problem, it 
memories sort of um makes it harder, even if it eventually helps, it's hard to admit a 
problem to begin with. ' b) 'there was a feeling that getting in contact with that 
will only meet, meet with negative feelings o depression or whatever, and 
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you, youý it's just you know opening old wounds sort of thing'. c) it's 
bringing up the incompetence thing again, that thing of you know feeling not 
... that you're a bit of a 
fool or you're incompetent or whatever, and um, I 
suppose it simply one doesn't want to dwell on that it'. 
10 (i) cause of shame and other (i) '[Can you say why you chose to keep it to yourself? ) That's it, shame. 
self-conscious motions [Right. That's where the shame came in]. Or embarrassment, yeah'. 
(i) cause of shame and other (i) a) 'Uniý I don't know, its just something that I wouldn't talk about to 
self-conscious emotions anyone normally, cos its, I don't know. Its this thing about shock on 
someone's face, or ... just ... I don't know, whether it ... for some reason ... 
um, if your like actually asharnedý you know using your word but, sharned in 
the sense that there so-, you know, this actually happened and you know you 
don't want to say it to anyone, you know. ' b) '[Does the shame part of it 
maybe stop you sort of sharing important things about your experience and 
your feelings and stuM1 Oh yes because I never wanted anyone to find out. 
And I thought well, if we ever get into a conversation what am I going to say, 
you know. I thought no I can't have this. So. I'm running away. [Laughs]. I 
think that's what it was, yeah'. 
(ii) out of character (ii) a) The importance of being 'strong': 'I think I was, I always wanted to 
feel a very s, you know determined character as you said, I wanted to try and 
sort of like, you know that a strong character, and by talking to anybody and 
by doing, by saying this it's like saying well I'm not very strong, you know'. 
b) '[What would you have expected if you had spoken to somebody about itý 
what do you think would have ... if you can think back into how you felt 
then? ] I think the fact that they were getting to know me a bit, they were 
getting to know my family life, you know, or ... and I didn't want that either, I just wanted them to know me, you know, I'm happy, I'm fine, but I was ... 
you know, so. that's why'. 
(iii) inability to justify own (iii) 'it's just something a mother and a father, you never hear of thatý I think 
feelings that's what it is. ' 
(iv) reluctance to experience 
unpleasant emotions/ (iv) 'I don*tý I, I think I just I wanted it to go away. I just, I thought by talking 
memories to people and stuff like that it would come back to me and I didn't want that. 
You know, I just thought you know, I don't want anyone to know, I don't 
want to talk about itý I'm perfectly fine, and I'm fine, that was it you know, I 
didn't... yeah. ' 
12 (i) cause of shame and other (i) 'And also ... even if I had someone to talk to, I couldn't talk because I felt 
self-conscious emotions I'd done wrong ... and I was ashamed. I was ashamed for letting it happen 
and I was ashamed for having an abortion. Everything. I 
(ii) out of character (ii) 'I think they would be shocked, um ... because I tend to keep the 
appearance [sigh] as if I'm in control. I'm not'. 
(iii) inability to justify own (iii) a) 'I thought that something was wrong with me because I never heard of 
feelings things like that, I never heard of anybody having an abortion, and I never 
heardýyouknow. Everybody seemed ... happy and everything was in place 
around me, and er, people don't talk about things like that. ' b) 'It's just not 
done, is it? Not ... done thing to. ' 
(iv) reluctance to experience (iv) 'It's just not done, is it? Not ... done thing to, It's like opening the 
unpleasant wounds and at the end of it er I would still feel the same and I might upset 
emotions/memories somebody'. 
13 (i) inability to justify own (i) a) 'I wouldn't know how to go about telling people, I don't think they 
feelings would believe me'. b) 'Well I wouldn't know how to go about telling people, 
I wouldn't know how to put the correct words in my mouth urn for them to 
understand. It's all something, you know ... But I suppose lots of people have these traumas, as a child, as children and not be able to talk about them. They 
wouldn't know how to put them across at all'. 
GO other (ii) 'Cos 1. I'm meant to get on with my life, you know, not think about it all 
the time. You can't go on thinking about things like that all the time now'. 
14 (i) cause of shame and self- (i) '... This is quite difficult. I think it ... ... ... it was something I didn't conscious emotions understand and perhaps that's where shame came in, that I didn't understand 
it And... it was like hiding it, or making it a secret, like locking it away. ' 
15 (i) cause of shame and self- (i) a) 'Urn, and the shame afterwards, that's why I never told anybody, Ijust 
conscious emotions wanted to put it out the back of my head, I never told anybody for years. You 
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know, I never mentioned it to anybody. So I, I lived with the shame for a long 
time'. b) '[can you say why you chose to keep it to yourself? ] Shame. 
[Shame. 01C) I was trying to ... pretend 
it didn't happen I suppose and that 
was my way of not telling anybody, I thought if I didn't tell anybody and I 
didn't think about it or try not to think about it even though I did and I was 
having nightmares, um, you, you it was my way of dealing with it and my 
way of thinking well it didn't happen it was just a nightmare you know. Push 
it to one sideý I mean, it'll get blocked away in a little room up in your head 
and it will stay there. Um, and if you didn't talk about it then it wouldn't 
come out' 
(ii) reluctance to experience (ii) a) 'I thought if I didn't tell anybody and I didn't think about it or try not to 
unpleasant think about it even though I did and I was having nightmares, um, you, you it 
emotionshnemories was my way of dealing with it and my way of thinking well it didn't happen it 
was just a nightmare you know. Push it to one side, I mean, it'll get blocked 
away in a little room up in your head and it will stay there. Unt, and if you 
didn't talk about it then it wouldn't come out' b) 'you want to forget it you 
want it to be buried, you want it to go away so you can get on with your life, 
forget about it so, no you don't want to talk about it because you just want it 
to be gone. Notý not so much pretend that it didn't happen, but you just want 
to go on with. get on with your life and just, that's another experience that 
you've had. push it to one side'. 
16 (i) cause of shame and self- (i) '[So when you, you know not telling anyone, was that because you felt 
conscious emotions guilty or because you felt ashamed to tell anybody? ] Well I feltý yeah, I just 
felt ashamed of itý because I mean you know I thought everybody would just 
say I asked for it You know, I should never have gone in. I couldn't believe 
it Just all happened so quick, you know, and this it was like one minute he 
was alright and the next he was a raving nut case. ' 
17 (i) cause of shame and self- (i) 'that's something that brings shame in the respect that you can't speak 
conscious emotions about it If people say to me, they automatically presume you're divorced, 
which I never said, I've always said no I'm not I'm a widow, urn, but if 
people ask oh I'm sorry how did he die, I automatically say, oh it was a car 
accident, um, and not go into it Urn, because you can see the horror. 
lberefore it's best not to say anything! 
18 
19 (i) cause of shame and self- (i) Embarrassment: 'I mean really I've kept, kept everything to myself. 
conscious emotions Perhaps through fear of being embarrassed or sort of laughed at. ' (Excluded 
from percentage because embarrassment not shame). 
(ii) out of character (ii) 'well I've always been quite a strong person, sort of strong minded and 
quite sort of, um self-de-. you know sort of self reliantý um, and I just didn't 
people to think I was perhaps weak and sort of er, insecure or, urn a bit soft 
sort of thing'. 
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APPENDIX19 
THEMF, S ASSOCIATED WITH THE BROADER CONTEXT OF 
EMOTIONAL ISOLATION 
P CODE I MATERIAL FROM MERVEEWS 
1 (i) differencetmargin isation (i? 'I thought it's not fair, why should it be me. Other people don't [inaudible) 
it s only me. ' 
(ii) negative identity (ii) a) 'It gives me an inferiority complex. I feel inferior. [inaudible] 
That's 
the main thing I think, feel inferior. I feel angry as well. Like we've just said 
in the last question that people seem to be able to go through their lives with 
no hang-ups and I can't do what I want to do. So jealousy. ' b) 'Inferior. Feel 
inferior. Childish, childish. I think that's about it' c) 'I could have a better 
future if it wasn't for that I know I definitely could because I could change 
my job [coughs] which would mean I'd get more money, which means I could 
get everything I want which means I could have a better future. Urn, I'd be 
self-satisfied; I'd be a different person. I'd be the person I want to be. ' 
(iii) diminished social (iii) experience related to a tendency to avoid situations where she might be 
involvement scrutinised by others: a) 'I couldn't sit in a room with a lot of people in case a 
person spoke to me and everybody focused their attention on to me'. b) 
Prefers socialising in dimly lit places (bars, discos). Won't go line dancing 
with daughter. c) Work: as cleaner 'I'm alright because I can say, I must get 
on, and go when I feel the need to go. I would love to change myjob, but 
because I'm too frightened to do it.... ' d) aspirations: would like to go to 
college 'Things like this really interest me, so I'd love to do something like 
that But I haven't go the confidence to do it, because of blushing'. e) 
recreation: ('my daughter keeps asking me to go line dancing, but I think, no I 
daren't, because if I made a mistake I'm going to be embarrassed and go redý 
and... I mean for a_ year old woman it's a silly thing to do. You can get 
away with it when you're a young girl and when you're a teenager, a forty 
nine year old woman, you know, you really should be able to control yourself 
a little doing that So there again, shamel Shame- [You feel shame? ] That I 
can't control it'. f) Generally: 'no end of things. [cough] I could go on for 
ever' (in answer to question 'do you think that the experience of shame led 
you to avoid certain kinds of situation which might otherwise have been 
upsetting? '). Supports this by recalling another incident in which she became 
embarrassed as a child. 
(iv) lack of confidence (iv) a) P would like to go to college 'Things like this really interest me, so I'd 
love to do something Re that But I haven't go the confidence to do it 
because of blushing'. b) 'I've always been a blusher. And that has been the 
bane of my life, it has. If somebody could give me a pill to stop that I would 
change completely, I would be a different person. 'Cos I've got all this 
confidence inside me, but, the lack of confidence shows on the outside, do 
you know what I mean? I could cover it up quite well. It's lack of confidence. 
If it wasn't for the blushing giving me away. And I could have done a lot 
better and gone a lot further, I know I could, if I didn't blush and give myself 
away. So, that has always been the bane of my life'. 
(i) difference/margin i On Ie ei ce w0 vious yv 
met different people I know it's not and I feet ashamed because we were very 
poor. I mean my father was rich but we were very poor. We didn't have 
proper clothes, we didn't have, we didn't know how to eat properly because 
we didn't have much food, it's lots of things. I didn't have any social graces 
or anything like that and I felt ashamed. I just felt ashamed of being me 
basically, just felt worthless, you know, and other people talk about, you 
know, things they'd get for their birthday, or things that their mum and dad 
used to do with them and talk about, and that never happened with us and I 
felt ashamed because of that I suppose. ' 
(ii) negative identity (ii) a) P says 'I always felt I was stupid' b) 'Um, it highlights that I feel 
useless. Um, it highlights, I just don't think there is any good in me or I don't 
think I am any good. Um, yeah, it does highlight [? ] feelings'. c) 'I mean it 
changed my life, I mean confidence wise. I don't feet a real person [long 
pause]. It's difficult to explain. I don't feel, I don't feel that I should be worth 
living, I don't feel [pause]. How to explain it? I don't like the sound of my 
own name being called. I don't like looking in a mirror at myself. I find it 
hard to accept compliments. I find it hard that somebody can care for me. And 
I think, I think that that's due to that Does that make sense? ' 
(iii) concealment/masking (iii) 'the only way I can think it makes me deceitful is (pause] is that they 
don't see my true personality because I don't, I just, you know, switch off. Put 
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a smile andjust change the subject'. 
(iv) diminished social (iv) P talks about a long-term pattern of social avoidance and isolation starting 
involvement when she was a child: 'I was very, I think I was a very nervous child. I mean I 
would never, I didn't like being in groups. I didn't like being in enclosed 
places either. And I wasn't very good at communicating so I didn't go out 
with friends very much especially when I started Dob] I kept my distance. 
Um, again I think it's the confidence part I never felt as good as them. 
Always felt that I was stupid. ' 
(v) lack of confidence (v) a) 'I was very, I think I was a very nervous child. I mean I would never, I 
didn't like being in groups. I didn't like being in enclosed places either. And I 
wasn't very good at communicating so I didn't go out with friends very much 
especially when I started nursing I kept my distance. Urn, again I think it's the 
confidence parL I never felt as good as them. Alwayi felt that I was stupid'. b) 
'I think it's ruined my life completely. Urn, I think, you know, my childhood 
was not very nice in many ways, um, because of that it has ruined my adult 
life. It's made me more of [inaudible] and I should have been stronger. Urn, 
it's definitely made me have very, very low confidence. ' c) 'I mean it changed 
my life, I mean confidence wise. I don't feel a real person [long pause]. It's 
difficult to explain. I don't feel, I don't feet that I should be worth living, I 
don't feel [pause]. How to explain it? I don't like the sound of my own name 
being called. I don't like looking in a mirror at myself. I find it hard to accept 
compliments. I find it hard that somebody can care for me. And I think, I 
think that that's due to that Does that make sense? ' 
3 (i) difference/marginalisation (i) a) 'I think she's got everything she wants. She's got a lovely family, she's 
got a loving husband. Why haven't I got that? You know, everyone's so 
lucky. ' b) 'I felt unwanted. Urn, I felt that there's no point in going on 
because I couldn't have what I wanted in life. I hadn't got a, hadn't got a 
partner. Uni, nobody seemed to listen to what L what I was saying, living on 
my own, Ijust couldn't cope' c) 'I feel I'm ugly, nobody wants me and I 
haven't got, I can't give people what they want. I mean most people can just 
have a partner and have a baby like that. There's something wrong with me, I 
know there is. I can't have a b-, I can't have children naturally. So, yes. ' 
(ii) negative identity (ii) a) 'It makes me think that I definitely am a really horrible and an ugly 
person and that I have been for years and that's why I'm still as I arn. Yes'. b) 
'I feel I'm ugly, nobody wants me and I haven't got, I can't give people what 
they want I mean most people can just have a partner and have a baby like 
that. There's something wrong with me, I know there is. I can't have a b-, I 
can't have children naturally. So, yes. ' 
(iii) concealment/masking (iii) a) 'Yeah, because normally they say I'm a happy-go-lucky person, but it 
isn't, it's a front When it's deep down it's I ike I'm very unhappy and very 
don't want to do anything. And that's the side, sort of most people don't see 
of me. Because when people come round I put on a different front, I try to be 
happy and there's times they're gonna get me when I'm not and they're gonna 
wonder why. That's the real me. ' b) 'Urn, yeah, I mean you hide your 
feelings. You don't even let people know that you're feeling, you try to hide 
your feelings and you try to hide that you know, you've been just overeating 
and got a problem. You try to hid them. Then when people go when they say 
they'll call round, they stay a few minutes, when they go um, you're back to 
your normal self. You're down and You're looking at the clock and you're 
looking at the fridge and they catch you unawares. ' 
(iv) diminished social (iv) a) 'I mean, um, I love to um, to do drama and do pantos but in the last involvement few years I mean I nearly backed out of one last year, I'm normally excited 
and thrilling and wanting to go. Now I, I can't be bothered. I mean if I could 
stay in bed all day, I'd do it I don't even like shopping. I feel everybody's 
looking at me when I'm in the shop. I can't even, you know a simple thing 
like going and pick a bag of soap powder and I'm like, no, no. someone else 
go for me. You know even the little girl down the road 'go on go shop for me 
quick' [inaudible]. ' b) P says that the experience she recounted has not 
changed her recurring pattern of social withdrawal: 'And I go to bed. I shut 
off - I'm quite abusive to people when I'm on the phone. That hasn't changed 
me. My friends know I'm like that and theyjust don't bother ringing when I'm like that, Cos nothing they Can Say Will make me get up and go out, Cos I 
won't do it and I can end up saying of for god's sake leave me and shut up 
and I'll put the phone down'. 
(v) relationship difficulties (v) a) P says that thinking about the incident makes her 'very difficult'. b) 
Seems to give up on the goal of getting others to like her. 'Yeah. I don't think 
people do like me. I just don't think they do. ' ... 'I give up trying. Yes. ' 
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4 (i) differencelmarginalisation 
(ii) values 
(iii) concealment/masking 
(iv) diminished social 
involvement 
(i) 'I wanted to tell somebody in my own family so that I could feel a bit 
comfortable at home. It's like lead-, it's like, it's like um, I'm leading a 
double life and I'm acting, you know, which I don't want to do'. 
(ii) 'like homosexuality especially in our community its like you know its a 
sin' 
(iii) 'I wanted to tell somebody in my own family so that I could feel a bit 
comfortable at home. It's like lead-, it's like, it's like um, I'm leading a 
double life and I'm acting, you know, which I don't want to do'. 
(iv) '[Sigh]. Like my social life. Urn I won't go out to weddings with my 
parents, family weddings. I don't like to cos I feel out of place because um 
I'm not I'm not able to enjoy myself how I want to. ' 
5 (i) negative identity (i) a) 'I think it started to make me feel as if I was worthless, not really worth 
much at all. So, you know, I've never held down ajob at all. I generally 
thought I was no good in any case. First marriage broke up. This one looks as 
though it's going the same way'. b) 'I should say 88% of the time I feet I am 
quite worthless. I've no prospects, no future, I haven't really done much. That 
was the whole idea really I suppose of me doing this voluntary thing at 
because I would, I could say to myself look what you're doing, you're doing 
something good. But when I think about all the other things it seems to knock 
that on the head straight away. ' c) P says he is 'Sick about myself. The way 
my whole life's gone in any case since ... Sometimes I think it's like God's 
retribution on me, and maybe that's why I'm being punished now by all the 
things that are happening, even in my own family at the moment'. 
(ii) concealment/masking (ii) a) 'Well people don't know, so their attitudes or opinions of me are only 
what I want to project to them. ' b) 'New people? It's always the same with 
everybody really so the questions seem to me a bit academic because L like 
I've told you I project what I think people want to see, because people don't 
want. My vicar told me once that people don't want to see a sad face. They 
only want to see somebody who's cheerful. And I think that's true. People 
don't really want to know you if you... ' c) 'Yeah I suppose so because, I 
haven't got much, I try to make out I've absolutely got tons of self-confidence 
and all this crap but nobody really knows me. And I haven't I'm very good at 
projecting a different type of person to other people. I've learnt. I mean I 
work [inaudible] I told you [workplace]. They don't really know what I'm 
like, they only see what I project to them, what I want to project to them. 
Because I don't want them really to know me. Because they're [slight laugh] 
they're snobs, I don't mean it. I have to be careful, I don't want them to talk 
down to me. So I try very hard to be 'intellectual'. More accepted. ' 
(iii) relationship difficulties (iii) a) 'People sometimes don't know how to take me because I tend to be an 
outwardly tying to joke and smile. And then when I do get a day where I just 
can't no matter how hard I try I can't get to be like that they think 'Ooh God 
what sort... ' They don't want to know me. [And that happens after you've 
thought about it? ] Yeah. [OK. So does that make you a lot more difficult with 
other people do you think? ] I suppose it makes it a lot more difficult round 
people because they only see that side of me and the side they I ike. It's the 
same really with my wife you know. Sometimes she keeps saying what's the 
matter with you? You're not speaking. What's the matter with you? 
[Inaudible] I'm just saying ch shut up, leave me alone. ' b) P also puts more 
demands on his relationship: 'More demands on my relationship because I've 
got to be positive that they do really care about me. ' 
ti) cimerenceimargmalisation (i) I also felt ashamed that because a lot of the staff were women, I was the 
only male there, that I felt that they were all sort of gossiping about me and I 
was in isolation, I'd been marginalised by it all and I felt ashamed about my 
behaviour, you know, them thinking I was weak and like... ' 
(ii) negative identity (ii) 'talking about whether the memory highlights any beliefs or ideas about 
himself. 'I suppose in some ways that I'm unlikeable in some ways maybe'. 
(iii) diminished social (iii) 'I changed job. I mean it was the biggest um overbearing factor of the 
involvement move so I decided to move on, so I've got to change this, and yeah, 
absolutely'. 
7 (i) difference/marginalisation (i) 'I've always felt a very strong sense of ostracisation because my family 
were poor, because we were Christian, bible bashers, holy Joes [laughs]. ' 
(ii) diminished social (ii) a) P describes how as a result of the experience she feels she has lost God 
involvement and Jesus: 'So my life changed and my faith, I lost God, I couldn't find him. I 
couldn't find where he was, I still can't althouph. I can but he's different to 
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what I thought, so perhaps that's not true and it's been a good discovery. I've 
lost the person who was closest to me, if this is any hassle to any one I'm 
sorry but it's the truth, mentally and emotionally which is Jesus. He was a 
person to me and my ftiendý mm, from 9 years old. I still can't find him 
because at one point I realised he was male, so I just, I suppose, I've shut 
myself off to him somehow, so, um, it's affected me every way, ' b) P 
describes how it destroyed the tug she had felt for her parents, and people in 
general: 'I felt I could go and murder my parents, which was a horrifying 
thing to feet, uni, they were the only people I trusted, L we didn't realise, well 
that's a weird thing to say because I was totally trusting I think from the age 
of about 19 to [date of re-remembering abuse], totally trusting and then I 
suddenly went right the other way, I didn't trust anybody and I still don't'. c) 
Left her church: 'The most immediate effect it had was that I left the Church! 
This was 'cataclysmic' for her. d) After the way she was treated by her church 
she became very suspicious of authority figures 'you see if you've been 
abused by authority, an authority figure, you think, I used to think doctors, 
people, anybody who was professional, even the mental health services as 
well - I'm wary of them for their own sake - because I have experienced the 
wrong attitudes, people are human I know but it makes you wary ... you're 
very vulnerable where authority is concerned ... you tend to take what comes 
rather than coming against it' 
8 (i) negative identity (i) 'Really I just felt totally used, washed up and useless burnt out, clapped 
out and I didn't know what I was going to do next'. 
(ii) diminished social (ii) a) P was unable to return to work after suffering the traumatic experience 
involvement he described: 'I just blew, I just had to get out of there, it was almost choking 
me, it was almost claustrophobic'. b) Avoids contact with people from work: 
several people have phone me at work, obviously they've got to keep a 
monitor if you've got a sick file, but I just couldn't face them, I really didn't 
want to see them, and I didn't want them in my house'. 
9 (i) difference/marginalisation (i) a) '... and a sense of being, not fitting in with situations, being a bit of an 
oddity as well, being a bit an outsider, that sort of feeling. I b) 'there was a 
feeling of, socially feeling inadequate and also feeling a bit incompetent'. c) 
'Yeah, def-, definitely ideas about ... not very good at making decisions, that 
kind of, well, or not very good at finding out um, not being able somehow to 
fit in very easily, find an environment that suits me, especially that one 
actually, being a bit of an outsider, yeah. Um, not getting on tert ibly easily 
with people. Urn, and the thing about giving up something at the moment of 
success or, you know, just stopping short of... of the um, of the final goal 
sort of thing. And not, sort of almost not reaping the rewards of having done 
the work which I think is something that hap-, I have failed to do quite often 
and not somehow being able to believe that something could work for me, 
yes. So, all those are things I do, I think some of them are true, and " and 
that situation highlights it yes. 9 
(ii) values (ii) a) 'I can sense that I can see that it's a bit odd really that I feel. I want to 
hide something that isn't really such a bad skeleton in the cupboard, 
objectively, and yet I do. Perhaps it's simply that I ... I don't know, put a lot 
of... put a lot of emphasis on wanting to appear together, you know or 
something and don't want to admit that there is a messier side or something 
like that and just put ... I suppose that begs the question, why do 1, but maybe I just do, you know. I think I come from certainly the sort of background 
where it's not easy to admit failure, or not, you know, and it's part of 
admitting failure or, certainly to, to urn discuss that time of my life'. b)'Ithas 
become less important and I can see that there's an alternative way of looking 
at it but I am still very ambivalent' .... 'there's a sneaking suspicion that 
those values ... of um, success and achievement and things that they actually do matter to me and although I can see that there are plenty of alternative 
ways of being, of urn leading a life, you know, I'm not, I think part of the 
problem is I haven't developed a complete alternative way of seeing things so 
it's still confused in a sense that I ... You know, conventional ambition, I'm 
quite critical of it but I don't know really whether that's something, that may 
well simply be a defence mechanism or largely a defence mechanism just to. 
to protect my, you know, because really ... I think I do ... I don't know, I think I'm still hooked into that achievement thing. Yeah. ' c) 'I have actually 
become more critical, yes I've become more critical of, of conventional 
values I suppose yes. ' 
(iii) negative identity (iii) a) 'But that decision right back then about leaving 
__-, 
it feels as if it 
set a pattern, or maybe it set a pattern if, it partly set a pattern for feeling, um, 
oh I've lost my thread a bit [sighs]. It's sort of like you know a Shakespearean 
tragedy where there's a tragic flaw and then everything goes wrong from then 
on in the hero, you know, there's something wrong with the person, there's 
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(iv) diminished social 
involvement 
(v) lack of confidence 
something about them that doesn't work and everything goes wrong as a 
result of that and ... it's almost as if I sometimes 
feel from, after that decision 
at nothing else can go right, you know, nothing can quite ever recover so 
in that sense it's altered my life. ' b) 'yeah certainly there was a feeling of, 
socially feeling inadequate and also feeling a bit incompetent and that is still 
very much with me at times'. 
(iv) The experience highlights for P his difficulty of 'not fitting in': a) P felt 
subsequent to the experience that 'I'd got into a pattern of failure by then, or 
of, well you know, not exactly failure but not fitting in anyway. ' b) P 
describes the negative aspects of the experience: 'the sense of isolation and 
cutting myself off from people that was involved was harmful, and the sense 
of dislocation or sort of urn, changing my situation so much so suddenly. ' c) P 
talking about the beliefs highlighted by the memory: 'Yeah, def-, defmitely 
ideas about ... not very good at making decisions, that kind of, well, or not 
very good at finding out um, not being able somehow to fit in very easily, find 
an environment that suits me, especially that one actually, being a bit of an 
outsider, yeah. Urn, not getting on terribly easily with people. ' 
(v) 'I'd have thought it's just a tendency anyway in me, not to, not to quite 
believe in myself, at the last minute I've stopped believing in myself, you 
know what I mean. It's sort of a confidence thing. ' 
10 (i) difference/marginalisation (i) a) 'er ... I don't know I suppose I grew up with thinking that urn, the world doesn't like me and I'm not very particularly keen on the rest of the world if 
you Re! b) 'The, the what happened and other incidents around it, have urn 
tended to imprint this insular attitude if you like and urn no amount of at the 
moment looking at it is going to make me more open or, or urn it only goes to 
reinforce the subconscious if you like urn that the less people know, then the 
less they can do. You, you tend to get inside your skin if you like to get at 
you, so you keep up that that veneer, that barrier. ' 
(ii) values (ii) 'having experienced the world for another 30 odd years, urn, you realise 
that urn the embarrassment and the guilt that you felt was because a) of your 
age and b) of your background experience and so that you could um, if I went 
back to that situation with the knowledge I have now, I would have literally 
not a) either have laughed it off or b) walked away or told them to shut up 
or... ' 
(iii) negative identity (iii) a) 'in here you lack within yourself if you like, urn confidence but also I 
think at the same time respect for yourself if that's not too difficult a thing to 
understand. You, how you perceive others seeing you, you know, and urn how 
they will translate your urn communications, your words, your thoughts into 
an assessment of you, yeah. Urn and you always assume it to be at the bottom 
end of any scale. Yeah. You are not thought of as, what's the word to use 
[sighs] ... Worthy? 
' b) 'It doesn't suppress your ability to think, but it will 
restrict actions and urn outlooks I suppose. You don't expect to er get on to do 
any good, to do well'. c) 'It probably lowers your self-appreciation, yeah. 
[Yes]. It makes you ... urn aware that you could be easily embarrassed again 
or er made a fool of again and um that because it was a bad experience you're 
going to avoid it re-occurring yeah, and it's probably, although you're not 
thinking that, it's there in the sub-conscious so you try and avoid situations or, 
or get away from situations as quickly as you can'. d) 'It demeans your 
outlooks Dt demeans? ] Your outlooks. You don't believe, er self belief is very 
um suppressed, you er, this is one of the things that brings the depression on. 
You are urn you are unable to break away, no, no er, it suppresses self 
confidence and um belief in yourselt So therefore without those two things 
you can't commit yourself to er, to saying that look, I'm stuck, I'm at a dead 
end. Um, alright let's change course. You are inhibited, you're too frightened 
to change because you've established a pattern that, as I've said earlier, you're 
in the mire but it's warm, you know and you're going to stay there because 
urn it doesn't matter what you have got, you don't think you've got or you 
don't see how it's going to be able to be of use for you to, to change'. 
(iv) concealment/masking (iv) 'The, the what happened and other incidents around it, have uni tended to 
imprint this insular attitude if you Re and um no amount of at the moment 
looking at it is going to make me more open or. or urn it only goes to 
reinforce the subconscious if you like urn that the less people know, then the 
less they can do. You, you tend to get inside your skin if you like to get at 
you, so you keep up that that veneer, that barrier. ' 
(v) diminished social (v) a) 'it all went to this urn keeping yourself to yourself, withdrawal if you involvement like, it's difficult to explain. So many things can go through your head when 
you think back, and you don't know ... at particular incidents where you 
could just say well that's when, you, from there you urn ... were greater or 
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lesser the um, I use the word introvert if you like um, contained um. ' (b) 'Has 
it had any great effect? Probably the answer to that is yes, definitely. Um, how 
to describe it? Urn .. I have a fear or dread of going in to strange situations, 
even going to secondary school and fu-st going into college in _ Urn ... having done an anxiety course just, just recently, you can now sort of say that 
the upset stomachs and you know the, you know this, was caused by, I call it 
stress or the anxiety of going into a situation where there's a large number of 
people that you know nothing of and how they're going to react to you, yeah. 
Um with, mind you expect from past experience ridicule and derision. ' (c) 'I 
think it made me very wary of urn ... certainly talking to the opposite sex. Urn, and um very wary of showing your feelings. ' (d) 'you don't want to get 
um, like I said earlier, you don't want to be put on the spot light you don't 
want to be um the target of ridicule so therefore you don't get into situations 
where you might make yourself a target, yeah. ' (e) 'Urn ... highlight, make 
me aware of, yes it does, um, that, you've got to avoid situations where you're 
going to be put on the spot, and embarrassed um and again it's because they 
can't get at you if you insulate yourself from them. Yeah, you put a barrier up 
between, you and people. ' f) Link between this pattern and diminished self- 
respect: 'It probably lowers your self-appreciation, yeah. [Yes]. It makes you 
... um aware that you could 
be easily embarrassed again or er made a fool of 
again and um that because it was a bad experience you're going to avoid it re- 
occurring yeah, and it's probably, although you're not thinking that, it's there 
in the sub-conscious so you try and avoid situations or, or get away from 
situations as quickly as you can'. 
(vi) lack of confidence (vi) 'in here you lack within yourself if you like, urn confidence but also I 
think at the same time respect for yourself if that's not too difficult a thing to 
understand. You, how you perceive others seeing you, you know, and urn how 
they will translate your urn communications, your words, your thoughts into 
an assessment of you, yeah. Urn and you always assume it to be at the bottom 
end of any scale. Yeah. You are not thought of as, what's the word to use 
[sighs] ... WorthyT 
(vii) relationship difficulties (vii) a) 'Um (sighs) ridicule and being laughed at is a very degrading um ... I 
mean even mickey taking in a work situation or you know, whatever, you can 
be hurt and, there are other people were saying [? ], you can be hurt and um in 
here, just, not physically but emotionally and um ... when you've been in one 
situation for a long time, you put a veneer on, you know, so that the scenario 
is if they think that they are upsetting you, if they're throwing you, you know, 
then it encourages them to do it a) more or b) again, yeah. If you put a 
veneer up that says I don't care, its water off a duck's back, is the old um way 
of putting it the old saying. If you give the impression that you're not really 
bothered or you don't care, um then it reduces the level of attack if you like or 
being had a go at. And also you can, when you've been in situations for a 
long time, you can leam to retaliate verbally or even strike first and ridicule 
um, people that you know use it as a regular weapon and therefore deflect or 
put them off, you know, and this is an insulation, this is protection, you put a 
of veneer up, you put a wall up. ' b) 'Um ... to avoid beingjudged ... um, well I've been um I don't take on board um other people's judgements of me, I've 
over a long time decided that if they don't like it they can lump it'. c) 'there 
are other things, um. ... as part of a pattern that makes up me and why I don't 
communicate and or will not communicate, uh what makes me um withdrawn, 
um ... that makes me not react in situations. I mean my wife will get quite 
annoyed with me at times when she, you know she's got a bee in her bonnet 
or whatever and I will not take on board what she's saying. I do take it on 
board but I don't react, yeah. She says that I do it deliberately to wind her up, 
yeah. But um, perhaps subconsciously I do. But I know if I react then we're 
going to have a row and I don't want a row'. 
(i) negative identity (i) a) P talks about her lack of confidence and how she feels what happened 
has prevented her personality from growing: 'I don't know whether it's like 
stopped my personality actually developing to the full maybe, I don't know. 
Maybe it's hindered in some way, in terms of lack of confidence'. b) She also 
talks about her fear of being put down by others: 'I don't look forward to 
anything cos I'm always afraid that I'm ... going to be put down sort of thing'. However she doesn't explicitly say that she feels badly about herself. 
concealment/masking (ii) a) 'I think I was, I always wanted to feel a very s, you know determined 
character as you said, I wanted to try and sort of like, you know that a strong 
character, and by talking to anybody and by doing, by saying this it's like 
saying well I'm not very strong, you know'. b) '[What would you have 
expected if you had spoken to somebody about it what do you think would 
have 
... if you can think 
back into how you felt then? ] I think the fact that 
they were getting to know me a bit they were getting to know my family life, 
you know, or ... and 
I didn't want that either, I just wanted them to know me. 
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you know, I'm happy, I'm fine, but I was ... you know, so, that's why'. c) 
'but I think that probably the reason why they are is because I've never talked 
to anybody about, I've never even ... and I always 
felt nobody knows me 
properly. And I remember like, nobody knows me, you know. ' ... 'I feel a 
mystery to everyone'. 
(iii) diminished social (iii) a) 'I think quite ... quite a lot of the time I mean there was like you know involvement um you don't give people a chance. Oh well, you know if they've said that 
well I don't want, you know and they're ahight they're fine, or if they do 
something that's ... I don't know. It's a bit ... I don't know. In terms of like 
with relationships, I've never ever been very urr4 I just not very close with 
anyone ever. That's ... not until now. But I've never, I always said no, you know, that was it, I never ... [You didn't want to get emotionally close to 
anyone? ] No never did, no. I'd just say Oh I'm fine, you know. Even if 
though I wanted to, I didn't want to [laughs]. ' b) 'I think it is quite harmful 
because you, I've got this, it's left me with a great sense of insecurity. And 
regardless of how insecure the other person is towards me or I mean secure 
[inaudible] what I've said, or you know, I'm still a very insecure person. I 
won't ... I won't tru, ... 
I won't trust anyone. ' 
(vi) lack of confidence (vi) 'Yeah I think that could be, because L I've always sort of got ... terr ... I'm very urn not very confident at all and like um, I was al ... I didn't, you know I wasn't at all confident And um, like my mum used to say why, andý 
and all this stuff , but even now I'm not very confident. I am confident in 
terms of like work and everything and if I've got to speak out I will, or, and 
stuff like that, I'm just within myself, there's always something wrong, 
there's like, there's nothing ever right with me, you know, so. But I think 
I've also had many terrible mood swings, violent mood swings as well which 
have stopped now, but urn at the time I thought you know I was probably a 
teenager or.. or whatever moods, but um, but then I think well maybe not. 
you know, cos of, you know, what I've been through or what I've seen, I just 
thought ooh I don't know, so. I think my um, through all what's happened to 
me, I think it has changed my um, or its, talking about personality. I don't 
know whether its like ... stopped my personality actually developing to the full maybe, I don't know. Maybe its hindered in some way, in terms of lack 
of confidence. But um, I don't know. ' 
(vii) relationship difficulties (vii) a) P says she can be very difficult when she has thought about incidents 
of the kind she described: 'Yeah, I have, I can be very difficult person to get 
on with at times, when, especially if I've got things like this on my mind, like, 
urn, and if I'm thinking about an incident I can be quite difficult. [in what 
sort of ways? ] Very abrupt urn ... very ... not I mean ... not moody, or 
maybe not show that I'm moody, but I'm very abrupt, I'm not very easy to get 
on with, every, anything anybody says is snapped at you know, is snapped at, 
you know, so, that's if I've thought about, I mean that didn't happen in the 
incident last week, but if I did tend to think about it for another like ten 
minutes or so or start pondering on ti, I'll, you know for the next couple of 
hours until something else has made me cheery, I'll be quite an abrupt person. 
Or I would want to stay on my own. ' b) 'In terms of like with relationships, 
I've never ever been very um, I just not very close with anyone ever'. c) Re 
disclosure: 'I have done actually because it came to the point where I had to. 
Um, because things were just getting really out of hand like, I just, I was very, 
I don't know, distant at times and I felt that he nee-, I wanted to speak to him 
about it and I felt he should know, really. And that's the first person I 
actually told, it wasn't actually about that it was something else, um, you 
know because I felt he had to know. ' 
12 (i) differencelmarginalisation (i) 'I just feel that I never had any preparation for life from my own parents ... 
any guidance or anything. And I tried to, hard to be loved and took care of, 
but er there were just so many obstacles. I feel from bad parents I walked into 
a family that's not better. They never accepted me, being foreign. ' 
(ii) 'I know I shouldn't feel ashamed but um, you know I do feel ashamed and (ii) values ... I feel that I let my... my beliefs down, because I should have really stood for what I believe and what I wanted. But because of the age and life then 
that, I wouldn't say I was influenced, but being alone, I just was pushed into 
it., 
negative identity (iii) a) P seems to have a sense of failure: 'Er ... Yes. I was ... brought up er with no knowledge about life or, um, sex experiences and um on coming here 
to England I had to prove that I would be able to look after myself without 
getting into any trouble, and um ... well I failed and I have let myself down, by putting myself in that situation'. (b) P says the situation changed how she 
thought about herself: 'How? [Sigh] ... I feel I'm not strong ... I feel I'm too 
emotional, I can express myself but there is nobodv to eXDress it ... * 
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(iv) concealment/masking (iv) 'I tend to keep the appearance [sigh] as if I'm in control. I'm not'. 
13 (i) diminished social (i) )P says the experience was harmful: 'I think it was ... both negative and involvement harmful, urn, because going through school, you couldn't really talk about 
your father, you know. You always had this behind you and other girls' 
fathers had urn a lot of money you know, and we weren't very well off at all 
really. Supposed tojoin your peers aren't you really? ' 
(ii) lack of confidence (ii) 'Um. I didn't have any confidence at school at all, confidence is the main 
thing! 
14 (i) difference/marginalisation (i) a) 'Hard up, sorry, financially, uni, but then again everything always 
seemed to be linked with the fact that obviously there's only one person 
working, and uni . ... ... well it just made you feel different Imeanlike 
significantly different I mean it was almost like having a physical handicap 
or something. I mean every one, all ... I mean uh, as I said I think things 
would perhaps be a wee bit different now because different attitudes or 
whatever, but the fact that urn everybody you knew had two parents, I'm just 
stating the obvious, and er. ' b) 'But my gut reaction I assumed that I would 
have been ... As I saidý use a horrible term, normal then, but I would have been, well I would have just been somebody else and it's more of an attractive 
idea now than, it is'. c) 'No, no I mean it has had a follow-through effect in as 
much that uni, ... well I suppose the fact that everybody else seems to be 
operating on a different wavelength half the time, tends to isolate you a bit. ' 
d) 'Urn, ... cos I got to admit by the time I started secondary school, um, I felt 
quite alienated, not alienated, that far too big a word, um, I felt different 
because, because of events like, things going on at home'. e) 'But to actually 
accept that you know I've got urn a right to expect anything, that's something 
I find it very ... I mean I always assume everybody's got more right to 
anything than I have. ' 
(ii) values (ii) 'I think the only time it really, I mean it was only urn ... ... ... ... it only 
started really, well not bother me but, when er you don't want that tension as a 
childý if you like, the sort of... when I was out with my mother, I think its 
probably one of the first labels I'd got urn because, its probably considerably 
different now when lots of children are in sort of urn single parent families 
and all the rest but it was considerably different then and only having one 
parent was really like labelling and it seems to effect everything you did, I 
mean sort of um, I mean we were never like seriously hard up, but then again, 
um..., 
(iii) negative identity (iii) a) P wishes he was a different person: 'Well if it hadn't happened, I 
would have been somebody else and I think I would have rather done that. 
[You would rather have been that other ... ?]I would rather have been 
somebody else, yes. Cos ... yeah because 
it it 
... in respect of moulding type 
of things, urn I mean it is the biggest thing that's happened and as I said, I'm 
mean like, I contribute everything that is negative about myself to it. ' b) P 
seems to feel he is abnormal: 'But my gut reaction I assumed that I would 
have been 
... As I saidý use a 
horrible term, normal then, but I would have 
been, well I would have just been somebody else and it's more of an attractive 
idea now than, it is'. c) 'It really was, it was um, I mean that's why, I mean in 
most people's eyes I mean I've, um, well not probably now, I mean I've 
deemed myself as like, a failure in normal social criteria'. 
(iv) concealment/masking (iv) 'Um, ... cos I got to admit 
by the time I started secondary school, um, I 
felt quite alienated, not alienated, that far too big a word, um, I felt different 
because, because of events like, things going on at home, I mean, I felt 
actually several years older than my peer group, cos I mean I was having to 
deal with things in the real world, I'd had to grow up a little bit quick. And, 
that clashed because they didn't really want to [? ] ... ... and uni ... that was perceived on the outside as being sort of, this sort of urn sensible well together 
person which is a total contradiction to what was really, I mean it was all act. So yeah I mean it did, but in a, what probably if seen from the outside was a 
positive thing, but it wasn't' 
(v) diminished social (v) Withdrawal within close relationships: '.. I think subcon-, um ... ... ... the involvement ability to close down, which I learrit then, I shut myself off, self protection 
thing. Uni ... ... its killed a couple of previous relationships and I mean it's 
put my present one on the rocks several times. And that's, um, that's a thing I 
could directly link back. It is the fact that you know if you don't let anybody in, you don't get hurt. And you just assume that people are going to go 
away. ' 
(vi) relationship difficulties (vi) Difficulties in relationships caused by his ability 'to close down'. 
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think subcon-, um ... ... ... the ability to close down, which I learrit then, I 
shut myself off, self protection thing. Unt ... ... its killed a couple of previous 
relationships and I mean it's put my present one on the rocks several times. 
And that's, um, that's a thing I could directly link back. It is the fact that you 
know if you don't let anybody in, you don't get hurt And you just assume 
that people are going to go away. ' 
15 (i) values (i) a) 'I told people, I've told, I've come out more in the open over the last 
year than I have, did before. Um, I think more so because it seems more, it 
seems more of an everyday occurrence when women are getting raped 
nowadays. In those days it was, it happened but you didn't hear of it that 
much. Um maybe it was because there was a lot of women like me thatjust 
didn't say anything about it, but nowadays it seems to be on the TV, on the 
news, in the papers, so when I say I've been raped and I hear other women 
that have been raped4 its not unnatural to admit to it and I don't feet ashamed 
to admit to it now. ' b) I think, I don't know, but I think going back I think 
they would probably, I don't know they probably think I'm sort of oh keep 
away, you know, she's been violated or, um, men would probably think of me 
as a big joke or you know they wouldn't, if I was in a relationship they think 
oh you know we don't want to go with her because she's been, been with 
somebody else, two at the time, you know, it, I think, I don't really know 
because as I say I was on my own at the time, so. I think men react different 
then than they do now. 
(ii) negative identity (ii) a) P not person she would like to be as a result of the incident: 'I does 
make me, it does um, have part, it does have part of the person that I am 
because it changes you, you can't help that, there's nothing you can do to 
control that, it does change you as a person'. b) 'Um ... I can't really tell you, I don't really know, urn, it's hard to explain, unt you mean what I think of 
myself, urn ... Um. 
Sometimes I'm not very proud of the person I am. I'm 
no% I'm ashamed of sometimes the things I say and do which can be hurtful 
especially when I've been drinking, towards men, because not all men are the 
same, you know, they're all different and you tend to forget thaý so I don't 
like that part of me'. c) P also talks about how the shame of the rape is 
indelible: '... I mean the shame's there it's something you live with for the 
rest of your life, so ... urn I don't really know how to answer that. ' 
(iii) diminished social (iii) P says that the incident has definitely had an effect on her relationships 
involvement making her wary of men: 'it's affected my relationships, it's affected my life 
style, it's affected the way I think of, what I think of men, urn ... it has given 
me this fear of not trusting them, unt not respect no respect for them. Um, it's 
mainly, I think it's mainly affected my relationships more than anything and 
my physical, the physical side of my relationships. ' 
(iv) relationship difficulties (iv) a) 'Oh yes, yes' .... 'Urn ... 
I can't really tell you, I don't really know, 
um, it's hard to explain, urn you mean what I think of myself, uni ... Um. Sometimes I'm not very proud of the person I am. I'm no% I'm ashamed of 
sometimes the things I say and do which can be hurtful especially when I've 
been drinking, towards men, because not all men are the same, you know, 
they're all different and you tend to forget that so I don't like that part of me'. 
b) 'Um, not on purpose, no, not not towards women I'm not, no, but I can be 
difficult when it comes to whoever I'm with at the time and malewise, er, but 
it's not meant to be, it's just the way it happens. ' c) 'it makes me more 
demanding. It doesn't make me want more demand off anybody else, no I 
think that's the wrong thing to say. It makes me more demanding. It makes 
me worse to live with'. 
16 (i) differencelmarginalisation (i) 'It's made me think my future is quite bleak. Cos.. I'll be on my own now 
you know, as soon as my kids leave home, that'll be it It's not something one 
likes to look forward to being on your own'. 
(ii) negative identity (ii) a) 'I was feeling a bit down at the time and um, slap, bang, wallop it 
happens again. I feel as if I've got this invisible sign in my head that says it's 
OK you can use this one. So ... it's just stuck me, it's back to square one 
again'. b) 'I don't know. I suppose, I mean, I hate myself [Does that get more 
so when you think about the rape? ] Yeah. [And how do you think of yourself 
when that happens? ] I don't know, I disgust myself I suppose. Don't like 
myself very much. ' 
(iii) diminished social (iii) a) P has given up the goal of having an intimate relationship with a man: involvement 'Well I've, I've given up ever trying to have a relationship with a man. 
[You've given up trying to? ] I'll never be able to live now with a man again. I 
find it even ha-, I find it even difficult to kiss my own son now, my little boy, 
when he kisses me'. b) She also seems to have become more withdrawn 
socially: 'Well I don't go out I don't have a social life at all actually, [Do you 
433 
think that's partly to do with the shame that you experienced afterwards? ] 
Yes, it, it's fear like you know, that jusL I don't feet comfortable any more 
with people'. 
(iv) relationship difficulties (iv) a)'Well I don't go out I don't have a social life at all actually. [Do you 
think that's partly to do with the shame that you experienced afterwards? ) 
Yes, it it's fear like you know, that just. I don't feel comfortable any more 
with people'. b) 'I am more difficult now with people, I'm more quick to 
temp, quick you know, to lose my temper'. 
17 (i) difference/marginalisation (i) 'I want to understand, maybe ... why has so many things happened and ... 
and why has fate if you want I suppose been cruel, why did someone adopt 
me and then not love me in a demonstrative way, urn why when it took all the 
years to find my natural first mother did she say what she said then, well I 
didn't want you then and I don't want you now. Urn, was it anything I could 
have helped? ' 
(ii) values (ii) a) 'Shame in the sense, wn, no not particularly me personally. It's not 
something you tell people about though because you are expected to feel 
shame because of the age' b) 'Yes. But even today if you tell someone and 
you say you were only 15, it still in this day and age, although the stigma isn't 
the same, er it still carries stigma and therefore it's something you still 
continue to hide'. 
(iii) concealment/masking (iii) a) 'Um, that made me the person I am now? A lot of memories but L in 
some ways have made me um, behave as an extremely strong person. But I'm 
not as strong as what I've always portrayed, or as other people have seen me. 
I've done that I suppose to hide behinct' b)'Um, but he certainly sees me as, 
that your always so strong, you can always cope with everything, and, you 
know, what's happened to you and why? Which is I suppose a part I've 
played all my life, that it doesn't matter, you know, it doesn't matter what you 
do, I'm alright But that's not really true, which I've suddenly started to 
discover! 
(iv) relationship difficulties (iv) I... 71ey made me more distrustful and ... I now live with someone whose 
a different sort of a persom When I say softer and gentler, I don't mean he's 
softer, but I mean, he's calm urn a peacefid type of a person, doesn't I ike 
hassle, doesn't want arguments and ... But sometimes I find that I say things 
... to him that I shouldn't, 
because he doesn't deserve them, because he is kind 
to me and he's always there for me. He's always stood by me. But, its like 
... ... I don't know 
it's, its like I push him, as far as I can, just to see ... how far I can go, do you know what I'm saying? ' 
18 (i) differencelmarginalisation (i) a) Th. Not just parents but people I meet in general, people with whom I 
socialise, things like dmt I mean my closest friends are people who do 
understand something about my feelings, I mean. We have similar feelings, 
similar tastes about things, and er, I mean I've always been regarded as rather 
a strange person and this was one of the things that came out when I had 
counselling, but er, you know, I said to the counsellor, people think I'm 
strange, you know. He just said well people say you're strange because you're 
different from them perhaps and they're frightened of you, a lot of this is fear, 
so. I think that er, yes people don't understand the way I feel. ' b) 'I mean not 
just in this particular incident but er a lot of the time all through my life I've 
had this problem, people don't understand a lot of the time the way I feel 
about things. [Yes, so that's something that goes back to your childhood? ) 
Yes, oh yes a long time. ' 
(ii) negative identity (ii) a) P had to leave before section on beliefs completedý however he says 
that the beginning of the interview (shame): 'I feel exposed, as if, almost as if 
people can see it I also feel that er, I've been dirty as it were and I've had to 
have [name of operation], and any woman that I confronted would sort of 
think that' b) ler I feel as if I've let myself down, that I was dirty, that er. 
degraded, felt as if I'd been subjected to a degrading operation. I felt really 
degraded afterwards'. 
(iii) diminished social (iii)'er ... the shame effect I suppose plays a part in my social life, you know involvement I would feel shame approaching a woman because of it. ' 
19 (i) difference/marginalisation (i) a) 'But I mean looking back on it perhaps it wasn't me who should have 
been ashamed, perhaps it was her more than anything else. But at the time I 
didn't feel that, you know the whole blame had been sort of put on me. [And 
you sort of accepted that? ] Well I didn't, you know, at the time I didn't sort of 
er, I didn't realize it was perhaps not my fault you know, after everything that 
I'd been told4 everything had been sort of blamed on me sort of thing, you 
know. ' b)'Um ... I 
don't have much contact with my friends any more I 
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mean from that point of view. Urn. people that were sort of around at the time, 
er perhaps didn't really know what to say to me or they felt quite embarrassed 
urn and therefore they didn't sort of make contact, and perhaps they didn't 
know what to say and I didn't really know what to say to them sort of thing. ' 
(ii) negative identity (ii) P feels a 'different sort of person' as a result of the experience: a) 'You 
know I think the whole thing has sort of left me feeling a different sort of 
person. * b) 'the whole sort of episode of my divorce and everything turned 
everything I thought about myself completely upside down. Urn I always 
considered myself quite easy going, quite easy to get on with, urn, quite a 
nice sort of bloke. Um, and the whole episode made me, or I was led to 
believe that I perhaps wasn't the sort of person that I thought I was. Um. So a 
lot of the things that I thought were true, urn, or that I sort of felt, urn as I say 
it completely turned upside down the way I thought about myself, the way I 
behavedý urn the things I did, were all sort of used against me sort of thing, 
you know'. 
(iii) diminished social (iii) P has given up his main social activity: 'Urn ... I think it has to a certain involvement extent I used to do an awful lot of things urn before, before me and my wife 
split up, um. I used to do an awfid lot of [hobby] at one time, that was my 
main sort of, my hobby, uni I found when I was stuck in [place of work] all 
the week it was nice to sort of get out in the open, in the countryside and sort 
of mix with people of a, of a similar sort of mind you know, um. That really 
was my social life. I never used to drink or smoke or anything like that so 
that was my chance of sort of getting out and sort of unwinding whatever. 
Urn, I don't do much of that any more. I used to do a lot of [another hobby], I 
don't do much of that any more. Urn, you know there's one or two things that 
I don't sort of do any more, that have sort of been triggered by that' 
(iv) lack of confidence (iv) 'I lack self-confidence now whereas I used to be sort of quite a confident 
person. I sued to be very forward thinkiiig, but now I'm sort of glad when the 
day's over and I don't particularly look forward to the next one, urn, in case 
I'm sort of faced with something I can't really cope with'. 
20 (i) negative identity (i) 'Um, but shame, urn, I'm not sure really, it's hard to say. I know it had an 
effect but I'm not sure what the effect is. Urn, I think I just kind of lost my 
[most data for this participant self-respect really. I think it's still taking me a long time getting that back. I'm 
missing] still not even sure whether I've got it now or not. I still feel a lot of shame. 
It's, it's sort of carried over with me, like it's stayed with me it's not really 
left me, it's there like a chip on my shoulder or something. ' 
APPENDIX 20 
POSITIVE ATTITUTES TOWARDS DISCLOSURE 
Disclosure - Participants' general ideas about the harms of non-disclosure and the 
benefits of disclosure 
'[Do you think you'd like to talk to someone about this [inaudible]? ] If they said, "If you talk about it we can 
help you7, then yes. But if they said "Would you talk about it, I'm afraid there's nothing we can do for you". 
Then no I wouldn't But if somebody, if somebody could say to me, if you come and talk to me for an hour, I 
guarantee you won't blush when you go out that door, I would sit there for a week, and talk about it 
2 Negative instance: 
I can't go back and change what's happened and that was the only thing that would help me was if I could 
change me now, make myself more confident. Um. Make me feet, you know, important, or worthful and I 
can't see a way of making me do that and I thinkjust talking about itjust brings it all back up and you relive it 
again and again. 
'[Would you like to talk to someone about it? ] Oh yeah, oh yeah. ' 
'If it's needed, if, I'll talk about it urn to help somebody else otherwise I won't really you know bother talking 
about it' 
Negative case: 
, [do you feel any urge to talk to someone about those experiences? ] No ... To be truthful I don't even know why I talked about it now'. 
'I do talk to people about it you know, not a lot but er, I suppose you know e reason I do mention it to people ' is er, I m trying to gain an insight into, trying to understand why somebody aves like that and you know, 
see what it is perhaps that I've done, you know that, yes, try to, trying to understand it I 
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7 i) 'I need to talk about it, and I need to talk about it with someone who I trust' 
fi) 'It was the only thing that has helped me. I mean I've been on antidepressant drugs, I've just come of 
Seroxat, no drugs help me. I mean, I've tried them twice, antidepressants, I've tried Seroxat, that gives you 
waking nightmares after a while, it makes it worse for me, if you're having body memories and flashbacks, it 
just makes them worse and someone else has said that as well whose been on them. Unt, ... you said helping, 
talking has been the only thing that's helped me, talking. not just talking but the person I speak to is key in that, 
their attitude to me, gentleness is one thing, one particular lady who helped me was wonderful. 
8 '[Can you just say a little bit about how you think it's been helpful? ] Because, urn, as we say, it's urn, not shall 
I describe it, a trouble halved, a trouble shared is a trouble halved, but with the right person for the right 
reasons'. 
9 'But I'm sure you, it's nice to talk about something because you can start to order it and I think that matters a 
lot to me, to put things in order and to understand how ... to have control, a sense of control over things, put 
things straight so know what It was meant to mean. Maybe I can't quite deal with that one. ' 
10 'Urn ... perhaps the more often you think about 
it over a period of time and the more often you're made to 
asked to explain, urn, it may do some unwinding of the tape if you like, some cleaning, some erasing'. 
'you just come to reality and it's just you can't keep things like that in there any more, so. It's not healthy 
[laughs slightly]. ' 
12 i) 'I'm sure it would have made, not a great deal of difference, but it would have eased the pain. But I would have been able to tell somebody or even talk to my husband about it'. 
ii) '[do you in fact talk to anyone about this experience now? ) No. [Or do you prefer to keep it to yourself? ] 
Urn ... yes I do. I don't really but I do, 
it's hard to, it's hard to explairL I do but ... even, I've got a very, very best friend, urn, but I still you know it's hard, hard to bring up' 
13 'Urn it gets you into talk urn about things that have happened a long time ago, cos I know I do need to talk 
about it more. ' 
14 ,... I'd like to actually, um... undo, some of the things that have been done, urn ... ... I mean I'd much prefer to be like ... its not about... I've been ... I'd like to be a far more open person. ' 
15 'Yes, yes. It would have been a very hard thing to do, but I would like to have done. [What would you have hoped to have got out of it do you think? ] Maybe to try and urn, part of the shame was guilt, feeling guilty, I 
felt guilty like I had provoked it, like it was my faul% even though it wasn't. Urn, I wanted to get rid of that 
feeling, I thought if you if you could talk to somebody then you could live, you could carry on and maybe try 
and live a normal life by not having the nightmares and not walking round thinking why, you know, what did I 
do, what did I say, why did I provoke them, or try and get rid of the shame, because in the end you block it off 
for so long, that it does affect your life and it, it helps if you are raped that, you can talk about it so you can 
analyse it and help you through, help you through it, you can carry on and try and live a normal life, ' 
'I think you hope to but you don't, you try and gain by getting rid of the memory that's in your head, but you 
don't It's still there no matter how many times you talk about it it's still there, it never goes away'. 
'I've never been able to talk about the whole inciden% it would be nice to be able to talk about it and the whole 
incident without wanting a glass of wine, without wanting a cigarette and without feeling urn, you know you 
feet like, stop asking me these questions, stop I don't want to talk about it anymore. Benicetobeabletosit 
and talk about it without having all those feelings! 
16 'Yes I would have liked to. I., ooking back now I wished I had. But at that time there was nobody I could have talked to anyway. Not you know confidentially like. ' 
17 11 vc gone im inese years oemg strong saying it doesn't matter, and I kind of had indoctrination all my life, say, 
you mustn't tell people you've, you know. um, and that's what I've done for 52 years ago, fifty one and a half 
or what ever, and now all of a sudden I don't want to be like that any more. I don't want to keep hiding, I don't 
want to keep being strong (very distressed at this point]'. 
18 '1 mean I've been reading a lot during this depression about things like psychological disorders affective 
disorders like depression and anxiety, thing like that, they tend to say a lot of these things happen because you keep your emotions bottled up, you're not satisfying basic needs, you're not releasing emotions. They fester 
away inside you like food going bad in a refrigerator, you know. Not very nice feelings in the comer of the 
reffigerator, likely to burst out'. 
19 'Um, at the time I could have, you know, urn I would have liked to have 
not a close friend, somebody who I didn't know Darticularlv well. I thini 
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had no sort of connection with, tan someone sort of neutral. Urn, but at the time, like the only person I was 
dealing with was solicitors and people like that and it was so sort of impersonal. Um. It was just so clinical. 
You know, that was the end of it and that was it sort of thing, you know. ' 
APPENDIX 21 
RECIPIENT SELECTION 
P Recipient selection 
(i) 'Talking to you it's entirely different because you're not close to me, and, you know, you don't know the 
real me. So it's easier talking to you because I'm just [inaudible], just a person, just an anybody'. ... 'Yeah, I haven't got to see you everyday, have L so it's not so bact' 
(ii) 'Do you think you'd like to talk to someone about this [inaudible]? ] If they said, "If you talk about it we 
can help you", then yes. But if they said "Would you talk about it, I'm afraid there's nothing we can do for 
you". Then no I wouldn't. But if somebody, if somebody could say to me, if you come and talk to me for an 
hour, I guarantee you won't blush when you go out that door, I would sit there for a week, and talk about it' 
2 (i) Very cautious (see also testing of childhood friends): 'I've had very, I've only had one, friend as I'd class it. 
I've got lots of acquaintances. They're my girlfriends and stuff. Um, but I only trust one and the only other one 
is . So I think that I dont trust easily. I vet people out quite a bit Urn, and the person I am very friendly with - aliEo ugh she hasn't got the experiences, she's got a bit of an understanding. Uni, so I used to find it quite 
comfortable talking to her. [So when this kind of memory comes to mind you find yourself sort of seeking her 
out or? ] Oh, no. no, no. She is just somebody that um I don't, I need to be, if I'm going to be a friend of 
someone, I need to be a close friend and she is one person I can be close to. Other friends are justý you know, 
have a drink, laugh and a joke. Unt, if I suppose if I was really down and stuck, then yes I would contact her, 
but I wouldn't necessarily ... I have spoken to her in the past about certain things, um, but then I tend to move 
away from it as it gets too painful. So again with her I probably would, but if it was anybody, then it would be 
her. ' (Friend 'vetted', and found 'trustworthy' and 'understanding'). 
(ii) Yea, yea. I mean looking back now I know the words I could have used. It's so much easier looking back 
and saying what you could do, but at the time I wouldn't know what to have said. I think I remember speaking 
to friends and saying does your dad ever hit you and things like this and they used to just laugh and I just knew 
then that they didn't so, I didn't say anything more. 
31 
4 (i) 'she's my supervisor, and um we were just talking about sexual abuse one day you know, she was just 
saying that one of her, one of um, somebody in her area where she lives um somebody's been sexually abused 
and um I actually felt that, I felt that I couldý because the way she actually responded towards that issue and it 
er was sort of similar to mine, I actually felt that I um, LI could trust her and talk about it and um I actually 
started talking to her about it'. 
(ii) 'I mean, I mean, I'm happy talking about it here because you don't really, you only know me now, you 
didn't know me before and you won't know my, my cousin that's actually did it' 
5 '[When you think about it to you feel shame now? ) Yeah. I don! t ever talk, you're the early one I think I've ever 
talked about it to. [Yeah sure, OKJ Its not something you would go talking to everybody else about is it 
really? [No obviously not] And the only reason rm telling you is because I know it can't go anywhere. ' 
6 (i) 'Ehm, (coughs) OK (hesitantly) I think at first like telling anybody anything first you think well how are 
they going to receive this and you tell them a little bit more and you put in a bit more to test the water if that's 
OK and a little bit more in and you know the feedback was good and I thought oh we can carry on here you know it seems, and you know it and yeah I felt OK you know, but always testing the water how much you give first, you know, because, otherwise if, if you, if you sort of let it all come out you know your sort of rejected on 
a very fundamental level aren't you if you know if you, you know if you open your soul to somebody and all of 
a sudden they turn round and say ouh you know ..... but with him I felt fine'. 
(ii) Counter-example: 'In fact itjust became the subject of my life, you know, I was always trying to find 
somebody to discuss it with so really I could get clarity and hopefully hear what I wanted to hear, you know, 
that's I don't know what I wanted to hear, that was the other thing, I didn't really know what I wanted to hear, I just wanted to talk about it, just made it more comfortable, I thought it would but with my work friends, no, ' no. 
7 (i) 'I had this, I don't know if this is relevant but I'm sorry if I'm wasting your tape, but this guy ring me up, I'm sure his heart was good, I'm not ... now I mean tha% and he said now tell me he said, what's wrong. Paughs]. I said you really, you honestly expect me to tell you what's really hurting me and made me feel 
suicidal, and he said yes. I said well would you open your heart and tell me right now what's hurting you and he said, oh, no I wouldn't. And I said well, why are you expecting me to when I don't even know you! And I 
sort of, you know, I laughed but I thought urghh. You know, God, do something with these people, you know. Reality. ' 
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(ii) 'I need to talk about it, and I need to talk about it with someone who I trust' 
8 (i) 'you assess them before you decide what level you're going to go in at'. 
(ii) '[Can you just say a little bit about how you thiA it's been helpful? ] Because, urn, as we say, it's urn, not, 
shall I describe it a trouble halved. a trouble shared is a trouble halved4 but with the right person for the right 
reasons, uni, you could go up and down _ 
Ifigh Street telling people and they'd think you was crackers, but to 
come in here and clinically or more clinically discuss it, then that's fine. [And how has it halved the problem 
do you think? ] Because you're telling somebody else that is researching obviously, severe experiences in 
people's lives. Now you've obviously got some clear idea of people's problems and how to, andjust how 
serious it is to them ... urn as opposed to telling the milkinan'. 
(iii) 'Um. I don't think so. I don't relate this to other people. I mean, L knows, urn, Dr C knows and you know, 
but outside of that, I wouldn't tell anybody. I've told _., 
but there again there is a corifidentiality factor, 
ffiffe. ' 
9 
10 '[Can I in fact ask how has it felt so far talking about it today? ] ... In four walls, er, and its going to be 
anonymously dealt with. urn it it doesn't to me then matter you know because its still, when I walk out of there 
now this afternoon, basically its still tucked up in that file up there and the draw's shut and its locked its not 
you know its not urn. its not going round people that know me, in a work situation and and whatnot and giving 
people ammunition to look at me in a different light or look down on me, or. ' 
'I have done actually because it came to the point where I had to. Urn, because things were just getting really 
out of hand like, I just, I was very, I don't know, distant at times and I felt that he nee-, I wanted to speak to 
him about it and I felt he should know, really. And that's the first person I actually told, it wasn't actually about 
that, it was something else, urn, you know because I felt he had to know. But that's the first person that I told, 
so that's quite an achievement for me, it was quite, oh my god I told someone, you know, it was Oh my Godl 
[laughs]'. 
12 
13 
14 (i) '... because of the very nature of... the subject, I'd only be telling somebody that I'd expect to be 
understanding. I mean I'd only tell somebody that was quite close I suppose. And thus you'd expect them to 
be understanding, well even you know the sheer fact that you'd tell them. ' 
(ii) ,... If they're the right people I think I actually prefer to talk about it But I'm very, very. The anonymity if 
you like that comes from professional relationships, it's a lot easier than sort of outside. [So have you talked 
about it, with professional people? ] Um.... seriously, only one. A mean there's loads and loads of doctors 
obviously over the last about 5 or 6 years, but there's urn, there was only one I was probably really open with. ' 
15 1 
16 'Yes I would have liked to. Looking back now I wished I had. But at the time there was nobody I could have 
talked to anyway. Not you know confidentially'. 
17 
18 
19 Tm, at the time I could have, you know, urn I would have liked to have spoken to somebody about it perhaps 
not a close friend, somebody who I didn't know particularly well. I think just somebody I didn't really know, I had no sort of connection with, urn someone sort of neutral. Urn, but at the time, like the only person I was dealing with was solicitors and people like that and it was so sort of impersonal. Urn. It was just so clinical. You know, that was the end of it and that was it sort of thing, you know. ' 
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APPENDIX 22 
CLEARLY HELPFUL DISCLOSURES 
P Nature of Helpful Disclosure - Very helpful disclosures 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 a) 'he is extremely helpful' 
b) 'yes it wasý he was very helpful, he still is' 
c) 'when I do see him, you know, we get on the same wavelength, it's brilliant, you know, it's partly because 
we understand one another and he was very helpful'. 
7 a) 'It was the only thing that has helped me. I mean I've been on antidepressant drugs, I've just come off Seroxat, no drugs help me. I mean I've tried them twice, antidepressants, I've tried Seroxat, that gives you 
waking nightmares after a while, it makes it worse for me, if you're having body memories and flashbacks, it 
just makes them worse and someone else has said that as well whose been on them. Um,... you said helping, 
talking has been the only thing that's helped me, talking, not just talking but the person I speak to is key in 
that, their attitude to me, gentleness is one thing, one particular lady who helped me was wonderful. ' 
b) 'I mean some like the lady who I said, you know who I said was wonderfully gentle, she was perfect I felt 
safe with her, she was a Christian, she had been through it herself, which might be a really big key, as she 
knew something of where I was coming from and she wasn'tjudgmental which is a big thing. ' 
c) 'somehow God is in other people when they listen I think. [Yes. ] Particularly when they listen with 
compassion. Its strengthening somehow, and its affirming they're not ... Oh, I don't know, that's the most I 
can say I think. ' 
d) 'Psychotherapy is so helpful, talking to this lady is so helpful, but it is, its like ..... I think its Carl Rogers 
really, she's accepting, she's accepting me and my feelings with respectý not telling me you shouldn't feel 
that, not saying were you that blitzed, she's just accepting me and my feelings and that's like um, I suppose 
its like an ointment really, its OK to be the way you are, not telling me I should be thinking or feeling 
something else. ' 
e) 'I think, you know, there are times when I think I could have done something stupid but her kindness, it 
was her humanity and compassion, you know'. 
f) 'I mean it's such a relief, it was such a relief to got here and just tell her how I felt And someone else sort 
of hear it and accept it'. 
a) 'she understands me because she has known me since we met in 19 - 
'. Said'Oh I know how you feel, 
put her arm round me and ... you know, she knows me better than anybody else, you know on the planet'. 
b) 'She was very receptive, she listens er to every word you say, which is a good thing, to show that they are 
listening. Erm. I know her that well I can't, I can't put it into language, but it's, it's something about her and 
her alone that gives you the support and gives you the drive if you like, that you can't rationalise because 
with everything else I do in life she supports me I WY* and I support her I W/o. ' 
10 a) 'and um but I've come away on a number of occasions feeling ... urn ... lighter, less urn down, less depressed if you like. ' 
b) 'you'll say things and come away and then when you've come away you think well I'm glad I said that, 
I've just got it off my chest and I feet um ... better for having said it, yeah, yeah. ' 
11 1 a) 'I felt quite good 
b)'I knew that, you know, they now understood why I was Eke that over period of [inaudible) you know, 
I so. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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16 
17 a) 'He was very positive! 
b) 'I suppose in some ways that he was there for me and helped to guide when things seemed very dark'. 
18 
19 
APPENDIX 23 
]HELPFUL DISCLOSURE WITI-1 MIXED OUTCOMES 
P Helpful Disclosures -mixed with unhelpful utcomes 
'Now I am wary that she's watching me, waiting for me to blush. When she says something about tliatý 
"What you done to your face mumr and I feel myself going red, you know, and I says "Why? " She says 
"Have you been putting cream on and you haven't rubbed it in properly, because you've got a lovely streak 
of white cream down there". You know, things like that' 
2 
3 *[So did you feel that in some ways it was unhelpful [? ] to talk to her? ] Yea, because I knew she couldn't do 
anything. she all she said to me was. keep on at them. I said well that's what I'm doing anyway, but I said its 
making me anxieted and why should I keep on and on. All they've got to do is got the letter do it through a 
word processor and send it. I said I've had this three years ago at A, I've even had to go and get the letter 
and take it to A. myselE I said they're getting paid for doing what ever they're doing, why can't a simple 
secretary or somebody simply send it. Why do I have to go in and keep requesting it, And in the end they 
did fax it to W. but it was only because I was on and on, "have you done it yet". "Oh you haven't received 
it". "Has it been done. " And it was backwards and forwards, telephone calls. I was getting more aereated 
thinking they promised me this before Christmas. I'm thinking, they're just sitting there, and I'm getting all. 
Because as I'm getting older my bloods getting all boiled up and I've got high blood pressure at the moment 
I've got to go back with it tomorrow because its, its, I think its the stress of having to do everything and by 
the end of the day I feel exhausted by about 4 o'clock. I'm just ready to, you know. I've got nobody at all. ' 
4 'So I didn't really go into great great details because I was a bit ashamed as well. ' 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 a) 'I think she did think it was stupid actually'. 
b) 'she also, I think she did make the judgement that it was a bit daft as well'. 
c) 'I suppose as with most people she had sympathy up to a point but she would tend turn on me sometimes 
and um be cutting and say something quite destructive'. 
10 
11 
12 
13 a) 'it is quite upsetting talking about it'. 
b) 'Oh the doctor here, I think she was a psychotherapist, she didn't react to anything I said, no. Um ... I really, I don't don't talk to my mother about it all the time, you know, on odd occasions, it's if something 
crops up on the TV about, physical abuse, you know, she thinks oh mustn't watch thatý cos it brings back 
memories, you know'. 
0 Re doctor: '[so you felt maybe she didn't, couldn't understand you? ] Yeah., 
14 
15 
16 10Y, Have you found talking about the experience in any ways unhelpful? ] I have in a sense that 
everybody's pinned on that and though [inaudible word] I've been like you know, suffering with depression 
and everybody thinks that's why I'm depressed now, when I think it's a lot of other things as well. As soon 
as people find out about that they think that's it It might have started if off like' 
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17 
18 a) '[On the whole did you find talking about the incident helped? ) Er ... to a certain extent, but er I mean it's ' very limited talking about my, well it appears to me anyway, it has been very limited talking about it 
b) Helpfulness 'Not a lotý slightly but er not a lot Mind you if probably if I hadn't said nothing I'd have gone 
completely mad by now'. 
19 a) 'I mean, I don't think people really understood how I felt and as I say they were just sort of sympathetic ' . and that was it sort of thing. you know, just forget about it and get on with your life sort of thing 
b) 'I don't think they reafly understood bow I felt at the time, um. As I say they did what they could, they 
sort of um were always there on the phone if I needed them sort of thing, you know, but er... ' 
APPENDIX 24 
UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORTIVE RECIPIENT RESPONSES TO 
HELPFUL DISCLOSURES 
P Understanding and supportive responses 
I 'She felt sorry for me. She knows what I went through as well'. 
2 
3 '[1 think you said before actually, that she responded sympatheticay. ] Yea, she did and she more or less said 
she knew the reasons why I'd done it It was because I wanted help from my practice with this this and she 
agreed that they were lacsadaxical in not sending out the information and she agrees that I could get stressful 
by that but there wasn't anything she could do about it But she agrees that the fact that this happened 
because they are, that's how they deal with things and she said yea it would helped with me if they were 
more forward. ' 
a) 'First they said, oh, you know, did you, you know, you've got courage for that and but I think I said the 
wrong thing by because she was a bit upset And urn. So I didn't really go into great great details because I 
was a bit ashamed as well. ' 
b) 'Well my friends have always been there for me when I've, when I've needed it. I mean I've always been 
there for them too and urn (pauseý This the relationship I had was really good with my friends, still have at 
the moment as well. ' 
c) 'I mean LI told them what my murn said and urn theyjust like they didn't really say much, they said the 
decisions yours to make you know, Its your life, you do what you want and um. they said we told you not to 
tell her yet, you know, so. They've always been very good really. ' 
5 
6 a) 'you could tell from the very sort of introspective things he would say that it was very much, that he could 
only have experienced or really been sensitised to understand'. 
b) 'when I do see him, you know, we get on the same wavelength, it's brilliantý you know, it's partly because 
we understand one another and he was very helpful'. 
a) 'Um, ... you said helping, talking has been the only thing that's helped me, talking, not just talking but the 
person I speak to is key in thatý their attitude to me, gentleness is one thing, one particular lady who helped 
me was wonderful. She totally, I mean she came to my home and I remember saying to her it sounds stupid, 
your real and your here and she didn't laugh, she just put her arms round me, she knew what I meant You 
know, because you think ... she said she would come as soon as she could but, like your drowning, your drowning in all this emotion and you try and grab hold of something to stop you drowning. ' 
b) 'I mean some like the lady who I said, you know who I said was wonderfully gentle, she was perfect, I felt 
safe with her, she was a Christian, she had been through it herself, which might be a really big key, as she knew something of where I was coming from and she wasn'tjudgmental which is a big thing. ' 
c) Disclosure may have made recipient appreciate P more: 'Maybe, maybe appreciate me more cos I used to 
think sh, sh, she made me feel brave about, no that's the wrong word, appreciate my own bravery and 
courage and that's a good feeling, you know, to think that someone else sees something good in you. you know. ' 
d) And you know somebody cares about you, well its like you sharing something with someone you know 
cares for you that's really hurt you. But somehow in the sharing of it, it helps that someone else is listening 
toit It doesn't lessen it, but it helps. She, she didn't tell me it was rubbish, I had imagined it... Cos I used 
to say to her, every time I was with the woman who prayed, this can't be real, that's the first thing I used to 
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say cos I just couldn't, but I knew it was, inside that it was still, that I'm trying to handle it and, chm, its I ike 
support, its a support thing, like your not having to deal with it totally on your own. Itstoo big, I mean... in 
a way no one else can help but God. But, somehow God is in other people when they listen I think. [Yes. ] 
Particularly when they listen with compassion. Its strengthening somehow, and its affirming they're not ... 
Oh, I don't know, that's the most I can say I think. ' 
8 a) 'she understands me because she has known me since we met in 19. '. Said 'Oh I know how you feet, ' . put her arm round me and ... you know, she knows me better than anybody else, you know on the planet 
b) 'She was very receptive, she listens er to every word you say, which is a good thing, to show that they are 
listening. Erm. I know her that well I can't. I can't put it into language, but it's, it's something about her and 
her alone that gives you the support and gives you the drive if you like, that you can't rationalise because 
with everything else I do in life she supports me 100% and I support her 100%. ' 
c) Re experience of interview: '[Can you just say a little bit about how you think it's been helpful? ] Because, 
um, as we say, it's um, not, shall I describe it a trouble halved, a trouble shared is a trouble halved, but with 
the right person for the right reasons, uni, you could go up and down _High 
Street telling people and they'd 
think you was crackers, but to come in here and clinically or more clinically discuss it then that's fine. [And 
how has it halved the problem do you think? ] Because you're telling somebody else that is researching 
obviously, severe experiences in people's lives. Now you've obviously got some clear idea of people Is 
problems and how to, and just how serious it is to them ... urn as opposed to telling the milkman'. 
9 
10 a) 'they've taken it I hope as information, you know, as perhaps one of the many, many complicated things in the past that's forming my attitudes and reactions to situations today. Um ... they seem to understand um 
... and they 
don't show any ridicule, show any ridicule so um from that you get the confidence to, to let other 
things come outI yeah. ' 
b) 'They're listening yeah and they're trying to, urn ... They're listening and they're trying to, not initially 
perhaps analyse, but collate what you're saying, to form, at least ajigsaw if not a picture'. 
a) '[And what was it that made you feel better, was it .. ?I Um just the comforting of it somebody there to 
comfort me, while I was thinking about it and saying it and know, I knew that, you know, they now 
understood why I was like that over a period of (inaudible] you know, so,, 
b) 'I don't know, I think its the immense urn closeness that there was. That I knew that there was but I was 
just being, you know. There was a very, very, we were very, very close and we still are and I think that's 
the only person I've ever felt close enough to talk to as a friend, as a partner, so. ' 
12 - 
13 
14 - 
15 - 
16 a) 'Oh. Well, me doctor's been, she's been, she listens. She never made me feel as I've got to rush out the doctor's surgery like, you know. after ten minutes. I mean she's listened and um, and I went to see a 
psychiatrist like, and they were that was very helpful like'. 
b) 'They made me feel comfortable, I suppose, that I could talk', 
17 a) re policeman: 'He was very positive, Um, ... he listened and tried to reassure me I suppose, that I wasn't to blame'. 
b) re policeman: 'His strength. Um. (What sort of strength was it? ) In that he could sit back and listen you know objectively and ... and I suppose in some ways that he was there for me and helped to guide when things seemed very dark'. 
c) re partner: 'he understands, 
d) Te Partner: 'And [name] just held my arm while we talked about it., ... 'Um ... understanding. um .... and again listening, I mean, the only people I talked to about it really are people who are extremely close to me. ' (P says of her partner 'I can talk to him about anything'. 
0 Vrn, and what qualities or characteristics of the people you spoke to were you most aware of when you 
spoke to them? ] Their qualities? [Yeah]. Um ... understanding, urn ... and again 
listening. I mean, the only 
people I talked to about it really are people who are extremely close to me., 
18 a) 'Er, well the few I have approached, say my parents and friends, they always seem to be sympathetic'. 
b) 'Er, well my father, er it's sympathy. Er, my mother this tendency to keep ftgs bottled up, and sweep 
them under the carpet. My brother a certain amount of sympathy. My best friend sympathy'. 
0 Well my father's quite sympathetic but my mother just doesn't seem to understand, I mean I suppose its 
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because my father's a man, and he's got_, he appreciates these things, but er. Talking to itto my mother I 
think she'd rather not talk about it, that's the impression I get. But she's very much a person who's 
into 
bottling things up, this is the problem with my mother, er ... I think she's a chin up, grin and 
bear it bottle it 
up, forget it. [And your best friend, was he sympathetic as well? ] Yes he was quite sympathetic. 
He says 
you've just got to go on presenting your case until you get some satisfactory explanation. And there's 
probably nothing they can do about itý but er at least I can try and get a satisfactory explanation of what, 
what's going on which might help. 
19 1 (? ) Equivocal: 'I mean people were sympathetic but ... I don't know, I don't think they 
felt at the time' 
APPENDIX 25 
INVALIDATING RECIPIENT RESPONSES IN CASES OF UNBELPFUL 
DISCLOSURE 
P Unhelpful disclosure - recipient responses 
1 
2 'They were urn critical of the fact thatý as I say, I don't think they thought I experienced as much. Um, when 
they were talking about the abuse, I said that I felt mum must have known what was going on. Or even if we 
didn't say that I remember saying, oh they were a bit critical about my mum, why didn't she leave, why didn't 
she do this, why didn't she do that and I was saying that I thought perhaps she was frightened and didn't know 
what to do. You know and in her own way had got pride and they were critical of me for saying that, that their 
mother had put their children through that but I feel she was that frightened then I can understand why she did. ' 
(i) 'Because she said do you know you've got to tell him what you were like at Christmas, does he know about 
it. I said yea he knows about the previous overdose because I've written to him about them. Because he used 
to study psycho um whatever it is, psychology and he understands because he's had a friend, and he's been in 
that situation, not himself. but with somebody like that, so he understands. So he doesn't think I'm a bad 
person'. 
(ii) 'I felt awkward telling this, with a friend of mine that's being my donor. I felt really sad about it and he 
looked at me and just said you daft sod and er he knew, it was like he knew exactly how I felt, because when I 
before I did it, I used to write to him telling him all my feelings on paper because I knew I could trust him but 
talking face to face to him he was like after all this you've written to me. You know, he was like. I think he 
thought then does he really wanna be the father of my baby because of the way I am, but in a way he does and 
in another way he doesn'tý but he doesn't want me to be like this. tic thinks that you can just snap out of it 
But I mean you can't You can't It's like turning over a leaf in a book, you can't just change. You know. 
You just can't' 
4 
5 
6 (i) 'I made the, I made the awful mistake in talking about it to some of my work colleagues, er, which wasn't a 
good idea, and as soon as I'd imparted all that I had to say, then I would start feeling insecure because I'd think 
that I wasn't either understood or that it was actually, erm, showing some vulnerability in me that I really 
didn't want to be opened up, you know, it was leaving myself wide open and I didn't feel safe that they had 
that information about me, I mean, I-% 
(ii) 'maybe they were giving me advice that I didn't want to hear, I don't know, I think possibly'. 
(iii) 'Yeah. just the fact that they would give advice and chm, that I felt insecure in what they would do with 
the information, because it was, it was, they were all women, I felt like that they would collude together, I felt 
like the, I was the marginalised one, that you know they would all be behind my back and that, that, I just didn't feel secure with it at all, and I felt that people were gonna be taking sides as well, you know, one side or 
the other it wasn't going to be very helpful because thatjust created an opposition, you know, they just, for me 
I just, I was just really gobsmacked about them all really9. 
(iv) 'Um, probably in the end, because I kept going on about it all the time. they just didn't want to listen I 
suppose, or, or, er, sometimes with a bit of annoyance I think because I kept going on about it. un-L. [Did you 
feel that from the beginning? ] Sometimes, yeah, sometimes I felt they were a bit annoyed, yeah, because she 
was the defenceless little girl and I was the male you know, and because they're all female as well, yeah, I felt 
some of that, yeah. There was some annoyance there from them. ' 
(V)'Ehm 
. ......... I don't know really . ..... qualities ... characteristics probably. 
Ehm, they all seemed to be on the 
same wavelength, they all seemed to be together, there seemed to be a togetherness about 'em. Youknow, 
which again made me feel more like the outsider, yeah, very much so, there seemed to be them and me, I was 
always the peripheral character there, or felt that, you know and then because of being male and because 
they: re all female and plus also what had happened, you know that just made me feel totally out of it. You 
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know, and I just didn't do myself any favours really, yeah. ' 
7 (i) '[Sighs] Only with those people that lacked respect for me, my faith, didn't treat me with dignity, didn't 
have sensitivity and didn't listen, and were judgmental [laughs] in any way, any time that came into it'. 
(ii) "I've had real problems with some professionals, they can'tý you see they're not in touch with their 
emotions, you keep the person there and because of that ... there are some situations where people need, they 
need to know you understand so I'm afraid you've just got to come out from behind that wall and be human 
with them. I had one doctor who was like that and she was lovely. In fact if it hadn't been her I don't know, I 
think, you know, there are times when I think I could have done something stupid but for her kindness, it was 
her humanity and compassion, you know'. 
8 'They're sympathetic, understanding, but you must appreciate that they wasn't there, they don't do myjob'. 
Then agrees that other people can't understand. ' 
9 
10 (i) 'I've been up there and I've come away and thoughtý pher, you know, why did I tell them thatý you know. 
what was the reason for going down that course and saying some of the things I did, whether I'd er, the fact 
that I might believe them or urn that's my outlook on life, is why did I tell them that you know and will they 
not now look at me in a slightly different perspective, you know, being too fatalistic or urn pessimistic. and er, 
and having tried to explain why, have they um, or will they say well this is personal experience which wasn't 
good, being, being tainted or coloured by his own feelings of depression and making it worse, making his 
outlook go down in urn hope if you like urn expectation. Min. Difficult to explain'. 
(ii) 'Again, er going out and thinking that you expressed yourself but haven't expressed yourself well enough 
for them to understand [sighs] urn, the Yanks have got a good expression for itý where are you coming from, 
yeah, yah? So urn having tried to explain and coming away feeling that you haven't really got a point over and 
driven it home hard enough. Urn that they, they don't appreciate what you're trying to let them know if you 
like. Urn, communication and emphasis can be urn ... diff icult. you can find it difficult to express feelings urn 
and if you put an outlook forward difficult to justify why you've got that outlook unless you actually analysed 
it before hand'. 
'because my mum found something out urn like a month ago and she was really annoyed, well she was upset 
and even ything, so um' 
12 
13 
14 (i) '... I don't know whether it would be, whether it was a personal or professionalism, but she actually 
appeared to want to know, urn, she actually seemed interested. And you don't always get that, which urn ... .... 
(ii) re psychiatrist: '[What effect do you think telling her had on how she saw you? ] ... 11at's a really important type of thing isn't it, because that's probably why ... ... ... I probably thought that she wouldn't think it anything derogative of me by telling her. Whereas urn ... ... ... ... ... I mean its stopped me talking to some 
people if I thought urn ... ... ... its letting them know that you're vulnerable I suppose. Uniý that's what you 
come down to though because I thought urn the only reason I probably did speak to her specifically is the fact 
that urn ... I said 
I'd, I mean it is difficult talking about things like that cos urn, I said its confusing what's 
personal, what's professionalism isn't it I mean, but a shear gut reaction I was quite content with it I think, I 
didn't take her as a threat. ' 
(iii) re wife: 'my wife, who I spoke to urn I've been like, it's been quite off hand with her, Cos as I said that she didn't actually see things like cause and effect, it's an event that happened such long time ago'. d) re wife: 'the few times I've like talked to my wife about it I actually urn ... she's the sort of person that would urn well she'd, she'd likejust too practical, urn oh that happened 40 years ago, well noý 30 years ago, it's not applicable 
now, but I mean she's a very day-to-day sort of person'. 
15 (i) 'of the people that I've told, friends, they just ... no response really, I mean notý I can't, I don't really know, urn ... I mean people have saidý oh I'm sorry, and left it at that and I'd use the words it happened and that's itý 
you know, You just can't really say nothing. nobody's ever sort of really gone overboard'. 
(ii) re first husband: 'he did help me come out of my shell a bit more, the physical side of it, urn, but it did 
affect our relationship when we were married, because he like he said I should let the past go'. 
16 (i)'Um . ... ... theyjust say oh dear, like. (Laughs slightly], [They say Oh dear? ]Yeah. [And is that what you'd 
expected them to say? ] I don't know. I'd have liked one of them to at least you know, to be able to talk to, 
bring itup again like. Butldon'tfeelasiflcandothaL I think people expect me just to carry on ... you know, put it aside. ' 
(ii) 'Me friends I don't, they don't talk about or anything, it's as if it never happened I suppose. [So they 
haven't really responded very much? ] I don't think they know what to say. ' 
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17 
18 (i) 'you know, when I went in there I was whipped through in about two minutes without really listening to 
what I was saying' 
(ii) 'I went back to see the doctor and I was expecting to see the consultant and I went in there, and another 
junior doctor again. And er, this junior doctor looked absolutely exhausted, fed up and depressedL He couldn't 
answer any of my questions satisfactorily, all he could do was tell me that uh the results of the ultrasound scan 
were perfectly satisfactory'. 
(iii) 'Er. What qualities? I think the doctors particularly, [name of consultant) and his junior doctors, flippancy, 
couldn't care less. ' 
19 (i) 'Urn, I mean people were sympathetic but ... I don't know, I don't think they really understood 
how I felt at 
the time, um. As I say they did what they could, they sort of um were always there on the phone if I needed 
them sort of thing, you know, but er ... [Did it confirm your fear that you might come over as someone weak 
or ... ?] Yeah I think so, yeah, definitely. 
Yeah it didn't have the desired effect. I mean I don't think people 
really understood how I felt and as I say they were just sort of sympathetic and that was it sort of thing. you 
know, just forget about it and get on with your life sort of thing, you know. Which is probably exactly what I 
told to somebody else you know, so I mean I knew what they were, I knew what they meant sort of thing, you 
know, but at the time it just didn't seem to it didn't make any sort of impression on me sort of thing, you know. 
I think I was too wrapped up on myself to sort of do that like you know'. 
(ii) Parents understanding but preoccupied with other things and unable to help much: 'I think my parents 
really understood how I felt, although I didn't tell them. Because I mean parents are quite good at things like 
that. But as I say, at the time they had sort of I wouldn't say more pressing things, but they had other things 
going on. Urn, I mean they sort of did what they could but here wasn't a great deal they could do. It was up to 
me to sort things out for myself. 
(iii) 'Most of them were quite clinical about it Urn I mean most people were saying sort of, oh forget about her 
just get on with your life sort of thing you know. One or two of my friends um, I don't think they particularly 
liked her, or, um what she was doing, so uh you know it was easy for them to say that I don't think my parents 
really got on with her that well. You know, they said thing like oh you know she wasn't good enough for you 
and I guess her family said the same thing about me sort of thing, you know. Urn ... As I say I mean most of 
them were pretty sort of clinical about the whole thing. 
(iv) Friends were 'sort of, you know they were very vague they didn't want to sort of uh, you know, basically 
they were saying sort of get on with your life and forget about her like, you know. I mean it's easier for other 
people to say that. ' 
20 it was like a look of disbelief on her face, like how could you? Like she didn't believe me or something. and just the look of real shock in her eyes as well. And I think that added to the shame too, really'. 
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